PROTESTANT MISSIONS
IN COMMUNIST CHINA

by

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A Dissertation
submitted in
Partial Fulfillment
of Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate School
Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut
May, 1953.

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SUMMARY OF DOCTORAL DISSERTATION ON "PROTESTANT MISSIONS IN COMMUNIST CHINA."

Creighton Lacy

The aim of this dissertation was to ascertain whether any consistent pattern or general conclusions would emerge from a study of the experience of Protestant missions in Communist China. The term "missions" has been deliberately employed to cover foreign personnel and their work and institutions, as distinct from the Chinese Church or from Christianity itself in China, in the belief that neither of these latter can accurately or fairly be analyzed under present circumstances.

This study is set against the background, first, of Communist theory in regard to religion, from Marx to Stalin; second, of Communist practice toward the various branches of the Christian Church in Russia and Eastern Europe; third, of Chinese Communist statements and attitudes toward religion. Two additional chapters have summarized the scanty but significant contacts between Chinese Communists and Christian missions from 1921 to 1948.

The survey itself is based on two hundred and twenty-five individual questionnaires, directly covering three hundred missionaries, approximately one-sixth of the total Protestant group serving in People's China. These, however, have been supplemented with scores of personal letters, interviews, diaries, unpublished articles, etc. in addition to all known publications dealing directly with this recent period of Chinese history, 1949-1953.

The inductive method used reveals a number of universal characteristics, closely paralleling those of Soviet Russia. While asserting a policy of religious freedom, the Communists employ unofficial, semi-official, and even official methods of anti-religious propaganda and practice. They denounce religion as an unscientific superstition, socially determined and reactionary, a deliberate instrument of capitalistic, imperialistic exploitation, and espionage.

In China this led to the primary goal of attempting to control the Christian Church by eradicating all foreign influence: in schools, social welfare agencies, hospitals, and churches in that order. The government recognized that Christianity would not be thoroughly domesticated until all missionaries were forced out by propaganda pressures, deported, or imprisoned--publicly distrusted and discredited. Within three years of the Communist regime it became obvious that Communist totalitarianism would not tolerate foreign missions.

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INTRODUCTION

"It is apparent that we are at the end of the missionary era in China."[1] This judgment came in January, 1951, from Charles L. Boynton, for many years secretary of the National Christian Council in China and unofficial statistician of the missionary movement there. Less than three months later it was echoed by Frank T. Cartwright, associate secretary of the Board of Missions and Church Extension of the Methodist Church, who was serving also as chairman of the China Committee under the Division of Foreign Missions, National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America. "For an indefinite period," he told the Associated Church Press, "the missionary movement in China is at an end."[2]

By the end of 1952, the post-war peak of over four thousand Protestant missionaries in 1948[3] had been reduced to approximately thirty-one[4] of whom the majority were under imprisonment or house arrest, and the remainder had waited many months for exit permits.

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[1] Charles L. Boynton, personal letter, January 25, 1951.

[2] Frank T. Cartwright, quoted in The Christian Advocate, April 19, 1951, p. 15.

[3] Charles L. Boynton, Directory of Protestant Missionaries in China 1948, private and unofficial.

[4] R. Pierce Beaver, "A Report on the Reallocation of China Missionaries and Funds by North American Mission Boards," Occasional Bulletin, Volume III, No. 14, December 24, 1952.

The thirteen colleges, two hundred and thirty-six middle schools, nineteen seminaries, thirty-one theological training and Bible schools, three hundred and twenty-two hospitals,[1] plus orphanages, clinics, industrial projects, rural experiment stations, and social service centers, had been closed or taken over by the People's Government. Contemplating this rapid liquidation of foreign missions in China, a young British missionary used the term *debacle*.[2]

With the signing of the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay on September 3, 1945, a tremendous new opportunity seemed to beckon the Christian Church in China. In the weeks immediately following, scores of missionaries returned from West China to their pre-war stations. By airplane and coastal junk, by rickshaw and military jeep, they"reinvaded" the north, south, and east.[3] Men who had spent three years in prison or internment camp made visits of inspection and encouragement to their Chinese fellow-Christians before consenting to recuperation at home. Others still in the uniform of liaison officers or interpreters stepped in to protect mission property.

By the fall of 1946 thousands of missionaries were crossing the Pacific, hundreds sailing from Europe through the Suez Canal.

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[1] *China Weekly Review*, November 19, 1949, p. 184.

[2] A China Missionary, "First Thoughts on the Debacle of Christian Missions in China," *International Review of Missions*, Vol. XL, No. 160, October, 1951.

[3] At least they avoided the obnoxious terminology of 1922, when a statistical survey of Missions and Church forces was entitled *The Christian Occupation of China*.

There were eager, young "first-termites" with trunkloads of enthusiasm, "Old China Hands" with cases full of experience, internee-repatriates with painful memories and deep spiritual lessons wrapped up together. They knew that colossal problems challenged both the government and the Christian Church in China. They had studied or experienced a succession of apparent "debacles" in 1900, 1911, 1926, and 1937, not to mention reading of the historic setbacks for Christianity from the Nestorians to the Taipings. Yet few of them accepted the classroom dictum of Professor Kenneth Scott Latourette that "there will be turmoil and chaos in China for at least fifty years."

What happened in five hectic years, to those missionaries and to the institutions with which they were connected, is the subject of this study.

Christianity has confronted Communism at many stages and in many forms. It continues to do so today in many parts of the world. There are purely ideological conflicts; there are economic tensions; there are long-smouldering political frictions; there are diverse social revolutions. It is a basic tenet of Communism--and of certain conservative Christian sects as well--that religion should have no relation to these dynamic movements.

Insofar as the Protestant missionary enterprise--with its largely Anglo-Saxon base--has endeavored to practice (though not always to preach) a Social Gospel, it has run into competition with Marxian Communism. On the one hand, religion is accused of being an opiate, a superstition, both the product and the instrument of bourgeois exploitation. On the other hand, whenever Christianity attempts to minister to the whole man--to his physical and mental as well as spiritual needs--it is execrated as deceitful and hypocritical.

This is frankly a factual social study, not a political or a philosophical one. The term "Protestant Missions" has been chosen deliberately to encompass only such Christian work and personnel as are directly related to Western organizations, as distinct from the Chinese Church or Christianity itself. There are several vitally important areas which this paper does not intend to invade.

This is not an analysis of the mistakes and failures of the missionary movement. "Lessons to be Learned from the Experiences of Christian Missions in China" are of keen interest to all who believe in the world outreach of the Church, from whatever angle. The summary under that title, compiled by Harold S. Matthews from one hundred and fifty-two missionary replies, is a thought-provoking document.[1] Younger and older churches alike could profit from an application of these lessons--many of them learned at enormous cost. The present paper, however, is not concerned with mission policy, though it is hoped that some valid lessons will emerge. They should be in the realm of social relations, rather than of theological or ecclesiastical programs.

This is not a comparison of Christianity and Communism.

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[1] China Committee, Division of Foreign Missions, National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, August 31, 1951 (mimeographed).

Bibliography in that field is expanding rapidly under scholars of several nationalities. As the Western democratic world sees in Soviet Russia its chief opponent in the struggle for political power, so the Christian Church begins to recognize in Communism its principal rival for the minds and hearts of men. Not only in missionary conferences, but in theological seminaries, the issues assume an increasingly important role. This survey will fail if it makes no contribution to an understanding of them. But it seeks to deal with sociological experience, not ideological principles.

This is neither a description of, nor a judgment upon, the New Democracy. If Communism is a paramount problem in human affairs, few movements of the twentieth century are more crucial for the future of the world than current events in China. What is happening day by day and hour by hour to one-fifth of mankind is of vital significance to the remaining four-fifths, whether they know it or not. It is important to understand what modification the reality of China is making in the theory of Communism, how four hundred and fifty million Chinese are reacting to unprecedented new controls, whether living standards are better or worse or unchanged. But answers cannot be given at present with any accuracy.

The few able accounts of early months under the People's Government have become speedily out-of-date. The stiffening of the so-called "Bamboo Curtain" makes all sources of information suspect on one side or the other, whether official communiques or the report of travellers still arriving in Hongkong.

Such foreigners as continue to emerge from Communist China have in practically every instance been cut off for many months from any comprehensive perspective, both by the isolation imposed on them as suspected aliens and by the complete control of all sources of information within the country. The facts contained herein are largely from first-hand reports by Westerners now able--though not always willing--to speak freely, reports which deal with aspects of the New Democracy directly experienced. If they shed light on the general situation in China, so much the better. But they are not collected to pass any judgments, pro or con, as to the social, economic and political achievements of the People's Government.

This is not a survey of Christianity or the Chinese Church under a Communist regime. To some observers this frank decision appears to be a fatal evasion. One close student of Communism and of China wrote as follows:

> When we consider the response of Christians in China to Communism from the point of view of "mission work," we falsify the whole picture in two respects. (1) We confuse the interaction of western culture, ideas, and politics with Chinese nationalism taking a communist expression on the one hand, with the interaction of Communism and Christianity on Chinese soil on the other. We are plagued with missionaries who have returned from the field and talk mainly about how Communism has affected them, the reaction of the Chinese friends toward them, the projects with which they were associated in leadership, the difficulties which they ran into with the Communist Government, never for a moment that there might be a difference between them and their concerns and projects, and the Christian Church in China, or that their treatment might have something to do with the fact that they were American rather than that they were Christian.

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[1] Charles C. West, personal letter, June 23, 1951.

> (2) When one concentrates on material drawn from missionaries and their experiences, it is a little like going into a marsh and searching for a pool of water where one can see one's own reflection--I speak Western-culturally, not personally--thereby forgetting that the marsh is really made of reeds and mud through which some water flows. I have seen reports from China which treat the situation as if the Christian life there was a series of Western projects and services which have now broken down. However, fear not, we have (so runs the pious phrase) many dependable native Christians who will keep the flame alive till we can come back some day and start things going again.[1]

This warning has been quoted at length because of its importance in grasping the total situation. From the standpoint of the Church and the expansion of Christianity this complete perspective is imperative. If any overall lesson has been learned, it may be the relative insignificance of the foreign missionary and of ~~the~~ Western culture in the midst of world revolution.

It is obvious that the missionary program is not synonymous with the Christian Church. Of course the experiences of a few thousand foreigners cannot represent the impact of Communism on China's millions. But neither admission should put foreign missions beyond the purview of legitimate study. Whether regarded as a liability or an asset, as "imperialistic exploitation" or transforming "leaven," Christian missions from abroad have had a role to play in China for over a century. A marsh may not consist of limpid pools, but without water it is no marsh, and the very reeds and mud acquire a different character. There are certainly elements of the missionary movement which _can_

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[1] Charles C. West, personal letter, June 23, 1951.

On the other hand, it seems clear that no one--Chinese or foreign, inside or outside the "Bamboo Curtain"--can fairly evaluate the contemporary experience of the Church in China, much less the attitudes of human hearts. The doubts about factual data suggested above apply even more sharply in this area. Church leaders and intellectuals whose names appear for or against the government are still remote from inconspicuous, often illiterate believers. The voices which penetrate to the outside world are not necessarily the truest and firmest expressions of faith--in either the Gospel or the New Democracy. Yet even where the "facts" or public statements are verified, no real interpretation is possible--or just. The deepest insight into Chinese psychology on the one hand and into police state methods on the other gives neither the right nor the ability to judge Christians in China today.

The missionary situation is somewhat different. All but a handful of the Western representatives of Christianity have left the country, by choice or force or both. The end of an era, proclaimed prematurely after Pearl Harbor, has now arrived. The separation will be deeper and longer than any comparable period of modern times. Whatever the results may be, this is clearly a moment in which to take stock.

The process is not easy. For those who despise and those who admire the new regime, and all the gamut between, an objective appraisal becomes extremely difficult.

Most of those who stayed in 1949--thus coming into the range of this study--did so with some hope that mission work might be continued, as it was after 1927, by those who obeyed the laws and made adjustments to a revolutionary situation. Their subsequent withdrawal may seem to call in question their adaptability, their prophetic judgment, their knowledge of Communism--or all three. This does not mean that they regret the decision made; on the contrary, statistics to be presented reveal that almost all would make the same choice again. But the disillusionment of sincere Christian hope offers one basis for subjective revision in looking backward, even at objective experiences.

What actually happened to Protestant missions and missionaries under Communist rule in China? Although some references will be made to Roman Catholic treatment for comparative purposes, any analysis of that whole area would expand the material unmanageably, in addition to introducing some issues not present in Protestantism. It is significant that the experiences of Catholic missioners have consistently been given wide publicity, whereas Protestant mission boards--especially prior to 1952--were extremely reluctant to release any information to the press.

Use of the term "missions" raises certain questions which must be met. Reasons for distinguishing foreign missions from the Chinese Christian Church have already been offered. Included in this study, however, are institutions such as colleges, schools, hospitals, orphanages, etc. Most of these have been under Chinese direction since 1927, when the new Nationalist Government decreed that all presidents and principals of registered educational institutions must be Chinese. Yet for a variety of reasons--imposed not only by missionaries, but by government officials or Chinese Church leaders--these properties were still largely owned by boards and societies in Great Britain or the United States. As rural evangelistic work came increasingly and rightfully into Chinese hands, the missionaries concentrated more thickly than ever in town and city institutions, and after the Japanese War foreign funds rebuilt and largely maintained these schools and hospitals. The rapidity and completeness with which such institutions fell under Communist government control in the past three years are indicative of their connection with missions.

When a board secretary in New York wrote in the spring of 1950 about the "emerging pattern" in China, his phrase was challenged by some workers on the field. Those living under the New Democracy, absorbed in the daily tensions and problems of a limited locale, tended to interpret most events as the whim of local officials. A certain distance of time and space was necessary to obtain even limited perspective on such a rapidly changing scene. One of the questions basic to this survey, therefore, is whether a pattern has existed in the Communist government treatment of Christian missions.

Does the New Democracy have a definite policy toward religion? How closely is it related to the Marxist and/or Russian policy? Are missions and missionaries dealt with primarily as agents of imperialism rather than of religion? Can any uniform time sequence be detected, especially in relation to external international events? Are certain sections of the country administered more harshly than others? Does nationality or denomination or type of work determine any differences in Communist policy? Is there a definite program for the control of schools or hospitals or churches? Do the missionaries imprisoned or publicly charged with crimes belong to any discernible category?

These are some of the questions which might be faced. Certainly not all of the questions can be answered in any explicit fashion. But the attempt in itself may shed light on the program of Christian missions, on the policies of Communism in practice, and on the highly determinative arena of China. Never before have Marxian ideology and Soviet methods been confronted with such a mammoth problem as China: her population, her social customs, her economic needs, her lack of transportation, her cultural heritage. Furthermore, Communism has never before encountered in any country so many aliens, allegedly serving capitalism and imperialism by spreading the opiate of religion.

The policies adopted--or practiced without conscious adoption--in such a situation may be determined by many things. Paramount of course are the social environment, the personal character of individuals on both sides, and the philosophical principles which motivate Communists and Christians, Chinese and Westerners. Benjamin Schwartz puts emphasis on the doctrinal momentum behind recent events in China.

> One cannot, of course, understand the tensions which have developed in China between Marxist-Leninist dogma and reality, or the political relations among various groups within the party and between the party and Moscow without reference to China's objective conditions or its cultural heritage....To those who dwell on the presumably Olympian heights of sociological, economic, geopolitical, and historic abstraction, everything which has happened in China may seem to have flowed inexorably from the "objective situation."....(But) the manner in which the tasks are met or not met is determined quite as much by the ideas, intentions, and ambitions of those who finally assume the responsibility for meeting them, as by any other factor.[1]

To ascertain what these merging influences have meant to the Christian missionary enterprise in China during the past five years is the task ahead.

One of the cardinal precepts of Marxism has always been unity of theory and practice. Mao Tse-tung lays great stress on this principle and refers to it frequently in speeches, denouncing dogmatism on the one hand and empiricism on the other. With approval he quotes Stalin as having declared: "Theory becomes aimless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice....Practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illumined by revolutionary theory."[2] In another lecture, "Reform Our Study," Mao praises Stalin's _History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)_ as

> ....the highest synthesis and summation of the world Communist movement during the last 100 years. It is the model of unity of theory and practice, and it is

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[1] Benjamin I. Schwartz, _Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao_ (Harvard, Cambridge, 1951), pp. 1-2.

[2] Quoted by Chen Po-ta, vice-president of the Academy of Sciences, "Stalin and the Chinese Revolution," in _Seven Hundred Millions for Peace and Democracy_ (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1950), pp. 66-67.

> the only perfect model in the entire world. By seeing how Lenin and Stalin interlinked the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Soviet Revolution and in this way developed Marxism, we can know how our work should be done in China.[1]

In Communist terminology, this study obviously leans to the empirical side; it is a survey of individual and group experiences based on first-hand reports. However, in order that its path may be "illumined by revolutionary theory," an introductory section is here included to sketch the underlying philosophy of Marxism. Three chapters will attempt to summarize the attitudes of Western Communist founders and practitioners toward religion, the experiences of diverse Church groups in Russia and Eastern Europe, and the ideological adaptations of Marxism in China. In each of these areas redundancy becomes inevitable. But the effort is designed to reveal whether or not the experience of Protestant missions in Communist China is based on any unity of theory and practice.

To books on Communism and Russia in general are at long last being added some excellent analyses of Marxism from the Christian standpoint. But the practical impact of Communist regimes on religion has been summarized in very few volumes on Europe and none on China. Some revealing first-hand reports about Chinese Reds during the late 'twenties and early 'thirties were completely overshadowed by the popularity of Edgar Snow and Agnes Smedley and a host of wartime correspondents, whose judgments reflected both the

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[2] Quoted, Ibid., p. 68.

United Front and the deterioration of Nationalist China. For these and many other materials listed in the bibliography, the writer is indebted to the Missionary Research Library at Union Theological Seminary, New York; the Silas Bronson Memorial Library in Waterbury, Connecticut; and the Sterling Memorial, Divinity School, and Day Missions Libraries of Yale University.

Above all, however, this is a personal study. No words can express the depth of gratitude and obligation due some three hundred China Missionaries, who took the time and trouble to respond to an appeal for help. It would be almost impossible to name the mission executives who provided the contacts, not to mention abundant counsel and encouragement; the cooperating societies are listed in Table I of Chapter 6. Special mention should be made of the International Missionary Council and of the China Committee, Division of Foreign Missions, National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, which unofficially but graciously and trustingly proffered their assistance and their personal endorsement. Two ~~longsuffering~~ advisors at Yale University, Professor Kenneth Scott Latourette and Dean Liston Pope, have boosted the candidate through an inordinate number of vicissitudes--academic, political, and individual.

The financial burden of this graduate study has been carried entirely by the Day Fellowship from Yale Divinity School (1944) and the National Council on Religion in Higher

Education (1951-3). A very different type of burden--requiring patience and sacrifice and faith in every area of daily life--has been carried through the years by Frances Thompson Lacy.

PART I

THE COMMUNIST ATTITUDE TOWARD RELIGION IN THE WEST

CHAPTER 1 - THE THEORY IN THE WEST

Because Mao Tse-tung so specifically proclaims the unity of theory and practice, no survey of Communist policies in China would be complete without a brief resumé of the underlying philosophy. This is not the place for an extensive critique of Marxism, which many others have produced. But events in China gain added significance if they are related to a long-range and basically consistent program. For the Christian missionary enterprise, for American foreign policy, and for the current revolution in other parts of the world, it is important to discover whether there exists any unity of theory and practice. To what extent are the experiences of Protestant missions in Communist China a direct product of the Marxist view of religion, as interpreted by Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and others?

Chapters 1 and 3, therefore, deal with the major pronouncements on the subject of religion made by Communist leaders, in Europe and Russia and China. Chapter 2 sketches a few of the developments within the Soviet Union and the Eastern European satellites, some of which chronologically follow rather than inspire parallel policies in China. It is nevertheless imperative to recognize Russian practice as part of Chinese theory, the more so because of the naiveté with which Chinese Christian friends cited reports on religious freedom in Russia (largely from the Dean of Canterbury) as evidence that "everything would be all right in China."

The question was raised by one university advisor as to whether Chinese Communism could be proved strictly Marxian. In recent writings on the subject this has become largely an academic issue. Both friend and foe have abandoned the myth about "agrarian reformers" without conscious political ideology. The phrase was a popular refrain during the Second World War, when the United Front influenced observers, from missionaries to journalists and from peasants to presidents.

A Yenching professor wrote at first hand of the Communists' "present moderate program of agrarian reform.... Their actual program, since the defeat of the Russian influence during the Long March, has never been Communism as it is understood anywhere else in the world."[1] Molotov convinced many an influential leader that "the Chinese Communists are land reformers; they are not Communists at all."[2] As late as 1944 Sun Fo, echoing almost the exact words of his father, Sun Yat-Sen, declared: "I do not think that Communism, of the Russian Soviet pattern, would be suitable for China. The Chinese Communists themselves have not attempted to impose it, but have so far largely confined themselves to agrarian reforms."[1]

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[1] Claire and William Band, Two Years with the Chinese Communists (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1948), p. 244.

[2] L. Vitray, "The Great China Debate" in United Nations World, November, 1949.

More recently scholars and translators have brought forth abundant evidence to the contrary. This is not to say that present Chinese policy is dictated from Moscow. It is not to deny that Mao Tse-tung and his associates have deviated from orthodox positions on numerous occasions, beginning with his insistence in 1927 on a rural base instead of the urban proletariat. It is not to forget the repeated assertion that the New Democracy and gradual socialism must extend over several decades before genuine communism can be practicable for China.

Yet, ideological dependence on Russian Communism can hardly be disputed. Soviet agents opened a school in Shanghai as early as 1919[2] and guided the movement very closely through its Komintang period until its isolation in southern Kiangsi. All of the Chinese Communist leaders with the probable exception of Mao himself[3] have had various lengths of training in Russia. Premier Chou En-lai, Commander Chu Teh, and Li Li-San, formerly an ideological opponent of Mao and long banished to Moscow, were active participants in Western European Communist Parties during the very early 'twenties.

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[1] Interview quoted by Stuart Gelder, The Chinese Communists (Victor Gollancz, London, 1946), p. xxv.

[2] Mildred Lovegren, "The Communist Conquest of China" (unpublished manuscript), p. 12.

[3] Cf. Eudocio Ravines, The Yenan Way (Scribners, New York, 1951), describing conferences with Mao in Moscow in 1934, only a few months before the famous Long March and two years before Yenan became both a capital and a symbol. Challenged by Derk Bodde in the New York Times (Book Review Section, Dec. 9, 1951, p. 39), Ravines insisted that Mao visited Russia several times, "official truth" to the contrary notwithstanding. The only other writer who suggested any journey outside China prior to 1950 was the respected Shanghai editor, J. B. Powell, who referred to "Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, both of whom had been trained in Moscow under Trotsky and Radek." (My Twenty-Five Years in China, Macmillan, New York, 1945, p. 262.)

Benjamin I. Schwartz, who has made the most exhaustive study of the ideological movements within Chinese Communism, states: "There can be little doubt that Mao thought of himself at this time (1927) as a thorough-going Marxist-Leninist."[1] The Chairman told his propagandists at the very peak of the United Front in 1938, when all Red activities had officially been subordinated to the Central Government, "Chinese Communists are Marxian internationalists, but Marxism must be expressed in a national form for practical realization."[2] On April 24, 1945, on the eve of the San Francisco Conference and the end of the war, he referred to "the universal truth" of Marxism, to its world outlook, and to the party name (which he repeatedly refused to change during the heyday of coalition and outward unity) as indicative of the ultimate communistic program for China.[3]

Chou En-lai admitted quite frankly in 1943:

> Is Communism unfit for China? The general truth of Marxism and Leninism can be applied to the whole of mankind. Why should China be an exception?....We dare tell

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[1] Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1951), p.76.

[2] At the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of Popularization of Propaganda, quoted in Boyd Compton, Mao's China (University of Washington, Seattle, 1952), p. 253.

[3] Mao Tse-tung, The Fight for a New China (New Century, New York, 1945), pp. 36, 77 *et passim.*

> the anti-Communist elements openly that Communism not only fits China, but, owing to the achievements of our party leader, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, has already closely united with the Chinese national emancipation movement and the actual interests of the Chinese people and become rooted in Chinese soil. Those who want to shake it will kill themselves.[1]

It is no mere accident that common references in China to the ideology of Communism use the first syllable of three names: Ma-Le-Sz ju yi (Marx-Lenin-Stalin-ism), with Mao-Tse-Tung's name often included to indicate the Chinese adaptations.

That there have been adaptations and even--to use a Communist-dreaded word--deviations from orthodox Marxism is obvious. They involve political theory and economic practice more acutely than philosophical presuppositions. As will be shown in this study, political and economic as well as ideological viewpoints determine Communist policy toward religious institutions. And all of these are Moscow-oriented.

> We must not overlook the abiding conviction of the Chinese Communists themselves that they are unswerving Marxist-Leninists....The leaders of the party never for a moment doubted that they were the chosen instruments of History, destined to lead China on the road to an industrialized socialism....The Leninist theory and practice of party organization has remained a hard unchanging core in the midst of change....Totalitarianism is a tendency inherent in the Leninist conception of the party....This totalitarian tendency is part of the vital core of Chinese Communism inhibited only by the force of external circumstances and softened until recently by the party's sparing use of force....The Leninist doctrine of imperialism....still plays a vital role in Chinese Communism....Whether living experience will ever teach

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[1] Stuart Gelder, op. cit., p. 178.

> the Chinese Communists to doubt the Leninist theory that imperialism is a phenomenon peculiar to a certain stage of 'capitalism' is a question which only the future and their own interests can decide.[2]

The burden of proof, then, rests on those who claim that Chinese Communist attitudes toward religion are somehow divorced from this basic Ma-Le-Sz ju yi. The excerpts and illustrations quoted herein, although including most of the major Communist statements about religion, are cited specifically for their relevance to the experience of Protestant missions in China.

Karl Marx

Karl Marx had several reasons for including religion in his revolutionary attack on society. His Jewish father had become a Christian for strictly expedient business considerations--a step sufficient in itself to convince an impressionable boy that religion is economically motivated. As a student Marx himself explored the philosophical assumptions of religion and wrote various essays in the field, before turning to economics and theories of history. Accepting Hegelian dialectic enthusiastically, he nevertheless claimed to set Hegelian idealism right side up. Praising Feuerbach for reducing religion to man's self-worship, Marx insisted on going further to a recognition of its social rather than individual source.

> The criticism of religion is the premise of all criticism. Man makes religion, not religion makes man. Religion is man's consciousness and awareness of himself when he has not come into his own or has lost his own....Religion is the sigh of the oppressed

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[2] Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 202-204.

> creature, the kindliness of a heartless world, the spirit of unspiritual conditions. It is the people's opium.[1]

Here in these few lines, criticizing Hegel yet echoing Feuerbach, can be found the seeds of all Marxist attack on religion. The opening sentence has not unfairly become a symbol of Marxian ideology, even though the word "criticism" is used in its technical sense, and the author probably meant only to say that religion is one of the "higher ideologies, that is, such as are still further removed from the material, economic basis."[2] From this paragraph sprouted most of the charges: that religion is a servant in the hands of reaction, a product of social and economic change, an unscientific superstition, an expendable irrelevance, a spiritual idealism both unnatural and antinaturalistic, both immaterial and anti-material.

Like the "Criticism of religion," the famous phrase "opiate of the people" has become a catchword of Marxism among opponents and supporters alike. Actually an Anglican clergyman and writer, Charles Kingsley, first used the expression, referring not to deliberate exploitation but to the dangers of a complaisant other-worldly Christianity.[3]

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[1] Karl Marx, On Hegel's Philosophy of Law, quoted by Robert Pierce Casey, Religion in Russia (Harper, New York, 1946), pp. 67-68.

[2] Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1949), p. 52.

[3] Alexander Miller, The Christian Significance of Karl Marx, (Student Christian Movement, London, 1946), p. 40.

Marx seems to have recognized and accepted the original sense that religion may act as a drug on all classes, rather than that sinister capitalism has maliciously administered the poison to an unsuspecting proletariat. But taken out of context, the words have become a dynamic slogan in many languages, fitting into many different philosophical climates.

From the historical standpoint, Marx and Engles were content in The Communist Manifesto to suggest that Christianity's triumph in the Roman Empire was merely a by-product of the ancient world's collapse, and that rationalism was in turn a victory of the "revolutionary bourgeoisie" over feudal ideas. But the radicals of one generation become the conservatives of the next, and "the ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class." So now, in the nineteenth century, "law, morality, religion, are to (the proletarian) so many bourgeois prejudices behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests."[1]

There seems to be in Marxism a logical inconsistency--or at least irrelevance--between the determinism of historical process and the demand for vigorous activism. Marx believed that religion had been "an inevitable, evil accompaniment of an inevitable, evil process."[2] But the simultaneous attachment of blame for social and economic conditions leads naturally to the conclusion that religion (along with all other aspects of culture) is an instrument of class exploitation. This in turn implies the paradox that within an inevitable process a good Marxist must seek to change the social situation; then such accidents as religion would automatically disappear.

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[1] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York Labor News, New York, 1939), pp. 32,21, *et passim*.

[2] Casey, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

One of the sharpest Communist attacks against religion is: "unscientific." Into the later writings of Marx--and still more of Engels--flowed the influence of Darwinism and other nineteenth century discoveries of science. Not only did this scientific revolution strengthen the humanistic emphasis, but it greatly intensified the misinterpretation of materialism as used by Marx. Many of his followers have never gone beyond the narrow, naturalistic, mechanistic view of materialism, which Feuerbach called: "the foundation of the edifice of human knowledge, but not the edifice itself."[1] Marx went on to construct a socio-economic-historical edifice on this foundation--basic structural defects notwithstanding. But a literal materialism, easily vulnerable in rational debate, has been hurled with tremendous effectiveness by Marxists against religion.

This is not to deny that Marx's own position led his followers to battle. Walter Muelder asserted: "The naturalistic scientism of Marxism is atheistic. It rejects not only

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[1] Engels, op. cit., pp. 23 & 26.

Christianity and the belief in God, but every form of spiritual realism."[1]

This atheism is more implicit than stated by Marx. It is implicit in his philosophy of history as class struggle. It is implicit in his concept of society as economically determined. It is implicit in his theory of creation as the product of human labor (although for his followers the distinction between creation of physical matter and of society is lost in a welter of confusion). It is implicit in his rejection of any spiritual reality, as well as of philosophical idealism. It is implicit in his assumption that organized religion is solely an instrument of class control. It is implicit in his confidence that all forms of superstitious delusion will wither away.

But these implications are vitally important for all who confront Marxism, in whatever guise. It is quite correct to say that "Marx's criticisms of religion...are generally polemical. He did not understand or use critical philosophy of religion."[2] Nevertheless these criticisms have been wielded as devastating weapons of propaganda. Because The Communist Manifesto declared, "as the parson has ever gone hand in hand with the landlords, so has Clerical Socialism with Feudal Socialism,"[3] Marxists have not only rejected the Church and other forms of organized religion, but also suspected and condemned Christian social action.

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[1] Walter G. Muelder, "A Personalistic Critique of Marxism" (mimeographed, 1952), p. 8.

[2] Ibid., p. 3.

[3] Marx and Engels, op. cit., p. 36.

Some loyal disciples of Marx would deny this inference of irreligion, much less anti-religion.[1] To do so successfully, however, requires a definition of religion far more abstract even than that which sees in Communism itself a religion. Marxism attacks directly or indirectly not only the philosophical presuppositions of religion and the bourgeois institution of Christianity. It also criticizes severely the doctrine and practice of the Gospel itself, with and without ecclesiastical accretions.

> Nothing is easier than to give Christian asceticism a Socialist tinge. Has not Christianity declaimed against private property, against marriages, against the State? Has it not preached in the place of these charity and poverty, celibacy, and mortification of the flesh, monastic life and Mother Church? Christian Socialism is but the Holy Water with which the priest consecrates the heart-burnings of the aristocrat.[2]

So much for Christianity and the Church. So much for the Social Gospel. And so much--by derivation--for the Christian missionary enterprise.

Only a few pages before these polemics, Marx and Engels dismissed any direct debate by saying: "The charges against Communism made from a religious, a philosophical, and generally from an ideological standpoint, are not deserving of serious examination."[1] Only in comparatively recent years have men with a Christian perspective accepted the challenge: Matthew Spinka, John Bennett, Alexander Miller, Ingli James, J. M. Cameron, Carew Hunt and others (see bibliography).

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[1] Cf. J. Middleton Murry, "Marxism and the Individual," in Marxism (Chapman and Hall, London, 1935).

[2] Marx and Engels, op. cit., p. 36.

The danger now lies on the opposite side: that the charges against Christianity made from a Communist philosophical and ideological standpoint may be overlooked as not deserving of rebuttal. But without serious examination of the words and principles from Karl Marx and his successors, one can never understand recent events in China--or future events in other parts of the world. Many of the specific criticisms, however, and the concrete policies which stem from them, can be traced more directly to Engels than to Marx himself.

Frederick Engels

Frederick Engels, in explaining his share in Marxian doctrine, gave credit to his collaborator for the basic principles, especially in the fields of history and economics.

> Marx stood higher, saw further, and took a wider and quicker view than all the rest of us. Marx was a genius; we others were at best talented. Without him the theory would not be by far what it is today. It therefore rightly bears his name.[2]

Nevertheless it remained for Engels, sometimes after Marx's death, to spell out the implications in philosophy and religion--and occasionally in practice.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 31.
[2] Engels, *op. cit*., pp. 39-40.

This is particularly clear on the question of materialism. Marx had said that "mind is merely the highest product of matter," and thereby opened the way to myriad misunderstandings. Engels began from the beginning. "Dialectical Materialism," he explained, "starts with the assertion that 'nature is primary.'" By nature, however, he referred to reality not "as a complex of ready made things, but as a complex of processes." In various bits of writing Engels heaped scorn upon those who conceive of materialism only as rigid physical mechanism.

To Engels, also, fell the task of elaborating the Marxian historical analysis of religion. This he did at some length in his review of Ludwig Feuerbach by C. N. Starche.[1] Beginning with the primitive rise of religion out of unenlightened psychology and cosmology, he pointed to the nationalistic character of early gods. In the heterogeneous expanse of the Roman Empire Engels found conditions requiring a pantheon of deities and ultimately a world religion. In the Middle Ages, he said, Christianity also developed a feudal hierarchy and a feudal morality, and the appearance of "the protestant heresy" corresponded to the rise of the burghers. Finally he lumped Jesuitism, Protestant orthodoxy, and rationalism as three bourgeois weapons against the proletariat.

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[1] Engels, op. cit., pp. 52--56.

One other area in which Engels filled in details for the Marxian outline was scientism. Specifically he listed three great discoveries in the mid-nineteenth century which seemed to clarify and verify materialism in its broadest sense. First was the cell, as the unit of life and growth and even mutation. Second was the transformation and conservation of energy, the recognition that inorganic forces such as heat, electricity, magnetism, chemistry, are integrally related to organic life. Third was the Darwinian pattern of evolution, which fitted so perfectly into dialectic and historical materialism.[1] The prompt and confident adoption of such scientific discoveries into the basic structure of Marxism, not simply as peripheral fact, has exerted a tremendous appeal for Chinese and other peoples caught in a belated but voracious scientism.

His final contribution Engels made in the realm of practical policies. "All religious bodies without exception are to be treated by the state as private associations."[2] From this simple dictum Lenin later drew up a fairly definite program for the Soviet Union, a program which appears to underlie many of the attitudes toward the Christian Church in Communist China.

Furthermore, religion, according to Engels, must be treated as an individual affair. This too is a natural concomitant of the Marxist interpretation of religion and the confidence that all supernatural faiths would ultimately and automatically wither away. It is a logical application from the designation of religious bodies as private associations. It is a useful expedient in the course of establishing unity and loyalty for a Communist regime. Yet it was at this very point that Lenin felt most obligation to take issue with Engels, not in contradiction, but in emphatic distinction between freedom of religion for the unenlightened masses or for party members. True Communism--and here its atheism is frankly implied--cannot tolerate religious belief on the part of otherwise wholehearted adherents.

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[1] _Ibid_., pp. 42-45.

[2] Quoted in the introduction to V. I. Lenin, _Religion_ (International Publishers, New York, 1933), p. 4.

The next section will indicate, however, how vigorously Lenin accepted and applied Engels' opposition to direct war on religion.[1] The practical consequences of certain Marxist corollaries began to trouble Engels, and as early as 1853 he produced a sharp denunciation of a sympathetic contemporary who urged positive opposition to all religious movements.[2] These consequences assumed acute reality for Lenin after the Russian Revolution. Whatever tactical shifts in policy may have been made, and despite certain exceptions which serve to prove the rule, Communists have generally tried to avoid a frontal attack on religious institutions as such. To what extent this principle has applied to China is one of the questions for investigation. Here it is sufficient to give credit where credit is due: Frederick Engels.

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[1] Cf. "Attitude of Workers' Party Towards Religion," ibid., ChapterII.

[2] Engels, Anti-Duhring, or Herr Eugen Duhring's Revolution in Science (International Publishers, New York, 1935).

V. I. Lenin

> At no point is Lenin more completely at one with the ideas and temper of Marx than in his attitude toward religion. As in his revolutionary thinking he is more Marxian than Marx, so in his critique of religion he is a more violent and aggressive enemy of faith.[1]

There are several reasons for this. As one observer put it,[2] Engels wrote in the cool morning hours of Marxism; in the heat of the day the polemic grew more caustic. Two decades before the Revolution succeeded in Russia, Lenin had to outline a concrete program of action in far more specific terms than Marx or Engels needed to face. The ideas, the presuppositions, the principles were the same, but the applications were sharpened in clear, explicit words.

At first Lenin spoke cautiously, proposing in 1895 "freedom of conscience and equal position for all religions."[3] But the official Leninist policy was defined in three important essays: "Socialism and Religion," "On the Relation of the Workers' Party to Religion," and Classes and Parties in Their Relation to Religion and the Church." From these three articles, crystallizing Marxist principles in practical form, can be traced most of the positions on religion embodied in Communist legislation and act.

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[1] Casey, op. cit., p. 77.

[2] Paul Anderson, People, Church and State in Modern Russia (Macmillan, New York, 1944), p. 57.

[3] Ibid., p. 49.

The fundamental doctrine of "Socialism and Religion" seems to be the separation of Church and State. For Marx and Engels this principle was an essential condition for the freedom of the individual in his revolutionary struggle, an escape from superstition and exploitation. As applied by Lenin, however, the separation of Church and State became a vital defense of the proletariat, not only against the corruptions of religion itself, but also against all Church institutions as reactionary forces.

Lenin's influence is brought to bear most forcibly where he reaffirms and reinterprets earlier Marxism. Referring to the classic charge that "religion is the opiate of the people," Lenin asserted this to be the cornerstone of the whole philosophy of Marxism on the subject of religion.[1] But he went further to drive the point home by employing a vivid Russian word, *sivuschka*: "Religion is a sort of spiritual moonshine (bad homemade liquor, a particularly low kind of alcohol) in which the slaves of capitalism drown their demands for even any sort of worthy human life."[2]

In addition Lenin spelled out the stultifying effect of religion on exploiter and exploited alike.

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[1] V. I. Lenin, *Religion*, p. 12, quoted by Alfred Martin Rehwinkel, *Communism and the Church*. (Concordia Press, St. Louis, 1948), p. 44.

[2] Lenin, "Socialism and Religion," quoted by Anderson, *op. cit*., p. 58. Cf. a slightly different version of Waldemar Gurian, *Bolshevism*, (Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1952), p. 6.

> Religion teaches those who toil in poverty all their lives to be resigned and patient in this world and consoles them with the hope for reward in heaven. To those who live by the toil of others, religion teaches philanthropy in early life, offering them cheap justification for all their exploiting existence, and selling at low price tickets to heavenly bliss.[1]

Here is Kingsley's original phrase drawn out to unintended extremes. Given such a commentary by the authority of Lenin himself, Karl Marx's slogan has become a two-edged sword against every aspect of religion, not simply in Russia but in China and throughout the world.

The undeviating adherence of all Communists to materialism as their basic philosophy is so obvious that it need not be recapitulated here, although Lenin in "Socialism and Religion" goes through the rational argument once more. Another major contribution to this subject, not initially related to religion but of vital significance to the China situation, is Lenin's essay on "Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism."[2] The "proofs" are irrelevent to a study of the Christian missionary enterprise, as they deal entirely with economic aspects. But linked to the charge that missions are a tool of capitalism, the impact has been inescapable.

Throughout his career Lenin steered a narrow and devious course between the dogmatic conviction that religion is a narcotic corrupting the proletariat, and the pragmatic recognition of its hold over "addicts." The position of Engels was reinforced and amplified. On the one hand, religious institutions and programs must be relegated to the status of private associations, with the true Marxist faith that the need and desire will wither away. On the other hand, Lenin was faced with the problem of winning workers and peasants who were deeply pious and dependent on the Church.

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[1] Lenin, ibid.

[2] Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (International Publishers, New York, 1933).

Soviet Communism was this confronted by a dilemma: Should it tolerate a "superstition" which it sincerely regarded as economically and socially harmful to the laboring class, or should it risk alienating those same workers by attacking their religious faith? The same problem presented itself in somewhat different guise in China: Were religion and its adherents sufficiently vital to national unity to be treated with either respect or caution? Despite all the variables of conditions and timing and materials, the Chinese solution has been--to a large degree, at least--the orthodox Marxist one.

Citing Engels' opposition to any direct war on religion, and admitting that unity was a prime factor in the initial success of Communism, Lenin declared: "That is why we do not declare and must not declare in our programme that we are atheists;....(we) do not forbid and must not forbid religion."[1] On the contrary, the proletarians, many of whom are heavily saturated with this opiate, must be encouraged to join the Communist Party at the beginning.

> To impose atheism upon the candidates (for the party) while the process of winning them for the Marxian theory is going on would be, according to Lenin, a tactical error; it would tend to frighten them away. It was for that reason that he declared himself "absolutely opposed to the slightest affront to these workers' religious convictions."[2]

In China and elsewhere a single such assurance has often been accepted at face value, with no knowledge or concern about counterbalancing statements. Coupled with the belief that final emancipation from religion would come only with a complete proletariat revolution and the ultimate Communist society, this avowed rejection of atheism as a requirement for society lulled many a Chinese Christian into false security.

Regardless of such pronouncements, however, Lenin had to devise for his own followers a tortuous path between the Scylla of toleration and the Charybdis of "social stupor." "We demand that religion be regarded as a private matter as far as the state is concerned," he said in 1905, "but under no circumstances can we consider it as a private matter with regard to our own Party."[3] Having denied atheism as a condition for membership, was Lenin here contradicting himself? Was the leader of the Russian Revolution withdrawing in one hand what he had proffered in the other? In actual practice, quite probably; in theory, not exactly.

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[1] Lenin, Religion, p. 10.

[2] Matthew Spinka, Christianity Confronts Communism (Harper, New York, 1936), p. 157.

[3] Lenin, "Socialism and Religion," p. 8, (italics Lenin's).

While atheism may not be a prerequisite for joining the Communist Party, it is essential for any genuine acceptance therein. From the sentence above, Lenin goes on:

> Our Party....must not be indifferent to lack of class-consciousness (unenlightenment), ignorance or insanity (obscurantism) in the shape of religious beliefs....One reason why we have founded our (Party) is just to wage such a fight against all religious stultification of the workers.[1]

In other words, once a person has been attracted to the Party, every available method of propaganda and pressure and group discipline will be used to eradicate from his mind all forms of "superstitious" faith. Stalin carries this emphasis still further in pronouncement and practice, but the general principle is clear in Lenin. A Christian may become a Communist; a true Communist does not remain long a Christian.

One final quotation from Lenin may be relevant, even though it sheds light on a somewhat different phase of religious belief. Marxism has always included morality along with religion as a product of bourgeois society. Lenin acknowledges this position quite frankly in his essay "On Communist and Religious Ethics:"

> Is there such a thing as Communist ethics? Is there such a thing as Communist morality? Of course there is....In what sense do we deny ethics, morals?

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[1] Ibid., p. 9; Cf. Gurian, op. cit., p. 147.

> In the sense in which they are preached by the bourgeoisie, which deduces these morals from God's commandments....Our morality is wholly subordinate to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat.[1]

Joseph Stalin

As Engels collaborated with Marx in the formulation of Communist theory, so Stalin worked closely with Lenin in developing its practice for the Soviet Union. So identical are their general policies that it seems redundant to quote the present leader of the Russians at any length. For Stalin even more than his ideological forerunners, actions speak much louder than words. After nearly thirty years of actual administration, the Stalinist position on religion, as on other matters, can be seen best in Soviet legislation and in the specific treatment of the Church in Russia. Therefore brief sections following this will be devoted to those expressions of Communist theory.

Joseph Stalin was expelled from a theological college at Tiflis for "liberal views."[2] Obviously such an experience would deepen and intensify his attitudes toward organized religion, but no evidence has been adduced to show that this in any way determined his wholehearted acceptance of Marxism. Such an attempt might well, in fact, be "putting the cart before the horse." Nevertheless one

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[1] Lenin, Religion, pp. 47-48.
[2] Casey, op. cit., p. 62.

Chinese pastor is reported to have appealed to Mao Tse-tung for protection for a Christian seminary on the ground that both Marx and Stalin had once been theological students.

In the first place, Stalin reiterated the now familiar position that individuals within the Soviet Union possess freedom of religion. Laws and practice alike make very clear that this means freedom of belief and of worship, not freedom of religious activities. Nevertheless, "there are no such conditions of admission to the party which place an obligation of atheism upon him who is a candidate."[1]

In the second place, speaking on "Marxism and the Colonial Question," Stalin as late as 1936 warned:

> Social Democracy will always protest against the persecution of Catholicism and Protestantism. We shall always defend the right of a nation to profess any religion it pleases. But at the same time, we shall take our departure from the rightly understood interests of the proletariat, and will agitate against Catholicism and Protestantism and even Orthodoxy in order to assure victory to the socialist view of the world.[2]

There are several points of interest in this statement, points which indicate that it was made for obvious propaganda purposes. One is the use of the term "Social Democracy" instead of Communism. Another is the discussion of religious persecution in terms of national rights rather than individual freedom. A third is the traditional claim to represent the "rightly understood interests of the proletariat," implying that the masses might conceivably prefer religion to "their own good." Finally there is the thinly veiled declaration of war against all organized Christianity on the assumption that it must be unalterably opposed to the socialist view.

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[1] Stalin, Problems of Leninism, 1938, quoted by Wladyslaw Kania, Bolshevism and Religion (Polish Library, New York, 1946), p. 15.

[2] Quoted by Casey, op. cit., p. 83.

In the mid-thirties there was strong sympathy around the world for "Social Democracy" under the Russian experiment. This hopefulness absorbed a great many clergymen and Church members as well as other liberals. The Comintern (now Cominform) might well have bluntly denied its atheism and sought to win the religious segment of society. Either it was very poor strategy to exclude all religious groups as automatically unsympathetic to the socialist view--or it hoped to disarm the opposition by frankness. The tactics followed may have relied on the basic Marxist conviction that religious socialism is corrupt and undependable, or else on the recognition that atheism is too central and fundamental a tenet of Communism to be disavowed.

Whatever the explanation, Russian leaders have been strikingly direct and honest in their statements concerning religion. When the first American Trade Union Delegation visited the Soviet Union in September, 1927, Stalin addressed the members clearly and frankly:

> We conduct propaganda and shall conduct propaganda against religious prejudices. The laws of the country

> are such that each citizen has the right to confess any religion....We also preserved for each citizen the right to struggle against any religion by means of persuasion, propaganda, and agitation.
>
> The Party cannot be neutral in regard to religion, and it conducts anti-religious propaganda against any and all religious prejudices because it stands for science, while religious prejudices go against science, since every religion is something contrary to science.[1]

Here in applied detail emerges the scientism of Marx and Engels, the absolute dogma that "every religion is something contrary to science." Not only are the branches of Christianity dismissed as opposed to socialist world view, but all faiths are lumped together as hopeless superstitions. The worship of science had already begun in China before the October Revolution, less from the writings of Karl Marx than from the speeches of John Dewey and Bertrand Russell, the volumes of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer, or the educational program of Christian mission schools. But Communism was ready and waiting to erect science as the keystone of a unified system, which offered political and philosophical solutions in addition.

Stalin told the same American guests:

> The Party cannot be neutral with regard to the bearers of religious prejudices, with regard to the reactionary clergy, poisoning the minds of the toiling masses. Have we oppressed the reactionary clergy? Yes, we have oppressed them. The trouble is only that they are not yet fully liquidated. Anti-religious propaganda is the means which must carry through to the end the work of liquidating the reactionary clergy.
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> There are, sometimes cases where Party members

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[1] Quoted by Anderson, op. cit., p. 101.

> hinder the full development of anti-religious propaganda. If such members of the Party are rejected, that is very good, because there is no place for such 'communists' in the ranks of our Party.[1]

It may be true that there are "no conditions of admission to the Party" which impose an "obligation of atheism." But equally evident and far more vehement is the assertion that there is no place for so-called Communists who obstruct the essential program of anti-religious propaganda. Many a Chinese, Christian and non-Christian alike, was to learn by experience that this distinctively narrow definition of "freedom of religion" did not even include freedom for neutrality or silence.

As Paul Anderson commented in regard to this passage,[2] Stalin and the others knew perfectly well the difference between "religion" and "religious prejudices." They probably also recognized that "reactionary clergy" is not a single hyphenated word, that liquidation of reactionaries is not necessarily synonymous with liquidation of the clergy. Yet most of his public either could not or would not draw a distinction. For them, reactionary clergy, bearers of religious prejudices, poisoners of proletarian minds, have been justly oppressed and must be ultimately liquidated.

It is easy to see from this one paragraph how an ideological presupposition, stated in terms of practical policy, can become a rallying cry for violent and fanatical action. Equally apparent is Stalin's fidelity, in theory and practice, to the doctrines of his predecessors on the subject of religion. Paul Anderson's survey of People, Church, and State in Modern Russia, published during the war, offered convincing data on the reasons for a modus vivendi between Church and State. Yet nowhere did he suggest the slightest hope that the modicum of rapport between the government and religious bodies would modify the basic attitude and teachings of the Party, inherited from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 102.
[2] _Ibid_., pp. 110-111.

Others

The preceding pages have summarized the attitude of "orthodox Communism" toward religion, in an effort to discover whether Mao-ism in turn builds its policy on a universal ideology or on local circumstances. It might be argued that Russian Communism represents a betrayal of original Marxism, that the program and practice of the Soviet Union are warped and twisted by imperialistic nationalism away from the teachings of Karl Marx.

Whatever the truth may be in regard to political philosophy, the issue need not be labored long in the field of religion. The quotations from Marx and Engels already offered should be sufficient to convince any reader of the essential atheism of Marxism. It might be of value, however, to adduce a few more illustrations pertaining to world

Communism, inseparable from the Russian stream though it may be.

Pravda has long been recognized as an official voice of Communism far beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. In orthodox circles there can be as little deviation from its pronouncements as from the word of Stalin. When Bukharin, the editor, makes an assertion of policy, therefore, there can be little doubt of its authenticity.

> Our task is not to reform, but to destroy, all kinds of religion, all kinds of morality....There are some soft-headed Communists who say that their religion does not prevent them from being Communists; that say that they believe both in God and in Communism. Such a view is fundamentally wrong. Religion and Communism do not go together, either in theory or in practice.[1]

For many a radical idealist the Communist International spoke with the voice of authority even after it purported to find its perfect model in the Soviet Russian state. When the Sixth World Congress met in Moscow in August and September, 1928, to adopt a world program, it had sweeping words to utter on the subject of religion.

> One of the most important tasks of the cultural revolution affecting the wide masses is the task of systematically and unswervingly combatting religion--the opium of the people. The proletarian government must withdraw all State support from the Church, which is the agency of the former ruling class; it must prevent all Church interference in State-organized educational affairs, and ruthlessly suppress the counter-revolutionary activity of the ecclesiastical organizations. At the same time, the proletarian State, while granting liberty of

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[1] Quoted from The ABC of Communism in Rehwinkel, op. cit., p. 50.

> worship and abolishing the privileged position of the formerly dominant religion, carries on anti-religious propaganda with all the means at its command, and reconstructs the whole of its educational work on the basis of scientific materialism.[1]

This marked the beginning of the most intensive planning and the most rigid dictatorship in thirty-five years of U.S.S.R. history.[2] The International was not only issuing directives for areas still to achieve the Revolution; it was justifying and reinforcing the policy just getting under weigh in Russia itself. Behind this defensive program lies the whole gamut of Marxian condemnations of religion: opiate of the people, agency of the ruling class, corrupter of education, counter-revolutionary, unscientific faith. The only concession to be offered is freedom of worship.

Under the heading of "Strategy and Tactics of the Communist International in the Struggle for the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,"[3] this same congress attacked specific religious organizations: Catholic trade unions, the Young Men's Christian Association, Jewish Zionist groups, and the like.

> By sanctifying all the abominations of the capitalist regime with the holy water of religion, and by terrorizing their flock with the specter of punishment in the world to come, the leaders of these organizations serve as the most reactionary units of the class enemy in the camp of the proletariat.[4]

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[1] Communist International, Blueprint for World Conquest (Human Events, Washington, 1946), pp. 207-208.

[2] Cf. Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-101.

[3] Communist International, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-225.

[4] *Ibid.*

In 1936 Earl Browder published a book entitled What Is Communism? It deserves mention here not because of his position in American Communism during the past thirty years, but because of his little publicized influence in China. J. B. Powell wrote of the early nineteen-twenties:

> It is not so widely known, particularly in the United States, that Americans and Britons professing leftist or communist faith, who flocked to China, exercised perhaps even greater influence upon the course of events in China than did the Russians.[1]

Earl Browder was one of these. In 1927 he was made secretary of the Pan-Pacific Labor Union's office in Shanghai and the following year concurrent secretary of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comitern.[2]

In his chapter on religion Browder showed great deference to church people and expressed the belief that in the final show-down they would participate in the revolution. It is quite possible, in his opinion, to establish a united front with church groups. "We judge religious organizations and their leaders by their attitude to the fundamental social issues of the day," he asserted.[3]

Only a few pages previously, however, Browder gave the party-line explanation of religion as a capitalist-controlled institution, as a "system of coercion," as a seeker of special privilege, as a superstitious belief in the supernatural, and as an obstacle to organizing the masses. "The social function of religion and religious institutions is to act as an opiate."[1] Nevertheless the one-time leader of the American Communist Party added:

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[1] John B. Powell, My Twenty-Five Years in China (Macmillan, New York, 1945), p. 127.

[2] "Red Cloud Over China" (Far Eastern Affairs Pamphlet, Vol. I, No. 6, San Francisco, August, 1938).

[3] Earl Browder, What Is Communism? (Vanguard, New York, 1936), p. 193.

> The Communists maintain that the religious beliefs of a person are his private concern in relation to the State and governmental policies. The State should not dictate religious beliefs....It is the anti-religious Communist who fights for freedom of religious belief.[2]

Although religion may be a private concern "in relation to the State and governmental policies," it is definitely not a private matter for party members. Here again Browder echoed Engels and Lenin, with no essential variations. Not that the party would insist on abandonment of belief; he made that very explicit. But in addition to removing the special privileges of religious institutions and the temptations to religious prejudices, the Communist Party would use the full force of "education" to root out belief in the supernatural. "We subject their religious beliefs to careful and systematic criticism, and we expect that they will not be able to withstand this educational process."[3]

Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia is the one political Marxist who has carried through his defiance of Moscow--and survived. Even more than Western democratic leaders, perhaps, he has hoped for some point of friction or outright offense between Russia and China which would throw Mao tacitly and openly into an alliance with Yugoslavia.[1] Yet on the subject of religion, as in most other spheres, the Yugoslav Communist Party parrots the Marxist line in striking detail. The preamble of the revised statutes published in September, 1952, declared that "membership in the party is incompatible with the practice of religion and the performance of religious rites."[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 190.
[2] Ibid., pp. 191 and 193.
[3] Ibid., p. 192.

Communist Legislation

Whether laws are more nearly an expression of a nation's theory or its practice is a moot point. Generally a "legislative lag" keeps actual codification of national principles decades behind their general acceptance by the people. But the revolutionary character of governments in Russia and China offers significant exceptions to this rule. Matthew Spinka suggested that "the Soviet legislation regarding religion made its appearance very quickly, since the fundamental lines of policy had been worked out long ago, and had become already part and parcel of the communist philosophy."[3]

This was particularly evident in the immediate adoption of the Constitution of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republics in January, 1918, only two and a half months after the October Revolution. This Constitution was supplemented by a number of important decrees, notably the Decree on Freedom of Conscience and on the Separation of the Church from the State and Education from the Church (January 23, 1918). The principles to be embodied in such a document had to be universally acknowledged as orthodox Marxist doctrines and fully endorsed by Lenin himself.

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[1] Cf. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Tito and Goliath, (Macmillan, New York, 1951), p. 276.

[2] New York Times, September 13, 1952.

[3] Spinka, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

> For the purpose of securing real freedom of conscience for the workers, the Church is declared separate from the government and the schools from the Church.[1]
>
> Instruction in religious doctrine is not permitted in any governmental or common school, nor in private educational institutions where general subjects are taught. Citizens may give or receive instruction in a private manner.[2]

When this latter regulation was tested in court, the verdict rendered was that religious instruction might be given only in groups of three or less. The extension of this law to all private schools offering any general instruction whatever proved a fatal blow to parochial education. One-third of the schools in Russia at the time of the Revolution were church institutions,[3] and few of these survived the new restrictions for any length of time.

The 1918 Decree also crippled Church finances in the

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[1] Quoted by Casey, op. cit., pp. 87-88.
[2] Quoted by Anderson, op. cit., p. 10.
[3] Spinka, op. cit., p. 56.

Soviet Union. On the one hand, all religious organizations were reduced to the status of private associations, as Engels had urged. This meant that they held no rights as juristic persons, could own no property, and were deprived of former state subsidies. On the other hand, the collection of voluntary offerings was permitted "only among the members of a given religious unit and only for the purpose of maintaining the buildings of worship, objects of the cult, engagement of servants of the cult, and the maintenance of their exclusive organizations."[1] Clearly such a circumscribed budget would eliminate religious education, charity, social welfare, propagation of the faith, literature, and numerous other activities, which were specifically forbidden in the Revised Law of 1929.

These restrictions affected the Baptist and other "Free Churches" (plus such organizations as the Y.M.C.A.) more than the Orthodox Church. But added to the loss of members and of members' wealth, financial strangulations left the Russian parish priests more poverty-stricken even than under the Tsar.

Also under this Decree the clergy were deprived of their civil duties; such as, the registration of births, marriages, and other community functions. For a period, too the priesthood was disfranchised as social parasites, although the vote was restored in 1929. There was no explicit ban on the publication or distribution of religious literature, either in the original decree or subsequently; in fact, up to 1928 some tracts were actually printed on government presses.[1] However, the strict regulations on church income and expenditures, the control of newsprint and presses, and finally the general prohibition of religious propaganda, all put an effective stop to Church literature of any kind.

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[1] Quoted, _ibid._, p. 98.

The most frequently quoted sentence from the 1918 Decree stated with simple directness: "Freedom for religious and anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens."[2] The atheistic Bolshevik Government thus granted not only freedom of conscience but also of public propaganda. One explanation seems obvious: the desire of the authorities to eliminate the special position of the Orthodox Church without immediately jeopardizing unity and popular support. Equal freedom for religious propaganda plus complete separation of Church and State would place the various sects, the Old Believers--and the atheists--on the same ground as the long-favored Orthodox religion.

This 1918 "freedom of religion" clause, however, has been cited most often in order to contrast it with the revision of 1929, which in turn was included verbatim as Article 124 of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1936).

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[1] Anderson, op. cit., p. 11.
[2] Quoted by Casey, op. cit., p. 88.

> In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the U.S.S.R. is separated from the state, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.[1]

The significance of this change need not be labored. Simply but frankly, the Church had fallen further victim to the intensified regimentation of the first Five Year Plan. Basic order and unity had been established, but the Church under all its handicaps remained a popular and unassimilated "private association." Meanwhile a decade of practiced atheism had produced an enthusiastic corps of "Godless." To them, therefore, with overtly implied sanction and encouragement, was granted the continued right of "anti-religious propaganda." At the same time the freedom of propaganda was denied to "believers" and replaced with the "freedom of religious worship."

Far more direct and detailed specifications were embodied in Article 17 of the Law of April 8, 1929:

> Religious unions (parishes or associations) are forbidden (a) to establish mutual aid funds, cooperatives, producing unions, and in general to use the property at their disposal for any other purpose than the satisfying of religious needs; (b) to give material aid to their members; to organize either special meetings for children, youth, women, for prayer and other purposes, or general meetings, groups, circles, departments, Biblical, literary, handworking, labour, religious study, etc., and also to organize excursions and children's playgrounds, to open libraries reading rooms, to organize sanatoria and medical aid. Only such books as are necessary for the performance of services are permitted to be kept in the church

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[1] U.S.S.R. Constitution, (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1947), p. 95 (purchased in China).

buildings and houses of prayer.[1]

All social activity in any form, even religious reading, was thereby forbidden. Any type of program not specifically catalogued would be covered by the comprehensive "etc." This Russian law made it clear that a Communist state cannot or will not tolerate competition in the field of social welfare, or even any group gathering which it does not control.

These revisions in the Soviet law were explained by the anti-religious press as "destroying the ambiguity" which had previously existed:

> Now any activity of propaganda or agitational character on the part of religious or church people cannot and must not be looked upon as activity permitted by the laws, but on the contrary as activity extending beyond the limits of the freedom of confession guaranteed by the law, and falling under the action of criminal and civil laws....Henceforth the activity of all religious unions consists only in the conduct of services. No other activity extending beyond the limits of serving religious needs are permitted. Even religious propaganda is not permitted. Confession but not propaganda.[2]

As already stated, the wording of the 1929 legislation was adopted without change into the Constitution of 1936. The only other concession in the entire latter document concerned the franchise. Article 135 granted the right of electing or being elected "irrespective of race or nationality, sex, religion, education, domicile, social origin, property status or past activities."[3] Under all other clauses the separation of Church and State as scrupulously observed, to the complete exclusion of religion. Immediately preceding the famous Article 124 came a guarantee of general civil rights irrespective of race or nationality (really intra-national states-rights). Immediately following were the assurances of free speech, press, and assembly. From the Western democratic standpoint, religion appeared conspicuously absent from both of these articles. Nowhere was political, economic, or social discrimination on religious grounds specifically prohibited or condemned.

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[1] Quoted by Anderson, op. cit., pp. 9-10, 103.
[2] Quoted by Anderson, ibid., p. 104.
[3] U.S.S.R. op. cit., p. 104.

Since the press quotation on the preceding page relegated church activities to the realm of civil and criminal laws, it may be worthwhile to mention three of those which apply directly to religious issues. The Penal (or Criminal) Code of 1938 was designed to make explicit a number of the principles embodied in the Constitution of 1936. Article 122 stipulated that:

> The teaching of religious doctrine to children and minors (infants or adolescents) in public and private educational institutes and in schools, or the violation of the disposition respecting the same, is punishable by correctional labor for one year.[1]

Article 124 forbade forced collections in aid of churches or religious work, under penalty of six months of correctional work. And Article 126 prohibited the conducting of religious rites or the placement of any religious symbols in any school, factory, or other state or public institutions, subject to three months of correctional labor.

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[1] Quoted by Kania, op. cit., p. 11.

Conclusion

After this brief survey of the Communist theory of religion, some facets of the practice in Russia and Eastern Europe will be discussed in the following chapter. Naive credulity or deliberate deception have produced a few outright denials that Marxism is atheistic or opposed to religion. At the other extreme could be cited vitriolic diatribes against the Anti-Christ of Communism. Neither of these approaches would be fruitful or objective.

The foregoing review of direct statements from Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin, seems to produce a consistent and irrefutable pattern. It must be recognized, of course, that many a Russian--or Chinese--is psychologically conditioned to accept sincerely the freedom of religion as synonymous with freedom to worship. There are others who accept the Marxist criticisms of misused religion and therefore justify attacks made on economic and political grounds. But the fundamental attitude should be clear to all who would "take and read."

> The goal of the policy of the Communist Party is the total destruction of all organized Christianity and other religions, and the conversion of the entire population to active, militant, and consistent atheism....The anti-religious animus of communism is part and parcel of its total world-

view, and cannot be understood apart from it.[1]

To the orthodox Marxist, then, religion is a superstitious product of primitive concepts of nature. Its form is conditioned by the social and economic environment. Because its original purpose is to provide comfort and security, even in its more sophisticated versions it resists change and supports reaction. To the ruling classes it preaches charity and stewardship in return for predestined status. To the proletariat it promises salvation and future reward in return for acquiescence and submission to earthly injustice. For both it is thus an "opiate of the people."

Intellectually as well, religion is denounced as unscientific and opposed to nature. It postulates an immaterial creator for a material universe and denies the supreme power of human labor. It accepts both philosophical and ethical idealism. It insists on an ultimate spiritual or supernatural reality. It injects a notion of community above and encompassing economic classes. It worships an authority beyond humanity and proclaims an absolute moral standard.

Since religion is a product of ignorance, on one hand, it can be undermined by education. Since it is an instrument of economic exploitation, on the other, it will fade away along with the state when the dictatorship of the proletariat is fully achieved. In the meantime, human resistance to change and demand for security are so great that personal faith should not be challenged directly. Emotional obsessions are most effectively combatted by ridicule, ostracism, scientific enlightenment, cultural transformation, and a new cause--a new object of loyalty and faith. Socially reactionary institutions can be successfully controlled by political manipulation, legislative restrictions, financial strangulation, and the elimination of leadership.

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[1] Spinka, op. cit., p. 119.

To accomplish this aim, the Communist government proclaims complete separation of Church and State. To the Church is conceded supervision of individual and group worship--and nothing else. To the State belongs the exercise of all education, medical programs, social welfare, mass communication, recreation, even group fellowship. As Archbishop Andrei put it when asked if war-time concessions to the Orthodox Church foreshadowed any change in policy:

> The relation between the Church and the Soviet government after victory will remain the same; even the clergy say that the Soviet government has never persecuted them for religious convictions, and they do not speak against the Soviet government, and consequently there can be no sort of change.[1]

Into this kind of heritage Mao Tse-tung and his associates have entered fully.

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[1] Quoted by Anderson, op. cit., p. 31, from "The Truth About Religion in Russia", issued by the Moscow Patriarchate in the early autumn of 1942.

CHAPTER 2

THE PRACTICE IN THE WEST

To many people the separation of Church and State sounds ideally like a principle of "live and let live." A significant number of missionaries and Chinese Christians were extremely hopeful that this would be the case under the People's Government. Some of these knew only that the Communist constitutions, in Russia and China, guaranteed "freedom of religion," missing or minimizing the distinction between "freedom of worship or belief" and "freedom of religious activity or practice." To these, reports of open, often-crowded churches sufficed; to ask or expect more would be utopian.

A much larger group among educated Christians of all nationalities knew the experience of the Church in Soviet Russia. They had read enough Marx to realize that Communism is inherently and irrevocably atheistic; they had read enough about the U.S.S.R. to understand that an elderly remnant of Christianity survived only under persecution and restriction, which varied in degree but seldom in kind. Their optimism, however, was based on a confidence that "China would be different." The masses of people, the scarcity of transportation, the scientific and technological backwardness, the social inertia of family and village life, the stubborn individualism, above all the moderation and tolerance of Chinese attitudes--these would combine to produce a very different religious policy in China from that in Russia.

Still another factor entered into this estimate. Those who knew anything whatever about the Orthodox Church under the Tsarist regime--often a fragmentary knowledge, to be sure--could sympathize with the Communist reaction. An official, established church, its clergy universally subordinate to civil authorities, its leaders frequently involved in ruthless court intrigues, its extensive land holdings and other wealth bleeding the populace, its social consciousness and welfare services almost negligible--such an institution might with some justification be drastically reformed or even suppressed.

The one obvious failure in attempting to judge the China scene from the Russian experience is patent ignorance among too many Christian workers about actual facts in the Soviet Union. The Iron Curtain is partly responsible for this. But it seems clear that even such authoritative books as were published in the 'thirties or early 'forties (by Paul Anderson, Matthew Spinka and others) have been read more avidly in the past three years than when they were written. News items from Russia seldom mention the Church, which appears to be beneath the notice of correspondents as well as Communists. Even reports from the most honest and unbiased religious visitors to the Soviet Union (Martin Niemoller or the

British Quakers, for example) require acute analysis of original statements apart from the welter of commentary which surrounds them. Regardless of such handicaps as "guided tours," inescapable interpreters, and a predetermined sympathy for the best that can be found, both personal pride and grateful courtesy require emphasis on the good and omission of the bad.

Nevertheless, despite such restrictions on communications, the general pattern of events in the U.S.S.R. is clear enough to indicate the Communist program toward religion and religious institutions. "The life of both Church and people has been influenced to a larger degree by government ideology and policy in Russia than in any other modern state."[1] For that reason it seems worthwhile to review sketchily the experience of the Churches in the Soviet Union and in some of the Eastern European satellites. Footnote references will indicate a number of books which tell the story in greater detail. Here it is sufficient to mention the trends and practices which have significant counterparts--or contrasts--in Communist China.

The Russian Revolution

In Russia the Communists were ready with their legislative programs when the Tsarist regime collapsed. Even during the ill-fated Kerensky period, the Orthodox Church was disestablished,[1] and on July 20, 1917, all parish schools were transferred to the Ministry of Public Education.[2] Following the October Revolution the new Soviet Government confirmed these aspects of the separation of Church and State and added others. Theological seminaries were closed immediately, and churches gradually succumbed to a variety of pressures. Church property was confiscated early in 1918, and the clergy disfranchised along with the "exploiting classes."

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[1] Anderson, People, Church and State in Modern Russia, p. 2.

The Orthodox Church in Russia showed itself, of course, a more conspicuous and powerful foe than the scattered branches of Christianity in China. Nevertheless, with all their immediate acts and formulated laws, the Soviet leaders were too involved in consolidating their political regime to turn their heavy artillery on the Church for two or three years. But in 1921 a number of Orthodox and Roman Catholic bishops were tried on charges of opposing or obstructing the new government and were sentenced to death.[3] The particular crime in many of these cases, though not all, was a refusal to surrender consecrated ikons and other venerated treasures. For supporting these "unpatriotic" bishops and priests, Patriarch Tikhon was imprisoned the following year.

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[1] Samuel N. Harper and Ronald Thompson, The Government of the Soviet Union (Van Nostrand, New York, revised 1949) p. 261.

[2] J.B. Barron and H.M. Waddams, Communism and the Churches (Morehouse-Gorham, New York, 1950), p. 15.

[3] Anderson, op. cit., pp. 3 and 74-75.

So drastic a step as the arrest of the Orthodox Patriarch required some mitigation, and the Soviet "solution" has clear relevance to China. Through the mid-twenties government support was directed to the Living Church, a domesticated and politically subservient organization also called Renovated, Regenerated, or Synodal. Some of its leaders were devoutly religious, faithful to the Church as they conceived its role, and sincere in their desire to accomodate to the State. But for a considerable time the real power lay in the hands of "ambitious, unscrupulous, politically minded individuals....who assumed the roles of the worst elements in the Holy Synod under the Tsar."[1]

Government favor, in an effort to secure the allegiance of the "superstitious masses," took a number of forms. Two seminaries were opened by the Living Church prior to 1927. Bishops who had lived in exile for years were restored to official residences. The Renovated Church not only held three Sabors, or assemblies--a privilege denied to the Orthodox since the Revolution--but received government subsidy for travel to the first one. In spite of these official encouragements, the schismatic faith never attracted a large segment of devout believers. At the same time it never escaped the atheistic environment and semi-official persecution meted out to all religious groups. In short, the

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 97; cf. pp. 76ff.

Living Church was a dying cause long before the pressures of patriotism and war restored some small measure of position to the Orthodox Church.

During this same period the wave of anti-religious indoctrination threw into prominence a violent popular movement, which received government sanction if not direct support. Friends of the Godless (later the League of Militant Atheists) in 1925 was formed to capitalize on the constitutional "freedom of anti-religious propaganda." It not only used effective propaganda to set the psychological "climate of opinion" against religion, but also exerted positive influence in tightening restrictions on the Church.

To be sure, the League of Militant Atheists passed its apex of power early in the nineteen-thirties and fell far short of its membership goals at that time. For one thing, the new generation, which could not remember Tsarist days, merely acorned religion as a subject of ridicule rather than of bitter antagonism. Yet in July, 1932, less than a year before Russia modified outward policies to win American diplomatic recognition, the president of the Godless Society told a group of American teachers: "We are not conducting an anti-religious campaign at present....We are carrying on systematic, day-by-day anti-religious propaganda, along with the organizing of such masses as desire to work in it."[1] His boast that whole villages call themselves Godless appeared to be the acme of success. This League of Militant Atheists, however, retained an active role throughout the country until the exigencies of a wartime United Front led to its official disbandment in 1942.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 115-116.

To close observers there appeared to be definite cycles of anti-religious programs and propaganda.[1] After the violent clashes of 1921-2 and the schism of 1923-4 came a period of relative quiet. With the resurgence of rabid and rigid Communism in 1927 began a new wave of persecution against the Church. This attach gained added impetus from the 1929 Constitution, which expressly permitted anti-religious propaganda but only religious worship. Camille Cianfarra, European correspondent for The New York Times, carried these cycles through another decade, dating the vigorous opposition from 1929 to 1932, followed by another lull for five years after the United States recognized the Soviet Union.[2] A brief but "vicious atheistic offensive" ended when the insecurity of the Russo-German Pact exploded into full-scale invasion and national defense. The characteristics of these successive stages of religious policy may be summarized very quickly.

Anti-Religious Instruction

With adoption of the 1929 Constitution forbidding religious propaganda, schools immediately became not simply separate from the Church and all religious teaching, but flagrantly atheistic. Anti-religious propaganda was considered a major function of state schools. Scores of training institutes were set up, demonstrating how to teach mathematics and science as well as art and history as atheistic subjects. Even more significant were the discussions of religion suggested in The Agitators' Guide, a fortnightly journal published in Moscow:

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[1] Ibid., p. 88.

[2] Camille Cianfarra, The Vatican and the Kremlin, (Dutton, New York, 1950), pp. 55ff.

> Religion serving the counter-revolution. The class essence of religion in the Western European capitalistic countries. The union of the Church and the state. The cooperation of social democracy, bourgeoisie and the Church....The World's religious organizations:....British and Foreign Bible Society, Scottish Bible Society, Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, World Student Christian Federation, Young Men's Christian Association, Salvation Army, World Baptist Union, and others.... Religion as a weapon of colonial spoliation and of imperialistic conquests. Christian missions as agents of imperialism.[1]

Many casual observers have assumed that Soviet opposition to religion represented simply the natural reaction against the faults of the Orthodox Church under the Tsarist regime. On the contrary, Anderson insisted, the Communists skilfully avoided this temptation and built their case against religion primarily on such universal complaints as "superstitious," "unscientific," "opiate." The Marxian criticisms of religion already reviewed have been employed most effectively by the Bolsheviks, with the result that both content and method of propaganda are easily exportable to other countries.

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[1] Quoted by Anderson, op. cit., pp. 134-135.

> The Communist Party, with its official or unofficial agencies, is as universal in its views on religion as it is on economics and politics... The basis for the atheism of Karl Marx and Engels is found in their dialectic philosophy, and their references to contemporary religion were drawn from Roman Catholic and European Protestant Church life.[1]

In the effort to indoctrinate youth against religion, government pressures were frankly utilized. Early in 1930 the Leningrad Regional Department of Education issued the following challenge:

> No school or organization of children without its "cell" of the Union of Militant Atheists!... No believing teacher in any Soviet school!... Every teacher in every Soviet school must be an active fighter for atheism of the children.[2]

Far more subtle, and often more damaging were the psychological forces turned loose, especially on young people. Prestige and influence were attached to the anti-religious role; ridicule or ostracism immediately befell any defender or even practitioner of faith, and his social as well as political and vocational status was circumscribed in all directions. "What was especially important with the young, they were made to feel as outsiders and outcasts who could make no contribution to their country's new era and whose loyalty must be questioned at every turn."[3]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 135-137.
[2] Spinka, Christianity Confronts Communism, p. 92.
[3] Casey, Religion in Russia, p. 89.

Although Lenin, like Engels, opposed direct and primary attacks against religion, even by propaganda, innumerable indirect weapons were brought to bear. Not only schools, but every medium of communication, joined in the propaganda barrage to create a fanatical atheism. Writers, cartoonists, and dramatists condemned religion with their sharpest tools. Legal subtleties convicted clergy and believers of counter-revolution; financial trickeries prevented the maintenance of church buildings. With one hand, the government encouraged sects, to create opposition and rivalry toward the Orthodox hierarchy. With the other hand, civil authorities endeavored to exterminate the sects as centers of espionage and reaction because of their foreign contaminations.[1]

Specific restrictions grew apace after 1929, even on the basic freedom of worship. The uniform six-day week eliminated Sunday as a holiday open for services.[2] Priests and ministers were classed as non-productive kulaks, deprived not only of their civil rights but of their bread cards, taxed outrageously on non-existent incomes, and forbidden to send their children for higher education.[3] Church buildings and property, legally confiscated and belonging to the State, were nevertheless taxed, charged rent and insurance, and threatened with "voluntary surrender" of use as well as official ownership.

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[1] Cf. Kania, Bolshevism and Religion, pp. 22-23.

[2] Cf. a revealing account of life in the Soviet Union, Harry and Rebecca Timbres, We Didn't Ask Utopia (Prentice-Hall, New York, 1939), passim.

[3] Cf. Anderson, op. cit., pp. 104-105, and Spinka, op. cit., pp. 103-106.

A precise and courageous index of such violations was contained in a protest from Metropolitan Sergius to Comrade Smidovitch, Head of the Commission on Religions, on February 19, 1930. The leader of the Orthodox Church, who was not allowed to be elevated to the rank of Patriarch until the war years, made the following complaints and appeals. They are significant first because they state so clearly the evils being inflicted on the Church, second because of the boldness with which they were presented, and third because they assume that the central government had competence to deal with the issues, even where purely local incidents were involved.

Insurance assessments on churches are exorbitant, the Metropolitan asserted, even though the State actually owns the property. An authors' honorarium has been collected for church music. Priests chanting mass have been classed as artists, for whose services the church has been charged a 5% fee (apparently by state labor organizations), sometimes as far back as 1922. Church taxes have been assessed in agricultural products, despite the fact that farm land has all been confiscated. Parish officers and clergy have been taxed at the rate for kulaks or landlords, instead of as members of a "free profession." Priests should have the right to reside within their parish, without subjecting their landladies to extra taxes. If sentenced to forced labor, they should have some consideration of their age and health. The Orthodox Church should be permitted to reopen at least one theological seminary and publish one religious periodical. Paul Anderson in quoting this important document concluded:

> It is idle to debate whether or not there was religious "persecution;" the important thing is not the name for what took place. The memorandum of Metropolitan Sergius is a very restrained recital of some of these things.[1]

There is no evidence that Comrade Smidovitch or any of his superiors granted substantial concessions to the Orthodox Church. During the mid-thirties various outward official pressures were relaxed, due partly to publicity attendant on American diplomatic recognition and partly to the decline in rabid anti-religious sentiment. Governmental attacks on either Orthodox or Free Churches grew less intense because they were no longer necessary, but the remnant of faithful believers felt no appreciable let-up in the weight of popular opposition. As Anderson put it:

> During the Second Five Year Plan....anti-religion also was brought down from the higher realms of theory and directly applied to the common life of the people. The organized power of religion was already broken, but there remained the necessity of breaking its power in individual lives and in the habits of social life.[2]

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[1] Anderson, op. cit., p.111.
[2] Ibid., p. 125.

Conciliation

Toward the close of this decade the correlation between domestic policy in the Soviet Union and external events became increasingly apparent. In the months preceding the Munich Pact, which Stalin evidently foresaw more clearly than statesmen of the West, "the pincer-movement (on religion), tightening for a while in 1937, is again halted."[1] Faced with the growing threat of Hitler's strength and expansion, Russia began early to consolidate her own internal position. Unity--including even religious unity--was a paramount necessity in this undertaking. To be sure, the initial steps appeared merely negative, the easing of propaganda abuse in press and radio and public speech. The important thing to notice, as background for the China story, is the tactical fluctuation of anti-religious policies. Once it is shown that atheism is fundamental to Marxian theory and practice, that program can readily veer with prevailing political currents.

Not until the actual German invasion of the U.S.S.R. did the government grant positive measures of conciliation to the Church. In fact, when Metropolitan Sergius early in the war offered a substantial, patriotic gift to his country, the immediate reaction was suspicion and denunciation. Both he and the head of the Renovated Church were accused of hoarding and hiding excessive and unexplained wealth. Before long, however, these charges were dropped, and Stalin himself thanked the Metropolitan for his generous war gift. By September, 1943, the Patriarchate was officially reestablished, and Sergius was immediately elected to the post, which had been vacant since the arrest of Tikhon in 1922. The restoration of complete outward unity was demonstrated when the Patriarch stood with officials in Red Square to review a military parade.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 157.

Meanwhile other positive concessions astounded the Orthodox Church and baffled many an observer. As already mentioned, the League of Militant Atheists was quietly disbanded, and its printing press turned over to the Patriarchate. One seminary, several theological institutes, and a number of convents were reopened. A religious journal started publication again, and taxes on church property were reduced. From fifteen churches open in Moscow in 1939 the number grew to thirty-five in 1947, and the total of active priests from 6,000 in 1939 to 30,000 in 1946.[1] According to Harper and Thompson, a measure of religious instruction for the young, as well as for the clergy, was permitted, and even a limited amount of social service--provided it did not remotely trespass on political activity.

To supervise these freshly tolerated programs a special Soviet for Orthodox Affairs was created in October

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[1] Cf. Cianfarra, op. cit., pp. 57-61; Anderson, op. cit., pp. 157ff; Harper and Thompson, op. cit., p. 262.

1943 and a Soviet for Religious Cult Affairs (all other sects) the following year. However, in accepting the jurisdiction of these government agencies and in acknowledging their ultimate control over religious activities, the Orthodox Church in February, 1945, surrendered--for the first time officially--some very crucial rights.

Differing from Harper and Thompson (more likely on definition or degree than fact), Cianfarra lists these forfeited freedoms as follows: to proselytize among the masses, to promote religious welfare activities, to own ecclesiastical property, to receive judicial recognition from the State, and to impart religious instruction.[1]

Why was the Russian Orthodox Church willing to make such sacrifices in return for semi-official toleration? In the first place, cooperation with the government was prompted by a very sincere sense of patriotism and nationalism, a desire to share in the popular unity and support in time of crisis. In the second place, the civil rights and social freedom given up appear far less vital in the Orthodox tradition than in the West. Especially after more than twenty-five years of vicious persecution, the freedom of worship plus a few administrative privileges loomed large and enticing. In the third place, the Orthodox Church recognized a coveted opportunity to strengthen its own position in relation to Roman Catholicism and the sects.

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[1] Cianfarra, op. cit., pp. 63-65; Cf. Fulton J. Sheen, Communism and the Conscience of the West (Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1948), pp. 179-180 et passim

The Present?

A dearth of post-war information makes it difficult to assess the long-range price paid by the Church in Russia for this lop-sided reconcilation. "The outstanding feature of Soviet religious policy from 1940 to date (published 1950) is that Moscow has been able to secure the collaboration of the national Church without repealing any of its fundamental anti-religious laws or abandoning its de-Christianizing program."[1]

This crucial fact has been overlooked by many an optimist, who mistook natural and strategic wartime adjustments for permanent modifications in basic policy. Meager reports indicate that the government, having enticed the Church into a position of helpless subservience, is reverting to its theory and practice of avowed atheism. Immediately after the war, the Russian Orthodox Church proved useful in exerting influence over the other Eastern Orthodox groups in the Balkans and combatting Western-oriented Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. That role has been largely played out, although State churches--in a practical and tactical reversal--are now being encouraged in the satellites.

Within the Soviet Union there appears to exist little more religious activity than the guaranteed freedom of worship.

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[1] Cianfarra, op. cit., p. 62.

Cianfarra in 1950 reported that violent anti-religious propaganda was continuing; Barron and Waddams the same year found recent signs of an increasing anti-religious tendency in Communist pronouncements. Lest Russian youth be deceived by the apparent Church-State rapport through the war years, the "Young Bolshevik" publication in 1952 urged a constant fight against religion:

> Under our Communist conditions, religion continues to play a reactionary part. It clings to all that is old and false, and being a most viable conservative ideology, it impedes the overcoming of other remnants of the past....Victory for Communism will come only after the struggle against all the religious traditions of the world has been won.[1]

In a lecture broadcast to Soviet political schools, the Moscow radio denounced "streaks of capitalism still prevailing in the country" and reaffirmed that religious beliefs and religious rites are incompatible with membership in the Communist Party.[2]

There are, of course, some people who deny the charges that the Russian Orthodox Church has bartered its soul to the Communist State. Most noteworthy of these is Martin Niemoller, who visited the Soviet Union on the invitation of the Patriarch at the beginning of 1952.[3]

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[1] Quoted by Associated Press religious news by ticker-tape, January 12, 1952, p. 48.

[2] Religious News Reporter, June 16-22, 1952, p. 10.

[3] Martin Niemoller, "Why I Went to Moscow" (Christian Century, March 19, 1952), pp. 338-340.

Admitting the strong possibility that the Church might have become a "propaganda instrument of Josef Stalin," the German pastor found a living Church, a growing Church, a self-supporting Church--and a suffering Church. He found priests "living for and from their calling," trained in eight four-year seminaries, supported by their congregations, regarding themselves as genuine servants of Jesus Christ rather than as functionaries of the political system.

Granting that the Church is not free openly to criticize the secular authority, Niemoller reminded his readers that it never possessed that liberty under the Tsars and probably does not regard such a role as essential to its Christian witness. He expressed surprise to find preaching now widely included in the Orthodox liturgy, but was content to raise the question, "About what?" and leave it unanswered.

There was no reference whatever in his report to any religious activity or program, other than worship, theological training, and a "brotherly sympathy" for the "ecumenical tie." That this last cannot now find expression through the World Council of Churches, Niemoller attributed to two factors: the universal Soviet suspicion that churches of the West are "partisans of Western political policy and friendly to the idea of war," and Russian Orthodox resentment at the World Council for accepting "illegitimate" and heretical groups among White Russian emigrants and other Eastern Orthodox communions. Both explanations reflect a definite nationalistic attitude on the part of the

Russian Church. The Protestant pastor summed up:

> Obviously the church in Russia is a tolerated and not a privileged institution. If there is no longer the severe persecution that characterized the decade following the revolution (....but that ended about twenty years ago....), still there are constant reminders that the system really has no room for the Christian church. At best--and the situation today may be described as "best"--the church is and will remain an alien phenomenon, merely tolerated and permitted to operate in the framework of the general laws.

Six months earlier a mission of seven British Quakers visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Peace Committee.[1] Perhaps their sponsorship was less conducive to a comprehensive understanding of the Church in Russia; perhaps their purpose did not extend that far; certainly their report showed far less insight than Niemoller's into the intricate ramifications of religious problems or personal liberties. The Quakers were impressed with the enormous crowds and the friendly goodwill in two services of worship, one at an ancient Orthodox monastery, the other in the Baptist Church in Moscow ("the largest Protestant religious group in the Soviet Union").

Again the visitors made no mention whatsoever of any Church activities, of any programs of religious education or social welfare, of any atheistic propaganda. The one exception, perhaps was the Quakers' own effort "to explain, if not to justify, the unresponsive attitude of 'Western' religious leaders to declarations coming from religious groups in the U.S.S.R. on the problems of peace, expressed in controversial political terms." The response to this is not indicated, nor to their appeal for closer East-West consultations among Christian leaders, nor to any other messages delivered.

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[1] Members of the Mission, "Excerpts from the Report of the Quaker Mission to Moscow" (Promoting Enduring Peace, West Haven, Conn.). Publication No. 22.

It must be borne in mind that these passages are only "Excerpts from the Report....", and that the Mission had only a twofold purpose:

> To increase understanding between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Great Britain, and contribute, however modestly, to the improved relationships and the positive and peaceful agreements between the Government of the Soviet Union and the Governments of the 'West' on which the hope of peace so largely depends.

Such visits are undoubtedly worthwhile and should be multiplied immeasurably. But there is a tragic danger that casual readers of such reports will find in them an assurance of goodwill--official as well as personal--toward religion, toward the Western democracies, and toward Christian participation in political affairs. Such an assurance, on closer scrutiny, is almost certainly not there.

While this modus vivendi works itself out between the Soviet Government and the organized Church, relentless pressure continues on thousands of individuals. Even if one can withstand the intensive propaganda and is content to limit his religion to worship, a shadow of suspicion still hangs over all faithful believers. Communists are sincerely convinced that religion represents reaction on the domestic scene, intrigue and espionage abroad. A person who retains any loyalty above the State, however supernatural and unscientific it may be, cannot be trusted at the level of political allegiance. From a practical standpoint this accusation is justified. Sooner or later, in a world of anti-Christian theory and un-Christian practice, the faithful follower of Jesus Christ must take a stand. Therefore he is closely watched and catalogued long before this time is reached.

Here is how David J. Dallin described the situation:

> Long lists of security resks are carefully prepared and classified over the years. These include individuals falling into any one of a multitude of suspicious categories: children of capitalists and "kulaks," relatives of "counter-revolutionaries," people with connections abroad, those with strong religious ties, members of disloyal nationalities, private entrepreneurs and "kulaks" in the recently acquired areas, persons previously punished for any reason, and so on and on.[1]

Dallin then discussed the casual, as well as causal, circumstances which lead to the arrest of these "security risks," often totally unconnected with any specific act or thought of the victim. Whenever the Government, or some subordinate official thereof, considers the individual a dangerous charater, there follows "the farcical process of accusation, interrogation, confession, and sentencing." The "security risk" thus becomes a "political prisoner," and here again Dallin pointedly included "persons with strong religious ties" among the more precise categories of "Kulaks," "traitors," "deviationists," and "outright anti-Communists." The end of this story is forced labor or a concentration camp--an ugly link between the practice in Soviet Russia and the practice in other Communist countries, but a link that is all too real for many "persons with strong religious ties."

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[1] David J. Dallin, "The Slave Empire Within the Soviet Empire" (New York Times Magazine, October 14, 1951), p. 15.

> Wherever the Soviet System has expanded into other countries, this institution has followed like a dark shadow. This has been the case in the Eastern European satellites, and in East Germany the Soviet Military Administration simply took over Hitler's concentration camps at Buchenwald and elsewhere. Now the I.T.L.'s (corrective labor camps) are starting to spread across China, as well.[1]

Eastern Europe

The external religious conditions confronting Communism in Eastern Europe differed markedly from those in other areas. As the Orthodox Church of Tsarism played the role of bête noire in Russia, and imperialistic foreign missions in China, so the Roman Catholic Church has borne the brunt of Marxist atheism in Europe. In certain countries the strength of religious loyalty has visibly delayed complete Sovietization, and extreme measures of direct discipline are only now going into effect. China, with its small and scattered Christian minority, has actually preceded her European allies at some stages of domesticating the Church.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 38-40.

Nevertheless the ultimate similarity of method holds great significance. From that standpoint, at least, the practice in Eastern Europe may justifiably be included in a survey of Chinese policy.

The area of investigation is large, despite the relatively small geographic territory and the comparatively brief span of time involved. Events are moving so rapidly in that theater of history that journalistic reports from two or three years ago have already become outdated. This study can simply sketch a few developments in Eastern Europe which appear to have some bearing on the experience of Protestant missions in China.

In 1952 the American State Department issued a report on Communist policy toward religion in the satellite countries, prepared for the President by high intelligence officers.[1] Tracing the avowed hostility from Marx to the present, the report declared that the ultimate Communist aim is the complete extinction of Christianity. For the present, however, Soviet authorities have had to content themselves with attempts to reduce the churches to harmless puppet institutions.

> The severity of treatment, the report says, has been in ratio to Catholic strength in the population. Thus the Church has suffered most severely in Albania, where only 100,000 out of a population of 1,200,000 are Catholics. On the other hand, the Church has re-

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[1] U.S. Department of State, "Soviet Affairs, Note 137 and 138" (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1952).

ceived the most lenient treatment in Poland, where 95% of the people are Catholics.[1]

As its first step, under the popular slogan, "separation of Church and State," the Communist Government eliminates all special privilege or "establishment" of any kind, whether Roman Catholic or Orthodox. Constitutions or supplementary regulations usually offer an assurance of religious liberty, although Bulgaria's Law Concerning the Churches, for example, guarantees only freedom of conscience and belief, not even mentioning worship.[2]

Secondly, the new economic policy requires confiscation of land and other revenue-producing property, and in certain cases the nationalization of Church buildings. In 1940, before her incorporation as a Soviet Republic, Estonia seized not only houses and farms, cash and bonds and bank accounts belonging to religious organizations, but even vehicles, homes for the aged, and cemeteries.[3] Eight years later Rumania did the same,[4] and most satellites have followed suit, with the exception of Poland and East Germany to date.[5]

Government control, in the third place, has been most promptly and thoroughly imposed on schools. Private schools, lay or religious, especially those operated by missions or other foreign groups, have been closed or turned over to the State. Even before this measure was consummated, in some instances, religious education was banned from schools; prohibition against all religious instruction and/or organization for children usually followed soon.[1] Most Communist systems chose to eliminate "superstition" entirely from primary classes, on the ground that young children were too impressionable to weigh the alternatives, but tolerated elective courses in colleges. In Rumania, on the contrary, "religious education (was) curtailed in all elementary schools and completely abolished in high schools, preparatory schools, and the university."[2]

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[1] Religious New Reporter, September 1-7, 1952.

[2] Barron and Waddams, op. cit., p. 37.

[3] H. Perlitz, "The Fate of Religion and the Church under Soviet Rule in Estonia, 1940-41," quoted by Rehwinkel, Communism and the Church, pp. 62-72.

[4] Cianfarra, op. cit., pp. 105-107.

[5] Leland Stowe, Conquest by Terror (Random House, New York, 1952), pp. 183, 197, et passim.

Concern for the proper indoctrination of youth leads to innumerable restrictions on all non-Communist movements. Within three weeks after the pro-Soviet government took over in Estonia, summer camps, youth associations--and the Salvation Army--were suppressed.[3] As the anti-religious campaign accelerates in Eastern Germany, one of the principal targets again proves to be young people. At the end of 1952 East German authorities charged Youth Community, a Protestant church-sponsored group, with being a "cover-up" for subversive activities, working for the American intelligence service, and trying to undermine Communist youth organizations.[1] The Christians were also accused of scheduling rallies, Bible-reading sessions, and catechism classes at hours set for Communist youth meetings. When a new wave of pastoral arrests began in East Berlin in February, 1953, several of the men who disappeared had been particularly active in young people's activities.[2]

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[1] Barron and Waddams, op. cit., pp. 37-38, 68ff.
[2] Cianfarra, op. cit., pp. 105-107.
[3] Perlitz, quoted by Rehwinkel, op. cit., pp. 62ff.

A fourth step in the Communist program--although the order may vary from country to country--is to deprive the Church of all social and institutional functions. The Bulgarian Law Concerning the Churches, for example, stipulates in Article 21 that religious bodies may not open hospitals, orphanages, old people's homes, and the like, and those already established shall be taken over by the Ministry of Public Health or the Ministry of Labor and Social Service.[3] In Hungary, in the spring of 1950, Catholic nuns were expelled from hospital positions.[4] No charity, clinics, reading rooms, recreational programs or other public services may compete with State functions.

Fifth, peripheral activities such as publication are withdrawn, leaving the Church no method whatever to combat the unceasing flood of anti-religious propaganda. The very first move in Estonia, only a few days after the Communist coup, was to discontinue religious broadcasting.[1] There, and in many other countries, petty annoyances and regulations have been enforced to hamper all forms of religious work. Discriminatory taxes, utility charges, school fees, etc. have been applied against the clergy. To christen a child became a crime. The Soviet "rest day" was introduced, eliminating the Sabbath as a day of worship. Even fire laws were rigorously applied against Christmas trees in churches.

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[1] Religious News Reporter, December 29, 1952.
[2] New York Times, February 28, 1953.
[3] Barron and Waddams, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
[4] Stowe, op. cit., pp. 185ff.

Two final but paramount measures have been summed up by Ernest Hauser in a full and illuminating article.

> The Soviet master plan envisages the destruction of the Catholic Church in two major steps. One is the isolation of the clergy from Rome and creation of a schismatic national church controlled by the Red regime. The second step is liquidation.[2]

This domestication of the Church (Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant) involves a number of factors. One is the offer of financial subsidies, in almost direct contradiction to the original separation of Church and State. Such a policy has the advantage of enticing weak, greedy, or ambitious clergy into subservience to the government, at the same time that it deliberately places one religious group in rivalry to others.

Another appeal is made on the ground of patriotism.

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[1] Perlitz, quoted in Rehwinkel, op. cit., pp. 62ff.

[2] Ernest O. Hauser, "What Stalin Has in Mind for Catholics," (Saturday Evening Post, September 22, 1951), p.19.

The Stockholm Peace Resolution and related movements have been used as a rallying point for "independent churches" and so-called "peace priests." Those who decline to support such campaigns are suspected as traitors; those who endorse the government programs find themselves inextricably caught in a whole series of political manouvers aimed at severing all foreign ties. The enlistment of "peace priests" has proved particularly effective in Czechoslovakia, where an unusually progressive and "social-minded" Roman Catholic Church has been trapped by its own liberalism.[1]

> The Russians have repeatedly betrayed an utter lack of comprehension of foreign peoples' psychology, but in their handling of the Czechoslovakians and the Poles, both Slavic peoples, they have shown a remarkable degree of psychological finesse. While pursuing identical ends in both countries, the Russians usually employ diametrically opposite tactics.[2]

Poland, with a 95% Roman Catholic majority is often alluded to as suffering mild, gradual restrictions, although leaders of the hierarchy told President Beirut as early as February, 1950, that "the war against the Church, against religion, against God, in Poland is obvious to all."[3] During the war-time occupation Russian soldiers indulged in a literal and figurative rape of Poland, deliberately destroying churches, shrines, cemeteries, stealing bells and crucifixes and other "souvenirs." "Where they had still to take into consideration the religious sentiments of the local population, they acted in a more refined way by applying tremendous taxes."[1] In June, 1940, even religious marriages were expressly forbidden.

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[1] Stowe, op. cit., pp. 193ff.
[2] Ibid., pp. 196-197.
[3] Quoted, ibid., p. 197.

During this same period of occupation the Soviet headquarters issued "Ten Commandments for Polish Youths," which are quoted in full, without comment:

> 1) Never forget that the clergy is a declared enemy of the State and of Communism.
> 2) Try to convert your friends to Communism. Do not forget that Stalin, who gave to the Russian people its new constitution is the leader of the anti-Gods, not only in the Soviet Union but throughout the world.
> 3) Try to persuade, but do not force, your friends to stop going to Church.
> 4) Watch out for spies; denounce sabotage.
> 5) Spread atheistic literature among the people.
> 6) Every good Komosol is also a militant atheist. He must know how to shoot and be expert in military discipline.
> 7) Work eagerly to prevent any religious element you may notice from influencing your neighbors.
> 8) Every atheist must be a good Communist. Watching the security of the State is the duty of every anti-God.
> 9) Support your Atheistic Movement by financial gifts that will especially aid the propaganda of foreign organizations, obliged through circumstances to work in secret.
> 10) If you are not a convinced atheist, you will not be a good Communist and a faithful citizen of the Soviet State. Atheism is permanently linked with Communism and the two ideals are the basis of Soviet power in Communist Russia.[2]

Since the war, however, civil authorities in Poland have stepped comparatively lightly on religious toes. On April 14, 1950, church leaders signed an agreement recognizing the authority of the State and promising to punish priests taking part in secret or anti-government movements. In return, the government guaranteed "supervised 'freedom'" of Catholic teaching, press, processions, and religious orders, and--unlike any other such pact--recognized the Pope's jurisdiction over the Church in religious and spiritual matters.[1]

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[1] Kania, op. cit., p. 50; cf. pp. 49-73.
[2] Quoted by Sheen, op. cit., pp. 157-158.

This concordat, and the survival until 1952 of some two thousand monasteries and convents, six hundred primary schools, a Catholic university, three hundred church kindergartens, etc. gave rise to much hopefulness.[2] But the entering wedge of nationalistic fervor succeeded where other methods had failed. The Polish hierarchy wanted permanent jurisdiction over the Church in former German areas. This covetousness played into Moscow's hands and caused a breach between Polish Catholics and the Vatican, which could not accept the division of Germany. Early in 1953 an edict was issued requiring government consent for all church appointments, transfers, and promotions. These depend on loyalty oaths, recognizing "only patriots....who will support the Polish state's interests." All others may be removed either by church authorities or on request of state officials.[3] Poland too has capitulated.

The aim of political control over satellite churches is avowedly to sever every link with the Vatican or with the World Council of Churches. In fact, the Rumanian Minister of Religion made this very explicit in June, 1948, when he declared:

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[1] Hauser, op. cit., pp. 21 and 124.

[2] Stowe, op. cit., pp. 196ff.

[3] Time, February 23, 1953, p.53; Religious News Reporter, February 16-22, 1953, pp. 7-9.

> There are two religious institutions of which world reaction is trying to make special use: the Roman Catholic Church and the so-called Oecumenical Movement. The Roman Catholic Church.....is joining its tendency to domination with that of Yankee imperialism, while the Oecumenical Movement, created and supported by the Church of England, is obviously under the influence of hard-pressed British imperialism.[1]

All manner of effort has been made to eliminate these two institutions from Communist territory. The Albanian Government in 1951 agreed to subsidize--and administer --a national Roman Catholic Church whose members and hierarchy would completely sever all contacts with Rome--or the outside world.[2] The Bulgarian Law Concerning Churches, issued in 1949, permits contact with Churches outside the national boundaries "only with the previous permission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." (Article 22) More specifically, "churches or their branches....which have their headquarters abroad cannot open up any branches, missions, orders, or charitable or other organizations in the People's Republic of Bulgaria," and those which exist already shall be closed within a month, and their property surrendered to the State. (Article 23) [3]

The Foreign Minister explained very frankly:

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[1] Quoted by Barron and Waddams, op. cit., pp. 74--75.

[2] Hauser, op. cit., p. 21; cf. Religious News Reporter, May 19-25, 1952, p. 9.

[3] Barron and Waddams, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

> Our law on religious creeds is aimed at preventing the Bulgarian servants of the Church from becoming agents, who, under the veil of religion, can supply foreign political centres with information which, according to the laws of all countries, is considered a State secret.[1]

The Rumanian Law on Religions, dated August, 1948, carried similar provisions:[2]

> The heads of religions, hierarchs, and in general the entire personnel in the service of religion must be of Roumanian citizenship enjoying the full exercise of civil and political rights. (Article 20)
>
> Relation of the religious bodies with foreign countries shall be only of a religious nature (and) only with the approval of the Ministry of Religion and through the intermediary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Article 40)

Clergy and communicants of all branches of the Christian Church suffered increasing pressures to accept the "peace priests" or "indigenous movements." Rumanian adherents of the Greek Orthodox Church, some seventy-five percent of the population, had to sign "of their own free will and with no pressure of any kind" that they wished to leave that organization and join the dissident, schismatic, national Orthodox Church. In many areas the government, or its "religious representatives," did not even bother to get signatures, but simply announced the total of citizens concurring. Those who objected were required to protest in person and threatened with loss of jobs or birth certificates or worse.[1]

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[1] Quoted, ibid., p. 43.
[2] Quoted, ibid., pp. 76ff.

For this same purpose--removing all opposition to a "domesticated" church--Protestant and Roman Catholic clergymen have been sentenced in most satellite nations, not for any violation of religious restraints, but for espionage, illegal currency transactions, passing on military, economic, and political information. The trial and conviction of fifteen Protestant pastors in Bulgaria in February, 1949, was entirely compatible with the Foreign Minister's explanation of the Law Concerning the Churches. Whatever the validity of the charges actually made or the justice of the sentences, the case must be examined in this legal and psychological framework.[2]

So too with Cardinal Mindzenty, sentenced the same month in Hungary to life imprisonment for treason, espionage, and illegal handling of foreign exchange, while his accusers shouted "Down with Mindzenty, agent of the Americans."[3] It may be true that the Cardinal was a confirmed reactionary and counter-revolutionary, in the sense of opposing the political and economic as well as the religious program of Communism.[4] Yet he stands as a symbol for all faiths of heroic resistance to social and personal tyranny. Mindzenty had not contested the expropriation of church property, but he did protest the nationalization of schools--as did Lutheran Bishop Ordass, subsequently imprisoned for two years for currency manipulations.[1] The Cardinal's successor, Archbishop Grosz, had capitulated fully and won government promise of "complete religious freedom," the reopening of eight Catholic high schools, and a diminishing subsidy for eighteen years, in return for supporting the State, its Five-Year Plan, land collectivization, and the Stockholm Peace Movement against "warmongering and atomic weapons." Yet ten months later he himself "confessed" to leading a movement to overthrow the government, and was condemned to fifteen years in prison by the same judge who had sentenced Cardinal Mindzenty and Robert Vogeler. The next month the nine still unjailed bishops swore allegiance to the Hungarian People's Republic.[2]

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[1] Cianfarra, op. cit., pp. 110ff.

[2] Cf. New York Times, February 20, 1949, et seq.

[3] Cianfarra, op. cit., p. 171; cf. pp. 162ff.

[4] Personal interview (August, 1952) with Protestant minister and economist who worked in Hungary in 1947-1948.

Three and a half years after arresting the heads of major Protestant denominations, Bulgarian Communists shattered the vastly stronger Roman Catholic resistance by a trial of forty leaders, including twenty-eight priests, in the fall of 1952. Four of the defendants, all of whom were charged with espionage and "vaguely defined anti-state activities" on behalf of the United States, were sentenced to death, most others to long prison terms.[3] In May of that year Bulgaria had passed a law nationalizing all churches and forbidding them any contact with the outside world.[1]

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[1] Barron and Waddams, op. cit., pp. 68ff.

[2] Hauser, op. cit., p. 126.

[3] New York Times, October 21, 1952; cf. Associated Press radio tickertape, October 25, 1952.

In satellite Europe, as in China, the "evidence" of treason and espionage has been produced in concrete, if suspicious, form. Czechoslovak police "discovered" hidden American weapons in several monasteries.[2] Bulgarian authorities justified the arrest of some thirty Catholic priests by claiming to have found a radio transmitter in the Plovdiv cemetery, although the Vatican insisted unequivocally that the transmitter was planted by police.[3]

The fact that Yugoslavia so vehemently refuses to be a Soviet satellite makes her adherence to the Marx-Leninist policy on religion all the more indicative. Such few modifications in the Communist program as do appear under Marshal Tito may be attributed to the political necessity of cultivating Western trust and friendship. The dream that a Communist state might be established with admirable and successful economic reforms, but without the evils of secret police, terrorism, religious persecution, rigid censorship, and the denial of human rights, has faded. In its place remains only a faint hope that a Communist state might co-exist beside the democratic world without displaying aggressive and subversive moves against its neighbors.

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[1] Religious News Reporter, September 29, 1952.
[2] Cianfarra, op. cit., p. 221.
[3] Religious News Reporter, August 11-17, 1952.

Immediately at the close of the Second World War the Yugoslav government confiscated all lands owned by "churches, monasteries, religious institutions, and all kinds of foundations, both temporal and religious."[1] For resistance to such measures, and for alleged wartime collaboration, a number of Roman Catholic priests were condemned to death early in 1945. Involved also was the historic feud between the Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches, a feud which had erupted into mass atrocities against Orthodox believers during the war. For some of these Archbishop Stepinac was held personally responsible; therefore his sentence on October 11, 1946, to sixteen years of hard labor was no surprise.[2] His elevation as Cardinal early in 1953 has renewed friction and caused a break in diplomatic relations between Tito and the Vatican.

Nevertheless Ernest Hauser conceded in 1951 that "Tito's Yugoslavia, which first evolved some of the techniques now applied against the Church throughout the Cominform countries, has called off the bloodhounds."[3] Some Protestant leaders have applauded the "encouraging" but rather shallow changes in the religious situation there. For several summers Sherwood Eddy has led a party of American educators to Yugoslavia, interviewing the Marshal.

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[1] Barron and Waddams, op. cit., p. 91.

[2] Cf. Sherwood Eddy, "Stepinac's Red Hat is Blood-Red" (Christian Century, January 14, 1953)and subsequent correspondence.

[3] Hauser, op. cit., p. 21.

> To questions concerning religious freedom, Marshal Tito answered that the Yugoslav constitution and Yugoslav law granted full religious freedom, and that the clergy had the right to conduct religious services. Good relations had been established between the State and the Orthodox and Moslem churches, which was not yet the case with the Catholic Church, the supreme heads of which were under external influence of a political nature.[1]

A representative of the World Council of Churches stressed:

> In Yugoslavia "religion" is not considered as being relevant to social questions, politics, education, health, civil records (marriage, census, death), nor is the Church considered as the best institution for dealing with the poor, the infirm, and with agricultural projects. There is liberty to preach the Gospel, to teach religion (in principle, outside the public schools, as in America), to worship, to baptize, marry and bury (in addition to civil rites), and to build churches and issue limited religious publications in conformity with other priority building and publishing plans.[2]

What seems significant is that, faced with the demands of political expediency, and the need to cultivate the trust and approval of the Est, Tito nevertheless frankly and consistently follows the Communist line on religion. In a speech in 1951 he echoed the words of Engels and Lenin: "Religion (is) the private concern of individuals....(It) cannot be destroyed administratively."[3] Hence the Yugoslav authorities, like the Russians and satellites, are attempting to establish a modus vivendi with the Church by encouraging national associations of priests and granting concessions to freedom of worship on the purely domestic level.

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[1] Yugoslav Review, Vol. I, No. 7, September, 1952.

[2] Robert Tobias, "Yugoslavia--Church and State" (Christianity and Crisis, January 7, 1952), p. 180.

[3] New York Times, September 16, 1951.

Yet Tito himself continues to take active part in the drive on religious subversion in any form. Just a month before his reassurances to the Eddy party, he delivered a vigorous warning against elements in both Orthodox and Catholic clergy accused of spreading disunity and chauvinism among the people. "We will never allow them to sow discord," he asserted.[1] Two months earlier he had sowed considerable discord in one of the touchiest areas of Church-State relations, the field of religious education. This is what Tito told the Association of Yugoslav Teachers --and the world--in May, 1952:

> Religion is superstition, and Communists must not allow children to fall under the influence of the churches....We are not persecuting religion... We are leaving the question of religion to the will of every individual man....But we cannot allow that children who have yet to be formed should develop according to the desires of those who are on a completely different road from us. In this respect we shall never give in before any pressure from outside.[2]

The pattern, then, is not exclusively Moscow-made. It appears to be inherent both in Marxist philosophy and in nationalistic totalitarianism, which can brook no rival. Obviously in Central Europe the Roman Catholic Church offered the greatest resistance, as did the Orthodox Church in Russia. "Disunited Protestantism, despite the heroism of some clergymen, became a swift and absolute conquest for collaboration."[3] But Roman Catholicism has a long series of

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[1] Religious News Reporter, July 14-20, 1952.
[2] Religious News Reporter, May 5-11, 1952.
[3] Stowe, op. cit., p. 201.

"black marks" against it in the Communist books.

A) Its numerical strength, ranging from eight to ninety-five percent of the population. B) Its supranational organization, where the Protestant churches have been established largely along national lines. C) Tremendous land-holdings, making the Church an implacable foe of Communist economic policy. On the moot point as to whether earlier land redistribution in a country like Hungary would have eased the situation, Stowe commented that it might have had considerable effect on policy and program, if not on eventual outcome.

> If there is no immunity from possible Communist conquest, neither can there exist in the twentieth century any immunity from recognition of the urgent need for social reforms where they have been overdue for generations.[1]

D) The Church's reliance on parochial schools and sometimes state subsidies in the past, creating acute opposition to the new educational program. E) The hierarchic structure of organization, regarded by Communists as patently undemocratic. F) The numerous convents and monasteries, whose residents seem even more parasitic and unproductive than other clergy. G) The stubborn refusal of Catholics to accept any church independent of Rome as The Church. To the Communists, belief in God is bad enough, but He can be dismissed as supernatural superstition. Loyalty to the Vatican can only be understand as political treason and an effective avenue for espionage. At the very least, the Pope is attacked as an ally of western capitalism and imperialism.[1] H) The inflexible stand of the Papacy against Communism, dating from the encyclical Qui Pluribus two years before The Communist Manifesto.[2]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 193.

Viewed solely as a primitive superstition, religion might be allowed under Marxist theory to wither away although it might actually "wither" as the Communist state seems to do in practice. Viewed strictly as a political foe, the Church could be attacked and destroyed by force. But embracing as it does so many emotional, ideological, social, and economic factors, religion in Red areas requires a variety of measures. These have been shown to include separation of Church and State, control of education, economic restrictions, abolition of social services, avowed freedom of worship, severance of all ecumenical ties, enticement of "patriotic" clergy, and elimination of dissenters by political punishment.

The order and severity of each step depends on a host of factors, tangible and intangible. The certainty of its ultimate appearance grows stronger with each new example added to the catalogue of history. Developments in China, both typical and unique, can be more clearly recognized and more easily understood against the framework of Soviet Russia and her Eastern European satellities. If one notes the careful choice of words, dealing with organization rather than inner personal faith, Leland Stowe's conclusion becomes almost inescapable:

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[1] Cf. Cianfarra, op. cit., p. 104.

[2] The earlier encyclicals are reviewed by Pius XI, On Atheistic Communism (National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington, D.C., 1937), passim.

> The Communists have demonstrated their ability to dominate every church, of whatever denomination, in any country where a Red regime is established. No organized Church--Christian, Jewish, Moslem, or any other--can hope to escape being reduced to an instrument of Kremlin policy. No believers, however devoted and loyal, can escape the subversion of their religious organizations to Communist designs.[1]

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[1] Stowe, op. cit., pp. 182-183.

PART II

THE COMMUNIST ATTITUDE TOWARD RELIGION IN CHINA

CHAPTER 3 - THE THEORY IN CHINA

> The revolution in the colonies is not going to be a Communist revolution in its first stages. But if from the outset the leadership is in the hands of a Communist vanguard, the revolutionary masses will not be led astray, but may go ahead through the successive periods of development of revolutionary experience. Indeed it would be extremely erroneous in many of the Oriental countries to try to solve the agrarian problem, according to pure Communist principles. In its first stages, the revolution in the colonies must be carried on with a program which will include many petty bourgeois reform clauses, such as division of land, etc. But from this it does not follow at all that the leadership of the revolution will have to be surrendered to the bourgeois democrats.[1]

This paragraph has been quoted at length because of its prophetic accuracy--or, rather, the faithfulness with which the blueprint has been followed. It comes from the "Theses on the National and Colonial Questions" adopted at the Second World Congress of the Communist International, held in Moscow the summer of 1920. What this declaration says concretely of agrarian policy may be inferred about religion: that methods and programs need not follow one hundred percent "pure Communist principles," providing always that the leadership is in the hands of orthodox Marxists.

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[1] Communist International, Blueprint for World Conquest, p. 130.

This chapter seeks to examine the degree to which Chinese Communists adhere to the "party line" on the subject of religion. The task is not easy. For one thing, entire articles or lectures--by no means brief in either Oriental or Soviet tradition--ignore the question completely. Marx and Engels, even Lenin and Stalin, lived in a "Christian" society, where the organized Church wielded great power and its creeds and ethics permeated--if not deeply penetrated--daily life. It is a truism that Christianity in China has exerted an influence vastly out of proportion to its numerical strength. Yet a membership of less than one percent, no matter how many government officials and educators it embraces, can have little substantial impact on the mass. To literally hundreds of millions of Chinese, the Church meant only a foreign building--ugly by Confucian or Buddhist temple standards--with a weekly ceremony instead of irregular individual worship.

This fact suggests two opposing corollaries. On the one hand, it is natural for Mao and all his henchmen to disregard religious issues as far as possible. A former Communist, turned Christian pastor, observes, "In Mao Tse-tung's books I can find no definite theory about religion except for a few very important sentences in the last chapter of China's New Democracy."[1]

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[1] Kao Tien-hsi,"How Shall the Chinese Church Continue Its Work Under the Communist Government?" (unpublished thesis, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1950), p. 54.

After all, the Reds' first-hand acquaintance consisted of a few tentative and negative contacts with semi-Christian schools. On the other hand, for that very reason, it might have been equally natural to deviate from orthodox Marxism at this point, to omit the traditional atheism as irrelevant if not actually harmful to the cause in China. But the thesis of these opening chapters is simply that irreligion and anti-religion cannot ever be divorced from Communism as irrelevant or unimportant.

One further point: the pronouncements of Chinese Communist leaders on religion are almost always in a specific context with a specific reference; seldom, if ever, do they concern an abstract freedom or idea. The historic religions of China are dismissed as unscientific superstitions, although Buddhism won meager representation on various people's political councils. Confucianism as an ethical system is execrated and ultimately banned for social reactionism. Mohammedanism and Tibetan Lamaism are conciliated as "national" minorities, possessing--to be sure--certain peculiar and regrettable religious practices. Prior to the establishment of the People's Republic, the two main branches of Christianity were treated solely as foreign institutions. Almost all direct Communist comments were made to some Western interviewer for foreign consumption, and often in regard to some particular practical question. Some of these will be cited briefly in the pages ahead.

The most fruitful approach to Communist attitudes appears to be chronological. This sketchy survey touches only the background against which Protestant experience must be measured. References to Russian influences merely provide the link between the preceding chapters and those that lie ahead, a link in which anti-imperialism and anti-religion are inextricably interwoven.

Founding Fathers

As early as 1918, and probably before, Marxist study groups were springing up in China. At Pei-ta (Peking University) Professor Li Ta-chao gathered a small coterie which included a young library assistant named Mao Tse-tung.[1] In his avid but sporadic education Mao had been attracted to socialism and skepticism in various forms. According to Robert Payne, he encountered the writings of Karl Marx soon after the 1911 Revolution, although Edgar Snow avers that he had not read the Manifesto, Class Struggle, The History of Socialism and the like until 1919-20.[2] Once a strong supporter of the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door Policy, Mao contemplated producing a study of the French and American Revolutions and dabbled in the two essential languages, "but there were no good foreign-language teachers in Hunan outside the missionaries, and he had long ago set his face against missionaries of any kind."[1] No clue is given in this or other comprehensive biographies as to what particular experience produced this reaction, or even any evidence to support Payne's statement. Wandering to Tientsin via Shanghai, Mao helped to organize and despatch the coolies sailing for France in early 1918, but decided rather casually not to accompany them.

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[1] Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, Chronology.

[2] Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (Random House, New York, rev. 1938), pp. 117-139.

Of the many Chinese mentors who helped to mould Mao Tse-tung's thought, Chen Tu-hsiu had apparently the greatest influence. As dean of the College of Letters at Pei-ta, he had founded the radical "New Youth" in 1915 and shared with Hu Shih, now one of the most distinguished exiles from Communist China, in stimulating the literary renaissance. Although hailing the successful Russian Revolution, Chen had written glowing tributes to the character of Jesus and the heroism of the Crucifixion, "and he gave his blessing to the missionaries, who had, whatever their faults, brought Western culture to China."[2] Up to the beginning of 1919 Chen asserted that Communism was not suitable for China and reaffirmed his political faith in the democracy of England and the United States.[3]

That year, however, marked a turning-point for China.

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[1] Robert Payne, Mao Tse-tung, Ruler of Red China (Schuman, New York, 1950), p. 53.

[2] Ibid., p. 58.

[3] Robert Elegant, China's Red Masters (Twayne, New York, 1951), p. 41.

The May Fourth Movement climaxed a growing resentment against foreign domination and domestic weakness. On July 25 the new Soviet government won fresh acclaim by renouncing extraterritoriality and Russian concessions in China.[1] By the end of that year Chen Tu-hsiu turned from the imperialistic West to Soviet Russia and "would soon be a passionate Marxist."[2] So complete was his conversion, so active his new faith, that he is commonly referred to as the ideological founder and pioneer of Communism in China.

In May, 1920, after resigning from Pei-ta and serving a prison term, Chen Tu-hsiu teamed up in Shanghai with Gregory Voitinsky, secretary general of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern. Voitinsky had arrived in China the previous year, the vanguard of scores of influential advisors from Russia during the 'twenties. He and his already-Moscow-trained Chinese aide had opened a school for Communism in Shanghai; with Chen and a group of others they started a newspaper and began forming trade unions, which soon spread to Hankow, Peking, and other centers. From this cell can be traced not only the "consistent Russian orientation" but the "ideological solidarity with the Comintern" which characterize Chinese Communism since its inception.[3]

Meanwhile Mao Tse-tung had been going through a similar transition. Like many another Marxist, he drew originally from the social thought of Western Europe and the pragmatism of John Dewey. Payne declared:

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[1] Mildred Lovegren, "The Communist Conquest of China" (unpublished manuscript, 1952).

[2] Elegant, op. cit., p. 42.

[3] Ibid., p. 190.

> Mao's intellectual roots are to be found in the mechanistic philosophy of the 19th century, and it is from Spencer, rather than from Marx, that he derived the belief that the individual must be sacrificed to the state. His beginnings lie with English sociology and the English conception of constitional reform. He had nothing but contempt for the revolutionaries.[1]

But he himself said: "By summer of 1920...I considered myself a Marxist...in theory and to some extent in action."[2] Several factors help to account for Mao's "leap of faith" to Communism. One was the apparent success of the October Revolution in Russia, the actual opportunity to demonstrate Marxian principles within a radically new framework. One was the rising tide of anti-imperialist feeling in China, blaming the Anglo-Saxon powers for weakness and hypocrisy at Versailles, and for their failure to follow Soviet lead in renouncing the "unequal treaties." Still another was the personal influence of Chen Tu-hsiu and other new converts to Communism.

By the spring of 1921 Mao had joined the inner circle around Voitinsky and Chen in Shanghai, a group drawing more from among upperclass students than from the proletariat. Of those who participated in the founding of the Chinese Communist Party on July 1, 1921, only Mao Tse-tung, Li Ta, and Shao Ti-tse survived to share in the Presidium in later years of victory. Six were captured or killed by the Kuomintang during the "extermination campaigns;" two were expelled from the Party, including Chen Tu-hsiu himself. Believing from the start that freedom from imperialism should take precedence over internal reform, and that the proletariat and bourgeoisie should cooperate against foreign aggression, Chen denied the necessity or even possibility of agrarian leadership and class struggle in China. In this he differed from his disciple, Mao. But his acute deviationist heresy occurred in 1927, when he urged withdrawal from the Kuomintang in defiance of Moscow orders, and was expelled for "going ahead of Trotsky."[1]

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[1] Payne, op. cit., p. 40.
[2] Quoted by Snow, op. cit., p. 1939.

Immediately after the First Congress, adroit Russian "advisors" moved into China: Borodin, Joffe, and Galen (who was in reality General Blucher, commander of Soviet Siberia). These soon realized that the best revolutionary material lay in Canton, where Sun Yat-sen and his supporters had taken refuge during the war-lord period following Yuan Shih-kai's attempted coup. There the Second National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party met in the summer of 1922. There Mao Tse-tung came into contact not only with Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Hu Han-min (whom he served briefly as secretary), but also the Russian representatives. Of these latter Payne made another provocative and highly statement, without any elaboration: "Mao, who knew no foreign language well and possessed a considerable contempt for foreigners in general, mentioned them rarely, and then with scorn."[1]

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[1] Yakhontoff, The Chinese Soviets, pp. 122ff.

Back in Shanghai, on January 26, 1923, Joffe for the Comintern and Sun for the Kuomintang issued this famous statement:

> Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the Communist order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either communism or sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who is further of the opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and attain full national independence, and regarding this great task, he has assured Dr. Sun Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia.[2]

It is noteworthy that this joint declaration as early as 1923 differentiated between communism and sovietism. Debate still rages as to how completely **Sun** accepted the Marxist distortion of his Three Principles of the People, an adaptation which Mao Tse-tung explained fully and frankly in The New Democracy, or whether Sun swung back toward the Right before his death. In any case, the revised structure of the Kuomintang followed closely the Soviet pattern, as did later Nationalist constitutions.

During the next few years Communism grew as both a political and an intellectual movement. Moscow had urged its disciples to join the Kuomintang as individuals; Voitinsky's opposition to this policy may have accounted for his replacement, as it did for Chen Tu-hsiu's later expulsion. Eager for any organized support, Sun Yat-sen and his successor welcomed these Communist adherents, confident that they could be controlled within a successful Nationalist regime. By 1925 Mao Tse-tung was director of the Kuomintang Propaganda Committee,[1] a year later secretary of the Kuomintang Peasants' Committee.

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[1] Payne, op. cit., p. 78.

[2] Quoted by U. S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Communism in China" in The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1949), House Document No. 154, Part 3, p. 10.

The Northern Expedition

This leads to the oft-disputed question of whether Communists were responsible for the excesses of the Northern Expedition in 1926-27. The conclusion appears to be affirmative, in very large measure. Whatever the extent of their military and political power in this campaign, the Communists provided the leadership for the very effective propaganda, or psychological warfare. On the Party's thirtieth anniversary Hsiao Hua, deputy director of the Political Department of the People's Revolutionary Military Council, made this authoritative boast:

> The Party....led the work of remoulding the Kuomintang troops, took the lead in the revolutionary war for the unification of Kwangtung Province, as well as in the 1926-1927 Northern Expeditionary War. The Party also controlled a part

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[1] Lovegren, op. cit., p. 21; cf. George Creel, Russia's Race for Asia (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1949), pp. 24 and 49.

the armed forces.[1]

Randall Gould, as editor of The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury one of the fairest newspapermen in the Orient, agreed. Even though he found it "puzzling in retrospect to make out why Canton was felt to be so Red," he added that "certainly (Russian) funds as well as technical help were forthcoming when the Northern expedition was started and, under Soviet direction, Chinese artists and writers devised their extraordinarily successful propaganda posters and other devices which fired the enthusiasm of the peasantry."[2] A letter sent from Hankow to Shanghai during this period reported:

> Nationalism in Hankow today is synonymous with outrage and mob violence. The envoys of Moscow have made the Nationalist movement a mockery.... The unions are absolutely supreme, organized and controlled by the argus-eyed Political Bureau, which is filled with Russian Bolshevik advisors....probably more Russians at Hankow than all the foreign residents combined.[3]

Only three more witnesses need be called briefly to the stand. Writing of this period, K. S. Latourette asserted: "The Communists were out not only to destroy religion, including Christianity, but Confucian morality, and much of the nation was scandalized."[4] After describing the 1923-27 collaboration during which Moscow played a direct and detailed role in guiding the Chinese Communist Party, Schwartz concluded: "The northern expedition was nevertheless launched with the final blessing of Borodin and the Comintern....It opened an immense area of activity for the aggressive organizers of the Communist Party."[2] The most competent witness of all is Chairman Mao Tse-tung in his Chinese Communist manifesto, The New Democracy:

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[1] China's Revolutionary Wars (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1951), p. 34.

[2] Randall Gould, China in the Sun, (Doubleday, Garden City, 1946), pp. 66-68.

[3] Chiang Throws off Yoke of Hankow Reds," Boston Evening Transcript, April 15, 1927.

[4] K.S. Latourette, The Chinese: Their History and Culture (Macmillan, New York, 1934), p. 436.

> In the Canton campaign and the northern expedition they (the patriotic parties) inculcated, for the first time and jointly, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal ideas into the ranks of the army, and thus created a new type of army....Due to the help rendered by the Soviet Union, the northern expedition was successfully carried out.[3]

Events in China moved relentlessly on. The disastrous break in 1927 presents too many facets for review here. Suffice it to say that China policy proved the cause celebre in the historic split between Stalin and Trotsky within the Soviet Union. Harold Isaacs, revising in 1951 his controversial book of 1938,[4] still maintains that had Stalin not misunderstood and misdirected the Second Revolution in China, the Communist Party might have been victorious then and established a regime independent of Russia and genuinely beneficial to the people. Such retrospective optimism fails to achieve full conviction on the political front; it gives no ground whatever for believing that the fundamental Marxist orientation described in this chapter would have altered in theory or practice.

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[2] Schwartz, op. cit., p. 124.

[3] Mao, The New Democracy, Chapter IX.

[4] Harold R. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (Stanford University, Stanford, rev. 1951), passim.

Mao Tse-tung, of course, from his boyhood on had laid the foundations for his leadership of a popular rural movement, a leadership which might never have fallen to him had the Communist revolution succeeded on urban proletarian or intellectual or political lines. Although a complete and avowed Marx-Leninist, Mao based his "Report on an Investigation of the Agrarian Movement in Hunan" not on any doctrinaire principles, but on the bitter experience of Chinese farmers. "The peasantry," he declared, "will bury beneath them all forces of imperialism, militarism, corrupt officialdom, village bosses, and evil gentry."[1]

From this same report came a few other sentences:

> The revolution is, after all, no banquet. It's not quite as dainty an occupation as writing books or painting flowers....("not a dinner party, nor a literary composition, nor a painting, nor a piece of pretty embroidery; it cannot be carried out 'softly, gradually, carefully, considerately, respectfully, politely, plainly, and modestly'.").... A revolution is violent action on the part of one class to overthrow the political power of another. ....All the excesses of the peasantry in this second period have a revolutionary significance.[2]

Perhaps Mao merely voiced the need for violence which even Martin Luther condoned in a Peasants' Revolt. Perhaps he reflected the ruthlessness universal in any class struggle. Or perhaps the orthodox Marxist had triumphed over the quiet, poetic Chinese scholar. In any interpretation, these words can be used to justify the atrocities--vainly denied by sympathizers--in Nanking and Hunan in the 'twenties, Kiangsi and Fukien in the 'thirties, Hopei and Shantung in the 'forties, the entire country in the 'fifties.

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[1] Quoted by Schwartz, op. cit., p. 74.

[2] Quoted ibid., pp. 75-76; the parenthetical phrases are from a somewhat different translation of the same passage from Payne, op. cit., p. 90.

Anti-Imperialism

At that time the traditional foe was still British imperialism, at least in the Kwangtung Revolt, adjacent to Hongkong. It is, therefore, quite relevant to this study to trace the shifting focal point from Great Britain to the United States of America. Two documents from the year 1929 bear so clearly and so critically on this issue that they deserve to be quoted. The first is a letter from the Executive Committee of the Communist International to the Chinese Communist Party, dated February 9, 1929:

> The American policy toward China, like that of the British and Japanese, is an imperialistic policy. The difference lies only in the method of application. The American "open door" policy is not designed to remove China from a colonial status. It is a liberal hypocrisy meant to prettify imperialist aggression. America is unable to adopt the same methods as the British and Japanese only because of present objective conditions.[1]

The Japanese had won their place in the Communist Hall of Infamy by the Twenty-One Demands. The British, holding Hongkong and a predominant influence in most of the foreign concessions, had not surrendered theirs. Yet America, despite her leadership in the Washington Conference restoring Shantung to China, had already earned a niche as the bulwark of capitalism. Not until the Second World War did the United States sufficiently come of age to be recognized as the arch-enemy in China. But the Communist International saw the shape of things to come.

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[1] Quoted by Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 130-131.

Obviously reflecting this Moscow directive, but embellished by familiar propaganda techniques, a Party Circular was issued in China in April, 1929, later included in "Our Policy on Activities Against the Wars Among the Militarists:"

> We must encourage the masses to oppose imperialism, particularly American imperialism, for while the masses can rather easily grasp the evils of Japanese and British imperialism, the crafty policy of the United States might easily lead the masses astray, particularly since they have been subject to bourgeois reformist deception. We must therefore stress the aggressive policies of the United States, which wishes, as it were, to suck the marrow of our bones and which is a hundred times worse than Great Britain or Japan.[1]

From this time forward, with few exceptions and regardless of war-time alliance, the United States increasingly replaced all rivals as the venomous symbol of capitalism and imperialism in Communist China.

Despite the loyalty of the Chinese Reds to the Comintern, direct aid and even direct contact appear to have largely ceased by the close of 1928. Chiang Kai-shek's "White Terror" massacred hundreds, including Mao's earliest Marxist mentor, Li Ta-chao. It drove the Russian advisors and some Chinese henchmen back to the Soviet Union. Meanwhile the triumph of Stalin over Trotsky had its Chinese repercussions in a Party split. Chen Tu-hsiu was expelled for favoring cooperation with the Kuomintang and opposing the isolated revolts in Changsha, Nanchang, Swatow, and elsewhere. Not until his death in 1943 was Chen canonized as the "ideological founder of the Chinese Communist Party."

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[1] Quoted, ibid., pp. 131-132.

Meanwhile Mao Tse-tung himself was somewhat persona non grata with Moscow. Although he had broken with his "heretical" professor, Chen Tu-hsiu, he had long insisted on an agrarian base for Chinese Communism, and was consequently condemned in a telegram from Stalin to Borodin and M.N. Roy, the Indian who played a decisive role in these events. Now, however, the chief actors were scattered, a few attempted urban uprisings had failed, and the Reds had no support except the "good earth" of China. With poor communications, a surrounding enemy, and little equipment of any sort, the Communists had to be guided by spot decisions and their intimate knowledge of local conditions in Hunan, southern Kiangsi, and western Fukien. Over the turn of the decade, not even newspapermen bothered with the "doomed remnant;" nor, apparently, did Joseph Stalin.

The major event of those early years of outlawry proved to be Mao Tse-tung's personal assumption of authority. Although he consolidated his position and earned absolute fealty only after the Long March, his leadership became clear much before that. In Chinese rather than Russian fashion, he compromised with possible rivals instead of destroying them. Most notable of these was Chu Teh, who joined forces with Mao in May, 1928, in the fastnesses of Chingkanshan, along the Hunan-Kiangsi border. Here the group of stragglers multiplied in two years from 10,000 to some 62,000.[1] Here they occupied Buddhist temples as hospitals, offices, and dormitories, ordering the priests to leave. Here, in defiance of both superstitious and intellectual religion, they hung their clothes on the idols and printed their newspapers on the backs of Buddhist scrolls.[2]

Soviet China

At the end of 1931 the First All-China Congress of Soviets convened in Juichin, Kiangsi, and established an independent Soviet Republic, with Mao Tse-tung as president. The Constitution adopted at that time has remained with very few changes the blueprint of Chinese Communist policy through two decades of expansion. It frankly set up a "democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants" in which....

> "only capitalists, landlords, the gentry, militarists, reactionary officials, tukhao (bourgeois capitalists?), monks--all exploiting and counter-revolutionary elements--shall be deprived of the right to elect deputies to participate in the government and to enjoy political freedom." (Article 2) [3]

Although the Chinese words differ, one may assume that priests and pastors and other religious workers were included with monks as "exploiting and counter-revolutionary elements."

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[1] U. S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p. 12.

[2] Payne, op. cit., p. 101.

[3] Quoted by Yakhontoff, op. cit., p. 218.

However, Article 13 encompassed much more than the corresponding section of the Russian Constitution.

> The Soviet Government in China guarantees true religious freedom to the workers, peasants, and toiling population. Adhering to the principle of the complete separation of church and state, the Soviet Government neither favours nor grants any financial assistance to any religion whatsoever. All Soviet citizens shall enjoy the right to engage in anti-religious propaganda. No religious institution of the imperialists shall be allowed to exist unless it shall comply with Soviet Law.[1]

First, religious freedom is restricted to even less than the full citizenry, at least by the 1949 definition of four classes: peasants, workers, petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie. Second, separation of church and state is broached in financial terms only. Third, there is a neat subtlety about the refusal even to "favour....any financial assistance." Fourth, this provision evidently excludes the Russian and satellite practice of controlling subsidies. Fifth, not even worship or belief counter-balances the "enjoyment" of anti-religious propaganda. Sixth, foreign missions are distinctly warned to acquiesce within Soviet areas.

As in the U.S.S.R. so-called civil liberties are listed as wholly divorced from religious rights. Article 10 guarantees freedom of speech, press, and assembly only to "workers, peasants, and toilers," while "all propaganda and other similar activities by reactionaries shall be suppressed, and all exploiters deprived of all political liberties."[1] Having already been named in these categories, "monks" of all types would presumably find their civil and religious liberties hampered thereby.

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[1] Quoted, ibid., p. 220.

In this first Chinese Communist Constitution, as in all subsequent documents and declarations, the most meticulous recognition paid to religion proves to be in terms of "national" minorities. In certain areas, especially the Northwest and Far West, these minorities hold the key to unity and popular support. Almost invariably, therefore, Moslems and Lama Buddhists are treated as racial and cultural groups, with added deference paid to their religious idiosyncrasies. Article 4 opens the ranks of citizenship in Soviet China to "all workers, peasants, Red Army men, and all their families, without distinction of sex, religion, or nationality" and then proceeds to itemize "Chinese, Manchurians, Mongolians, Mahometans, Tibetans, Mao (Miao?), Li, as well as all Koreans, Formosians (sic), Annamites, etc. living in China."[2]

The original Chinese Soviet territory included practically no foreigners, although the tides of civil war occasionally overflowed Protestant or Catholic mission stations. For this reason the Communists might well have ignored international problems, isolated as they were and engaged in a bitter struggle for survival. In more recent years observers have often commented that the People's Government was not prepared to handle the multitudinous issues involving foreigners, because previous contacts had been sparse and wholly individual. It is significant, therefore, to find that the Constitution of 1931 laid down some very specific policies in the field of international relations.

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[1] Quoted, ibid.
[2] Quoted, ibid., p. 218.

Foreign concessions, which still existed in most of the major cities, should be unconditionally returned to China. Resurgent nationalism demanded outright confiscation of customhouses, railways, mines, factories and the like under foreign ownership; these "colonial" vestiges had long rankled in patriotic Chinese minds. Whatever Mao Tse-tung may have thought of the Russian advisors in Canton in 1923, his new government proclaimed "the Soviet Union, the land of proletarian dictatorship, to be its loyal ally."[1] One can hardly argue from this that Communist China was forced reluctantly into a Russian alliance only by events and policies of the Second World War and its aftermath. Nevertheless, to individual aliens the 1931 regime, like that of 1949, guaranteed impartial treatment--within the framework of Communist class and state. "All foreign toilers living in districts under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Government shall enjoy the equal protection of all rights granted to toilers under the Soviet law." (Article 16)[1]

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[1] Payne, op. cit., p. 127.

Agrarian reform has always been part and parcel of the Communist program, although not--be it reiterated--the entire goal. So, too, the Land Law invariably goes hand in hand with the political constitution. Article 6 adopted by the First Chinese Soviet Congress declared:

> All lands belonging to religious institutions, to temples, and all other public lands shall without fail be delivered into the possession of the peasants by the Soviet Government. However, in disposing of these lands, it shall be essential to obtain the voluntary support of the peasants, so that their religious feelings may not be offended.[2]

The Chinese Communists had already learned, by experience more than by dogma, the warnings of Engels and Lenin. Religious institutions must be crippled, for their inherent falsity as well as their obstruction to social and economic programs, but superstitious sensibilities must not be violated.

Despite this caution, the Soviet regions were marked by persistent and undeniable persecution of all faiths. Succeeding chapters will reveal the specific impact on Protestant missions during these years. Here it should suffice to quote the report of Chairman Mao Tse-tung at the Second National Soviet Congress, also held in Juichin, in January, 1934:

In the Soviet territories, imperialist privi-

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[1] Quoted by Yakhontoff, _op., cit_., p. 221.
[2] Quoted, _ibid_., p. 223.

> leges have been abolished and imperialist influence wiped out. Imperialist pastors and fathers were ousted by the masses; estates of the people seized by imperialist missionaries were returned; missionary schools were turned into Soviet schools. In short, the Soviet districts in China alone are liberated from the imperialist yoke.[1]

Through these years of 1927-1934 the harassment of Kuomintang troops kept the Communists on the move and prevented much direct contact with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless the Chinese leaders were so thoroughly indoctrinated that the face of Russian Communism stared literally at every citizen toiler. Silver and paper currency carried not the picture of Mao Tse-tung or Sun Yat-sen or Joseph Stalin, but of Marx and Lenin.[2]

Intelligentsia

Meanwhile, in the cities under Nationalist rule, the cult of Communism grew substantially. The converts and the dogma of intellectual Marxism in the cultural centers of China differed markedly from those of the "agrarian reform" in southern Kiangsi. Economic equalitarianism seemed as alien a concept for fashionable silk-gowned students as foreign imperialism for isolated peasants, yet each proved acceptable as part of the ideological whole. Despite this apparent incongruity, one should not underestimate the power of the student movement during this period. Nor should one forget that many of the issues had been introduced into China by John Dewey and other apostles of skepticism and democracy. Bertrand Russell, for example, lectured widely on Religion, Bolshevism, and Russia,[1] and contributed an article, as did Chen Tu-hsiu and others, to the first edition of Anti-Religious Essays.[2]

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[1] Quoted, ibid., p. 252; cf. Mao Tse-tung, Red China (Martin Lawrence, London, 1934), p. 7.

[2] M. James and R. Doonping, Soviet China (Labor Research Association, New York, 1932), International Pamphlets, No. 20, p. 31; cf. photostatic copy in the author's possession.

The first violent anti-Christian movement sprang up in opposition to the world Student Christian Federation Conference held in Peking in the spring of 1922. Kiang Wen-han, student secretary of the Y.M.C.A., described the organizers as "a group of students in Shanghai who were apparently under the influence of communism."[3] Their proclamation of March 9, couched in obviously Marxist terms, asserted that "the present Christianity and the Christian church are the devils that support the (exploiting and oppressing) class in their effort to exploit and oppress the (exploited and oppressed) class."[4]

Under the guidance of several Pei-ta professors, who urged religious freedom in public as in the provisional constitution of China, the campaign shifted slightly from anti-Christianity to the Great Federation of Non-religionists.[5] Writing on "The New Thought Movement," H. C. Hu made no mention of Communism except in the titles of two study societies, Marxist and Communist. But he went on to list three familiar views of religion as prevalent among Chinese intellectuals: absolute opposition to an emotional, dogmatic, superstitious, authoritarian, alien system; acknowledgment of eternal religious values coupled with demands for radical revision in present forms; and recognition of religious influence on mankind, still needing to adopt more scientific methods.[1]

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[1] Chinese Recorder, August, 1923, pp. 447ff.

[2] Kao, op. cit., p. 56.

[3] Kiang Wen-han, The Chinese Student Movement (King's Crown Press, New York, 1948), pp. 61-62; cf. Philip DeVargas, International Review of Missions, 1925, p. 351.

[4] Quoted by Kiang, op. cit., p. 62.

[5] Chinese Recorder, op. cit., pp. 459ff.

The climax came on May 30, 1925, when several students were shot by International Settlement police in a Shanghai demonstration. Demands for government registration of all academic institutions, for Chinese administration, and for the separation of religion and education swept the country. By 1927 Chiang Kai-shek's new Nationalist Government had to include these provisions in its educational program. Most Protestant ~~mission~~ schools acquiesced at once, although some never yielded until forced to do so twenty years later by the People's Democratic Republic.

No one can say with authority how much Communist instigation lay behind these attacks in the early 'twenties. The students themselves denied that they were either anti-foreign or Red, but C. S. Chang described the influence as "distinctly Bolshevik despite denials;....the seeds sowed last year (1923) have undoubtedly borne fruit."[2] With proper orthodoxy the intellectuals denounced religion as an opiate of the people, missionary education as cultural imperialism, and Christianity as one cause and ally of the "unequal treaties." On the other hand, these smoldering resentments clearly antedated Soviet propaganda in China and probably any extensive study of Marxism. Presumably, as so often in years to come, a tiny nucleus of Communists exploited and capitalized upon the mistakes of the West.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 447ff.

[2] "The Anti-Religion Movement," *ibid.*, pp. 459ff.

Although Chiang Kai-shek's secret police had effectively eliminated most Red organization in the cities, the study of Marx and of the Russian experiment gained momentum in academic communities. Kiang Wen-han reports that five-sevenths of social science books in 1928-1930 dealt with Marxism, dialectic materialism, and related subjects. By 1935 the Classified Catalogue of Current Chinese Books listed ninety-seven volumes as follows: ten on dialectics, three on the history of dialectical method, five on materialism, eighteen on dialectic materialism, sixteen on historical materialism, ~~sixteen on historical materialism,~~ nine on scientific socialism, twenty-two on Marxian economics, and fourteen on conditions in the Soviet Union. Only nine of these were written by Chinese.[1]

Within the Chinese Church the Social Gospel paved the way for an acceptance of Communism. This is not the place for a detailed evaluation of religious thought. To say that China has contributed little original theology, however, is not to lay the blame at the door of liberal Western Protestantism, as some writers attempt to do.[1] The Confucian tradition professed skepticism about the supernatural and concentrated its powerful dogma on social and ethical relationships. Chinese pragmatism and individualism rejected any authoritarian creed, especially mysticism and transcendentalism. Chinese philosophers, with but one notable exception, stressed the goodness rather than the sinfulness of man. All the so-called Younger Churches have lacked the theological and social heritage of the West, which managed to moderate the Social Gospel over the decades.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

These reasons seem sufficient to suggest why the ethical character of Jesus and the social responsibility of the Church took precedence among many Chinese over other aspects of the Christian Gospel. Kiang Wen-han admitted that "Jesus was not only viewed as an ethical character but also as a social revolutionary."[2] He went on to cite two examples. Wu Lei-chuan, an old-style scholar and chancellor of Yenching University, believed that "the sole purpose of Christianity is social reconstuction," that salvation is to be found primarily in reconstructed environment, and that "the Kingdom of God" is "a new social order."[3] Y. T. Wu, whose name has since become a symbol of the "Domesticated Church," published his interpretation of The Social Gospel in 1934. In it he regretted that the Church had become reactionary by overemphasizing personal salvation, offered an analysis of the economic and political crisis "not very different from that of the Marxist," and implied that there is in the task of social reconstruction "practically no difference in objective between Christianity and Communism."[1]

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[1] Cf. Samuel E. Boyle (ed.), The Church in Red China 'Leans to One Side' (Hongkong, 1950).

[2] Kiang, op. cit., p. 131.

[3] Wu Lei-ch'uan, Christianity and Chinese Culture (1940), quoted ibid., p. 131.

An able scholar might write a fascinating dissertation on the Social Emphasis of Chinese Christian Thought. The subject is mentioned here only because it so obviously contributed to the theory behind recent events. Not only were certain--by no means universal--segments of the Church predisposed to accept this link between Communism and Christianity. But this interpretation of the Gospel has colored the more tolerant viewpoints of Red leaders; e.g. Chou En-lai in his peripheral contacts at Nankai Middle School in Tientsin. Despite its imperialistic origins and debilitating superstitions, Protestantism has been more nearly acceptable than other religions precisely because of its possibility as a revolutionary social force.

The United Front

From the Long March on, the leadership of Chinese Communism was the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, the pronouncements of the Party were the pronouncements of Mao Tse-tung.

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[1] Kiang, op. cit., pp. 131-132.

In January, 1935, three months from their south-central base and pursued by Kuomintang troops and planes, the Central Committee called a conference at Tsunyi, Kweichow Province, decisively excommunicated the "Left opportunists," and consolidated the power of Chairman Mao. Regardless of one's political sympathies, the story of the Long March makes thrilling reading, and the accomplishments in the barren valleys of Shensi cannot be discounted or belittled.

Although the historic trek ended in October, 1935, a year after it began, it was not until December, 1936, that the Communists finally established their headquarters in Yenan. That was the month when Chiang Kai-shek flew into a "kidnapping" plot at Sian--and, to the amazement of the world, flew out again on Christmas Day. The full story has never been told. Certainly reactionaries in the capital threatened to precipitate civil war, and the Generalissimo's execution, by mobilizing their own forces. Certainly the forthright courage of Madame Chiang and her husband weighed heavily in the decisive balance. And almost certainly the Communists, with Chou En-lai as spokesman, helped to save the President's life for the greater task ahead.

When Communist "Ambassador" Chou visited Nanking in the spring of 1937, he reportedly made four promises to the Kuomintang in preparation for resistance against Japan. According to Mao Tse-tung, these were as follows: 1) to abandon the agrarian revolution as practiced in the past; 2) to cease attempts to overthrow the Kuomintang by force (assuming this obligation would be reciprocal); 3) to reorganize the Soviet government in the Border Regions as democratic local regimes; and 4) to reorganize the Red Army as a national revolutionary army.[1]

The Nationalist version published much later differed significantly. 1) The Communist Party should struggle for the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen. 2) It should abandon not only the land policy and the effort to overthrow the Kuomintang, but also the entire Communist movement. 3) It should dissolve Soviet organization and carry out principles of democracy for the unity of the nation. 4) It should disband the Red Army.[2] Aside from the assumption of war against Japan, no reciprocal obligations have been mentioned by either side.

With all of its discrepancies, this proved to be the foundation for China's United Front. As early as the summer of 1935 the Comintern had advised its members to promote and participate in collition governments.[3] In the midst of the Long March for survival, the Chinese Communists could not immediately obey. But Chen Shao-yu (alias Wang Ming), Central Executive Committee representative in Moscow from 1931 until he returned to work for the United Front in China in

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[1] Quoted by Gunther Stein, The Challenge of Red China (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1945), p. 114.

[2] China Handbook, 1937-45 (New York, 1947) p. 67, quoted by Payne, op. cit., pp. 165-172.

[3] U. S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p. 22.

1938, declared that all conciliation to Chiang stemmed from that Comintern order. He added that the Reds always intended to retain full political and organizational independence.[1]

Public announcement of the United Front came on September 22, 1937, when the Chinese Communist Party proclaimed that "the policy of insurrection which aims at the overthrow of the Kuomintang's political power, the policy of land confiscation, and the policy of Communist propaganda shall all be disowned and discontinued."[2] The next day the Nationalist Party issued a similar assurance of "buried hatchets" and a United Front against Japan.

What the world did not hear, or heard only through a handful of sympathetic travellers, was the real voice of Yenan. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs has quoted a statement (with no source given), "attributed to Mao Tse-tung and certainly expressive of the party line" concerning the United Front:

> The war between China and Japan is an excellent opportunity for the development of our party. Our determined policy is 70% self-development, 20% compromise, and 10% fight the Japanese....The first stage is to fight for a balance of power vis-a-vis the Kuomintang to achieve an equilibrium. The third stage is to infiltrate deeply into central China, to establish bases there, in order to launch counter-offensives against the Kuomintang, with the view of taking away from the Kuomintang its leading position.[3]

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[1] Martin Ebon, World Communism Today (Whittlesey, New York, 1948), p. 370.

[2] Quoted, ibid., p. 371; cf. U. S. House Committee, op. cit., p. 23.

[3] Quoted by U. S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p. 24.

Whether these are the words of Mao Tse-tung or not, they coincide remarkably with another document purportedly issued in Yenan in 1937 as "Present Strategy and Tactics of the Chinese Communist Party:"

> It is the present strategy of the Chinese Communist Party to establish a democratic republic and its tactics are to cease civil war and to cooperate with the Kuomintang....(because) present circumstances require a temporary compromise....(although) to give up temporarily the revolutionary regime is merely a change of name and a preparation for greater victory in the future....Our compromise is designed to weaken the Kuomintang and to overthrow the National Government;...in reality the Red Army will continue its independent existence.[1]

These two statements are quoted at length because they reveal the duality of Communist policy which may later appear in the religious field as well. This can also be seen in the fact that Mao Tse-tung told newsmen in September, 1939, the Chinese Communists were opposed to what had become an "imperialist war" after the Nazi-Soviet Pact.[2] Some analysts have noted a distinct slackening of effort against Japan during the Moscow-Berlin alliance. In short, the struggle for the survival of China itself was subordinate to the orthodox Comintern line.

The New Democracy

Even the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives of the United States of America calls Mao Tse-tung's The New Democracy

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[1] Quoted by Ebon, op. cit., p. 371.
[2] Ibid., p. 374.

> ....the most important Communist writing produced outside of the Soviet Union since before the Russian revolution. Few single Communist documents since the Manifesto in 1848 have made greater contributions to the system of Communist thought. It is as remarkable for its deceptive effect as for its Communist orthodoxy.[1]

The New Democracy was published early in 1940, although it includes fragments from previous speeches as well as subsequent ones. At that point in the Second World War Allied fortunes were low. Chinese resistance had reached its direst extremes of isolation, discouragement and military bankruptcy. Western Europe floundered in an apparent war of attrition and dared not risk her Far Eastern resources in any provocative aid to China. America remained technically neutral, her attention and power increasingly concentrated on the "Battle of the Atlantic."

Within China conditions seemed well-nigh hopeless at the close of 1939. No air-lift "over the Hump" as yet supplemented the trickle of supplies along the Burma Road. In bombed and battered Chungking the Nationalist Government encountered frictions and rivalries and conflicting counsels among its own ranks. To the Communists at Yenan, and scattered in guerilla forces across North China, the United Front had lost its usefulness. Russia had signed a Friendship Pact with Hitler Germany and denounced the imperialistic war; why should Soviet China do less?

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[1] U. S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p. 34, cf. pp. iv. and 27-33.

The New Democracy means all things to all men; that is its strength. Mao offers loyal acceptance and subtle perversion of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People. Liberals who recognized China's need for state socialism combined with private enterprise could accept the economic goals of the New Democracy without looking beyond to the ultimate goal of Communism. Lovers of patriotism and international justice welcomed the resolute opposition to Japanese--and other--imperialism. Missionaries conscientiously wading through the Chinese characters, before and after 1949, were lulled by the elementary repetition into a very shallow analysis.

Like most Communist documents, The New Democracy says almost nothing about religion or foreign missions, even by implication. Nevertheless, without attempting to review the book in toto, this study should point out the passages which, directly or indirectly, might have relevance to the experience of Protestant missions in Communist China.[1]

Repeatedly around the world Christianity and Communism have clashed over their concepts of truth. Fundamentally Marxism poses the paradox of ethical relativity combined with absolute authoritarianism. Mao Tse-tung reflects this dilemma when he appeals in his introduction for the scientific approach, seeking "only one truthful answer to any question." His conclusion, based not on "individual preferences" but on "objective thinking," is that "the revolutionary practice of thousands of the people is the measure of truth." No mention is made of the methods used to determine (in both senses of the word) that practice. And in Section II Mao quotes a 1925 article by Stalin, concluding, "What is correct in one historical situation may prove to be incorrect in another historical situation."

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[1] Quotations are from the publication by Sharaf Athar Ali, (New Age Printing Press, Bombay, India), used by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs as "the best available at the time this study was prepared" (op. cit., pp. 67ff.).

Just a few lines earlier Mao Tse-tung permits Stalin, in a 1918 quotation concerning the achievements of the October Revolution, to raise the paramount issue:

> It has widened the scope of the national question and converted it from the particular question of combating national oppression into the general question of emancipating the oppressed nations, colonies, and semi-colonies from imperialism......

Just as "imperialism" is central to Marxist thought, even though it requires varied interpretations in different settings, so is it central in the treatment of Christian missions in China. After this initial assertion from Stalin, Mao goes on in Section III to make two vital admissions: first, the influence of Russia on the Chinese proletariat, and second, the influence of Communism on the Northern Expedition of 1926-27.

> The Chinese proletariat of that time (immediately following the May 4 movement in 1919), through its own growth and through the influence upon it of the Russian revolution, rapidly became a conscious, independent political force. The slogan, "Down with imperialism," and the

very thorough anti-imperialist program, were laid by the Communist Party of China.

Since "the dominating feature of the international situation of today is the clash of declining imperialism and rising soicalism, therefore it is imperialism that will not allow China to develop its own capitalism." (Section V) This same theme runs through practically every paragraph. Real socialism in China is out of the question until imperialism and feudalism are overthrown (Section VI). Whatever other modifications are made in Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles, the policy must not ally itself with imperialism or against the Soviet Union (Section VII).

Careful rereading of history does reveal some alliances of Christian missions with imperialism: appeals for "gunboat diplomacy," property manipulations, flagrant abuse of extraterritoriality, for Chinese converts as well as foreigners. Anarchic conditions may have justified some of these acts. From the modern standpoint differences in Occidental and Oriental law or psychology do not justify them.

But the most telling criticisms fall in the area of "cultural imperialism." This may mean certain forms of economic exploitation: "Standard Oil for the lamps of China," "a cigarette in the mouth of every man, woman, and child." But it can and does also refer to the Anglo-Saxon educational system, to protests against foot-binding or concubinage, to the spread of toothbrushes into the very remotest hamlet.

"In China," says Mao Tse-tung (Section VIII), "there is the imperialist form of culture, which is the reflection of the means by which imperialism rules China." The problems, which neither Mao nor missions have been able to settle, are these: how to separate the good from the bad, and how to make the good indigenous, independent of its foreign origins.

For the proper Marxist "a certain culture is the reflection in a thought form of the politics and economics of a certain society." Only with this in mind can one understand why Mao Tse-tung lists as "Stages of the Cultural Revolution" (Section IX) what seem obviously periods of political realignment. Nevertheless, in an effort to follow the twistings of Communist attitudes toward Christianity, it may help to see the successive phases as he does.

First were the two years, 1919-21, from the "anti-imperialist and anti-feudal" May Fourth Movement to the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. This revolution, "unprecedented in Chinese history," accomplished a great deal, according to Mao, "against the old ethics and for the new ethics, against the old literature and for the new literature." The second period consisted of six years, 1921-27, during which the embryonic Communist Party grew to adolescence. It was marked by a close alliance of Kuomintang and Kungchantang[1] with overlapping membership, by the disastrous incident of May 30, 1925, and by the Northern Expedition of 1926-27. It ended with the split of the party, first by Chiang Kai-shek's "betrayal" and second by the Chinese parallel to the Stalin-Trotsky fight.

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[1] Chinese Communist (literally Produce-Together) Party.

The nine years from 1927 to 1936 saw Communism come of age in China. Under bitter attack by the "White Terror," it gained in support, from both peasants and intellectuals, and in the hard wisdom of experience. By guerilla tactics it defended itself against overwhelming odds, and consummated one of the epic journeys of all history. In the northwest it established headquarters which proved to be a fitting ideological home, and by wise restraint it tipped the balance for Chiang Kai-shek's leadership in the war against Japan.

Mao ends with the three year period, 1937 to 1940. By most calculations that stage continued until 1946, despite the political shifts within the Comintern, reflected by Yenan. In this last successful struggle the establishment of a central government on October 1, 1949, marks a climax but not a dividing point for the Communists themselves. Mao Tse-tung concludes this section as follows:

> During the twenty years of the zigzag path followed, we have tasted every form of good and evil....The policy of extermination had the constant backing of imperialism, together with the support of the reactionary forces both inside China and all over the world.

Section X of The New Democracy supplies the "knockout" blow as far as Christian missions are concerned. "We Communists may work in a united front for political action with people who profess religious or idealistic beliefs but should have nothing to do with philosophical idealism or religion in themselves."

The sentence immediately following demands that the new democratic, revolutionary culture must preserve the best of the old but throw out all the "feudal rubbish" it contains. The paragraph immediately preceding the "keynote" exalts a scientific culture, which "opposes all forms of feudal and superstitious thought and stands for the pragmatist attitude, an attitude of getting at objective truth and the unity of theory and practice." "In building up an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, and anti-superstitious joint front of the forces of progress....care must be taken to avoid including any form of reactionary idealism."

More specifically Mao attempts on this problem of cultural imperialism to combine practical realism with proud nationalism, or in Marxian terms, to unite empiricism with dogmatism. The Chairman, who later showed keen admiration for American visitors to Yenan, especially radio and observation teams, laid down this policy near the close of The New Democracy:

> China should absorb on a great scale the progressive culture of foreign countries....However we should in no way blindly accept everything foreign without criticism, but should deal with it just as in metabolism; we first chew our food, then finally our system separates it into two por-

> tions, the one that is to be absorbed to nourish us and the other which is to be thrown out. The thesis of "wholesome westernization" is a mistaken viewpoint. To import things foreign has done China much harm. The same attitude is necessary for the Chinese Communists in the application of Marxism to China. Marxism should not be applied subjectively and dogmatically. Such Marxism is useless.

This document has rightly been hailed as a masterpiece of propaganda, especially for enticing liberals into the Communist camp. The paragraph above might be wholly acceptable if accompanying theory and subsequent practice did not reveal the selection and methods of ejection used in all Marxian metabolism. Foreign friends of China have over the decades been more concerned for an indigenous yet modern Chinese culture than many Chinese. But Mao's criterion becomes obvious when he lists as prerequisites:

> ....taking the hand of friendship offered by the Soviet Union, (and combating the) section (I refer to it as only "a section") of the so-called American-European educated, who....are now trying their hand at the policy of so-called "restricting the Communists" and "liquidating of communism."

Here, then, Mao Tse-tung's advocacy of an expedient united front with religious groups is coupled with a vigorous rejection of religious principles. He does earlier concede that creeds are economically determined, and therefore cannot be eliminated until the class struggle ends. "There is the outlook of feudalism for the landlord class, of capitalism for the bourgeois, Buddhism for the monks, Christianity for the Christians, polytheism for the peasantry...." (Section VI) Beyond this anthropological-psychological-historical illustration, Mao makes no mention of Christians or Christianity. He does, however, propose "real popular and equal suffrage irrespective of differences of sex, belief, property and education." (Section IV)

Other Statements

In the months which followed publication of The New Democracy tensions and clashes between Communists and Nationalists steadily increased, until full-scale conflict broke out in December, 1940. The very few contacts which missionaries--or any Westerners--had with Yenan will be cited in a later chapter. After Pearl Harbor an American Army group and assorted correspondents visited the Border Regions, as many as could secure permission from suspicious Kuomintang officials. To these guests Chairman Mao, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, and the rest were unfailingly courteous--and diplomatic. Along with these pleasant foreigners, almost unanimously sympathetic to the Soviet cause if only by contrast to Kuomintang chaos, the war brought Mao and his cohorts a distorted concept of American life *à la* Hollywood. Of those films which Robert Payne specifically mentions,[1] Betty Grable undoubtedly proved the complete decadence of bourgeois culture, while "Grapes of Wrath" confirmed the most sordid and degraded economic analyses of Karl Marx.

The most important statement by Mao Tse-tung after The New Democracy was his report to the Seventh National

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[1] Payne, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

Congress of the Chinese Communist Party on April 24, 1945, on the eve of the San Francisco Conference. Other major wartime addresses had dealt largely with military tactics rather than civil or international affairs: On A Prolonged War (1938) and Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary Wars (February, 1941). But the Chairman's 1945 report turned out to be a major policy statement, designed for all the world to hear, and timed not only for the United Nations Conference, but prophetically for war's end as well. The speech, first entitled On Coalition Government, was later published as The Fight for a New China.

With such timing and purpose, The Fight for a New China sounded gentle and mild, favorable to America as well as to Russia, China's great allies in a "holy war." Even the Kuomintang, Mao averred, should not be regarded as a "unanimously reactionary party." Ironically enough this significant Communist document demanded the "abolition of party-controlled education."[1]

Mao's report, however, came at a time when "thought control" had become rampant in Nationalist China, and the fascistic tendencies of Chen Li-fu had forced him--but not his methods--out of the Ministry of Education. Declaring broad-mindedly that "we Communists should join hands with all intellectuals, irrespective of class, religion, or political affiliation,"[1] Mao encouraged anti-Kuomintang liberalism by demanding the "abolition of concentration camps and reactionary decrees that suppress the people's freedom of speech, of press, of assembly, of association, of thought, of belief, and of person, so that the people may enjoy these rights."[2]

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, The Fight for a New China (New Century, New York, 1945), p. 44.

Regarding cultural imperialism The Fight for a New China echoed almost the exact words of The New Democracy:

> Toward foreign culture it is wrong to take a hostile attitude. Progressive foreign culture should be absorbed as much as possible for the benefit of China's cultural movement. But it would be wrong to copy it slavishly.[3]

Again too, civil rights should be respected primarily in terms of protecting national minorities, whatever their language, customs, and religious beliefs may be.[4] But here Mao Tse-tung went beyond such general guarantees to stipulate the following:

> In accordance with the principle of religious freedom, all religions are allowed to exist in the Liberated Areas. The government will protect all Protestants, Catholics, Mohammedans, Buddhists, and all other religious believers if they observe its laws and decrees. Both followers and unbelievers have equal freedom. No compulsion or discrimination is tolerated.[5]

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[1] Ibid., p. 64.
[2] Ibid., p. 42.
[3] Ibid., p. 64.
[4] Ibid., p. 65.
[5] Ibid., pp. 74-75; this is the left-wing New York version, but another translation, claiming to be based on an original copy from Yenan, concludes: "It is forbidden to force people to accept any religion or to discriminate against unbelievers." (Unbreakable China, Low Pay Hock, Singapore, p.39.) If this is accurate, Mao has cleverly parroted the lopsided freedom of Soviet Russia; the Chinese language which can be aggravatingly explicit and precise, can also be conveniently vague.

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The era of Chinese "carpet-baggers," Nationalist and Communist, the valiant but foredoomed Marshall Mission, the mutual recriminations and retaliations, cannot be described here. The Reds officially date their War of Liberation from July, 1946, with the collapse of negotiations and the resumption of full-scale combat. Chiang Kai-shek and his reactionary cliques stood adamant, not only against concessions to Communist demands, but also against essential counter-balancing reforms. The "rebels" effectively sabotaged military power and economic rehabilitation by guerilla tactics against railroads and towns from Manchuria to Shensi. By November, 1948, as the bitterest military battle of the civil war surged around Hsuchow, Mao Tse-tung placed American imperialism ahead of Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary rule as the chief obstacle to a unified democratic people's republic in alliance with the Soviet Union.[1]

Came the year of "Liberation," 1949. Most of Shantung, including the mission center at Tsinan, had fallen the previous autumn. Yenching University, probably the most famous Christian institution in China, had been taken over in December, 1948. From Tientsin and Peking in January the tidal wave swept southward and westward, to Nanking and Taiyuan in April, to the Wu-Han cities and Sian, to Shanghai and Nanchang in May, to Tsingtao (the ex-German-Japanese-American naval base) in June, to Foochow and Lanchow in August, Sinkiang in September, Canton in October, Kweiyang and Kweilin in November, Chengtu in December. Only Tibet remained on the mainland, more vulnerable to a war of nerves than direct attack.[1]

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[1] Payne, op. cit., p. 246.

> Today (Mao Tse-tung) is the undisputed master of China, with an effective power greater than that possessed by any of the Chinese emperors. Never in history has any man possessed so much direct power over so many people. For good or evil the power represented by him has come to stay, and from now on the destiny of the world will be intimately, and perhaps violently, affected by the decisions made by him and by the people he leads.[2]

In the midst of this decisive advance, Chairman Mao issued his annual message on the party anniversary, July 1, 1949. Gone were any fictitious concerns for coalition government or civil rights or foreign approval. (Mao expressed his long-held and apparently sincere belief that "the internal crisis in the United States is of a very serious nature."[3]) This address was a frank declaration of war against all reactionary classes.

First there appeared the familiar theme, more explicit than in The New Democracy, that between imperialism and socialism there can be no middle road, no "third path;" neutrality is a camouflage or a delusion.[1] Second, the rights to vote and to express an opinion were expressly confined to "the people," and to them alone "the democratic system" grants freedom of speech, assembly, and organization. Third, "at the present stage in China the people are the working class, the class of the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie."[2]

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[1] The failure of the People's Liberation Army in several costly attacks to seize Chinmen (Golden Gate) and other small islands off Amoy suggested to some observers that President Truman need not have "neutralized" the Formosan Straits to protect the Nationalist retreat; in fact, he may thereby have deflected "Red China's fighting hordes" from a watery defeat to the firmer soil of Korea.

[2] Payne, op. cit., p. 263.

[3] Mao Tse-tung, On People's Democratic Rule (New Century, New York, 1950) Marxist Pamphlet, No. 5.

Fourth, in his report On People's Democratic Rule, Chairman Mao made very clear the methods to be used in consolidating his regime, methods which pay little heed to the Marxist dream of withering government, methods which have been felt increasingly by Chinese and foreign Christians during 1951-1952.

> We cannot destroy state power at present.... Our task today is to strengthen the apparatus of the people's state, which means in the main the people's army, the people's police, and the people's courts, national defense, and the defense of the interest of the people....The army, police and courts of the state are instruments of classes to oppress classes. To hostile classes the State apparatus is the instrument of oppression. It is a weapon of violence and not of "benevolence."[3]

In conclusion, Mao turned to classic quotations and said of

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[1] Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[2] Already the Three-Antis (corruption, waste and bureaucracy) and the Five-Antis (bribery, smuggling, stealing natural resources, skimping work and materials, and stealing national economic reports) have threatened to eliminate petty capitalists and national capitalists from the scene.

[3] Ibid., pp. 8-9.

"one phrase we always remember" from Chu Hsi, the Sung Philosopher, "'Do unto others as they do unto you:' that is exactly what we are doing today."[1]

Throughout this decisive year of 1949 the rapid advance of the People's Liberation Army was preceded by a propaganda barrage, reminiscent of the Northern Expedition on a vastly larger and more effective scale. Radios whispered glowing promises, assurances of order, and practical instructions. Illicit posters and leaflets appeared, defying a despised and decadent Kuomintang. Hastily chalked slogans adorned available walls: "Long Live Mao Tse-tung, Our Saving Star!"

The official "Announcement of the Chinese People's Liberation Army," signed by Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, varied slightly in different locales. But the eight points became familiar, month by month, across the length and breadth of China. Those clauses applying directly to the experience of Protestant missions are quoted from a local translation:

> 1. Protection be given to lives and properties of all people. People of all walks of life, without distinction of caste, religion and profession, are expected to maintain the original order....Punishment will be given to those who are reactionary....
>
> 4. Schools, hospitals, cultural and educational institutions, gymnasiums and other public welfare works are under protection. The employees therein are expected to carry on their work. The Liberation Army will give them protection; no infringement is permissable.

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[1] Ibid., p. 11.

> 7. The feudal land system is unreasonable and should be abolished....generally speaking, lessening of rent and interest will precede redistribution of land....Land and houses in the city will not be handled in the same way as in rural districts.
>
> 8. Protection be given to the lives and property of foreign residents in the country. It is hoped that they will maintain order of the society and do their business as usual. They should obey all legal orders of the Liberation Army. They should not carry on spy activities, neither should they do anything contrary to the independence and liberation work of the Chinese. They are not allowed to protect war criminals, otherwise they will receive punishment.

It is worth noting that these regulations came strictly from the military branch of government. Mao's name was signed as "Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission" and Chu's as "Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese People's Liberation Army."

The Common Program

The official constitution of Communist China is the Common Program (also called the Organic Law) passed by the People's Political Consultative Conference at Peking in September, 1949. In various sections of the country--during early months at least--Christian groups seemed to be convinced that their treatment stemmed from local authorities and local circumstances, with little or no regard for a national pattern or policy. Often this was true, especially in areas which had been "liberated" long before the establishment of civil government. In other cases, this conviction obviously reflected lack of information and perspective on the total situation. But increasingly the importance and authority of the Common Program became apparent everywhere, and Chinese Christians occasionally appealed successfully for Peking to enforce religious tolerance denied at the local level.

Article 1 of the General Principles asserts that the People's Republic "opposes all imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism and strives for the independence, democracy, peace, unification, prosperity and strength of China."[1] Article 3 stresses more explicitly that

> ....the People's Republic of China must abolish all prerogatives of imperialist countries in China, confiscate bureaucratic capital....protect the economic interests and private property of workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie.

Of course the privileges of extraterritoriality and foreign concessions had been surrendered during the Second World War--twenty-five years after the Soviet Union made that gesture. But in the chaos of post-war Nationalist "reconstruction," special agreements had nullified much of the newly-acquired independence. Foreign gunboats still patrolled the Yangtze "to protect their nationals," and Western capitalism still controlled many strategic utilities and public services as well as industries. Neither Nationalists nor Communists in recent years had devised any procedure for turning over alien property to Chinese owners; those mission boards which belatedly recognized the "handwriting on the wall" found no legal provision for transferring their "imperialistic holdings" to acceptable Christian "citizens."

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[1] Except where otherwise indicated, quotations are from the unofficial translation by New China News Agency, printed in the China Weekly Review, October 8, 1949, pp. 85-88.

Article 5 of the Common Program guarantees:

> The people of the People's Republic of China shall have freedom of thought, speech, publication, assembly, association, correspondence, person, domicile, moving from one place to another, religious belief, and the freedom of holding processions and demonstrations.

Although religious freedom is herein confined to belief, without hint of education or social service or even specifically worship, at the same time this provision lacks the encouragement to anti-religious propaganda, found in Russia or in the Chinese Soviet Constitution of 1931. Since neither aliens nor reactionaries hold status among the four classes of "people," no constitutional rights for Church employees can be claimed.

Equal rights and "freedom of marriage" for women as well as men (Article 6) have become in effect sanctions for easy marriage and divorce on political grounds, and this collapse of traditional family morality has earned Christian condemnation. The demand to suppress all counter-revolutionary activities, especially those who "collude with imperialism" (Article 7) has naturally been extended to include opposition to Communism. The avowed unity "with all peace and freedom-loving countries and people's democracies throughout the world, first of all the Soviet Union, all people's democracies, and all oppressed nations," (Article 11) excludes by official definition the homelands of most

Christian missionaries, thus introducing an emotional as well as political point of friction.

Under Cultural and Educational Policy, the Common Program stresses nationalism, science, and democracy. "The application of scientific historical viewpoint to the study and interpretation of history, economics, politics, culture and international affairs shall be promoted." (Article 44) The Marxist scientifical historical viewpoint, however, conflicted in many an educational institution with the Christian scientific historical viewpoint.

> The method of education of the People's Republic of China is the unity of theory and practice. The People's Government shall reform the old educational system, system, subject matter and teaching method systematically according to plan. (Article 46)

To Christian literature Communist propaganda offered irrestible competition. Translations of Church classics, denominational periodicals, devotional materials, religious education supplies, and all manner of tracts fell under the purview of the Common Program, Article 49:

> Freedom of reporting true news shall be safeguarded. The utilization of the press to slander to undermine the interests of the state and the people, and to provoke world war is prohibited. The people's broadcasting work and the people's publication work shall be developed and attention paid to publishing popular books and newspapers beneficial to the people.

An entire chapter of the Common Program deals with "nationalities" and racial minorities in terms of equal rights, appropriate representation, and regional autonomy. Article 53 guarantees that "all national minorities have the freedom of developing their dialects and languages, preserving or reforming their customs, habits and religious beliefs." The whole Marxist doctrine, from Engels through Lenin to Mao Tse-tung, is epitomized in this one alternative. Communism holds firmly to the conviction that religious faith and practice are unscientific superstitions, yet they must be tolerated in order to win the unenlightened masses. Therefore such customs and beliefs may be preserved, but more likely under systematic indoctrination they will yield to reform--or eradication.

Finally, in the chapter on Foreign Policy, "the People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall protect law-abiding foreign nationals in China." (Article 59).

Conclusion

Against this background of general policy, it is now possible to sketch in the details of Protestant missionary experience in Communist China. For twenty years Chinese Reds had encountered foreign Christians on an individual and local basis. Whether the policies and treatments applied could also be classified as individual and local is quite another matter. That question poses one of the problems for subsequent chapters. But certainly scattered bands of Communist guerillas met and dealt with isolated missionaries--for good or ill. The occasional visitors to Yenan during the war years found themselves welcomed as representatives of democracy and the united front rather than agents of the Church--almost always sympathetic to Communist ideals.

By the close of 1949 Mao Tse-tung had established a New Democracy, a People's Republic, over the largest homogeneous population and one of the largest territories in the world. He faced a subtle and paradoxical blend of hope and hopelessness. Out of desperate economic suffering and despair, political apathy, and fear of the "Ba Lu" (Eighth Route Army), the peasantry yearned for a full rice bowl and the end of war. Out of post-war disillusionment and shame, financial stringency and frustrated nationalism, the intelligentsia longed for some measure of stability and dignity. The hopeless and hopeful were not successive, but inextricably mingled.

Among 475,000,000 Chinese some 1,800 Protestant foreign missionaries should be easily ignored. They could not. The wonder is not that the Government and local officials and newspapers said and did so little, but that they said and did so much.

The relationships of cause and effect are too complex, too intricate, for neat, precise analysis. Social science can never achieve the positivism of natural science because it handles the great intangible, human motivation. It may be true, as some would maintain, that Communists can be "pigeonholed" more easily than other people because they are automatons or puppets. Yet the possession of minds and hearts and even souls--whatever the orthodox explanation may be--can produce Communists as unpredictable as Christians, for the factors determining interaction are not all one-sided.

In the broadest sense, Marxists, especially Chinese Mao-ists, react not to the master's voice but to a master philosophy. Mao Tse-tung in The New Democracy quoted Lenin as having said: "There can be no revolutionary practice without revolutionary theory." For that reason it has seemed justified to devote these introductory chapters to the revolutionary theory behind the truly revolutionary experience of Protestant missions in Communist China.

CHAPTER 4

THE PRACTICE IN CHINA, 1921-1934

Two such powerful ferments as Communism and Christianity could not exist side-by-side, even for a year, without violent reaction. The Communist Party of China organized on July 1, 1921, in Shanghai; the violent attacks on Christianity began on March 9, 1922, in Shanghai. It is difficult to say whether Voitinsky, Chen Tu-hsiu, and the others--more directly concerned with labor union efforts --exerted personal influence on students and intelligentsia, or whether the causal connection lay among the writings of Karl Marx and the events of the Russian Revolution.

In any case the twin themes of anti-religion and anti-imperialism were hammered away in unison. The Chinese Student Union in league with the Non-Religious Federation shouted and painted "Down with Imperialism and Anti-Cultural Aggression" and "Religion is the People's Opium."[1] Their criticisms covered church organizations, mission work of all kinds, Bible teaching, and even the lives of missionaries. By the following year, 1923, denunciations had become widespread. Chinese intellectuals resented the frank admission that the aim of missionary education was to make China Christian. They resented still more the earlier and narrower declaration (at a General Conference of Protestant missionaries in 1877) that part of the purpose of Christian schools was "to introduce to China the superior education of the West...to take the lead in introducing to China the science and arts of Western civilization" as "the best means of gaining access to the higher classes of China."[1]

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[1] Kao, "How Shall the Chinese Church Continue Its Work Under the Communist Government?" pp. 55-56.

The May Thirtieth (1925) Massacre, as it came to be called, added fuel to the spreading flames. Where full-blown agitation against Western imperialism had occurred in only twelve mission schools prior to that "day of infamy," forty-four schools were seriously affected in the next four months.[2] Y. T. Wu, already active in the Student Christian Movement, charged in a special issue of The Chinese Recorder on "The Intellectual Awakening of Young China," that students in mission schools were being robbed of initiative and independent thought. "Let the foreign missionaries change their domineering attitude, if they hold such an attitude," he demanded.[3]

In that same magazine, perhaps the most influential English-language publication of the time in China, C. S.

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[1] Quoted by K. S. Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China (Macmillan, New York, 1929), pp. 441-442.

[2] Kiang, The Chinese Student Movement, pp. 87-95.

[3] Chinese Recorder, August, 1923, pp. 468ff.

Chang listed in some detail the criticisms of religion, Christian teaching, and the Church.[1] Religion in general, according to many students, is a primitive and antiquated superstition, dogmatic, unfavorable to progress, unnecessary for mankind, and unrelated to genuine morality, which is a natural impulse. Christianity as such rests on utterly unscientific legends and miracles. Its doctrine of the goodness of God in an evil world is an insult to logic. Its assurance of heaven deceives the masses and obstructs sound social theories. In short, this unnatural foreign religion is not at present adaptable to China.

Finally, the Christian Church is charged with opposing free thought, causing war, supporting capitalism and suppressing radical ideas. By protecting missionaries and converts in lawsuits and property seizures, the Church's cloak of extraterritoriality is a sin against the national integrity of China. With evil methods the Church favors the aristocracy, tricks its converts, encourages low moral standards and "rice Christianity." "To these critics", Chang concluded, "the Christian Movement in China seems to be the vanguard of Western exploitation, capitalism and imperialism."

South China

From the May Thirtieth Incident on, the anti-foreign, anti-religious crusade could find plenty of active support in any section of the country. But as the criticisms began where the Communist Party began, in Shanghai, so they reached their peak of intensity where the Reds now concentrated, in Canton. Whatever the fluctuating sympathies of Sun Yat-sen may have been, his death left the Kuomintang in the South an easy prey to Communist infiltration.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 459ff.

In Canton's sympathy strike of 1925, Shameen, the principal foreign residential island, was blockaded, and passes were issued to most nationalities except the British. A New Zealand missionary received a pass as "one of the oppressed people of the British Empire." In commenting on this episode, H. A. Wittenbach, canon emeritus of Hongkong Cathedral and now Secretary of the Church Missionary Society, remarked: "Communism in China was thus originally anti-British. It was also anti-Christian...(although) other religions were also attacked as mere superstitions."[1]

This movement, however, had even antedated the Shanghai Massacre. In April, 1925, Y. L. Lee cited communistic propaganda as one of ten causes for anti-religious propaganda, but others were closely interrelated: nationalsim, opposition to Great Britain and America, the movement to control Christian schools, the failure of students in Christian schools to cooperate in patriotic movements, the support of certain Kuomintang leaders (such as Wang Ching-wei, who contributed to the first edition of *Anti-Religious*

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[1] H. A. Wittenbach, *Christianity and Communism in China* (Highway Press, London, 1949), p. 4.

Essays along with Chen Tu-hsiu, and capped his career as the puppet president of Japanese-occupied China).

"There is a certain political element," Lee explained discreetly, "which wanted to get into every institution of learning for the sake of propaganda, and it has found its opposition in the mission schools." Responsibility for this agitation he placed at several doors: political societies, the Whampoa Military Academy (of which Chiang Kai-shek was head), the Kuomintang, and the Kungchantang.[1]

In an already familiar catalogue of Christian crimes, Lee assembled the following reasons for the anti-religious movement. Christianity, as a forerunner of imperialism, helps capitalism to enslave the masses. Christianity, as impractical and miraculous and superstitious, has no place in the world of science. Roman Catholicism is singled out as too autocratic. Missions, by preaching internationalism, oppose the growing nationalism of China and force students to become not only Christianized, but Westernized. Finally Lee pointed out the integral connection between political and religious aspects of foreign missions in this propaganda:

> It has been in the international situation that Russia stands on one side and Great Britain and America or the Anglo-Saxon on the other. All the

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[1] Listed under both Nationalist and Communist Parties was Chan To-sau, presumably the Cantonese Romanization of Marxist Chen Tu-hsiu.

> recent anti's have had something to do with either Great Britain or America. It has been practically the same group of people who were responsible for all kinds of demonstrations who celebrated the Russian National Day more than they did October 10th. One often wonders who has been pulling the string behind the curtain after all.

This, be it remembered, was 1925, not 1950.

In the same issue of The Chinese Recorder Frank Lee explained that the Reds do not understand the millions of dollars given by Great Britain and America for Christian missions, and therefore appeal to the Chinese sense of shame in regard to foreign relations. Superstition plus imperialism proved powerful weapons then as now.

> The Communists support an Anti-Christian Movement that is well-organized, wide-spread and with a definite objective....(There is) no reason to doubt their open and avowed antagonism to religion and especially to Christianity.[1]

As it also developed twenty-five years later, such a flood of propaganda could not build up without breaking out in certain concrete situations. At Canton Hospital, the oldest Western medical institution in China, labor unions took control in March, 1926. Demanding drastic wage increases and a "closed shop," they forced the workers to leave the hospital and so threatened the doctors and nurses that all but seven withdrew. Not until complete blockade cut off food supplies for foreigners and patients did the hospital management yield, move out the patients, and close down.

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[1] Frank Lee, "Communism and the Anti-Christian Movement," Ibid., pp. 232ff.

Although it was claimed that the majority of workers did not want to strike, that eighty percent of the beds were public wards supported by mission funds and private gifts, and that requiring a "closed shop" would be a distinctly imperialistic act, the labor unions won out.[1]

The same month the same game was played with variations at Stout Memorial Hospital (Southern Baptist) in nearby Wuchow, this time involving also a girls' school. From one faculty member "teaching radical doctrines" grew a public denunciation of all foreigners, especially Americans, culminating in demands that (a) the missionaries should go on record opposing the "unequal treaties;" (b) the hospital property should be turned over to Communists among the Chinese Christians; (c) Communists should control school and hospital finances.

Two days later the servants went on strike, the school was closed, and the girls hidden for safety. At the end of the month, waiting in good capitalistic fashion ~~under~~ until after pay-day, nurses and coolies in the hospital went on strike. Meanwhile pickets followed the foreigners around the city, forbidding any store from selling to these missionaries or any coolies from carrying baggage to the wharf. At the shore a loading ramp was destroyed, forcing the evacuees to wade to their boat under a hail of ridicule and pungent Chinese profanity. The report concluded that local police had wished to protect the foreigners, but were powerless against the fanatical labor unions.

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[1] "Chinese Communists and Mission Properties" (privately printed pamphlet drawing on personal statements and English newspaper reports, c.1929), ChapterII.

Four weeks later the hospital superintendent, in a statement to the Hongkong Daily Press, outlined the manifesto which the Chinese Christian Promotion Association (apparently permeated with Communists) ordered the missionaries to sign. They were asked to assert that the "unequal treaties" were oppressive and that treaty protection was inappropriate for missionary work, and to declare their individual and personal approval of Chinese resistance to international restraint and of treaty abrogation, their willingness to help relieve China of oppression, and their admission that "missionary affairs belong to the God and should be openly handled by Chinese Christians."

The foreigners offered instead, and in vain, their approval of an international conference to revise existing treaties, their consent to joint boards of control for funds and institutions, and their faith in Christ and in divine guidance and protection. According to the Chinese Christian Promotion Association, because the original demands were refused, "the saying that the missionaries and doctors are vanguards of the Imperialist invaders proves to be a fact undeniable."

One crucial factor existed here which was absent twenty-five years later. An American gunboat anchored in the harbor, and the captain, resisting the temptation to send a landing party ashore, went personally and without molestation to seal the school and hospital premises. The missionary superintendent reported that the "presence of the (U.S.S.) Pampanga greatly strengthened our precarious position," adding that the police could do nothing because "Bolshevism knows nothing of law and order."

> The radicals in China under the influence of Bolshevik propaganda are demanding less consular and naval protection for foreigners residing in China, (yet) they offer no help through the officials to the foreigners in time of danger or opposition....Our experience calls for better protection of the lives of the foreigners and foreign property and a fuller enforcement of existing treaties.[1]

Those of the younger generation~~s~~--or their sadder, wiser elders-- to whom such language sounds shockingly "imperialistic" would do well to review political and social and psychological conditions of that day. However ready many Westerners may have been to abolish the Toleration Clauses or extraterritoriality or both, few localities were prepared to offer minimum justice or protection (as the above incident shows), and few Christian groups possessed leadership qualified to cope with immediate and wholesale devolution. Although points of friction may be remarkably similar between 1925 and 1950, the heated bitterness on both sides in the earlier period contrasts sharply with the calculated and deliberate manouvers of recent experience.

In both of these revolutions, higher education shared in the turmoil, but with less drastic and speedy consequences. At Canton Christian College, later Lingnan University, three students were expelled in April, and a number of staff members went on strike in their behalf. The outcome, however, showed a majority of students endorsing the expulsion on the ground that those three had misrepresented Kuomintang interests. The Hongkong Daily Press report virtually equated the terms "Kuomintang" and "Bolshevik," and it may well be that patriotic but reasonable students resented this all too intimate tie-up.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, Chapter III.

Meanwhile, a little farther up the coast, the Anglo-Chinese College (in reality a middle school) at Swatow ran into typical difficulties. Run by English Presbyterians, the school had suffered so acutely under the anti-British boycott since mid-July, 1925, that it was decided to suspend classes for the fall term. Rather than surrender their educational facilities, the Students' Association asked to "borrow" the buildings for one term. The request was granted, even though public propaganda had announced the move as a first step toward outright seizure.

During that term a large proportion of students and staff joined the prevailing anti-Christian campaign, carried on little work, attended school at their convenience between the many "popular" and "patriotic" holidays, and generally demonstrated such poor morale that faculty and pupils lost confidence in themselves, in each other, and in the missionaries. Despite the claim that land and buildings were simply held in trust by the mission and belonged ultimately to the Chinese people, the "loan" of the school was not renewed, and its reopening under Christian auspices awaited calmer days.[1]

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[1] Ibid., Chapter IV.

These four illustrations have been cited at some length both because they survive in documented form, and because they typify the Communist practices of 1925--and 1950. Middle schools drew the earliest and most concentrated attacks, with hospitals and universities close behind. Students and labor unions vied in confusing liberty with anarchy, thereby crippling or destroying their own institutions. Marxist scorn of religion blended inseparably with nationalistic hatred of imperialism. Rigid dogmatism and obsession with rights and privileges on both sides led to misunderstanding, bitterness, and conflict.

By the summer of 1926 Chiang Kai-shek and his cohorts were ready to march northward to establish a national government. Under the guise of patriotism many, if not most, Kuomintang leaders had adopted the methods and parlance of

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[1] Ibid., Chapter I; although no specific mention of Communism occurs in this opening chapter, the tactics and issues suggest a kinship with other events across China, justifying the title, "Chinese Communists and Mission Properties."

Communism. At the Whampoa Military Academy, which Chiang headed, the campaign adopted a typically Chinese device: the Three Downs and Two Ups (or Three Antis and Two Pros). Parade banners and shouted slogans urged "Down with Foreign Imperialism, Warlords, and Capitalism; Up with the Chinese Revolution and the World Revolution.[1] In May Chiang himself, speaking to the National Labor Conference as a "younger brother," had voiced his conviction that "the workers and peasants are already able to fight imperialism with their own forces, without reliance upon the forces of the army." Clenched fists and shouts of "Long Live the World Revolution!" greeted his address. Harold Isaacs, describing the occasion, admitted: "The men who now fully controlled the nationalist movement could still appear before the people as 'revolutionary leaders' between whom and the Communists there was little discernible difference."[2]

Little doubt remains today that the Communists controlled the propaganda vanguard of the Northern Expedition, with Mao Tse-tung himself in a prominent role. Their indoctrination spread contagiously through both the peasantry and the army, for with the Chinese Reds marched extremely able Russian Advisors.[1] K. S. Latourette has summarized the situation in the following paragraph:

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[1] Vaughan White, Our Neighbors, The Chinese (Rinehart, New York, 1946), p. 149.

[2] Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, p. 104.

> The militant anti-religious convictions of Russian Communism were especially influential... The radical elements in the Kuomintang were vigorous in their anti-religious activities, especially during the days of their power in 1926 and 1927. Most of the agitation was focused against Christianity, for the latter was palpably foreign in its origin and in much of its leadership, and it was associated with the "capitalistic" nations for which Communism had so strong an aversion. Some of it, however, was directed against other forms of religion. More than one temple was converted into a school, and even the Taoist "Pope" was forced to flee from his accustomed residence.[2]

Changsha

On the direct line from Canton northward, the first key city, Changsha, fell to the southern army in July, 1926, but there was no appreciable change in attitude toward foreign missionaries until the arrival of the Soviet Russian consul in October or early November. Immediately trade unions were organized, first among the Yale-in-China hospital coolies, then household servants, then nurses, and finally students. The servants initially demanded a 30-40% increase in wages, a 54-hour week, recognition of the union, a "closed shop," and protection against dismissal, but more unreasonable claims followed.[3]

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[1] Cf. Kao, op. cit., p. 57; and Frank Houghton, China Calling (China Inland Mission, London, 1936), p. 42.

[2] K. S. Latourette, op. cit., pp. 480-481.

[3] Anne Foster, "Yali, A History of Yale-in-China College" (unpublished paper), p. 7.

The nurses in their turn insisted that the Dean of the Nursing School be dismissed, and the administration be turned over to a "Soviet Committee" of faculty and students. No student should be expelled without the consent of this committee, but any teacher unsatisfactory to the students must be fired. Books and uniforms ought to be supplied free. Any attempt to close the nursing school would be met by a general labor strike in the hospital and throughout the city. A missionary doctor wrote of the situation:

> If the foreigners gave in, they might as well pack their belongings and return to the States and close the institution, for it was evident that if they conceded to these demands, others would soon follow even more impossible to grant.[1]

Meanwhile similar agitation disrupted the nearby middle school and parallel demands appeared--with addenda. No student should be dismissed or demoted without approval of the union, but unpopular teachers should be dropped on request. A student delegate with vote should attend all faculty meetings, and students should handle their own mail. There should be no compulsory chapel and no religious services or prayers at chapel; the course in comparative religion should be discontinued or made elective. Finally, a new, modernly equipped gymnasium should be provided in about two months.[1]

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[1] John H. Foster, personal letter, December 6, 1926.

Meanwhile the Nationalist Government issued an edict in December, covering its occupied provinces and requiring all missions and private schools to conform by April 1, 1927. The regulations included control of finances by a Chinese Board, and the relegation of foreigners to advisory capacities only. Posters, which the missionaries dared not touch, urged "Down with Imperialism!" from every available wall. The Dean of the Nursing School received a festive New Year's card with the following inscription:

DOWN WITH CHRISTIANITY

1. Christianity is a tool of world imperialism.
2. Christianity is not scientific.
3. Christiantiy helps to subject the weak nation in slavery.
4. Christianity fools the feebleminded young student.
5. Christians conspire with despicable vagrants and outlaws.
6. Christians taking advantage of unequal treaties influence law suits.
7. Christians occupy Chinese premises by force.
8. Christians interfere with the freedom of matrimony.

A CLEAN SWEEP OF ALL CHRISTIAN INFLUENCES IN CHINA.
TO_______WISHING YOU A HAPPY NEW YEAR FROM_______.[2]

Under these pressures the Yale-in-China Committee in New Haven withdrew its support, and the local Changsha government took over the hospital at the end of December. By January 29, 1927, the long-threatened missionary evacuation took place, and most of the 370 Americans in the Hunan consular district withdrew, leaving only a few to supervise property. The British, who had suffered even harsher denunications and mistreatment, evacuated Changsha on January 11. When word of the plan spread, an anti-British strike was called, and Chinese pickets interfered with British luggage, attacked their servants, and caused as much trouble as possible without actual violence.[1]

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[1] Interview with John H. Foster, Japan Advertiser, Tokyo, February 12, 1927.

[2] Copy loaned to the writer by Dr. John H. Foster.

The most vicious calumny turned on another missionary institution, the Hunan Bible Institute. A radical Changsha newspaper charged that its object was to maintain a house of prostitution, that many babies were born in the school, that students were not allowed home in two years and their letters were censored, that the children were cruelly treated unless they submitted to missionary demands, and that teaching students to await a King from Heaven was contrary to Kuomintang policies.[1]

Writing on "Bolshevizing the Yale-in-China College," Charles Dailey denounced

> ....the warfare upon Christianity, and the attempt to Bolshevize Christian institutions... In Hunan, at last, the radical or Bolshevik faction is in control, and the chief campaign is

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[1] Anne Foster, op. cit., p. 10.

> being carried on at that great institution known as Yale-in-China....As time goes on it becomes more and more apparent that the warfare of the Soviet-aided Kuomintang is directed not only against the foreign treaty powers, but also against Christianity, and that it is the purpose to drive the missionary and the Bible from the field....All these attacks upon Christianity and upon the morals and virtue of the teachers, physicians, and nurses cannot come from the Chinese themselves. It must be inspired by the Bolsheviks.[1]

Again the same pattern appears: agitation among laborers to demand exorbitant raises and impossible terms, agitation among students to condemn all foreign influence and eliminate the religious emphasis of Christian schools. As has always been true in China, the fanaticism of some zealots was tempered with evidences of real sympathy and friendliness toward the missionaries. The spontaneity of these demonstrations of trust and gratitude, among impressionable students as well as uneducated farmers, revealed the superficiality of Communist propaganda. Yet

> ....there was obviously Russian influence, such as the beginning of the trouble at the arrival of the Soviet consul, the use of Soviet colors--red, gold, and green--on posters, the organization of the Government on Soviet lines, and the celebration of the anniversary of the Russian Revolution.[2]

A German-Russian member of the Yale-in-China staff commented that these events at Changsha seemed very similar indeed to Russia during the Revolution, except that there instead of threatening, "they" went ahead and killed by the wholesale.[3]

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[1] China Weekly Review, January 1, 1927, p. 116.
[2] Anne Foster, op. cit., p. 15.
[3] John H. Foster, personal letter, Jan. 24, 1927.

Hunan Hinterland

But other parts of Hunan besides the capital felt the brunt of this northward movement. In the spring of 1927 some two thousand Communists entered Chihkiang, in southwestern Hunan, shouting: "Down with the rich!... Dwon with the (provincial) soldiers!..Down with the officials!..Down with the Christians!" While the missionaries, unmolested within their compound walls, feared to appear on the streets, posters ordered all schools closed and students and townspeople to assemble for a public meeting.

"The plan was to take the preachers as prisoners and parade them through the streets as 'foreign dogs.' To humiliate them, large paper hats with devilish pictures on them had been prepared for them to wear."[1] But the first parade was broken up by rain, the second by a local general who finally mustered courage to drive out the Reds when they set fire to his house. Meanwhile in the same district Communist indoctrination captured the "poorer and more ignorant class" and stirred up government school students against the foreigners in Yuanchow.[2]

Soon "the Northern Expedition passed through Yochow (in north Hunan) leaving in its wake a devastation of spiritual effect almost as great as the material."[1] That same spring missionaries were forced to evacuate to Shanghai, many of them continuing to Japan or America, some of them never returning. In Yochow one of the first ordained evangelists was stoned by the Farmers' Union, and a majority of Christian schools were closed.

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[1] Fred John Meldau, Pioneering for God in Bleeding China (Christian Victory, Denver, c. 1950), p. 78.

[2] Herman Becker, What God Has Wrought! (Christian Book Room, Shanghai, 1933), p. 22.

Sterling Whitener, writing of those hectic days for his own mission, analyzed the situation thus:

> It has been quite conclusively shown (by M. N. Roy, D. J. Dallin and others) that the propaganda arm of the Northern Expedition was put in the hands of the Communists. It would seem a likely possibility that the Communist influence was very great in the effort to make the educational system of the entire country uniform and to take from the Missions the education of the youth of China by the compulsory registration of all Christian schools. Such words as "imperialistic, capitalistic, aggressive force, guardian of the status quo, etc." which were hurled at the Church undoubtedly stem not from a desire for national self-determination alone, but also from Communist indoctrination or propaganda of the time.[2]

Anna Louise Strong, whose love and sympathy for China's millions carried her far to the Left, cited similar incidents from Hunan and other sections of the country. The only difference seemed to be that hers had a happy ending. For example, the first two missionaries to return to Central China in July, 1927, ran into difficulties with labor unions, to be sure, but the servants who had made spiritual effect almost as great as the material."[1] That same spring missionaries were forced to evacuate to Shanghai, many of them continuing to Japan or America, some of them never returning. In Yochow one of the first ordained evangelists was stoned by the Farmers' Union, and a majority of Christian schools were closed.

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[1] Sterling Whitener, "The Growth of Church Self-Government in North Hunan as Influenced by the Communist Movement" (unpublished manuscript, 1951), p. 4.

[2] *Ibid*., pp. 5-6.

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[1] Sterling Whitener, "The Growth of Church Self-Government in North Hunan as Influenced by the Communist Movement" (unpublished manuscript, 1951), p. 4.

[2] *Ibid*., pp. 5-6.

Or take the case of a German Protestant pastor in the same area. The first attack on religion by the unions had been against Buddhist idols, although Miss Strong admitted that "among the peasants the attack on religion was not very successful." So a delegation visited Pastor Schindewulf with this proposition:

> As you are a German, we should not bother you. But now the Kuomintang is against religion. Therefore we tell you to leave Yungfong...We have People's Power and we need no religion, but we need your chapel for our labor union.[1]

The missionary was allowed to take his personal belongings but no mission property, "for the Mission was given to the people of China and is now taken over by the People's Power." For possessions left behind a receipt was given.

Meanwhile the mission servants and church employees were marched through the streets in disgrace as "eaters of foreign religion," and one Christian was made to bow to Sun Yat-sen's picture.[2] ~~(a practice which became universal~~

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 192-205.

[2] A practice which became universal in all public meetings under the Nationalist Government for the next twenty years.

~~in all public meetings under the Nationalist Government for the next twenty years).~~ Pastor Schindewulf's cook was allowed to help him pack, but his house boy could not demean himself by carrying baggage.

Before his departure the missionary treated a wounded man so successfully that the union even debated asking him to stay. Although this move was defeated, all the local unions accompanied him to the boat with farewell speeches and firecrackers, and with profuse thanks for giving them the mission buildings. A few weeks later Pastor Schindewulf returned with orders from the regional labor union to restore the mission property. It was vacated within four hours.

At nearby Siangsiang other German Christians were expelled after the same "song and dance:" the People's Power does not need religion; the labor unions do need buildings. While workmen chiseled off the mission name carved above the outer door, union officials listed the entire contents of the rooms, even to doors and glass panes. Unfortunately, although unions and the People's Army never stole anything, looters and local soldiers stole everything.[1]

As the missionaries made their way to their boat, they were greeted with jeers and "Down with the foreigners! ....Kill! Kill!"--reminiscent of Boxer days. Yet somebody sent after them with $200 for their expenses of travel. Appeals to Peking were useless, for "the Foreign Office had no power against the People's Power." Yet after orders at Christmas, 1926, to attack religion, the revolutionary headquarters at Wuhan sent instructions in February to protect foreign property.

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[1] Strong, op. cit., pp. 206-221.

The extreme incitement which marked the Northern Expedition through Hunan can be readily understood. The province had long had the reputation of being one of the most radical centers in China. As early as 1925 the Russian Soviet Schools in Peking and in Moscow are said to have drawn 60% of their students from Hunan.[1] It was the home "stamping ground" of Mao Tse-tung.

But even from the northwest, where ten years later the Communists were to establish their fabulous capital in the caves, reports told of agitation and violence. "In Boxer times," said an English missionary from Sian, "the province of Shensi was the safest of all provinces for foreigners.... But in the 1911 Revolution, Shensi was the worst of all provinces."[2] Now in 1926 students and soldiers burst into Christian meetings shortly before Christmas, shouting, "Who is God?" Radical clubs and unions took over Buddhist temples for their meeting places, and threatened to seize the missions as well. Not until May, 1927, after Chiang Kai-shek had turned on his Communist allies, did orders come from Hankow to protect the foreigners, and "Christian General" Feng Yu-hsiang, the dominiant local warlord, proclaimed religious freedom for all.

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[1] John H. Foster, personal letter, c. January, 1927.
[2] Quoted by Strong, op. cit., pp. 262-263.

> Soon after the Communist Organization was set up in Hankow in November, 1926, there began to be more systematic use of all the weapons which the Communists employ. Processions and mass meetings were held in order to arouse public opinion. Strikes and boycotts were the order of the day... Tremendous emphasis was placed on winning the "workers" and "peasants" and stirring them up to discontent....From every possible vantage point in the street, at indoor or outdoor meetings, the young men would tirelessly expound the principles of the revolution. Posters in vivid colors were posted on temple walls and buildings with slogans, such as "Down with British imperialism," "Down with the Foreigners' Tame Dogs," or "Down with the Unpatriotic Slaves." Very often cartoons of John Bull or Uncle Sam of the most malicious nature were used. Only a blind man could not see that this was the work of Russian cartoonists.[1]

The second generation missionary writing went on to describe particular charges of imperialism and superstition against Christianity. Not only was it condemned as a foreign religion, managed and subsidized by aliens, but its literature, churches, schools, hospitals, and universities represented a vast system of propaganda for the domination and control of the Chinese people. All who associated with the missions--as church members or nurses or teachers or students or servants--were labelled as "tame dogs" of imperialism. And the Marxist "opiate" charge was extended from the field of social and economic exploitation to that of nationalism, since the degenerating superstition was accused of "enslaving the minds of the Chinese people, anaesthetizing all their higher patriotic instincts."

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[1] Daniel Nelson, The Apostle to the Chinese Communists (Norwegian Lutheran, Minneapolis, 1935), pp. 32-33.

> There is no doubt but that Christian education suffered more at this time than any other form of Christian activity....Churches and congregations did not suffer so much as educational institutions.. and hospitals, which were usually concentrated in the larger cities.[1]

Nevertheless, throughout Central China worshipping groups were scattered, their buildings seized as barracks, and their programs disrupted even if not subject to direct and violent persecution.

So persistent and intensive grew the attacks on foreign missionaries that their consuls, home societies, and Chinese co-workers in many instances recommended evacuation. "Thus we have in Central China in January and February of 1926 (should be 1927?) the largest exodus of missionaries in the history of Christian missions in China."[2] Nelson estimated that over 1,400 foreigners moved down the Yangtze from Hankow to Shanghai, and over 3,000 missionaries left China in 1927.

The Nanking Incident

With all this epic migration, it took cold-blooded murder in the future capital, Nanking, to awaken the indignation of the Western world--and perhaps to shock Chiang

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[1] Ibid., pp. 38-39

[2] Ibid., p. 40.

Kai-shek into a realization of his liabilities. When the combined Nationalist-Communist forces swept down the Yangtze River toward Shanghai, they encountered a greater concentration of foreign wealth, property, missions, and personnel than they had met before, even in the tri-cities of Wuhan. There are those who maintain that Soviet plans included deliberate provocation of Western powers, confident that imperialist intervention would but stimulate the turmoil and hatred on which the Red campaign was based. There are others who hold that "trigger-happy" youngsters well indoctrinated with anti-foreign antipathies, got carried away by the excitement of capturing a major metropolis.

In any case, the invading troops ran berserk through Nanking on March 24, 1927. One account declares that all foreign-owned buildings and missions were wrecked and looted;[1] another says "all the foreign consulates and many foreign business offices and residences and various missionary institutions were looted."[2] Some writers charge that "the commanders of the troops that captured Nanking were 'undercover' Communists, and the Russian (Borodin) ordered them to raid British, French, and American consulates."[1]

At the University of Nanking a group of Western faculty members were marched around the campus by surly captors, until the mild reasonable protests of Vice-President John Williams were silenced by a fatal bullet.[1] Elsewhere in the city two Englishmen and two priests--one French and one Italian -- were killed, and an American woman who refused to surrender the keys to her mission safe was wounded.[2] Even the British consul was shot and wounded, but missionary reports of the rape of foreign women proved on subsequent investigation to be utterly false. Nevertheless, the "Nanking Outrage," from which most foreigners were evacuated by imperialist gunboats, threatened to set back international goodwill in China by decades. Whatever the real degree of Communist responsibility, Chiang Kai-shek later found it convenient to blame the atrocities on the Red elements among his troops.

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[1] Lovegren, "The Communist Conquest of China," p. 16; cf. Creel, Russia's Race for Asia, pp. 29-30.

[2] "Red Cloud Over China" (Far Eastern Affairs, Vol. I, No. 6, August, 1938), p. 15.

An eye-witness has written in retrospect of the invasion of another town in East China, a small but flourishing mission station.[3] Soldiers and students from the south (presumably the now familiar propaganda corps) were escorted into the compound by local friends. For over a month the missionaries remained within their home, with doors and windows locked, while servants did the necessary shopping and a few faithful pupils continued to come in for classes. "Soldiers raced their ponies in the compound, blew their bugles on the veranda, and in every way pestered us, or tried to."

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[1] W.Reginald Wheeler, *John E.Williams of Nanking* (Revell, New York, 1937).

[2] "Red Cloud Over China," op. cit., p. 15, and Powell, *My Twenty-Five Years in China*, pp. 156-157.

[3] Personal Letter, No. 14, March 19, 1952.

At one time during the "occupation," soldiers came to the residence with local representatives and demanded that the missionaries vacate the building for the military at once. A firm stare of refusal turned them away, but all other mission buildings were filled, sometimes with as many as four or five hundred men.

Repeated protests to Nanking brought only a telegram that the foreigners must not be molested; presumably the new National Government felt as helpless as the local authorities. "We understood these southern students were Communists..... but I cannot cite any clear-cut evidence." After more than a month of virtual house arrest, the missionaries boarded a canal launch and journeyed to Shanghai without incident.

Similar experiences occurred over a wide area throughout south-central-east China in late 1926 and early 1927. Veteran correspondent and editor J. B. Powell described a meeting of foreign refugees in Shanghai:

> As a result of the anti-imperialist propaganda inspired by the Communist faction of the Kuomintang ....American and other Occidental missionaries whose stations were in the path of the advancing armies were the first to feel the effect of the Communist hook-up....In most cases they were forced to flee from their homes, which were looted by the disorderly soldiers. Mission churches and religious schools were particular objectives of the Reds, and were subjected to wholesale desecration. The missionaries were attacked on two grounds--imperialism and the Christian religion....
>
> One man after another got up and told of atrocities committed in his district by the political branch of the army.

> I asked one of the speakers how he accounted for the fact that the communist students and soldiers were able by the use of intensive propaganda to counteract the accomplishments of Christian missionaries extending over a long period of years. He replied, "It is always easier to destroy than to build," explaining that the widespread anti-imperialism and anti-religious propaganda directed at the missionaries was so closely linked with the question of nationalism and political reform that the majority of Christian converts were unable to come to the assistance of their foreign friends and benefactors.[1]

Whatever the explanation--and this one proved as valid in 1951 as in 1927--the Northern Expedition dealt a blow to Christian missions which has never been fully overcome. A director of the China Inland Mission, largest of the Protestant groups at work in that country, estimate in 1936 that there were 5,875 Protestant missionaries on the field, where there had been 8,300 "less than ten years ago."[2] Recent statistics reveal that the post-war maximum barely topped 4,000, less than one-half of the mid-twenties peak. The Board of Foreign Missions of the Reformed Church issued a statement on January 6, 1928, that "the missionary work in China has come to the end of an era."[3]

The Kiangsi Period

The abrupt and bitter split between the Nationalists and Communists in 1927 inaugurated a "White Terror" against Red sympathizers of every class: peasant, worker, student, organizer. To be sure, "foreign friends and benefactors" of

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[1] Powell, op. cit., pp. 133-134, 141-142.
[2] Houghton, op. cit., p. 117.
[3] Whitener, op. cit., p. 7.

China did not suffer directly from this persecution--except in the deep resentment and retaliation of the Communists when they captured Western "imperialists." But the Kuomintang retained its essentially Soviet-type structure, its one-party rule, its Youth Corps and secret police, its abolition of compulsory religion in schools, and many other characteristics acquired in Canton days.

Meanwhile the Communists, crippled by the Stalin-Trotsky feud and its China repercussions as well as by the Nationalist purge, retreated into the hills of southern Kiangsi. To survive repeated Kuomintang attacks was an achievement; to grow in numbers and in influence, a miracle. Driven by necessity to a rural base, the Chinese Reds gradually accepted the leadership of the man who had consistently advocated an agrarian movement, Mao Tse-tung.

As these mobile Communist forces retreated or forayed back and forth from eastern Hunan to western Fukien, they often seized Christian missions and missionaries, as well as native converts. Charles Patrick Fitzgerald, former Australian ambassador to Nanking, admitted that these guerillas in the early years after 1927 were openly hostile to missions and that most stations in their areas had to be evacuated. After all, he explained:

> ....to travel abroad and live among strangers, not for profit or advantage but merely to alter their religion and substitute another equally steeped in the supernatural....seemed a most improbable explanation. It was much easier to believe with the mass of the people that the mission-

ary was the agent of some foreign power.[1]

Another friend of the Chinese Reds, Edgar Snow, reported that

> ....in Kiangsi the Soviets carried on extensive "anti-God" propaganda. All temples, churches, and church estates were converted into State property, and monks, nuns, priests, preachers, and foreign missionaries were deprived of the rights of citizenship.[2]

Summarizing the situation, ex-Communist Kao Tien-hsi concluded, it was "impossible to carry on church work because of the persecution."[3]

A few first-hand accounts of this period may tell the story better than extensive general summaries. One missionary recollected:

> Mao and his gang came in (to Lungyen, Fukien) in 1929, plundered our mission property, three residences, looted the Fagg Memorial Hospital, set up the Soviet Government of China, gave the Christians a bad time, intimidated, imprisoned, tortured one or two of the church leaders, captured Dr. Holleman, held him for $50,000 ransom--which he (Mao) never got, as Dr. Holleman escaped.[4]

Altogether the Communists were in control of Western Fukien for five years. In 1932 they captured Changchow, not far from the port of Amoy, and in only a few days accomplished disastrous looting of mission property. "(Mao's) visit to Changchow cost Talmage College $16,000, (as) all equipment was destroyed or carried away, and we had heavy repairs on mission residences."[1]

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[1] Charles Patrick Fitzgerald, Revolution in China (Praeger, New York, 1952), pp. 126ff.

[2] Snow, Red Star Over China, p. 362.

[3] Kao, op. cit., p. 59.

[4] Personal Letter, No. 51, November 3, 1952.

Farther north, near the Kiangsi border of Fukien, another missionary lived at the edge of "Chinese Soviet" territory and twice revisited his station during periods of Communist withdrawal in 1930 and 1932. He reported:

> Peng Te-huai lived in our house on two occasions, 1930 and 1931, and of course they looted the mission hospital and the homes of the missionaries. They were anti-American, anti-foreign, all through that period, and, as you know, murdered the two Anglican missionaries, Miss Nettleton and her companion, near Kienyang, Fukien. All missionaries in the Communist-occupied areas of Kiangsi and Fukien, during the Red occupation of Juichin headquarters, evacuated or paid ransom either in money or life.[2]

Back in southwest Hunan, where the Red tide had swept northward three years before, another Communist band reentered the town and went straight to the mission. Brandishing his revolver, the captain ordered all to leave the office and then demanded that the missionary surrender the buildings for military headquarters. Herman Becker replied that he would rather be shot in his own office than outside by bandits (a slur at the behavior of the Reds), and the captain, who had been educated in an American mission school, began denouncing religion as an opiate.

Just then a major arrived and, on learning the captain's purpose, reprimanded him in these terms:

"What do you want to drive this man out for?

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Personal Letter, No. 52, September 2, 1952.

> Don't you know he has a large work here and a large following among the people? He is caring for the poor and doing much for the sufferers in this city. Leave this man alone and get out, or you'll be shot right here in this office."[1]

Orders were issued that no soldier was to enter the mission premises, but Becker in turn was not to go out. After two weeks, during which the town was placarded with "many very blasphemous anti-Christian posters," the Communists withdrew, and the Church resumed its normal routine--until the next attack.

Across another provincial border, in Kweichow, the Reds encamped for many months, imprisoning Chinese Christians or forcing them to bow before idols. The Yuping magistrate sided with the Communists and demanded the deed to the Church property, safely in missionary hands at another station. In frustrated vengeance, the magistrate and soldiers smashed everything inside the church and closed and sealed the building against use. In nearby Mayang a dozen Reds rushed into a meeting of Christians demanding their money or their lives. When the Christians confessed to being poor peasants at worship, who would--of necessity--have to trust in the future life, the Communists decided instead to kill the rich man across the street. Of such incidents were the experience of Protestant missions compounded, whether or not foreigners resided in the station.

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[1] Meldau, op. cit., pp. 81-82; cf. Becker, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

Kidnappings

Still another missionary, who later worked hopefully if not cordially with the Communists in Shensi, wrote as follows:

> From 1922-1936 the attitude of the Chinese Communists to Christianity was bitterly hostile. They persecuted the Church as the tool of imperialism.... The Reds in 1930 in Kiangsi alone captured more than a hundred missionaries and cruelly murdered thirty-three----(as well as 150,000 Chinese).[1]

A few of these kidnappings and martyrdoms have been described in published books, which offer exciting drama, revealing glimpses of Communist tactics, and inspiring witness to Christian faith.

Kristofer Tvedt, a Norwegian Lutheran, has recounted his experiences in captivity with Bertin Nelson, who was finally executed. Knowing that "for a foreigner to venture near enough to fall into the hands of the Reds would, of course, be folly,"[2] Tvedt and Miss Bergliot Evenson had hidden during an unexpected raid until cold and hunger forced them to surrender on October 17, 1930. Prisoners in the mission residence, they watched a bonfire "kindled with Bibles, New Testaments and Christian literature, our entire stock of books for the year's work."[3]

Twelve days earlier Bertin Nelson, an American missionary of the Norwegian Lutheran Church, born and raised in China, had been surprised at Kwangshan, near the Honan-Hupei border. There was no doubt in his mind that his captors were Communists. They rushed into the Church, searched all the school buildings, and looted every house. They chopped up church benches for firewood, spread straw on the floor for beds, and hung their rifles on the wall. The mission became their headquarters, and no services could be held. For the first few days Nelson was treated well, allowed to stroll in his own yard, given the same food as the soldiers, and even permitted to visit some Christian families. But the first of incessant moves caught Tvedt and Miss Evenson at nearby Loshan.[1]

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[1] George A. Young, The Living Christ in Modern China (Carey Press, London, 1947), pp. 175ff.

[2] Kristofer N. Tvedt, In Captivity (Lund Press, Minneapolis, 1937), p. 23.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 37.

This is not the place to recapitulate detailed negotiations or geographic wanderings, but only significant insights into Communist aims and attitudes. The original demand for ransom had been $400,000 (Mexican, about $3 to U.S. $1) for Tvedt and Miss Evenson, $300,000 for Nelson. In a very short time, the woman missionary was released for $3,000, and the amount for the two men reduced to an additional $27,000.

To many observers this mundane concern for cash seemed to attest to bandit activity, long familiar in China, rather than Communist plots. For three years, however, the Chinese Reds had been isolated from Russian or other aid, and the smuggling of arms to maintain their struggle required vast sums of money. Clearly from Tvedt's account, financial and political motives were intimately linked.

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[1] Nelson, op. cit., pp. 62-68 et passim.

> The Reds have assured (Nelson) that he has nothing to fear. Again and again they have declared that he is to suffer no bodily harm at their hands, and that they are holding him only for international and political reasons. They want to give Chiang Kai-shih, who has promised to protect all foreigners, all the trouble then can, and they also have it in for the United States and other countries that are providing China with money to fight the Reds.[1]

> They assured us they would do us no harm, but went on to say we must be prepared to help the Red army, as it was in great ~~financial~~ straits. Not that they wanted our money, far from it. But we must write to the Nanking government, to Chiang Kai-shih, and remind him of the fact that he had promised to protect us. And we must write to the American consul and ask him to take steps to secure our release.[2]

During his captivity Tvedt observed three stages of attitude toward the foreign prisoners: curiosity, cold indifference, and bitter hatred and contempt. The last employed all the vicious epithets of rampant nationalism and Communism combined: "blood-sucking capitalists, bigoted imperialists, swindlers, etc." As they moved from place, through isolated areas of Hunan, the coming of the foreigners was announced as a sensational attraction. "Now you will have a chance to see what imperialists and capitalists look like! These are the people that have oppressed our country and who kill us whenever they have a chance."[3]

Occasionally the missionaries suffered physical brutality. They were beaten with bamboo while tied and kneeling to emphasize demands that they write still more letters for ransom money. At one time a village rabble pestered and teased them, pulling their clothes and throwing stones. When they appealed for protection to the chief officer, however, he apologized and forced the ringleader of the torment to apologize next day. On a similar occasion, when a mob including children had been stirred up to bellow "Shoot the Imperialists!" a single guard kept the crowd away with the reminder, "This man is a human being too."[1] Tvedt gives credit for "comparatively decent treatment in the early part of our captivity" to a letter from the commanding general ordering his men to treat the prisoners well, since they were neither imperialists nor capitalists.[2]

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[1] Tvedt, op cit., p. 24.
[2] Ibid., p. 39.
[3] Ibid., pp. 61-62.

When Miss Evenson had been released, after just a week and the payment of Mex. $3,000, she had been given $4 for travel expenses. Exactly six months after his capture, Kristofer Tvedt was set free for the money which was supposed to ransom both men. Perhaps because he had a family and Nelson did not, perhaps because he was ill, perhaps because his native Norway was less imperialistic than America, Tvedt was sent back and Nelson held. New demands for money, medicines, supplies, munitions, and oil became so exorbitant that the negotiator remarked it would be as easy to reach the moon as acquire those goods. "But you are friends of Chiang Kai-shek," he was told.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 62.
[2] Ibid., p. 57.
[3] Nelson, op. cit., pp. 79 and 111.

Little is accurately known about the later months of Bertin Nelson's captivity. At that time it was the longest on American State Department records, twenty-two and a half months, before he was executed by sword or pistol in a remote ancestral temple. Apparently, by the summer of 1932, affairs were going badly for the Reds. The Nationalist offensive had been intensified; it was harder to secure guns and other supplies; a split developed within the Communist ranks. All these factors shortened tempers while they increased the burden of dragging a foreign missionary captive on mobile maneuvers.

Bertin Nelson was neither the first nor the last to be martyred by Chinese Reds. Besides the English members of the China Inland Mission, Miss Nettleton and Miss Harrison in Fukien, three Finnish women were executed "by sword, fire, and probably other means equally brutal."[1] A German member of the Basel Mission "suffered a terrible death at the hands of the Reds."[2] During these early nineteen-thirties a number of Catholic missionaries had also been captured, and some of them were never heard from.

Another dramatic kidnapping story with a happier ending is The Restraining Hand. As the Communists, hard pressed by Kuomintang bombing planes and blockade, started on their epic Long March, they captured a sizable group of China Inland Mission workers near Kiuchow, in Kweichow province, on

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[1] Tvedt, op. cit., pp. 73ff and 148.

[2] Ibid., p. 73; cf. William B. Lipphard, Out of the Storm in China (Judson, Philadelphia, 1932), p. 30.

October 1-2, 1934. The married women and children were released immediately, the single women after a week. But Arnolis Hayman, a Canadian, and Rudolf Bosshardt, a Swiss, were marched along over six thousand miles in the following year and a half. Theirs was not a direct journey, uncomfortable though that would have been, but a veritable wandering in the wilderness of Kweichow, Szechwan, Hupei, Hunan and Yunnan.

Ironically enough, when one escape attempt failed, the Communist judge reprimanded the Christians for not obeying the Gospel injunction to "go the second mile and turn the other cheek." Unlike the Lutherans four years earlier, this pair was brought before a public trial, replete with flags and flowers, a stage and judges, and a crowd of several thousands. Part of the ridicule included pronouncing and spelling their full names, but also describing their reasons for coming to China. The specific charges levelled were these: possessing a camera, they have taken pictures of supposedly strategic places; wearing Chinese dress and speaking the native language, they conceal their true motives; preaching Jesus' doctrine of non-resistance, they weaken the Chinese people.

Their punishment, for such crimes plus attempted escape, was to raise the ransom demanded from $100,000 to $150,000, since "they established beyond doubt that we were spies for our respective countries,"[1] Again payment was required in medicines, anti-aircraft guns, and other supplies which were not in missionary stock. Bosshardt himself felt that the chief explanation of the kidnapping lay in this desperate desire for ransom money, but Herman Becker, the mission negotiator, found such a willingness to adjust the sum demanded without any move to release the prisoners that he came to this conclusion:

> Why do Communists take missionaries captive? They plainly told our men they do not take them primarily for ransom, Money is not the important issue with them. Their purpose is to show the foreigner that they do not want the Christian doctrine in China. It is "opium" for their people. The teachings of non-resistance and of man's dependence on a Higher Being are all contrary to the Communist doctrine. They want to show the foreigner that they will not have this foreign doctrine that he brings to combat theirs in their own land.[2]

General Ho Lung, commander of the Second Army, taunted the prisoners in front of a crowd: "Unless you pay the ransom quickly, we will chop off your heads. Don't think your beards will save you;. I killed a Roman Catholic priest with a beard many times longer than yours."[3] On another occasion, beaten with a notched bamboo and struck across the face, the missionaries were told that their captors would "punish this Imperialist like the British punish our poor people in places like Hongkong."[4]

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[1] Rudolf A. Bosshardt, The Restraining Hand (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1936), p. 49.

[2] Ibid., pp. 287-288.

[3] Ibid., Chapter 4.

[4] Ibid., p. 115.

When the time of Bosshardt's release approached, after 560 days, General Hsiao Keh explained the reason:

> "We have decided to differentiate between foreigners in the future. You are a Swiss citizen, and we know that Switzerland is not an imperialistic country. You have no unequal treaties with China, neither have you any concessions, so we have decided to set you free tomorrow."[1]

Actually it was several weeks later, on Easter Sunday, April 12, 1936. Hayman had been released, desperately ill, the previous November. General Hsiao's remarks were specifically aimed at a German priest, Father Keller, who was not set free because the fascist imperialism of Germany was aiding Chiang Kai-shek. At Bosshardt's request, the general promised extra care and food for the priest, and bid farewell in these terms:

> "I have no objection to you remaining in China as a visitor, and shall even permit you to have a school if you will only refrain from drugging the scholars and the populace with this belief in God. But I think it would really be better if you went home."[2]

The final dismissal reiterated that Bosshardt was guilty of preaching the Gospel and would be released only because his country was non-imperialistic and on condition that he would not transgress again--a condition he was fortunately not required to accept verbally or in writing. He received ten silver dollars as a travel fund.

One further incident, perhaps the last and, most brutal, can be mentioned only briefly. In Anhwei, far off the beaten Communist path, Mr. and Mrs. John Stam were ruthlessly murdered.[1] On their death march, Mrs. Stam left her two-months-old daughter in a bundle of rags in a Chinese home, where she received devoted care and ultimate delivery to grandparents in Shantung. J. B. Powell tells the story as follows:

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[1] Ibid., p. 237.
[2] Ibid., p. 252.

> The execution of the Reverend and Mrs. Stam was staged on a hill before a large crowd of country people and was accompanied by an outburst of posters, banners, and oratory, with the bound victims standing by. The speeches and posters denounced the United States and world capitalism, and extolled the Soviet Union. After the helpless victims had been beheaded, the Reds responsible for the atrocity issued a bombastic statement declaring the execution of the young missionary couple had been carried out in retaliation for the action of an American company in selling to the Nanking Government airplanes which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had used in bombing the Reds out of their base in the mountains of Kiangsi.[2]

Meanwhile the main body of Communist troops, led by Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, moved round-about westward, continually skirmishing with pursuing Kuomintang forces. One group raided three Reformed Church outstations across the lake from twice-captured Yochow, in Hunan province.[3] In the spring of 1935 the Red route through Kweichow and Szechwan was marked with terror and slaughter, and missionaries were compelled to leave their posts for refuge in Chengtu or outside the country. By June there was still no immediate prospect of resuming mission work.[4] Even Edgar Snow admitted of the so-called

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[1] Lee S. Huizenga, *John and Betty Stam-Martyrs* (Zondervan, Grand Rapids, 1935.

[2] Powell, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-263.

[3] Whitener, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

[4] F. Borham, "Communists in West China," *Chengtu News Letter* (Vol. II, No. 9, June, 1935, pp. 7ff.

Fourth Front Army: "Remarkable successes--and tragic excesses--had marked their campaign in Szechuan, the whole northern half of which had been under their sway."[1]

Reds or Bandits?

To many an outside observer at the time--and perhaps to readers now--these episodes, tragic and discouraging though they were, seemed but links in a long chain of captures and massacres occurring intermittently throughout the century of missionary labor. Foreigners have not infrequently expressed genuine regret that they had never been caught by Chinese bandits, for the encounters proved sometimes amusing and always exciting narrative material. It is little wonder that Communists and bandits appeared almost synonymous--as perhaps they were at times.

The significant fact is rather that missionaries and others possessing little or no acquaintence with Marxist theory or Soviet practice, so clearly and positively identified their captors as real Reds. To be sure, ambiguity arises here and there, but it is noteworthy how definitely not only a competent journalist like J. B. Powell, but a mission publicist like Fred John Meldau (to mention but one name among many), indicate that such and such an incident involved bandits, whereas a similar one concerned Communists.

The most obvious circumstantial evidence comes from the familiar propaganda line. Wherever slogans included the

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[1] Snow, _op. cit._, p. 191.

the catchwords of "imperialism," "capitalism," "opiate," etc. the influence of professional agitators could be deduced, whatever the organizational connection with "Soviet China" or Soviet Russia might be. Some reporters noted the Russian hand obvious in cartoons and caricatures, as it was again in 1949. Among old-style Chinese bandit gangs, for example, would be found few posters proclaiming: "The Soviet government is the only hope of China." In these early days the Communists carried a red flag with a black star, in the center of which shone a white hammer and sickle. "The colour of their dress is not uniform even within one company," and this was still true in the relatively affluent People's Liberation Army. Bosshardt summed up his conclusion as follows:

> Many reports have referred to our captors as "bandits" or "robbers" because of their method of working, but the truth is that the leaders are convinced Communists, disciples of Marx and Lenin, and do what they do from principle. They are in touch with other bands by wireless and work with the USSR, referring to Russia as their "Mother."[1]

An even more dependable clue than propaganda slogans can be traced through this reference to the leaders as convinced Marxists. When the foregoing accounts of missionary experiences were published, few people in China could identify the officers mentioned. Now some of the names are familiar the world around.

Mao Tse-tung himself apparently took part in raids through southern Fukien as well as Kiangsi. A personal letter already quoted told how Peng Te-huai occupied a mission residence on two occasions. General Peng has been deputy-commander of the Communist Armies since 1937, now chairman of the Northwest Administrative Area. Called by Robert Payne "politically the most astute of the generals,"[1] he shares with Chu Teh the distinction of being the only military representative on the five-man Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee. Peng, like Mao a native of Hunan, joined the Communist Party in 1927 and the following year established the first Hunan Soviet government.[2] In 1930 he commanded the forces which captured Changsha for ten days.

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[1] Bosshardt, _op. cit_., p. 12.

Bosshardt referred to Generals Hsiao Keh and Ho Lung as in charge of the area where he and Hayman were held. Hsiao Keh is apparently Hsiao Ching-kuang, reserve member of the Central Executive Committee and deputy commander of the Northeastern Army in Manchuria. Still another Hunanese, he studied in Moscow from 1919 to 1924, and again from 1927 to 1931. When he returned to China the second time, he was appointed commander of the Seventh Army Group and participated in the Long March, then became garrison commander of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region in 1943.[3]

Ho Lung, a fourth Hunan revolutionist, actually did serve his apprenticeship among bandits and secret societies and is today still illiterate. After leading a peasant revolt in 1913, he was made a regimental commander under the Kuomintang in 1918, and participated in the Northern Expedition. After the Nanchang uprising in 1927, he joined the Communist Party and later commanded the Red forces in the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region. Despite his illiteracy, he belongs to the Central Executive Committee and the Central Revolutionary Military Council.[1] Elegant says that somewhere in this career Ho received special training from Chou En-lai in Hongkong.[2]

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[1] Elegant, China's Red Masters, biographical appendix.

[2] U. S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Communism in China," p. 96.

[3] Ibid., p. 92; cf. Elegant, op. cit.

Is this a one-sided picture? As far as Christianity and foreign missions are concerned, there seems to be only one side, at least during this early period. That does not mean that individual Communists did not show sincere friendliness and helpfulness toward individual Christians. Both Bosshardt and Tvedt mention such incidents specifically. But they show clearly to have been in defiance of the party line rather than variations in it. The frenzy of anti-religious propaganda, coupled inevitably with anti-imperialism, had permeated the lowest ranks of soldiery and peasantry. As military pressures from an ever-stronger Kuomintang caused more acute hardship among the Reds, resentment and antagonism toward foreigners and reactionaries naturally increased.

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[1] Ibid., p. 92.
[2] Elegant, op. cit.

But did social and economic conditions improve? Did the Communists fulfill needs of the people which Christian missions had flagrantly ignored? That has been the view of many observers in 1950, as it was in 1930. Randall Gould, fairer to missionaries than most journalists, concluded: "On balance, the peasants found gains and hope in the Communists....If the means were violent, so were the times in general."[1] The obviously left-wing Labor Research Association quotes the New York Times for January 31, 1932, as follows:

> Foreign missionaries writing from the zones recently overrun by the Reds report that the peasants and common people are giving a hearty welcome to the returning Communists. They said that after comparing their status under previous Communist rule with the bad government and confiscatory taxation enforced upon them after the arrival of the Nanking troops last summer, they enjoyed greater liberty and a greater degree of prosperity under the Reds than under Nanking.[2]

No reference indicates what missionaries issued such reports under what conditions. Gould paid special tribute to the missionaries, especially those at work in ex-Communist Kiangsi, for abstaining from involvement on either side in Chinese internal affairs.[3] But the Protestant who played the most active role in post-Communist reconstruction had a different story to tell about the area where he served before and after Mao.

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[1] Gould, China in the Sun, p. 75.
[2] James and Doonping, Soviet China, p. 22.
[3] Gould, op. cit., p. 292.

> Under the National Christian Council of China, with Chinese associates, and the approval of the Nationalist Government, I went into Lichwan, Kiangsi, where the Reds had ruined the social life and economy of the _hsien_ (county). We saw first hand what "reforms" they brought about, and it took us three years to get the _hsien_ on its feet, under the direction of the Kiangsi Christian Rural Service Union.[1]

As Mao Tse-tung said, one leans to one side or the other. The greatest difficulty in reaching any conclusions from the material available rests in the diametric opposition of conflicting viewpoints. Admittedly the books and other materials drawn upon in these chapters are less familiar than the reports of journalists, which have also been studied. In fact, the entire Kiangsi period has been largely neglected, except by Schwartz in his ideological survey. Yet as far as their attitude toward religion goes, the Chinese Reds showed greater "unity of theory and practice" in these years preceding the Long March than they did during the United Front, described in the next chapter.

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 52, September 2, 1952.

CHAPTER 5

THE PRACTICE IN CHINA, 1935-1948

The establishment of new Communist headquarters in the northwestern corner of China signalled also the inauguration of new policies toward Christianity and the West. As early as August, 1935, according to Freda Utley, the Party announced that only "parasitic landlords" would be liquidated, "that merchants, artisans, and even priests would not have their lands confiscated."[1] The fact that this condescension began before the Sian Kidnapping (December, 1936), and the subsequent United Front against Japan, suggests, at least, that one factor was obedience to the Comintern order of 1934.

Although the Red remnant settled first in Pao-an and moved to Yenan only at the end of 1936, the security and frontier opportunities of a fresh base must also have contributed to this abrupt reversal after the atrocities of the Long March. Furthermore, the presence of a powerful Moslem bloc in the Northwest required gradualism if not sincere tolerance. Edgar Snow, admitting the severity of "anti-God" propaganda in Kiangsi, went on to maintain:

> In the Northwest a much milder policy of religious

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[1] Freda Utley, Last Chance in China (Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1947), p. 188.

> toleration was practised. Freedom of worship was a primary guarantee, in fact. All foreign mission property was protected, and refugee missionaries were invited to return to their flocks. The Communists reserved the right to preach anti-religious propaganda of their own, holding the "freedom to oppose worship" to be a corollary of the democratic privilege of the freedom to worship.[1]

Immediately after Chiang Kai-shek's release on Christmas Day, 1936, the United Front impressed itself upon missionaries and correspondents who knew the Border Regions, even though formal agreements and a declaration of war against Japan were still months off. To be sure, the Roman Catholic missioners were driven out of Yenan and their cathedral seized by the Communists when the town was chosen as the Red capital.[2] But in a later statement Chou En-lai offered to restore the property to those who had "fled," and explained that opposition to Spanish priests lay in political abhorrence of the Fascist Axis, not of religion.

George Young, an English Baptist in Sian, knew full well the anti-Christian record of 1922-1936 and remarked that "sudden conversions take some believing." Yet he seemed to accept at face value both the verbal assurances and the demonstrations of a changed attitude.

> In 1937 they changed their policy to one of tolerance. This new attitude was explained to a body of Church and mission representatives in Sian by Chou En-lai....After recounting some of their history during the past ten years and their present aim of a united front, he said that they had learned

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[1] Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, p. 362.

[2] Mark Tennien, Chungking Listening Post (Creative Age, New York, 1945), p. 197; cf. Harrison Forman, Report From Red China (Holt, New York, 1945), p. 192.

> much from past mistakes and had now changed their policy of opposition to Christianity, and assured us that the Communist Party now stood for religious liberty, that they welcomed our doctors and teachers, and that they would protect our churches in their area.[1]

As in 1949, the Communist Army on its arrival in the Northwest in 1936, made an exceedingly favorable impression. Good discipline, simple friendliness to foreigners, kindness toward the peasantry, unswerving loyalty to a cause--all these impressed onlookers of whatever ideological stripe. At the moment, too, The Cause was resistance against Japan--or so it appeared on the surface. By their declaration of war in 1932 and their offer of united resistance with the Kuomintang in 1936,[2] the Communists won the support of patriotic Chinese and sympathetic Westerners alike. This factor loomed especially large in a region which had never been wholeheartedly in allegiance to the Nanking Government.

Between these wider international affairs and the social concerns of the local populace, certain issues were easily overlooked, or at least minimized. The now familiar distinction which balanced freedom of worship and anti-religious propaganda as "corollaries" evaded the basic problems of both fundamental theory and future practice. The cordial welcome to doctors and teachers left unspoken the reservation of General Hsiao Keh, "if you will only refrain from drugging the scholars and the populace with this belief in God." It also left unmentioned the status of evangelistic missionaries.

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[1] Young, The Living Christ in Modern China, pp. 177 and 182.

[2] United States Relations With China (U. S. Department of State, Washington, 1949,) p. 46.

As in 1925 and in 1949, some Christians frankly recognized and appreciated the challenge and stimulus which Marxism brought to the Church. "Each soldier knew quite clearly what was his creed and what he was fighting for;"[1] should any Christian do less? Although, as Young reported, the "remarkably efficient" Political Propaganda Corps made members critical of the Church, they stirred a re-examination of salaries, living standards, patriotism, and program that proved in many respects wholesome. One English-trained doctor remarked to the missionary in 1937: "Christianity is not like Jesus....Jesus was the first communist....the first church a communist society."[2]

So conflicting and complex reports began to come in. James Bertram, visiting the Border Regions in 1937-1938, reported conversations with English missionaries in a small village. "You're with the Eighth Route Army?" they asked.

> "Those are the people that shut us up here last year (when the Red Army overran Shansi in early 1936). They gave us a good scare then, I can tell you.... But we'd rather have them here than some of these other Chinese troops; they have real discipline in their army. These other fellows are the bandits, who go looting the common people."[3]

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[1] Young, op. cit., p. 177.
[2] Ibid., pp. 181-182.
[3] Quoted by James Bertram, Unconquered (John Day, New York, 1939), p. 166.

Bertram then recalled the days when "Christian missionaries in China had been perhaps the most vocal and hostile element in the country against the 'Red bandits'." Now, however, he saw the beginning of a change among those who had met and talked with Communist leaders, who had seen the shift in Soviet policy "proved by demonstration," and who had found "the safety and property rights of all foreigners except the Japanese" protected by these Reds. "If only they weren't against religion," one missionary sighed, "we would have much in common."[1] Bertram himself made no comment on the religious issue as such, but he did express the belief that many atrocity stories had been exaggerated, "though some unquestionably had a basis in fact. But during the 'Red Army' period, the Communists were outlaws at open war with landlord-officialdom; and the missionaries had generally sided with the landlords."[2]

For a year or two at least, not only Communists and Nationalists, but Communists and Christians fraternized in the common struggle against Japan. In the temporary capital of Hankow in 1937, Bishop Logan Roots entertained Peng Te-huai, the Red general who had occupied mission residences in Fukien and joined in the kidnapping of missionaries in Kiangsi. The bishop teased the general about the latter incident--jestingly, "for the missionaries had not been ill treated; they had been taken to care for some wounded peasant-soldiers and then let go." Peng Te-huai's response contained no reference to the medical need--or financial considerations--or superstitious opiates--or imperialism. "We were rather green and hot-headed then," he admitted.[1] Gordon Poteat offered a somewhat fuller version of what was presumably the same luncheon party, where a Communist general told Bishop Roots:

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 167.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 168.

> "There were many misunderstandings then. The missionaries have helped much in Shensi, and Shansi. We are sorry for the misunderstandings of the past and want to work with them for the good of China hereafter."[2]

As early as 1938, even before the disintegration of Kuomintang morals and morale, Edgar Mowrer was almost correct in claiming that foreign visitors to Yenan were "unanimous in praising (the) national, social, and educational influence" of the Communists. He told, also, a possibly approcryphal story of a Western newspaper correspondent who, at dinner in the capital with a group of Red Army officers, was suddenly asked: "Would you care to say grace?"[3]

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[1] Anna Louise Strong, The Chinese Conquer China (Doubleday, Garden City, 1949), p. 28.

[2] Quoted by Gordon Poteat, Stand By for China (Friendship Press, New York, 1940), p. 162.

[3] E. A. Mowrer, Mowrer in China (Penguin, Hammondsworth, 1938), pp. 160-161.

Gilbert Baker spoke of a "short period" in 1938 when Christian relief work won high esteem not only among the Kuomintang leaders, but from Communists as well. Groups of missionaries travelled to the Northwest and received a royal reception. On one such occasion General Chu Teh himself assured his guest that he had changed his anti-foreign prejudices and that Christians and Communists would fight together against a common Fascist foe.[1] After all, "the good opinion of the missionaries is worth having, for they are the only considerable section of the foreign population who are in China for other reasons than profit."[2]

In the spring of 1938 Chu Teh and his wife attended a Sunday service in a Chatholic Church in southeastern Shansi. When invited to speak, he stressed freedom of religion and urged all Catholics to take part in the struggle against Japanese Fascism.[3] Furthermore, the General once invited members of a missionary delegation, including an Episcopal bishop, to attend a Catholic Mass said by a Belgian priest in honor of China's war dead. Such gestures indubitably carried weight--in some circles at least,for the reporter of this particular incident asked: "Considering these changes in Communism, why is it that the Generalissimo and particularly a number of leaders under him still continue to be so suspicious of communism in China?"[1]

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[1] Gilbert Baker, The Changing Scene in China (Student Christian Movement, London, 1946),pp.114-115; cf. Poteat, op. cit., p.162.

[2] Bertram, op. cit., p.167.

[3] Stuart Gelder, The Chinese Communists (Gollancz, London, 1946), p. 255.

One delegation bringing relief supplies to the Boarder Regions consisted of a Swiss woman journalist, an Anglican deaconness, the Episcopal bishop's daughter, an American tourist, and a lecturer from a mission college. They were cordially welcomed by Tso Chuan, acting chief of staff of the Eighth Route Army in North China, with this greeting:

> "We have had many different experiences with missionaries in China, and sometimes in the past they were not very happy ones. How much better it is now when Christian friends can come to visit us and see for themselves what the terrible 'Red Army' is like!"[2]

Colonel Evans Carlson of the United States Marine Corps described himself as so impressed by the similarities between Christian doctrine and Chinese Communist practice that he bought a pocket New Testament in order to read the four gospels systematically and compare them with what he saw in the Border Regions. He also referred to a British couple of the China Inland Mission, "the better type of missionary....which accepts the Chinese as equals," and who were so excited by news of the character of the Eighth Route Army that they sent a personal copy of the Bible to

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[1] White, Our Neighbors, the Chinese, p.212; cf. Bertram, op. cit., p.286.

[2] Bertram, op. cit., p.285.

[3] Evans F. Carlson, Twin Stars of China (Dodd, Mead, New York, 1940), p.176.

General Chu Teh.[1]

One of the early missionary visitors to Yenan was a British member of the Young Women's Christian Association staff, Winifred Galbraith. In China Now described her 1938 interview with Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Admitting that many times in history the Christian Church had been the spearhead of capitalist aggression, she pled for a change of opinion regarding Christianity and missionaries. She made no pretense of believing, as so many sympathizers claimed; that any conversion had already taken place. Instead she confronted Mao with a blunt accusation:

> The Chinese Christians love their country, and most of the missionaries are here because they care for the Chinese people and wish to serve them. You have persecuted Christians and killed missionaries for ten years, but you do not understand the facts.[2]

In reply, Mao Tse-tung placidly asked, "What are you here for?" When Miss Galbraith quoted Isaiah about deliverance and healing and sight, Mao reportedly said, "It is not so unlike our own aim. Is that really what Christianity is trying to do?" adding in a moment, "Yes, I did think you foreigners were all capitalist aggressors, but I am beginning to change my mind." Acknowledging the Christian failure to achieve a unity of theory and practice, Miss Galbraith commented: "So does a pagan pierce to the heart of our weakness."[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 83.

[2] Winifred Galbraith, In China Now (Morrow, New York, 1941), p. 87.

Even in these early years, when the United Front was strongest politically and militarily, and while friendliness and apparent trust grew between some Protestants and some Communists, Roman Catholic missionaries continued to encounter violent prejudice in the Border Regions. Some of this could be traced directly to their nationality, for Spaniards, Italians and Germans predominated in the Northwest. A cardinal characteristic of Communists everywhere is a sincere inability to believe that any individual, Christian or otherwise, can actually be unconnected with the political machinations of his own country.

But there existed other crucial factors. Claire and William Band, who spent two years after Pearl Harbor with the Chinese Reds, suggested strongly that the kidnapping of eleven French Catholic fathers near Wenchuan about 1937 had been engineered by a local general, using "old-style bandit tactics" to secure funds, and blaming the incident on the Communists. But the Bands also cited two more valid and universal explanations of Roman Catholic mistreatment.

> The Roman Catholic Mission was one of the biggest land-owning interest in North China before the war, the only one that has been dispossessed by the Communists; and even this, the Communists claimed, was only because the Catholics did not care to return, due no doubt to their rather violent anti-Communist prejudices. All other land-

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 88.

> owners in the areas liberated from the enemy have retained their land and joined in the United Front resistance movement against the enemy.[1]

All through the pressures and privations of the war years, a handful of foreigners worked--and some died--among the Chinese Communists. One of these was a Roman Catholic doctor, interrogated by Stanton Lautenschlager on his visit to Yenan. How could he serve a regime which had confiscated all the local Catholic property and set up the Lu I Art College in the cathedral?

> "Yes," he said, "our priests ran away. The Church had a great property and very few Christians. Perhaps Lu I is doing more good than the Church did. Anyhow the property is big enough for both. I am sure if the priests came back all that was really needed for their work would be gladly restored to them."[2]

On the other hand, a very different story was told by Father Raymond de Jaegher, who lived in Red sectors of North China from 1937 to 1949. "In all those years," he said, "I never saw the Communists take any action that was not a carefully calculated move to advance communism."[3] Early in the Japanese War, the period still under review, Communists coveted French (not Axis) mission property in a certain town, according to Father de Jaegher's report. They charged, to provide a semblance of legality, that the missioners had failed to pay proper wages to employees. This became a familiar enough complaint in 1949, but ten years earlier the question was asked: what employees? The answer: those employed during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. All protest was vain; the penalty was confiscation of the entire mission, buildings, printing press, hospital, and the rest.[1]

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[1] Claire and William Band, Two Years With the Chinese Communists (Yale, New Haven, 1948), pp. 91-92 and 125.

[2] Stanton Lautenschlager, With Chinese Communists (World Issues Pamphlet No. 4, Edinburgh House, London, 1942), p. 15.

[3] Raymond J. de Jaegher and Irene Corbally Kuhn, The Enemy Within (Doubleday, Garden City, 1952), p. 12.

An equally fantastic incident concerned a Hungarian (enemy) bishop accused of having stolen a mule--during the Boxer Rebellion. The fact that he was not even in China at that time carried no weight with Communist justice. The compensation consisted of the total mission property--church, residence, school, hospital, convent, etc.--at a suspiciously high estimate of US $200,000.

On his so-called "first arrest"--actually an excessively thorough searching--Father de Jaegher suffered indignities which were fortunately not repeated in subsequent foreign contacts. Apparently as a public example, he was stripped completely, including underwear and sandals, and then examined in nostrils, ears, mouth, and other orifices. According to his account, only an indignant rush from the peasants who had assembled enabled him to mount his bicycle and escape further humiliation.[2]

Although this is a study of Protestant experience, some Catholic reports are introduced for a number of reasons.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 90ff.
[2] Ibid., pp. 106-107.

In later sections they prove useful for comparative purposes, by indicating something of Communist motivation. With more missionaries and much greater publicity, the individual case histories of Roman Catholics are far too numerous to catalogue fully. But during this Sino-Japanese War period Protestant eye-witness accounts are too meager to give a detailed and rounded picture.

Nevertheless the overlapping of certain episodes and attitudes and interpretations becomes very revealing. For example, Red General Ho Lung, who five years before had taunted Rudolf Bosshardt about his beard, remarked to Father de Jaegher on June 15, 1939: "Don't you know I've burned many of your Catholic churches? That I've killed many fathers like you?" But he went on to add that although his views on religion had not always been friendly, he thought perhaps he had changed his mind a little.[1] This same general was also labelled by an American Lieutenant-Colonel as "the old butcher" and a "former bandit" who had "ruthlessly murdered several missionaries." Robert Rigg asserted too that Ho Lung had greatly impressed fellow-travellers and correspondents in Yenan, but not so favorably the American officers assigned to observation and liaison in the Border Regions.[2]

At the very time Father de Jaegher and many comrades of his faith were being stripped by soldiers or threatened by generals, some publicists in America did their best to minimize Red influence in China and to prevent that country from being "written off," either as a military ally or as a missionary field. The West Meets East Committee, using exclusively Roman Catholic sources, published a pamphlet in 1939, entitled "The Truth About Communism." A few quotations from that booklet are listed here in order to show one reason why Communism in general and its attitude toward the Church in particular were so misinterpreted during the war years.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 172-174.

[2] Lt. Col. Robert B. Riggs, Red China's Fighting Hordes (Military Service, Harrisburg, 1951), p. 43.

The editors: "Chinese Communists themselves are deeply rooted in the doctrine of the Golden Mean" (having since officially repudiated Confucianism--CL) "and long ago gave up all extreme features of Marxist theories and practices." Madame Chiang Kai-shek in a letter to a Catholic friend in America: "Virtually there is no Communism in China if by that you mean people under the influence of the Third International." Captain Evans Carlson of the U. S. Marines: "How can you still call them Communists or Communist Armies? They have even given up that name." (for the armies, never for the party--CL) "Their doctrine is no longer Communism--it might be most accurately described as a doctrine somewhere between Democracy and a mild sort of Socialism."

Bishop Paul Yu-pin of the Roman Catholic hierarchy: "Actually there is no longer organized Communist propaganda in China....The Communist movement in China is definitely checked and suppressed....China is *in no danger of becoming Communist*." (italics episcopal) Bishop Louis Gabriel

Jantzen of Chungking: "I can safely say that China will not take to Communism even in the future." The editors: "China has many grave problems to be solved, but Communism has ceased to be one since 1936. The possibility of China becoming a Communistic state passed as early as 1927."[1]

The United Front in China really came to an end with the signing of the Stalin-Hitler Pact in August, 1939. The Chinese Communist Party obviously diluted its enthusiasm for combatting Japan, called the Generalissimo a Fascist, denounced Lend-Lease, praised the Russo-German Agreement, and reaffirmed that Chinese Communists were "social revolutionaries, never reformists." Freda Utley claimed, in her own "about face" on Marxism, that Mao Tse-tung told Edgar Snow late in 1939 there were "no differences between Fascism and democracies in this war" and hinted at a pact between Russia and Japan to "save" China.[2]

Nevertheless Western missionaries and correspondents continued to find an inspired and inspiring welcome in Yenan, the more impressive as conditions under the Kuomintang deteriated. Gunther Stein reported the first favorable opinion about the Reds from American, Canadian and British Protestants who visited the Border Regions early in 1939. They found the "Communists free from anti-religious bias" and believed the change in policy would be permanent.

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[1] "The Truth About Communism" (West Meets East Committee, New York, 1939), passim.

[2] Utley, op. cit., pp. 195ff.

Stein also cited four well-known missionary names in the Yenan hostel guest book, each with its effusive tribute to the hosts. Of this particular quartet, only one was in China when the People's Democratic Republic was established in 1949. Only one, according to Stein's quotation, included a tempering Christian witness, to this effect:

> "We as Christians sincerely wish your cause well and believe the inclusion of a religious faith and worship would greatly strengthen your many fine qualities and bring about....a relationship to the Supreme Being which makes life complete and helps us love all our fellowmen."[1]

Another of these men travelled to Yenan with two Chinese secretaries of the Y.M.C.A., one now on the mainland and one in Hongkong. They conversed on several occasions with Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and other Communist leaders in 1940 and were assured that the organization of a Y.M.C.A. branch in Yenan would be welcomed, that there were many fields in which the Association and the Party could cooperate. But when Chou En-lai was asked if a Y.M.C.A. secretary

> ....or any Christian for that matter, could become a member of the Party, he tried to avoid the question, but when pressed finally said he could not, as no one who professed any religious belief could be accepted. A day or two later I asked Mao the same question. He immediately replied, "NO," that a man must avow atheism to become a Party member. We did not feel that it would be wise to attempt the organization of a Y.M.C.A. in Yenan.[2]

It is noteworthy--and typical--that Chou En-lai the diplomat should try to evade such a question, where Mao Tse-tung the peasant responded instantly and honestly. A similar incident is told of a Chinese evangelist who joined the Communist Party but continued to preach the Christian Gospel. He was finally sent to Yenan for trial, at which Mao himself ordered: "You must either be a Christian or a Communist; you cannot be both. Choose what you will do. Either leave the Church or leave the Party."[1] The evangelist left the Party; some others have not been so courageous. But here during an ostensible United Front, when the Reds still sought the approval of Western visitors despite international policy shifts, Mao and his colleagues boldly went beyond Marx and Lenin to affirm the incompatibility of Communism and Christianity.

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[1] Gunther Stein, The Challenge of Red China, pp. 236ff.
[2] Personal Letter No. 18, June 20, 1952.

Another of the Yenan guest book signers had been responsible for the sending of the Y. M. C. A. team, yet apparently he would not believe the results. On a visit to Chungking Chou En-lai had asked Stanton Lautenschlager to bring some Y.M.C.A. secretaries to the Red capital and start a branch there. Asked if he would welcome Christians, Chou replied, "Certainly....we welcome all who have a contribution to make to China."[2] Repeatedly Lautenschlager was assured that the attitude toward religion had definitely changed, that there were Christians in the schools, that Christian workers would be welcomed in Yenan, and that there would be no opposition to religious meetings.

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[1] Young, *op. cit.*, p. 183.
[2] Lautenschlager, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

When he himself visited the Border Regions, Chu Teh promised that the church destroyed by Japanese bombs could be rebuilt "on the old site or any site you choose." Then he added, "We asked the Y.M.C.A. to come last year; why didn't you come?" Lautenschlager, who must have received reports on the Y.M.C.A. interviews and decision, nevertheless made this observation:

> Some say that Yenan's present welcome to religion is only a change of policy and not a change of heart, and that if ever the Communists came into power they would become anti-Christian again. It is reported that Mao #Tse-tung said that one cannot be both a Christian and a Communist. If it is true that a Christian cannot join the party and that on becoming a Christian a Communist must leave the party, then the Communists must consider that there is an irreconcilable conflict between Communism and Christianity. In this case Communism in power would be likely to become anti-Christian again. I did not see Mao Tse-tung, as he was ill, but all other leaders in Yenan denied that there was an irreconcilable conflict. They said that there were no regulations preventing a Christian from being a Communist, or a Communist from being a Christian....No doubt one of the reasons whey Yenan welcomes Christians is to convince the Christian world that Chinese Communism is no longer anti-Christian. Whatever the motive--self-interest or freedom or truth--it is clear that the Chinese Communist want Christians to be their friends and not their enemies. For the Church this new attitude makes Yenan and Chinese Communist territory an open door.[1]

About this time Chou En-lai and Father Shanahan concluded an agreement for the reopening of Roman Catholic missions in Yenan, which had been closed--by force or abandonment--when the Communists moved in. Here is Chou's own account of the terms laid down:

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

> "I said they were these (which hold good for Protestant missions too): Foreign missionaries must observe the laws of the Border Region government. They must not oppose the political leadership of the Communist Party. And they must not use religion as a means for political activities. ....The Catholic Church near Yenan and the other mission buildings they need will be returned to the fathers when they resume their work. The Art College of Yenan University is at present housed in the Catholic mission station near Yenan and will evacuate as soon as the fathers arrive. We promised that the government would give the missionaries full freedom for their religious activities, that is, freedom of movement, ceremonies, meetings, and religious connections.... I told him frankly that in my own opinion Americans or missionaries of other nationalities would be more suited (than the previous Spaniards) for we are definitely opposing Franco in our publicity."[1]

One might speculate at some length concerning the definition of religious freedoms involved. Movement in the Border Regions--and all Red territories--has always been carefully circumscribed, for war security if nothing else. Education is not mentioned by Chou, but neither are the topics of meetings specified. If "religious connections" embraced allegiance to the Vatican or to Protestant ecunemicity, it would indeed be a rare and significant concession. The test, however, was never made, for the Roman Catholics like the Y.M.C.A. decided that the effort and risk outweighed the probable values of establishing religion in the capital of Chinese Communism.

There were others. James Bertram recounted visiting the Young Men's Club, housed in the Baptist Mission and using the church as a concert hall. When he inquired about the missionaries, he was told: "They won't come back, though we have asked them to several times. So we use the buildings. We put a new roof on the church last winter; the old one was leaking."[1]

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[1] Quoted by Stein, op. cit., pp. 239-240.

This is not to say there were no missionaries in the Border Regions. Edgar Snow claimed that by June, 1938, the Reds had not only restored order following the first chaotic year of war, but had also established primitive but effective transportation and communication. As a result, some missionaries depended on the Eighth Route Army for escort to and from their stations in the battle zone, and others were sufficiently impressed by the social reform program of the Communists to volunteer medical aid.[2]

A Belgian priest led a first-aid unit of his converts with the Eighth Route Army.[3] Despite their "expulsion" from the capital, several Spanish priests expressed their intention of buying reconstruction bonds in the Border Regions: "Yenan has guaranteed the freedom of preaching and religious belief. The Border Region is poor....so we must help."[4] Catholic sisters helped to secure medicines, and "Protestant missions have contributed to relief work for refugees....and to medical aid to the soldiers and peasants more often than can be told."[5]

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[1] Bertram, op. cit., p. 130.
[2] Snow, op. cit., p. 472.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Gelder, op. cit., p. 227.
[5] Ibid., pp. 253-255.

In May, 1941, the Border Region Government published a regulation to the effect that

> ....every foreigner is permitted to travel freely in the Border Region and to engage in any kind of anti-Japanese economic or cultural activity, under the condition that the laws and rights of the Chinese Republic are respected.[1]

This permission, plus active assistance, in travel through the North and Northwest proved vital to those who escaped from Yenching University and other Japanese-held stations when the news of Pearl Harbor broke.[2]

On the other hand, the same anti-Christian persecution continued in areas remote from Yenan. A. J. Britland of the North China and Shantung Mission reported:

> The Eighth Route Army....opposed to religion in any form, made it at first difficult and later impossible for any evangelistic or other activities to be carried on. The murder of a priest and a deacon at Mili, in 1941, was a proof of the fierceness of the Church's enemies. The people, young and old, were forcibly indoctrinated with Communist teaching, opposition to it being punished by torture and death, so that a veritable reign of terror existed in these remote areas.[3]

As suspicion and tension grew between the Kuomintang and the the Kungchantang, the latter's 1937 pledge to abandon Communist propaganda vanished along with many a Nationalist guarantee.

The murdered priest and deacon were presumably Chinese, but missionaries continued to suffer torture and persecution in regions beyond the eye of foreign correspondents.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 226.
[2] Cf. Band, _op. cit_., _passim_.
[3] _Land of Sinim_, Lent, 1950.

In Tihwa, capital of distant Sinkiang, a Scotch member of the China Inland Mission was seized by Russian secret police in 1941. During eighteen months of imprisonment, using sleeplessness and semi-starvation as weapons, "they put into action their methods of deranging my mind to the point of making me admit I was a British spy and sign a confession."[1]

In the same general area Father Philip Moritz was held from July 14, 1939, until January 8, 1941, while "police" repeatedly searched his house for letters to prove espionage. At various intervals he was denied sleep for eleven, then sixteen, then thirty-seven days, impossible though that sounds from a purely physical standpoint.[2] Whatever government and personnel carried out this treatment, it provided all too effective demonstration for later emulation by the People's Democratic Republic.

Nor were all foreigners sufficiently impressed by Communist promises and behavior to remain at their posts. As far south and east as Yenchang, in Kiangsu province, one missionary evacuated in October, 1940, under Communist fire until the boatmen ran up the American flag. Of the three remaining Americans, two women and one man, he wrote: "They had a pretty rough time for awhile....I was never able to return or to attempt to return."[3]

To be sure, the choice did not always rest with the missionaries themselves, or with those who possessed the closest acquaintance with Communist policy. First, there were the Nationalists. After the initial sharp threat of civil war, and the growing popular acclaim of Yenan as contrasted with Chungking, the Kuomintang virtually blockaded the Border Regions. Not until 1942 did Chiang Kai-shek give his approval for mission work in Red territory, and other officials exerted all their influence against any such undertaking.[1]

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[1] Quoted by Tennien, op. cit., pp. 100-106.
[2] Ibid., pp. 107-132.
[3] Personal Letter, No. 10, early 1952.

Second, there were the Japanese. Through much of North and Central China the tides of battle ebbed and flowed continually. For foreigners, as for native peasants, it was always unhealthy to be "captured" by one side after showing any degree of cordiality or cooperation toward the other. While Axis nationals suffered mistreatment and suspicion at the hands of the Chinese guerillas, Allied citizens were resented and circumscibed by the Japanese, even before Pearl Harbor and their subsequent internment.

Finally, there were the mission boards at home. However scrupulous an individual might be about avoiding political entanglements, personal sympathies could not be eliminated. The vast majority of missionaries, in contrast to some businessmen, remained steadfastly loyal to China against the invading forces. But when the question of Which China? became acute, so did the resultant problems. In some cases home societies appeared hopelessly ignorant of conditions on the field. In other cases, as proved true again in 1950, they showed a wider and clearer perspective than isolated individuals on the spot. Indubitably the restraint of Protestant mission boards in regard to public statements and fixed policies contributed to the more favorable treatment meted out by Chinese Communists than that accorded to Catholics.

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[1] Stein, op. cit., pp. 237-238.

Nevertheless Gunther Stein quoted one foreign missionary, who worked in the Border Regions during the Civil War and who had been ordered by his mission board to withdraw. The station had been occupied by Red headquarters but evacuated immediately when the missionaries returned. The Communist officer, scrupulously fair in all his dealings, had offered to pay for any damage to the property.

> "We never saw any religious persecution in the Red areas....I know we would suffer no risk in returning to the Border Region, and we are eager to do so. The Communists would certainly welcome us, for they realize our usefulness in educational and medical work."[1]

Stein also summed up the situation as he saw it during the latter war years. A majority of missionaries, he believed, refused to revise their "fundamentally negative views" about the Chinese Communists, or to show any real interest in their current ideas and practices. This despite increasing disappointment and disillusionment with the

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[1] Quoted, ibid., p. 239.

Kuomintang, whose illiberal or inefficient policies were actually hampering Christian work. "A comparatively large minority of liberal men and women in Protestant missions," Stein thought, "have come to think well of the Chinese Communists." On the other hand, he added, "I have found only a few missionaries, however, who are actively supporting the Kuomintang in its condemnation of the Communists."[1]

Throughout the war, regardless of the ever widening breach between Yenan and Chungking, leaders of both parties continued to issue reassurances and promises. On the Sixth Anniversary of the War of Resistance, Twenty-Second Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Tse-tung extolled the Soviet Union, its army, its people, its leader, and its decisive battle of Stalingrad. He then went on to recall:

> (In the days of the First World War) "there was no Communist Party in China, and the people were so ignorant that they could not even distinguish the good foreigners from the bad. Marxism was not yet known, though it had existed for seventy years by that time. The teachers of philosophy, economics, or sociology in schools did not even know the name of Karl Marx."[2]

One month later, August 1, 1943, Chou En-lai addressed a Reception Party at Yenan on the anniversary of the Chinese Red Army. "Speaking of democracy," he said, "in these three years our party has....carried into practice....industrial, cultural, and religious activities in the Border Region, under the principle of respecting its law."[1] About this same time, Lo Mai, secretary of the Border Region Government, was asked by correspondents for a statement on the official attitude toward religion. "The New Democracy gives everybody freedom of belief and worship, " he declared. "Before our law all are equal, no matter whether they are Buddhists, Moslems, Christians, or atheists, and we give religious organizations the right to own property."[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 238.
[2] Quoted by Gelder, op. cit., p. 152.

At this point it may be appropriate to digress for a few pages on the Communist treatment of other religious groups in China. Father de Jaegher wrote in some detail of attacks on Confucianism, which has since been officially outlawed as a reactionary social philosophy, and Taoism, which has largely been scorned as a disorganized superstition. Buddhism in many areas retains not only its popular appeal, but also its scholarly heritage, especially in certain monasteries of the South. However this was split into isolated and independent sects, easily vulnerable to Communist persecution. Bewailing the desecration of the sacred Buddhist pilgrimage site, Wu Tai Shan, Father de Jaegher reported: "I saw Communists take over all the Buddhist properties wherever they went in China, killing the monks or making them beggars and wanderers, depriving the people of a spiritual solace they had had for centuries."[3] And he added that bitter resentment among Buddhist leaders has already stimulated an underground crusade, in which they are "turning from its ancient, contemplative mysticism to a dynamic philosophy of active resistance to Communism."[1]

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[1] Quoted ibid., p. 176.
[2] Quoted by Stein, op. cit., p. 239.
[3] de Jaegher, op. cit., p. 46.

Stuart Gelder, on the other hand, told of Buddhist monks who were armed as self-defense corps in Japanese territory, and lamas who gave food and shelter to the Eighth Route Army. Wherever this occurred, "their religious ceremony remained; wherever the army goes, it abides by its rule not to interfere with worship or violate the images of the Buddhas in the temples."[2] Often attacks on Buddhist temples and monasteries received the same justification applied to Catholic establishments: Communist opposition to large landholdings. Extensive fields or even scarcer woodlands have been ruthlessly carved up, and many a priest sent back home to become a productive worker instead of a social parasite.

Although Tibet, like many another citadel, actually fell to fear, without ever testing its impregnable defenses, the Chinese Reds endeavored to cultivate the Dalai and Panchen Lamas and the followers of these two Living Buddhas. Very early in the Japanese War, Nym Wales (Mrs. Edgar Snow) talked with one old Mongol lama who claimed to preserve his faith under the Red regime. In fact, he had found no conflict since "according to the Communist Party program, religion is freed from all ties, (and) many lamas, both rich and poor, are joining the revolution now."[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 47.
[2] Gelder, op. cit., pp. 253-255.

Another Tibetan lama from Sikong was still only a fifteen-year-old hsiao kwei ("small devil," apprentice errand-boy) with the Red Army. But already he had been well indoctrinated in the proper terminology as well as sentiment. "I don't believe in any religion," he told Mrs. Snow; "religion is feudalism, and it is the opium of the Tibetan people." [2] As recently as November, 1952, Mao Tse-tung assured a Tibetan mission to Peking that "believers and non-believers, believers of one religion or another are all protected alike and their freedom of belief is respected, and as this policy of protection is observed today, so it will be observed tomorrow."[3]

Even more important in the Border Regions, however, were the Moslems. These Communism has consistently treated as a racial or national minority rather than a religious group, although instructions to the Red Army stressed toleration of their dietary and ceremonial idiosyncrasies. In 1937-1938 James Bertram convinced his missionary host that there had been no discrimination against Mohammedans in the Northwest, proof that the Communist change of policy was sincere.[1]

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[1] Nym Wales, Inside Red China (Doubleday, Doran, New York, 1939), p. 164.

[2] Ibid., p. 159.

[3] New York Times, November 26, 1952, p. 3.

On the contrary, the Reds recognized their importance and began propaganda work among the Mohammedans as soon as they reached the Northwest. By June, 1936, Company Discussion Materials issued by the First Army Corps Political Department asserted that "it would be impossible to carry out our mission" (the anti-Japanese war _and_ contact with Russia) "if we failed to win over the Mohammedans to our sphere and to the anti-Japanese front."[2]

Moslem soldiers assured the sympathetic interviewer that they were engaged in a common revolution, that "the Red Army does not interfere with Mohammedan worship." Of course, it was admitted, if priests owned land or could not be persuaded to join the revolution, but preferred to aid the Kuomintang instead, "they would be bad _ahuns_, and the people would demand their punishment."[3] Snow clinched the broad-minded tolerance of the Red Army by reporting a squad assigned to clean the premises of a local mosque, although in most sections of Islam that would horribly defile the sanctuary.

Meanwhile Mrs. Snow chatted with Moslems as well as lamas and learned that all the old people still adhered to the faith, though perhaps one percent of the young had abandoned it. "The Communists gave their minorities students full freedom of religion, but nobody took advantage of this except the Mohammedans," she was told. "Although the Mohammedans of China are much less fanatical than those in Islam proper, these believers in Allah were still loyal even after inoculation with the virus of Marxism."[1] Nevertheless they did not bring their Koran or any other holy books with them when they came to the Party School at Yenan.

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[1] Bertram, _op. cit._, p. 168.
[2] Quoted by Snow, _op. cit._, p. 317; cf. pp. 311 ff.
[3] Quoted _ibid._, p. 322 and 339.

When Moslems joined the Eighth Route Army, they proved very adept at killing Japanese sentinels and stealing trucks and artillery. "To respect their religion" they were organized into a special detachment with their own ahun or mullah to supervise their daily routines. On feast days they received a special beef ration instead of pork, and while the Han soldiers listened to speeches and reports by their political leaders, the Mohammedans held religious services. After three months they themselves asked to have the same organization and the same political directors as the rest.[2]

On September 30, 1950, Premier Chou En-lai made his first year's report to the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference, entitled, "The Fight for the Consolidation and Development of the People's Victory."

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[1] Wales, op. cit., p. 159.
[2] Gelder, op. cit., pp. 253-255.

In the section on nationalities and regional autonomy, Chou concluded:

> As to religious beliefs and other mass customs and habits, the principle of non-interference has been firmly adopted by the People's Government and the People's Liberation Army. Because these policies have been carried out, various nationalities begin to express trust and amity towards the People's Liberation Army and the Han cadres in the People's Government. But what we have done towards uniting the various nationalities is still very little and much remains to be done or to be improved.[1]

In 1944 Harrison Forman visited Red territory and came out with the statement that "today the Chinese Communists are no more Communistic than we Americans are."[2] Mao Tse-tung had convinced him that they were following in Lincoln's footsteps for the liberation of slaves, that they had discarded the entire program of land redistribution in favor of reduced rents, and that "under a reciprocal arrangement (they) will permit and welcome...foreigners and foreign capital."

With a group of newsmen, perhaps in Forman's own party, a Passionist priest also journeyed to Yenan, where Communist students still occupied the cathedral. When he asked permission to hold services for the first time in eight years, it was granted--"for the benefit of the foreign press," Father Tennien explained. But confession was forbidden--"no private conversations allowed." Despite the priest's insistence that this was a worldwide religious practice, the Reds were adamant: "Not here....The people can tell us and we can relate to you whatever they have to say."[1]

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[1] First Year of Victory, 1950 (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1950), p. 12.

[2] Forman, op. cit., pp. 177-179.

The Japanese surrender in the summer of 1945 brought a fleeting ray of hope to exhausted China. Mao Tse-tung traveled in safety to Chungking, probably the first time in twenty years that he had been outside blockaded territory. While there, confronted by a question other Communists evaded or denied, Mao bluntly conceded to an inquisitive American: "You can call it (Communism) a religion if you like, the religion of serving the people."[2]

By mid-1946, months before General Marshall's discouraged failure, the chasm between Communist radicals and Kuomintang reactionaries had obviously become irreparable. The political story is presented with admirable fairness and understanding in the American White Paper,[3] as well as such individual works as John King Fairbank's The United States and China.[4] Certainly the expansion of Red territory and population and power during the war years could not be reversed as readily as some imagined, quite apart from disputed Russian aid in Manchuria. Frank Price, one of the keenest missionary observers in China, traced the aggressiveness of Mao's forces back to the Japanese surrender.

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[1] Tennien, op. cit., p. 197.

[2] Anna Louise Strong, Tomorrow's China (Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, New York, 1948),p.38.

[3] United States Relations With China, op. cit., passim

[4] John King Fairbank, The United States and China (Harvard, Cambridge, 1948).

> Since V-J Day the Chinese Communists seem to have made a radical change in their policy. In most of the areas into which they have recently expanded they have manifested bitter hostility to religion and especially to Christianity, because of their belief that it is superstitious and opiating, and also because of its connection with nations that are today challenging Russian policy and methods.[1]

Freda Utley suggested the closing months of 1946 as the period when the Reds "started to throw off the democratic mask and to withdraw the iron hand of terror from the velvet glove worn in Yenan."[2] Early the following year Tillman Durdin, correspondent for The New York Times, wrote that the Communist land policy had been sharply altered and was being carried out with "cruelties and other excesses such as the 'Settle Accounts' trials, executions, and some cases of slaughter such as the recent massacre of the residents of the little Catholic village of Tsungli in Chahar."[3]

All across North China as well as Manchuria, when missionaries began to return, they found their stations belligerently occupied by Reds or caught in a civil war often more bitter than the Sino-Japanese conflict.[1] In some cases Westerners made inspection trips to Communist territories and concluded that foreign mission work would be impossible for the present.[2] As a result, experienced missionaries and first-term language students crowded Peiping and other "island" cities, awaiting "clarification of the situation."

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[1] Frank W. Price, China--Twilight or Dawn? (Friendship Press, New York, 1948), p. 119.
[2] Utley, op. cit., p. 162.
[3] New York Times, February 3, 1947.

One of these exploratory expeditions has been described in considerable detail by personal letter. Two men journeyed into south-central Shansi, where two major stations and about twelve hundred Christians had been under Communist rule from 1938 to 1946. The missionaries found a royal welcome, with living quarters and food provided free of charge, and occasionally a public demonstration replete with cheer leaders, band, etc.

Although no direct evidence showed persecution of Christianity, the congregations had dispersed, and the Reds had torn down major buildings to use the materials, although they claimed the damage resulted from Japanese artillery. Some family worship groups reported direct pressures, such as removal of Bibles and hymnals, while others had been unmolested. Communist officials differentiated three types of Christians: Roman Catholics, who delved into politics, owned land, and opposed the people; Pentecostal groups, who preached and taught but did not serve, and were therefore a harmless but worthless nuisance; others who opened hospitals and schools and really served the people. Representatives of the latter type would be cordially welcomed, this deputation was told, but individual Christians expressed doubt that anybody would dare to patronize mission institutions.

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[1] Archibald M. McMillan, For Christ in China (Broadman Press, Nashville, 1948), pp. 50 and 67.

[2] Personal conversations in Peiping, 1948.

> While over-all policy may have looked varied, it seemed to us that Christianity was not welcomed, in general. This feeling was confirmed privately by a number of Christians....They guaranteed freedom of religion, which needs to be interpreted according to their definition....We left with the feeling that if a real truce were established, we might try to do something in Red areas....No doubt some of the lesser lights really wanted our services. Higher up it was probably playing politics.[1]

Many accounts of life in the Border Regions refer to a mysterious American doctor, who insisted on using his Chinese name, Ma Hai-teh. Dr. George Hatem of Greenville, North Carolina, stopped in China on a world cruise and throughout the Japanese War served the Communists with the faithfulness, if not the warm devotion, of Dr. Norman Bethune. Only in Father de Jaegher's narrative did Ma Hai-teh assume an administrative role.

When the priest sought the return of Catholic lands at An Kwo, Hopei, in the spring of 1946, Dr. Hatem and a

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 7, December, 1951.

Chinese official received him. Land redistribution had been denied to monks and nuns, who were classed as social parasites, and the Church retained only enough fields to support the orphans in its care. The buildings, had been requisitioned at the point of revolvers. Nevertheless Dr. Hatem, the American, assured him:

> "You are not really so badly off....Actually we (sic) could suppress the Catholic faith if we wanted to. Instead we allow you freedom of religion....We only occupy the buildings you abandon. If your missionaries run away and leave the buildings empty and untended, of course we occupy these establishments. It would be a criminal waste not to do so."[1]

When de Jaegher inquired why these missionaries, Catholic and Protestant, run away, leaving "everything they've spent their lives on." There must be a reason, he prompted; could that reason be the Red armies? Yes, both Communist representatives admitted, that might be sufficient explanation. The priest also described how the Border Region Government, when it felt sufficiently strong, dispensed with pseudo-legal formalities, denounced the missionaries as collaborators with the Japanese or agents of the Kuomintang, and confiscated all their possessions.

One further story from this peripatetic priest is worth repeating, for it could hardly be concocted by imagination. Communist General Yeh, who took part in the

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[1] Quoted by de Jaegher, op. cit., pp. 286-288; cf. Robert Payne, China Awake (Dodd, Mead, New York, 1947), pp. 358-361.

Peiping negotiations with General Marshall, had a brilliant young public relations officer named Hwang Hwa, a graduate of Yenching University. Shortly before the Marshall mission returned to Washington, Hwang Hwa paid a visit to all the Christian institutions in the Vicinity of Peiping.

> He knew that those who would write and talk against the Communists to reveal their machinations to the world and prevent their coming to power would be the persons who had had the longest experience with the Communists and therefore knew the real motives and aims behind the elaborate chicanery of their propaganda. These persons, of course, were the missionaries, Catholic bishops, priests, brothers, and nuns, and the Protestant ministers and missionary doctors.[1]

So he informed his listeners, suavely and impressively, that if they spoke and wrote nothing derogatory about the Communists, their favor would be reciprocated; when the Reds ultimately seized Peiping, these friendly Christian missions would be protected and guaranteed the same freedoms enjoyed under the Kuomintang. "'I myself realize,' he said with tongue in cheek, 'that the missions are really not imperialistic and are, as you claim, actually good for the people.'" At one Roman Catholic House of Study, Hwang Hwa had made a particularly charming impact on a young priest--until it was discovered that he had stopped in the yard to warn the children not to trust foreigners, who were anti-Chinese and would pretend to like children and then make them suffer.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 190.

The man most responsible, however, for thoroughly captivating friend and foe alike was Chou En-lai. Urbane and handsome, the epitome of diplomacy, he convinced scores of missionaries and correspondents that Communist moderations and modifications were completely sincere. Disillusionment came for one friend on a trip to Kaifeng in 1946 to conduct negotiations for Yellow River dyke repair. This missionary escorted Chou from Shanghai in General Marshall's plane and offered to share his room with the Communist delegate. Chou accepted the bed instead of the camp cot--"not quite in the Chinese tradition of respect to one's senior"--wore a well-tailored suit of English tweeds, a silk shirt, silk underwear, silk socks, and sported a gold-mounted toilet kit and the best imported luggage, "as contrasted with the very humble Sun Yat-sen uniform he used to wear." "But what disturbed me most was that in the two or three days' conferences which followed he proved to be just as unreasonable as the other Communists had been, so our efforts resulted in nothing."[1]

Freda Utley, despite her vehement antagonism to former friends, still gave the Communist Premier the benefit of the doubt. "I find it hard to believe," she wrote,

> ....that Chou En-lai, who charmed me as he did

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 18, June 20, 1952.

> everyone else, is a liar and a cheat. He may have only been carrying out a clever strategem in Moscow's interests, but it is barely possible that for a short period of time he saw a possibility, through American support, of cutting the umbilical cord which binds the Communists to Moscow without killing his party.[1]

Whatever their motives, Red leaders continued to issue assurances of welcome and toleration. Mao Tse-tung had declared in 1945 that:

> ....only the Liberated Area...has effectively realized (the liberties of speech, publication, assembly, organization, thought, belief, and person)....Everyone is free to believe in any religion or not, and no compulsion or discrimination against him is allowed.[2]

In 1946 Chu Teh told American correspondents:

> "We have no secret police, no torture chambers. ....We would like foreigners to come here, and we guarantee their freedom of movement, and we guarantee freedom to all missionaries....We will not confiscate and we will not break our agreements."[3]

Yet the Basic Program on the Chinese Agrarian Law, passed by the Central Committee of the Party on October 10, 1947, ruled that "Land Ownership rights of all ancestral shrines, temples, monasteries, schools, institutions, and organizations are abolished."[4]

During these years of precarious balance between World War II and the Communist sweep to power, a number of relief workers from various organizations made contact with "liberated areas." With few exceptions they received enthusiastic cooperation, although some lower Red echelons failed to distinguish one kind of foreigner from all other imperialists. As early as December, 1945, a medical convoy to Yenan found "every courtesy and opportunity to see what was being done there in great and quite open detail."[1] Similar teams to deliver medical and relief supplies or to make arrangements for future convoys met businesslike but reasonable treatment in Honan, Kiangsu, Hopei, and other regions.

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[1] Utley, op. cit., p. 81.

[2] Mao Tse-tung, On Coalition Government, quoted by Kao, op. cit., p. 63.

[3] Quoted by Payne, China Awake, p. 307.

[4] Quoted by Gerald F. Winfield, China: The Land and the People (Sloane, New York, 1948), p. 403; cf. China Weekly Review, November 15, 1947.

Even in the narrow eyes of Chinese Communists, most of these relief agencies possessed distinct advantages over Christian missions. They owned no property, although they frequently occupied--with permission--either Catholic or Protestant buildings. They lived on the simplest standards, usually with Chinese associates, unencumbered by families and belongings. They were international, in a more immediate and obvious way than Christian missionaries. They made every effort to serve both factions impartially, even to give Communists preference wherever possible, although goods and personnel having any connection with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration were increasingly suspected by the Reds.

Some of their reports, are cited here because they shed indirect light on Communist attitudes. For instance, one team staying in a Catholic mission just north of the Yellow River heard "gory stories" about what the Reds had done elsewhere. One priest who spend two years in "liberated territory" had been favorably impressed at first, until gradually officials relieved him of his possessions, assigned spies to his household, restricted worship services, and placed anti-Christian posters in the church.

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 2, October 8, 1951.

When the Communists actually arrived, however, they amazed everyone with their discipline and efficiency. The relief workers, transients themselves, were largely ignored, although their gasoline was apparently "borrowed" to burn the town gate, the railroad station, and the hsien headquarters. Even the priest apparently convinced the interrogating political cadres that he, like them, worked for the common people.[1]

The most dramatic tale came from a four-day capture in Honan, December, 1947, although "the crisis was never so great that I felt complete dejection or the need of appealing for Divine assistance."[2] Communist soldiers brandishing guns made in Connecticut rounded up the members of the team, denounced them as Americans (though some were British), and warned them against any aid to the Nationalists. "It doesn't make any difference how big your nose is," they threatened; "we will shoot." The chief problem appeared to be uncertainty as to what to do with barbarian imperialists, who were trucked from one village to another while awaiting higher instructions. "They say the reason is that they fear for our lives," as rumors had circulated of foreigners killed by the Kuomintang, who blamed the Reds. Meanwhile even the common soldiers demonstrated an astounding knowledge and curiosity about Truman, Wallace, Marshall, and Stuart.

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 3, October 19, 1951.

[2] Personal Letter, No. 8, November 19, 1951; cf. China Newsletter (mimeographed), June, 1948.

A neighboring agricultural sub-station of the relief mission suffered more seriously. There the Communists absconded with a boar pig, a Holstein bull, two cows, eleven goats, a phonograph, and a stock of clothing. They also broke into the store of baled cotton and distributed it among the people, some of whom remarked: "What did the (relief team) ever give us? They have to wait for the Ba Lu (Eighth Route Army) to come to give it to us." These losses put an end to that particular project. At relief headquarters the only disappearance involved several dozen pairs of stockings made by the textile cooperative. These were "purchased" for a very nominal price in Communist currency, which had no exchange value in that area. An order to use agency trucks to transport fifty tons of CNRRA wheat was refused--and strangely not enforced.

Another religious service group in the same province encountered even more difficult circumstances. After five months of intermittent contact with the Reds, they decided to abandon their relief project. Eight members had all their equipment stolen and had to walk miles to the rail junction, most of them ready to return to America far short of their three-year contract. From another sector came an appeal to evacuate sixteen members of the China Inland Mission, including six children, who had been "liberated" in early December, 1947, and by late February, 1948, were eager to be "reliberated." They had not been mistreated, and their borrowed jeep had been returned after two days, but some had been completely isolated over four months. The mission representative who accompanied the rescue truck made the mistake of calling together a Christian gathering while he was in town, and this so excited Communist suspicions that everybody was ordered back for awhile. Finally the county magistrate granted a pass and supper to the missionaries and their escorts, even though he had made a violent anti-American, anti-Christian speech on the parade ground the day before.[1]

The administrative superintendent of one such relief agency described in some detail the efforts to secure adequate recognition and credentials from both sides of the civil war. During this fluctuating period, when team members found themselves first under one regime and then under the other and then in "no-man's-land," it proved imperative to be able to interpret the purpose and program of such a voluntary service organization. For the most part their activities, especially hospitals and clinics, won admiration and support. The superintendent's summary of attitudes and experiences is worth quoting:

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[1] Personal Diary, No. 8, Dec. 17, 1947, to Feb. 22, 1948.

> It was obvious during the first year or two of Liberation that (our) popularity in the area was not welcomed by many of the Communist authorities, and they made a number of attempts to discredit us. The individual experiences of some of our members in imprisonment and trumped-up charges are results....
>
> Our relations with the Communists were often strained but often friendly. We found them difficult to negotiate with, but normally firm in their commitments, once agreed to....They were obviously thorough-going Communists in almost every case, and ....were quite willing to use tactics with which I could not agree....
>
> We were treated considerably better than other foreign and mission groups because our work was primarily medical and we had tried to maintain complete neutrality, non-political and non-military involvement. We were an international group and, therefore, less vulnerable to anti-American propaganda. We also had Chinese members on an equal plane with our foreign personnel. We did not flee from the Communists, but....went out to them to interpret....our desire to help the Chinese people ....We were not as deeply involved in property, families, etc., as some mission groups.[1]

This report then went on to speak of Christian missionary work which had been observed. The Communist attitude toward foreigners did "tighten up," especially after the Korean fighting began, and the Reds intensified and made more explicit their criticism of missions, especially the Catholics and others who held property. Some restrictions on public services were evident, but in other places they continued with few restrictions, at least in the "stabilized Communist areas back in 1948." As during the

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 6, November 2, 1951.

Japanese War, Church property was being used by the government, particularly where mission personnel had fled.

Unfortunately the exigencies of war took precedence with both Kuomintang and Kungchantang over the welfare of the people or the nation. This fact added to the problems of relief and rehabilitation, as well as of regular mission work. For example, the UNRRA engineering project to control the Yellow River met repeated sabotage from the Communists, who blew up gasoline dumps, burned trucks, kidnapped some workers, destroyed air compressors, and made impossible demands as the price for repairing the Shantung dikes.[1] On the other hand, the Nationalists consistently refused cooperation on any phase of relief and reconstruction which might conceivably benefit "Liberated territories." Each side, naturally, opposed any measures which might facilitate order and prosperity for the other, and conversely engaged in any activity which might embarrass the enemy.

This tendency, as well as the inherent antagonism to foreigners and their religion, undoubtedly contributed to some spectacular Communist raids on mission stations. Early in 1948 three members of the Mission Covenant were murdered, though whether by bandits or orthodox Reds can never be positively ascertained.[2] However Jean-Jacques Brieux, who defended Communist practices most sympathetically, claimed that since the middle of 1948 there had been no political assassination of missionaries.[1] In Shantung the Congregational mission at Tehchow was largely demolished, and one missionary remarked that "in Shantung there has been more destruction of church property by Communists than in all the years of Japanese occupation."[2] On the other hand, Brieux mentioned a French missionary in the same province who said he lost more in one hour of Kuomintang attack in 1947 than in three years of Communist occupation.[3]

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 18, June 20, 1952.

[2] Clara J. Jones, Above the Tumult in China (Augsburg, Minneapolis, 1948), p. 193.

Farther north the much-publicized Changli Raid took place in May, 1947, on the Hopei Coast just south of the Great Wall. Communists had foraged in the hills and forayed against the railway line for a couple of years. Nine veteran missionaries, including some guests for a student conference, had recently resumed work at the hospital, school, and church. At 2:30 one Sunday morning Eighth Route Army scouts knocked in search of a doctor. Succeeding waves of Red visitors behaved less courteously. By insisting that the elderly women could not travel, six of the missionaries resisted all efforts to march them off. The other three women--a doctor, a nurse, and a teacher--were "kidnapped" into the hills by foot, but released unharmed two days and one night later.

Meanwhile the raiders thoroughly looted the entire mission property. From the hospital everything in the line of medical supplies, instruments and equipment disappeared, not to mention bedding, towels, and so forth. From the school all food supplies, students' clothes and bedding were taken, while over three hundred pupils with their teachers and principals were marched into the countryside and back, about thirteen miles. From mission residences the soldiers demanded money and watches and rings and flashlights and anything else they fancied. From one house loaned to the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, precious stocks of grain, flour, and other relief supplies were carted away. What the Communists did not want they encouraged the townspeople to appropriate, emptying feathers and straw to use pillows and mattresses as gunnysacks. Two things prevented an absolutely complete stripping of the property: the presence of some missionaries and faithful Chinese staff members, and the temporary "looting" by friends who returned personal belongings the next day. Sunday night the CNRRA house and another mission residence were burned, and Monday evening the foreigners hid in a neighbor's home when the rumor spread that other buildings would be set afire. By Tuesday morning the Red raiders had withdrawn, leaving frightful tension and ruin.

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[1] Jean-Jacques Brieux, La Chine du Nationaisme au Communisme (Editions du Beuil, Paris, 1950), pp. 397-398.

[2] Price, op. cit., p. 119; cf. Chester S. Miao, ed., Christian Voices in China (Friendship Press, New York, 1948), p. 19.

[3] Brieux, op. cit., p. 397.

Despite the greed for material goods, which extended even to student clothes and possessions, an ideological and political motivation was also apparent. Chinese Christian companions soon found it wiser to keep away from the Westerners, so bitter was the feeling against "running dogs." Others courageously hid the missionaries, insisting that "it was not safe to be seen, that the whole move was very definitely anti-foreign, i.e. anti-American and anti-Christian." On the trek into the hills the same attitude showed up. A Chinese principal in that group, "who was a small boy in 1900 and remembers the Boxer Uprising, says that the wanton destruction, the anti-Christian and anti-foreign spirit reminded him of those days."[1]

Apparently little if any basic change had taken place in the attitude toward religion, especially imperialistic Christianity. Outwardly, in a small circle around Yenan, the United Front lasted almost exactly ten years, from 1936 to 1946. Actually there existed critical breaches and violations of this unity all during that period, on the ideological as well as the military front. Said one North China missionary: "The effect of Communist occupation has been universally disastrous. Most of our rural work cannot be started again under present circumstances."[2] A mission executive wrote from Peiping on July 7, 1947:

> "Grant the Communists more idealism, more enthusiasm, more honesty, more efficiency in the areas they control; they are still so tyrannical, unjust, and so motivated by hate that I am bound to feel that their cure for a lot of evils is worse than the disease."[3]

Ironically enough, Robert Payne's approving comments on the Red agricultural program may be equally revealing of of other aspects:

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 33, May 21, 1947.

[2] Quoted by Miao, op. cit., pp. 119-120.

[3] Ibid.

> One of the more remarkable things about Chinese Communist policy toward the peasants was its consistency: it was so consistent that in 1948 the Central Committee of the party reissued unchanged two documents first published under the Kiangsi Soviets in 1933. They were: "How to Analyze Classes" and "Decisions on Some Questions Concerning the Agricultural Struggle."....The long, unchanging tradition of agricultural reform worked in the Communists' favor. If they had changed with every change in dogma, the Chinese Communists could hardly have won the support of the peasants.[1]

Yet the fifteen-year period referred to embraced a multitude of twists and turns, from wholesale confiscation to a complete denial of any land redistribution, ostensibly urging instead a reasonable reduction in rents. If these changes in dogma and public pronouncement were mere "window-dressing," or if the Communist principle at its most concrete point had swung full cycle in fifteen years, why should missionaries give credence to religious tacks? As the party editor in Yenan remarked to Freda Utley, "We Communists know how to make turns to reach our goal." And as she added, herself adroit at shifting position, "it was clear....that it was circumstances, not conviction, which had led the Chinese Communists to adopt a more or less liberal policy."[2]

Against this background of twenty-seven years, missionaries and other foreigners faced a nation-wide "Liberation." Many of them knew absolutely nothing about Communist theory and practice, but they relied on their intimate and sympathetic knowledge of the Chinese people. An "Experienced Diplomat," speaking of the Japanese War not civil strife, once remarked: "The missionaries know a lot about China and nothing about the rest of the world. How can they judge?"[1]

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[1] Robert Payne, Red Storm Over Asia (Macmillan, New York, 1951), p. 50.

[2] Utley, op. cit., pp. 158-159.

Some foreign missionaries had vague, emotion-charged recollections of the "Kiangsi Period" of Red activity. Their own friends or colleagues had been captured by a new breed of "bandits," who waved the Hammer and Sickle and shouted against imperialism and Christianity. Or they had read the shocking account of the Stam murders and more recently heard lurid tales about the Changli Raid. Some of these announced flatly that they had not been "called" to preach to infidels or to risk marytrdom. Others soberly and reluctantly decided that the welfare, rather than actual physical safety, of their children required them to leave. Or they realized that their own health, perhaps after years of Japanese internment, could not stand another siege of tension. Over two thousand of these, counting children, crowded the ships from every Chinese port between November, 1948, and May, 1949, with stragglers in the South even later. They included elderly workers near retirement, others who were ill, some with short-term or temporary assignments in China and major responsibilities elsewhere, and a buoyant but frustrated company of language students and first-term recruits, who had hardly gotten settled in the land of their life-time careers.

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[1] Mowrer, op. cit., p. vii.

Still another segment of the missionary population was cautiously but frankly optimistic. They sincerely hoped that with an end to civil war and the devastating economic inflation China might again find stability--and faith. They agreed often with their embarrassed Chinese friends who concluded, honestly but regretfully, that the Kuomintang mess appeared so hopeless, "nothing could be any worse." They recognized--most of them--that there would be critical hardships for the nation and for the Church, but they constantly reminded themselves that these people had always absorbed alien conquerors and ideologies (a somewhat dubious historical fact) and would doubtless do so again.

"Old-timers" recollected that the Nationalist Revolution of 1926-1927 had been anti-foreign and anti-Christian, and missions had weathered that storm along with many others. The "youngsters," who probably represented a sizable portion of this particular group, tended to judge the post-war government of China by what they had seen in 1947 and 1948, and by what they had read of Edgar Snow, Theodore White, Agnes Smedley, and Jack Belden. They lacked the mitigating sympathy, appreciation, and understanding of Chiang Kai-shek that came from living through the relatively halcyon 'thirties in China.

One final group, as difficult to define as to number or classify: the stubborn realists, they might like to call themselves. They did not really believe that Christian missions--as distinct from the Christian Church--had much future under a Communist regime. They regarded their presence as a "holding action" which might fortify and encourage their Chinese colleagues, even if they themselves had little to offer in such fresh circumstances. This category included a few of the curious, who wanted to experience "this thing" first-hand. It included at the other extreme a few of the most devoutly committed Christian witnesses, who knew that God had summoned them to this task and these people, and they would stay as long as He willed. A majority of both the curious and the committed, it might be fair to say, belonged in an earlier and more optimistic classification.

One of the missionaries who had most intimate contact with the Chinese Reds during the Kiangsi Period describes his own forewarnings thus:

> A high executive of (a) mission board in New York asked my opinion of the attitude of Reds toward missions, and as they occupied North China, following World War II. I told (him): "Within two years of their complete occupation of China, there will not be a 'foreign devil' other than Russian left in China. All missionaries will be out, in prison, or dead!" (He) argued that his reports from.... their executive in Shanghai revealed a possible friendliness. My final reply was: "(He) and New York executives did not know the Reds for what they are. I am speaking out of experience."[1]

Written in 1952, this could be impressive hindsight. To those who know this missionary, it commends itself as penetrating insight acquired twenty-five years ago and expressed just as forthrightly at that time. But a handful of missionaries believed this prophecy almost as strongly as it was voiced in New York--and yet chose to remain at their posts.

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 52, September 2, 1952.

Whatever their motivation, optimistic or pessimistic, sustained by social liberalism that welcomed reform or by pious fundamentalism anticipating the anti-Christ, almost two thousand Protestant Christian missionaries carried on through "Liberation" and the establishment of the People's Democratic Republic of China. How they carried on, what they carried on, and what befell them and their work is the real material of this study.

PART III

RECENT PRACTICE IN CHINA, 1949-1953

CHAPTER 6 - THE QUESTIONNAIRE

After consultation with advisors at Yale University and a few mission executives in New York in the summer of 1951, "An Inquiry Concerning the Experience of Missionaries in Communist China" was prepared. It asked first for the following biographical data: Name (not to be quoted without permission), present address, mission board, age, education (college and graduate work), stations in China (with dates) before Communists, stations in China (with dates by months) after Communists, type of work (if changed after "Liberation" give reason), Mandarin speaking or local dialect or neither or both, and reading or study on Communism in theory or practice.

Then came these fifteen questions:

1. What were the first effects of Liberation on your personal life?
2. What were the first effects of Liberation on your mission work?
3. What later definite changes in Communist attitude toward foreigners did you note?
4. What later changes in Communist attitude toward mission work did you note?
5. Were there clear-cut stages in the treatment of missionaries and/or mission work in your locality? If so, how would you describe them (giving approximate dates)? Was there any correlation between propaganda, popular attitudes, and official acts?
6. Were there any noticeable differences of either leniency or harshness between your treatment and that of other missionaries (a) in your own group? (b) in other missions, including Roman Catholic? (c) of other nationalities? If so,

what form did they take, and how do you account for these differences?

7. What were the determining factors in your decision to remain in China under the approaching Communist regime? Would you make the same choice again? Did you wife and family leave earlier, and if so, did this fact appear to influence subsequent Communist attitudes toward you?
8. What were the determining factors in your decision to leave, and when was it made? Please indicate any advice from mission board, Chinese friends or officials.
9. What procedures and time span did you go through to secure your exit permit?
10. Were any public charges or trial ever brought against you? If so, please detail accusations, experiences, settlement, any other observations, dates, etc.
11. Were you ever under house arrest, imprisonment, or exceptional bans? If so, please give dates, charges, experiences, settlement, and your own views on the incident as to motivation, justification, real issues, attitudes of officials or friends.
12. What were Communist policies and practices toward mission property in your area, in regard to both occupation and taxes? Please give details of property involved, whether Chinese or American owned, Communist uses, rates and amount of taxes, etc. Did you have any evidence that property treatment was discriminatory? How?
13. Did you personally have any unique experience, pleasant or unpleasant, with Communist authorities which might shed light on their motives, policies (toward religion and foreigners), etc.?
14. What restrictions or pressures were placed on Chinese Christians during your stay?
15. Any comments or observations or additions or suggestions you care to make?

With this questionnaire went a personal letter of explanation and some specific suggestions for those replying. The former included a letter of endorsement from the associate secretary of the Far Eastern Joint Office, Division of Foreign Missions, National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America. Eighty days later, after the China Committee had discussed the project and realized the dangerous precedent of backing any such individual research, a request was added that this be regarded as "a personal endorsement rather than an official one." Most copies of the questionnaire mailed subsequently carried a penned note to that effect.

In November, 1951, the chairman of this China Committee in a personal letter expressed the "somewhat doubting hope that you will find a considerable number of missionaries ready to take the time to write a reply such as your fifteen questions would imply." The chief concern seemed to be inordinate length. As early as July he had written:

> I have sat for an hour, an hour and a half, or two hours, listening to missionaries recently returned from China, giving the answers to just two or three of these questions that you are asking them to deal with. It may be that some of them will feel free to give you adequate replies, but a terrific amount of effort and time would be required if they give you worth while answers. Having said that, maybe you will boil these down to the limit.

This very real handicap appeared obvious but inescapable. The questioner knew first-hand what a mountain of experience, often undigested and perhaps indigestible, lay behind each successive query. Yet some of those who remarked most sincerely that they could write a book on these points were the ones who most cheerfully did write four, six, eight single-spaced pages to cover the material at all adequately.

Ironically—but naturally—enough, the academic advisors urged additions rather than subtractions, both in biographical data and questions; e.g. the effect on Communist attitudes of one's family's prior departure. Another pointed out that the original information dealt almost completely with foreign personnel and suggested the inclusion of Question 12 on mission property. This had proved to be an important issue under the Communist regime, even though the majority of people replying were not qualified to give property details, and many reports were often vague and incomplete.

The next step was to secure address lists. A letter of explanation and request was sent to every mission board or society affiliated with the Far Eastern Joint Office and later to the European societies connected with the International Missionary Council. Additional agencies were located through the American Bible Society list of organizations having work in China, through personal liaison, or through chance reading.

With hardly an exception the responses from mission secretaries sounded cordial and cooperative. Several had had no foreign missionaries in China since the Second World War, but almost all of the remainder willingly shared their address lists, although some with extreme caution. In mid-1951, many missionaries still awaited exit permits in China, and Senator Knowland had not yet broken down the wall of silence which the State Department and Protestant missionary societies had voluntarily erected.

Perhaps one reason that board secretaries so readily granted address lists was that they had to decline another simultaneous request: to peruse office files of China correspondence. One board opened all "circular" mimeographed letters from its missionaries and all general statements and "releases" from its secretaries. Another permitted the use of its docuumentary file on Communism in Asia and Europe. But only one allowed the writer to read personal correspondence from those actually on the field during the years surveyed. Although this was entirely understandable, it seemed a serious blow at first, for an individual's judgment in retrospect seldom coincided precisely with on-the-spot impressions. Later personal letters were assembled from enough private sources to give a fairly comprehensive picture, supplementing the questionnaires.

In the last analysis, however, only two mission agencies declined to cooperate in any way with this project; a few small Continental societies failed to reply. Both of these two, the China Inland Mission and the Salvation Army, have their international headquarters in London, although preliminary contact was made with their American offices. The omission of the China Inland Mission from this survey represents an immeasurable loss, not only in the number of replies tabulated, but also in the coverage of remote sections of the country. However, a few C.I.M. friends have talked freely about their experiences (off the record), and the annual printed reports (two of them sent free and voluntarily with the purchase order of a third) reveal about as much of certain incidents as any questionnaire would have done. Although the overall picture would probably not differ greatly, the inclusion of the China Inland Mission and its affiliates would have added approximately one-third of the total missionary personnel in China as of 1949.

It was obvious from the start that British missionary societies felt greater reluctance to cooperate in such a project than either the American or the Continental. The matter was discussed at a number of denominational and interdenominational conferences in England during 1951, with a personal friend interceding on behalf of this survey in at least one instance. It was even proposed that some central bureau might be set up to coordinate the collection and tabulation of such precarious missionary information, and to adopt broad principles concerning publicity by the Conference of British Missionary Societies and its member groups.

The general compromise position, with two major exceptions, declined to release an address list directly but consented to distribute the questionnaires forwarded to the main office in bulk. Even this represented a triumph of courtesy over caution, sometimes with the express instruction to recipients that they were under no obligation to reply simply because their society had agreed to trust their discretion. One of these boards passed all replies through headquarters before remailing to the United States. Yet by August, 1952, the women's auxiliary of this same church not only submitted an address list direct, but added:

> There have been several discussions on this matter, and I think that the general opinion is now that these missionaries may be approached, and asked to give what information they are able to do, in strict confidence to yourself.

Such a concession reflected not only the withdrawal from China of most of the remaining missionaries, but also the general temper of international relations. For one thing, Great Britain has waited over three years for the People's Democratic Republic of China to reciprocate her diplomatic recognition. Meanwhile there has been no sign of repentance over the Korean "Incident" or any noticeable leniency toward British nationals on the Chinese mainland. Propaganda has denounced the United Kingdom for retaining Hongkong, for failing to support Red China's cause in the United Nations, and for awarding contested airplanes to an American concern. All these, not to mention critical developments within China itself, have recently tended to nullify British hope of moderation or compromise or Titoism in any form.

Of course, too, the British take a dim view of American sensationalism and expect to find Hollywood methods applied even to a doctoral dissertation in the Department of Religion at Yale University. Certainly, the number of personal acquaintances among mission executives in the United States facilitated cooperation on this side of the ocean, although several of the secretaries who assisted this project most cordially have themselves failed to send in a report.

With this groundwork laid, the questionnaires began to go out in September, 1951, and the majority were distributed by the end of that year in the United States and Canada. Most of the Continental and some few British and American societies were not reached until the spring of 1952. To all persons who received their inquiries by December 1, 1951, a postcard "reminder" was mailed at the end of that month. No other "follow-up" has been used except where some personal lead has indicated; e.g. a reference by one missionary to some colleague's experience.

Another minor problem, for statistics at least, soon made itself evident. Few of the address lists submitted by the mission boards proved fully accurate. Some frankly included "China Missionaries from 1945" or "China Missionaries on Furlough." In one denomination further inquiry, after most of the questionnaires had been posted, revealed that forty out of fifty-four names had withdrawn from China before "Liberation." More often the lists actually claimed to represent those who had served in "Communistic China," yet personal knowledge or friendly, apologetic notes from the recipients disclosed inaccuracies. Apparently most boards shared the confusion of late 1948 and early 1949 on the field, or else they made no attempt to keep or compile an exact list of missionaries who were "liberated."

Again, some societies listed only husbands, whereas others listed couples even though the wife might not have been in Red China. These facts make it impossible to estimate accurately how many individuals who actually served under the Chinese Communist regime were reached by this questionnaire, probably over a thousand counting wives.[1] Replies have therefore been tabulated to include those who reported that they had left before the "turn-over," as well as those who declined to comment.

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[1] Since the China Inland Mission and its European affiliates claimed 737 on the field at the end of 1949 (Anne Hozelton, Gal of the Valleys, C.I.M., London, 1950, p. 18), there could not be more than a hundred others who did not receive this inquiry.

The first column of the following table lists the number of questionnaires sent out. As previously stated, the majority of British and Continental inquiries were sent in bulk for distribution from missionary headquarters. In the case of German societies the numbers were suggested by the secretary of the German Evangelical Missionary Council, and no direct contact was ever made with several of the groups. Undoubtedly the language factor discouraged some Europeans from answering, although the offer was made, and in three cases accepted, to report in German.

The second and eighth columns include not only the "Valid Replies" of column 6, but all those who took the trouble to respond by letter or verbally, even to decline or to state that they had left China before the Communist regime. Among the refusals two or three main reasons stood out. First, the frank objection to filling out questionnaires, more specifically on a topic which might so easily produce repercussions within China. Some of these will be quoted at a later point. Others found themselves simply too rushed, often en route to another field already, to tackle the formidable array of questions. A few pled illness or inability to concentrate on the past tensions and strains. Thirteen people definitely indicated by letter or word of mouth their intention to report, but never did so.

Table I

Replies to the Questionnaire

	Sent Out	Replies	Not In	Refused	Promised	Questionnaires	Individuals	Percentages
American Baptist Foreign Missionary Society	21	8	5	0	0	3	5	38%
Women's A.B.F.M.S.	36	12	6	0	1	5	5	33%
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions	34	20	0	2	3	15	24	56%
Assemblies of God	3	1	0	0	0	1	1	33%
Christian and Missionary Alliance	1	1	0	0	0	1	2	100%
Church of the Brethren	10	7	1	0	0	6	8	70%
Church of God	4	3	3	0	0	0	0	75%
Evangelical and Reformed	7	3	0	0	0	3	4	43%
Evangelical United Brethren Church	7	5	0	0	0	5	5	71%
Free Methodist Church	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	50%
Friends Foreign Missionary Society of Ohio	1	1	0	0	0	1	2	100%
Page Totals	126	62	15	2	4	41	57	49%

Table 1 - Continued

	Sent out	Replies	Not In	Refused	Promised	Questionnaires	Individuals	Percentages
Friends Service Unit	35	10	7	0	0	3	4	28%
Augustana Lutheran Church	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Evangelical Lutheran Church	3	2	1	1	0	0	0	67%
United Lutheran Church	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Mennonite Church	5	2	0	0	0	2	2	40%
Methodist Church	46	27	1	3	0	23	38	59%
Methodist Woman's Division of Christian Service	87	50	5	0	4	41	41	58%
Oberlin-in-China	5	2	0	0	0	2	3	40%
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.	63	22	1	0	1	20	30	35%
Presbyterian Church U.S.	20	9	2	0	1	6	7	45%
Protestant Episcopal	48	15	0	2	0	13	19	31%
Reformed Church in America	17	8	0	1	1	6	11	47%
Seventh Day Baptist	1	1	0	0	0	1	2	100%
Southern Baptist Convention	42	17	3	1	1	12	13	40%
United Boards of Christian Colleges in China	7	3	0	0	0	3	3	43%
Page Totals	387	168	20	8	8	132	173	43%

Table 1 - Continued

	Sent Out	Replies	Not In	Refused	Promised	Questionnaires	Individuals	Percentages
United Christian Missionary Society	12	5	0	0	0	5	8	42%
Young Men's Christian Association	12	5	2	0	0	3	5	42%
Young Women's Christian Association	6	4	1	2	0	1	1	67%
Yale-in-China	6	4	0	0	1	3	4	67%
Page Totals	36	18	3	2	1	12	18	50%
	126	62	15	2	4	41	57	49%
	387	168	20	8	8	132	173	43%
United States Totals	549	248	38	12	13	185	248	45%
Canada								
Church of England	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Presbyterian Church	3	1	0	0	0	1	2	33%
United Church	17	4	0	0	0	4	7	24%
United Church (Women)	16	2	0	0	0	2	2	13%
Canada Totals	37	7	0	0	0	7	11	19%

Table 1 - Continued

	Sent Out	Replies	Not In	Refused	Promised	Questionnaires	Individuals	Percentages
Great Britain								
Baptist Missionary Society	7	1	0	0	0	1	1	14%
British and Foreign Bible Society	1	1	0	0	0	1	2	100%
Methodist Missionary Society	8	2	1	0	0	1	1	25%
Friends Service Council	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	100%
Church Missionary Society	40	8	0	0	0	8	9	20%
Church of England Zenana Missionary Society	8	4	1	1	0	2	2	50%
London Missionary Society	40	11	0	2	0	9	12	28%
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel	30	2	0	1	0	1	1	7%
Great Britain Totals	135	30	2	4	0	24	29	22%
Continental European Missions								
Basel	5	3	0	0	0	3	5	60%
Hildesheimer	3	2	2	0	0	0	0	67%
Rhenish	10	3	0	0	0	3	4	30%
Swedish Missions	3	1	0	0	0	1	1	33%
Danish Missions	44	7	5	0	0	2	2	16%

Table 1 - Continued

	Sent Out	Replies	Not In	Refused	Promised	Questionnaires	Individuals	Percentages
Continental Missions (Cont.)								
Berlin	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Schleswig-Holstein	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
China Missionary Alliance	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Liebenzeller	10	1	1	0	0	0	0	10%
Hotschuan	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Yunnan	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Continental Totals	123	17	8	0	0	9	12	14%
United States	549	248	38	12	13	185	248	45%
Canada	37	7	0	0	0	7	11	19%
Great Britain	135	30	2	4	0	24	29	22%
Continent	123	17	8	0	0	9	12	14%
GRAND TOTAL	844	302	48	16	13	225	300	36%

In other words, the questionnaire, despite unusual ground for declining to answer, brought a thirty-six per cent response (forty-five per cent from American missionaries). Three-quarters of these (or twenty-seven per cent of the total mailed out) consisted of two hundred and twenty-five valid replies from exactly three hundred men and women who actually served in Communist China. The total number distributed probably reached a thousand, including board secretaries, individuals who had earlier contact with the Chinese Reds but did not appear on the post-war lists, a few "Old China Hands" in business circles, and an assortment of could-be counsellors and interested friends.

At least one mission executive suggested it might be wise, in order to balance the subjective and retrospective element in these replies, to supplement with Chinese and non-missionary observations. The idea was excellent; the experiment was completely unsatisfactory.

First, there are few Chinese now accessible--in the United States at least--who have spent much time under the People's Republic. Still fewer had close connections with missionaries. An even smaller number would be able to give an objective appraisal about their foreign colleagues and the new regime. And most expatriate Chinese prefer to say nothing in writing or speaking which might incriminate relatives or associates still on the mainland. One Chinese representative of a small denominational board offered to share a scrapbook of clippings collected in Hongkong, but they hardly sounded worth the effort of translation in addition to regular summaries being received from Hongkong.

Second, the questionnaire was sent to three personal friends who had served in large commercial enterprises or private business in Shanghai. One replied that the three members of his foreign staff who had left China late in December, 1951, were scattered so widely on vacations and a honeymoon that they could not be located within three months --an almost incredible statement for a major business concern. The correspondent did, however, make several observations. (a) Practically all foreign businessmen withdrew from the interior before "Liberation," so the number with experience outside of Shanghai or a few other port cities would be negligible.

> (b) Their activities were under constant surveillance and it was not considered safe to discuss the whereabouts or treatment of third parties....even among themselves; consequently our men have practically no information about anybody except those individuals with whom they were closely associated.

Specifically these three had made no reference to any missions or missionaries and regarded it as extremely dangerous to ask about anyone else. This also implies the vast gulf--still far too prevalent even after the Pacific War--between business and missionary communities. (c) Although the aim of supplementing information on a strictly missionary survey had been stressed, this reply suggested that the questionnaire be revamped "so that it would appear to be directed to the businessman" to assure a "better acceptance" and "better likelihood" of support.

From the second individual came a single-spaced page and a half condemning the "agrarian reformers" myth, pointing to the frank consistency of Mao Tse-tung's statements through three decades, reaffirming the incompatability of Communism and religion, and denying recently printed charges that he himself had been a paid propagandist for the Nationalists. With the exception of his business reasons for staying, the earlier departure of his wife, and nine months' wait for an exit permit, that letter contained no response to the questionnaire and no mention whatever of missionaries. The third business man failed to reply.

A note to a Roman Catholic priest scheduled to speak on China brought a cordial answer although illness prevented his address from being given. A close personal friend and fellow language student of the Roman Catholic faith either did not receive the query or did not care to respond. With these half dozen efforts at supplementary and complementary reports, enthusiasm and ambition waned. This survey is thus necessarily based solely on first-hand and personal reports, supplemented by all available published data.

In general the missionaries who responded--not guessing at the disapproval expressed by silence--showed less reluctance to report their experiences than did their mission executives. Most of them repeated the writer's pledge to quote no names or specific, identifiable localities, but a large number urged some form of publication of the findings.

One Canadian wrote a lengthy paragraph about the uniqueness and remoteness of his province, and the scarcity of missionaries there, which he feared would make recognition easier. Another said in a published article: "So good is the Chinese information service that a summary of this article will probably reach Communists in Chungking forty-eight hours after this magazine goes on sale."[1]

Quotations from two refusals, however, may serve to indicate the attitude of a great proportion of those who did not reply as well as nearly a dozen who did. One American told of how he had informally chatted of his experiences in a small group of "Old China Hands" and subsequently received "the echo of a very sharp reaction on the part of the Communists in China against me personally." Adding that he had been strongly advised by his mission board to say little or nothing about the new regime, he expressed further concern about retaliation on Chinese friends and colleagues.

> Do you think your work, so conscientiously undertaken, does not run the risk of being prejudicial to the Christian effort in China?....I tried to imagine what two of the most helpful co-workers would say.... and I could almost hear the voiced disapproval.

A rather different approach to the same problem came from a British woman, as follows:

> I feel very strongly that we missionaries who have voluntarily stayed in China and have had the great privilege of experiencing her process of "evolution" must be very careful lest anything we say may be misunderstood and so make the process more complicated. I have had a wonderful opportunity

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[1] A. Stewart Allen, "I Was A Prisoner of the Chinese Reds." (MacLean's Magazine, April 15, 1952), p. 52.

> of watching this new China emerge and I believe there will come a day when people will say "Thank God for the way the Chinese found themselves in this generation." I should be delighted to answer the questionnaire if it were merely a matter of educating the public in our own countries, but to me it seems much more complicated than that. I of my own free will was a guest in China, living with the Chinese and entering into their national hopes and aspirations not for my sake, or my country's, but for theirs. If I had criticisms I made them to them, but I consider that even if I could it would be wrong to exploit my very special opportunities by making them public now after I have been trusted by a government in a time of revolution when it is naturally suspicious of any imperialistic elements. And of course it is true that anything in print referring to China is always made the subject of deep study and always has repercussions one way or another. Forgive my writing like this but I feel sure that God is also in this revolution in China, and we may not help His purpose by saying too much.
>
> P.S. Of course it is well known that all missionaries are suspected of being political agents, and it is therefore very necessary that there should be no foundation for this.[1]

Two other factors influencing responses should be mentioned: time and temperament. Apart from the fading of personal memories it seems certain that a much larger proportion of recipients would be willing to answer such a questionnaire if it were sent out in the fall of 1952 instead of 1951. On October 20, 1951, Senator William F. Knowland shocked the mission boards as well as the Department of State by releasing correspondence about "the fate of more than three hundred Americans still in Communist China, more than thirty of them as prisoners."[2]

By April 16, 1952, even the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America spoke out in protest against the imprisonment or detention of at least forty American Protestant missionaries, eleven of them jailed "contrary to all the practices of civilized nations.. .... It would seem that in practically every instance the missionaries are being held for propaganda purposes, since many have been used in public trials."[1] Issued through the China Committee of the Division of Foreign Missions, this statement presumably had the approval of thirty leading foreign mission boards.[2] It therefore represented a sharp reversal of earlier policy concerning publicity.[3]

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[1] Personal Letter, No. R9, April 16, 1952.
[2] *New York Times*, October 21, 1951

Undoubtedly several factors helped to determine this shift. By 1952 there were less than one hundred Protestant missionaries remaining in China. Roughly half of these were under house arrest or in jail, and many of the cases had been publicized in the Hongkong or world press and often in China itself. Negotiations which had been carried on for months through the "unrecognized" British representative and the Indian Ambassador in Peking had produced no results in the release of foreign personnel. Finally events within the People's Republic had apparently passed the "point of no return." Involvement in Korea, the widespread political executions, the Three-Antis (against corruption, waste and bureaucracy), the Five-Antis (against bribery, smuggling, stealing natural resources, skimping work or materials, and stealing national economic reports), and the domestication of the

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[1] Waterbury American, April 17, 1952.

[2] Christian Century, April 30, 1952, p. 518.

[3] For sharp criticism of this earlier silence, cf. Edward Hunter, Brain-Washing in Red China (Vanguard, New York, 1951), p. 20.

Christian Church by means of the Three-Selfs (-government, -support, -propagation) plus the inseparable Aid-Korea-Oppose-America campaign--all these indicated a determined policy on the part of China's Red masters which would not be altered and could not be hid.

But if time helped to influence a missionary's reaction to this questionnaire, so did individual temperament and socio-political inclination. It would not be wholly fair to stress previous political leanings, either in broad ideology or in hopes for China's future. Some people most predisposed to welcome and defend the New Democracy found themselves its chief victims and frankly confessed that their experiences under a Communist regime had revealed new dimensions of totalitarianism. Yet others arrived in Hongkong, after being under house arrest, still asserting that "I have heard nothing of any persecution of church people. I haven't met anyone in China who did not feel that the new government is a popular one."[1]

As a limitation on the balance of this survey, it must be admitted that none of these avowed extremists replied to the questionnaire. One of them did offer to do so immediately after his return to the United States, but no further statement has been forthcoming. In cordial personal comment, this missionary took exception to three words in the general covering letter which accompanied the inquiry. With reference to "other mission fields where Communism is a very present threat," the final word was criticized as "loaded." So too was the phrase "tragic 'facts'" in connection with the Chinese Christian Church. The critic was quite correct from the standpoint of pure objectivity, though neither passage directly concerned the questionnaire itself, which has been condemned from the "Right" for using the term "Liberation" without quotation marks.[1] Obviously, however, the "Left" has found good reason within the project as a whole (the most recent returnees did not receive any covering letter) to assume their replies would be swallowed up in the mass.

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[1] China Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 4, April 16, 1952.

On the other hand, some of the closest colleagues of these men have chosen a different course. One told his story in full in a nationally popular magazine. Another in the same mission at first ignored the questionnaire out of concern for his guarantor and a foreign missionary prisoner, but later changed his mind and volunteered a report. "The situation has now changed: (my colleague) is home, some things have already been published, and misleading reports by Jim Endicott[2] and others need to be counteracted."[3]

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[1] The word "Liberation," a direct translation of the Chinese term, has been employed not with any value judgment, but as a more vivid, distinctive, and convenient term than change, turn-over, conquest, etc.

[2] A former Canadian missionary who has since paid a visit to Red China and returned implying charges of germ warfare by the United Nations.

[3] Personal Letter No. 40, June 13, 1952.

Still another correspondent from the same town in China though a different mission, a man who returned to America before "Liberation," wrote as follows:

> Even if you get your questionnaires answered, you will need to get the "personal equation" of the folk who answer you. I have talked with some twelve people who have left....China after we left. If I did not know my people, I would be at a loss to interpret and build up my picture. Fortunately I more or less know them or rather knew them before my date--yet I have had to allow for their growth or/and bias since.[1]

These are some of the pyschological problems, the pitfalls of subjectivity, which confront any analysis of returns from this questionnaire. Of the two hundred and twenty-five persons submitting valid replies (e.g. who actually served for some months under the New Democracy), the writer has talked with over fifty since "Liberation," and many more were personal acquaintances before that time. Even this, however, gives no sound basis on which to weight and interpret various factors in written response. One can only hope that in this total number individual "growth and/or bias" will largely cancel out and leave as accurate a record as honest but human reporters can reconstruct ex post facto.

Against a background of extreme reticence in most missionary headquarters, of profound Christian concern for jeopardized colleagues, of sincere reluctance to justify charges of espionage under any interpretation, and of personal tension and exhaustion amounting sometimes almost to shellshock, two hundred and twenty-five missionaries to China took the time and effort to report their experiences under the Communist government.

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[1] Personal Letter No. 44, January 10, 1952.

Representing well over twenty-five per cent of those reached, probably nearer thirty per cent of recipients who actually served in "liberated" areas, this covers approximately one-sixth of the total Protestant missionary personnel in China at the start of the Red regime.[1] In other words, questionnaires went to well over half the eligible list. Most of the remainder belonged to the China Inland Mission, although a few of the Continental European missions which did respond were C.I.M. affiliates.

Replies continued to come in from September, 1951, through March,1953, and from the following two dozen countries or territories: the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Hongkong, Jamaica, Malaya, India, Japan, Vietnam, Switzerland, Thailand, Sweden, Taiwan, Burma, Sumatra, Costa Rica, Brazil, French West Africa, Tanganyika,Cameroun, Denmark, Germany, and Italy and Hawaii in transit. The next chapter will summarize the biographical data of these men and women who have gone from China to the whole world.

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[1] Probably 1800-1900, cf. China Bulletin, No. 89, June 13, 1950; R. Pierce Beaver, "A Report on the Reallocation of China Missionaries and Funds by North American Mission Boards" (Missionary Research Library, Occasional Bulletin, Vol III, No. 14, December 24, 1952) reports 2,108 North American missionaries on the China rolls in 1950, but admits (Personal Letter, January 28, 1953) that this includes all those on furlough or withdrawn before "Liberation" and not yet reassigned.

CHAPTER 7

THE PERSONNEL

In tabulating replies to this questionnaire, a rather arbitrary geographical division has been used, with separate biographical summaries for Canada, the British Isles, and Continental Europe. In assigning provinces to various regions, however, effort has been made to demarcate the principal missionary centers in regard to numbers, general problems, and date of "Liberation." These have been selected as follows: Manchuria (and Mongolia); North China (Shantung, Hopei, Shansi, Shensi); East China (Kiangsu, Anhwei, Chekiang); Central China (Honan, Hupei, Hunan, Kiangsi); South China (Fukien, Kwangtung, Kwangsi); West China (Kweichow, Yunnan, Szechwan, Kansu, Sikang).[1]

Kansu, which has the economic and ethnographic features of Mongolia and the geographic level of North China, has been included in the West because of its position in the later time-scale. Shantung could be separated from Hopei, for much of its rural area remained in Red hands from 1945 to 1949. An even stronger case could be made for dividing

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[1] The People's Government has adopted a regional administration as follows: Inner Mongolia (autonomous), Northeast, North, East, Central-South, Northwest, Southwest.

Fukien from Kwangtung, not only because of the large concentrations of missionary personnel in both provinces, but also because Foochow, Amoy, and environs changed hands at least four months before Canton. Conditions, however, were similar, and one subdivision would lead to another until each area became so distinct as to be identifiable.

Education

Again, certain arbitrary classifications have had to be used in educational background of the missionaries. With obvious injustice at some points the record of Bible school or nursing has been rated as less than a bachelor's degree unless college graduation was also specified. In gross unfairness, especially to physicians, the Masters and the Reverends and the Medical Doctors have been grouped together, with only Ph.D's accepted as a double step above university, though in actual practice this is not always so.

Nevertheless it is still worth noting that of 185 American missionaries, 116 hold at least one graduate degree, and twenty more have earned their Ph.D. Thirty-five reported only a B.A. or B.S. and at most a dozen received less than a full college education. These proportions hold fairly consistent in all five areas (no American missionaries were reported in Manchuria), from 65% to 84% possessing graduate degrees.

The Canadian record is even higher: six out of seven individuals replying hold at least a B.D. or M.A. degree, two of them Ph.D.'s and the seventh is a college graduate.

The difference in British and Continental educational systems accounts in large measure for the different academic picture, especially as it applies to nursing and other feminine vocations. College is seldom interposed between middle schools and professional training, yet the higher level of European secondary schools raises many British and Continental standards above the corresponding American level. It is difficult to know whether to classify English Masters' degrees with an American doctorate, whereas a degree in theology probably represents less time than in the United States.

At any rate, according to the previously cited schedule, nine Britishers out of 24 reported a graduate degree, five more had a full college preparation, and ten received somewhat less than complete university training. Another factor which reduces the accuracy of these figures is that several British citizens are included under American missionary organizations and might shift the balance either way. Five of the nine Continentals reported graduate degrees, including both doctors and clergymen, one a college degree, and three vocational training.

Age

Under the heading of age, thirteen Americans and three Britishers failed to confess, or overlooked the item on the right-hand side of the page. These ages were of course given as of the date of the writing, an average of early 1952. Perhaps a year or less should be deducted for the age when leaving China. Even so, all but the very youngest missionaries would have passed their thirtieth birthday.

The age figures for the 185 Americans replying run as follows: under thirty, 7; thirty-one to forty, 42; forty-one to fifty, 29; fifty-one to sixty, 58; over sixty, 35; not answering, 13. In other words, just over half of the total are more than fifty years of age, probably more than one-fifth over sixty, if the ages not given were correctly apportioned. At the other end of the scale, a sizable majority of the 42 are in their lower thirties, probably in their twenties when they went to China. This leaves perhaps a fifth, not more than a quarter at most, in the vital age span of 35 to 50. Non-American figures reveal the same situation. Canadians: up to forty, 1; up to fifty, 2; up to sixty, 1; over sixty, 3. Great Britain: forty and under, 5; forty-one to fifty, 7; fifty-one to sixty, 9; not given, 3. Continentals: under forty, 2; under fifty, 1; under sixty, 1; over sixty, 5.

Most of the explanations are obvious and need only be mentioned here. Following the First World War there was a tremendous upsurge in missionary interest and an outpouring of money and personnel for all parts of the world. Those who went to China during that entire decade would be now in their fifties and sixties. The Harding Recession dealt a critical blow to the whole enterprise almost at the start. In 1926-28 came the Nationalist (and Communist) Revolution which sent thousands of missionaries from their stations, hundreds of whom never returned. Before the political situation in China had become fully stabilized, the Great Depression hit the United States and then the rest of the world. In many cases greater retrenchment followed, and usually the younger people with less field experience and more adaptability were the first to be withdrawn. Almost no new missionaries were sent out during the early and middle 'thirties and many of the newer recruits who evacuated or were interned during the Japanese War did not return.

By the end of the war, or the opening up of transportation late in 1946, a new generation of missionaries was ready for service, some of them slightly older than normal for fresh appointees, since they had been waiting and planning during the war years. Yet the new missionaries withdrew in greater numbers than other age groups before the Communist conquest. Some were still in language school; the majority had been at their posts hardly a year. By experience, linguistic preparation, established position in Church or community, and overall usefulness they were--however reluctant to admit it--more readily expendable. Furthermore, and perhaps most decisive, most of them had young children for whom they were not eager to face the uncertainties of the new regime. "Old-timers" of fifty and over had long since sent their children off to college and families of their own and after the war had recommitted themselves to finish out a lifetime of service in China.[1]

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[1] Cf. R. Pierce Beaver, "A Report on the Reallocation of China Missionaries and Funds by North American Boards", pp. 3-4.

Service

This predominance of older missionaries stands out more clearly and accurately in lengths of service recorded than in age charts. In all cases the figures have been based on the date of first going to the field, irrespective of the number of furloughs or war years or other gaps spent at home.

Far more indicative than age is the discovery that 46 out of 185 American missionaries had been in China less than five years. Substantiating the preceding discussion of a sizable time gulf, even fewer had served from six to twenty-five years: 17 from six to fifteen, 29 from sixteen to twenty-five. But 89, almost half the total, had gone to China before the Revolution of 1927, 21 of those 89 before the First World War.

Of the seven Canadians, 1 had been in China less than five years, 1 under fifteen, 2 under twenty-five, 1 under thirty-five, and 2 thirty-six years or more. Of the 24 from British societies, 4 were first-termers, 5 had gone to China during the Japanese War or immediately before, 9 had served sixteen to twenty-five years, 5 up to thirty-five, and 1 failed to indicate his dates. Of the Continentals, 2 were in China less than five years, 1 between sixteen and twenty-five, 6 between twenty-six and thirty-five. Although West China showed a slightly higher proportion of second-term missionaries, the pattern remained consistent throughout each group in each region: a plurality in the twenty-six to thirty-five year service, with the under-five-years coming next. The British missionaries, however, reflecting the same age curve, fell into a ten-year lower service bracket. This suggests both a slightly higher recruitment age and a less complete "embargo" on new candidates during the depression and Second World War.

This tragic gap of twenty years in age and service showed itself not merely in statistics, but in misunderstandings and frictions within missions and stations, which the middle-aged handful tried vainly to bridge. Such unfortunate but inevitable divisions affected attitudes toward both mission policy and socio-political conditions, although of course there were exceptions to any rule in each age group. The new generation felt that their elders clung to outmoded methods, living standards, and social judgments. The older missionaries knew that these newcomers lacked perspective on China and the missionary enterprise as a whole, and that they failed to realize the tremendous progress which the nation and the Christian Church had made during the 'thirties, or the mortal wounds inflicted on the body politic by the Japanese War. The conflict, always smoothed by Christian love and a common purpose, was too intangible to be analyzed in any such study as this, but it had its relation to the experience of Protestant missions under Communism.

"Liberation"

The lengths of individual experience under the People's

Government vary tremendously in any such statistical record. Returns included those who had left on furlough or on account of illness after only three or four months, and a European woman who spent almost four years in Communist territory in Manchuria. The mean terms reflect fairly accurately the successive dates of "Liberation" up to a common departure period, although missionaries in some areas decided earlier than others to apply for exit permits.

The 225 missionaries polled spent a total of 4,099 months under Communist rule, an average of 18 ¼ months. That is long enough to reach beyond the "honeymoon period," beyond the "Christian" Conference with Premier Chou En-lai in May of 1950, beyond the Korean outbreak and China's "volunteer entry". For a good many people that duration extended past the freezing of funds and assets by both American and Chinese Governments. Yet it is briefer than the prison terms of some.

Table 2 - Duration of Residence Under People's Government

Area or Group	Number of Reports	Total Months	Average Months	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
North	26	641	24 ¾	8	34	25
East	50	909	18 ¼	4	41	21
Central	31	591	19	6	34	19
South	57	855	15	3	39	16
West	21	310	14 ¾	7	36	13
Canada	7	113	16	7	24	20

Area of Group	Reports	Total Months	Average Months	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Britain	24	471	19 1/2	6	41	20
Europe	9	209	26	13	45	23
Total	225	4,099	18 1/4	3	45	

It has seemed worthwhile to tabulate these figures on the duration of stay by geographical regions, although the same breakdown of figures for age or service or education would have little meaning. As will be instantly apparent, the mean statistics give an almost exact picture of the relative dates from "Liberation" to evacuation about February, 1951. Peiping and Tientsin changed hands in January, 1949 (Shantung the previous September); Nanking and Shanghai in April and May; Hankow in May; Fukien in August and Canton in December (giving an October mid-point); Chengtu in December, 1949.

Obviously the non-American figures are affected by the locality represented, especially the two reports from Manchuria. Another regional factor which might be mentioned is ease of departure. Despite one fiasco when hundreds of people in Shanghai awaited an evacuation ship which was finally refused harbor entrance, for the first year of Communist control it was vastly easier for East, South and part-of-the-North missionaries to get out than it was for those in Central or West China.

Other local situations, and the reasons for a nation-wide pattern pointing up to early 1951 evacuation, will be cited in later sections dealing with decisions to leave and with procedures for securing exit permits.

Type of Work

It is often startling and thought-provoking to have old claims and suppositions verified in new contexts. Such an example is the discovery that thirty-six per cent of the American missionaries reporting were engaged in educational work, as compared with twenty-six calling themselves evangelistic and seventeen per cent medical. That leaves thirteen per cent as treasurers or other administrative officers, five per cent in social work, and three per cent in miscellaneous organizational or relief or undesignated positions. In South China evangelistic missionaries outnumbered the educators five to four and by a plurality of one in West China. But the heavy concentration of Christian colleges, not to mention middle schools and seminaries, in North and East China throws the balance heavily toward the academic side. In both those areas education outnumbers evangelism and medicine combined, although a strong claim could be made for including theological teachers as evangelists. South China, with large mission centers in both Fukien and Kwangtung, shows only one less administrator than East China, although the proportion is one-eighth as against over one-sixth of the total in Shanghai.

The Canadians, all from one region, several on the same faculty, show a close kinship to the American pattern, with three in education, two in medicine, one in evangelism, one in administration. The missionaries from Great Britain are about evenly divided: seven evangelistic, seven medical, six educational, two administrative, two indefinite. The Continental European missions at the other extreme report seven evangelistic workers, one medical, one educational. Again it must be noted that the geographic sector represented affects this balance significantly. It should also be added that the inclusion of the China Inland Mission in this survey would have drastically altered the picture toward the evangelistic side. Despite reports from a few smaller missions, the larger denominations represented by the bulk of replies have assumed enormous institutional responsibilities on the field. The importance of education to the total Communist scheme makes this situation acutely relevant to the experience of Protestant missions, as will be shown in the analysis of reports to follow.

Language

An inquiry concerning language and dialects spoken by the missionary brings forth very little fruitful data, except the fact that only two out of 225 replies professed to speak no Chinese at all. A great number modified their answers with "poorly" or "a little," a modesty not only befitting guests in China, but also reflecting an awareness that mastery of the language in any complete or even satisfying sense is an impossibility for most foreigners. The distinction between Mandarin, or the national speech, and local dialects means very little except in East and South China. From the shores of Shantung across the plains of Hunan to the mountains of Szechwan, Mandarin possesses so many brogues and variations that only well-traveled Chinese can understand them all.

But when the missionary of North or Central or West China reports that he speaks Mandarin or a local dialect or both, his definitions may vary from those of his neighbor, or his standards may be simply language school versus the village street. Only south of the Yangtze, from the Wu dialects around Shanghai through utterly alien-sounding tongues of Fukien down to Hainan, this language distinction is very real.

North China reports 23 speaking Mandarin, 3 both; Central China, 23 Mandarin, 2 local, 5 both; West China, 16 Mandarin, 4 local 1 both. In the real dialect areas, however, the missionaries divide as follows: East China, 28 Mandarin, 6 local, 16 both; South China, 10 Mandarin, 25 local, 21 both. The greater Mandarin-speaking in East China results from the fact that Anhwei and the Western portion of Kiangsu, including Nanking, use predominantly the national tongue, whereas Mandarin is not native to any portion of South China. Those who speak it exclusively do so largely in educational work, where it is the universal language.

The Canadians in West China report five Mandarin and two both. The British report eleven Mandarin, four local dialect, and nine both. The Europeans report three Mandarin and six local dialect, although one German mission secretary took vehement exception to the use of the word dialect, on the grounds of strict philology.

With a quarter of the missionaries serving their first term on the field, language deficiences naturally abounded. Some older missionaries garbled their Chinese more fantastically than new recruits trained by the latest scientific methods, yet "got by" on their personal qualities and good intentions. What really matters is that no charge can be levelled against missionaries, as against so many Americans throughout the world, that they failed to acquire the language where they lived and worked. The two who frankly admit to speaking no Chinese were avowedly short-term teachers of English and medicine respectively. One of them studied intermittently, and no doubt both picked up a good many words from their student contacts. Whether that best was good enough, missionaries in China have certainly done their best to avoid "linguistic imperialism."

Study of Communism

Of even more critical importance is the China missionary's acquaintance with both Marxism and Stalinism. The final biographical question was specifically worded to inquire: "What reading or study had you done on Communism in theory or practice?" A great many reporters overlooked this past perfect tense, listing reading and study groups in which they participated after "Liberation" or even after their return to this country. Since no "multiple choice" suggestions were given, the answers often proved vague, ambiguous, and difficult to classify.

The writer has therefore attempted to assign each reply to one of these four categories: much, general, little, or none (the last of course including such a "smattering of ignorance" as can be achieved by normal newspaper and magazine reading). With due allowance for subjectivity in both response and classification, these are the rather shocking revelations of Communist study.

Two-thirds of the Americans replying admitted, directly or indirectly, that they had done little or no advance reading on Communism in either theory or practice. The remaining thirty were equally divided between those who had done a fair amount of general reading and study, and those who had taken specific courses, written papers, or made special studies of Marxism or Russia or Communism in China. For the purpose of this inquiry the post-"Liberation" perusal of Mao Tse-tung's authoritative New Democracy did not qualify the reader as an expert, whether that study took place in missionary circles, in faculty discussion groups, or in "guided" circles of indoctrination.

Had that little pamphlet, or many others like it, been read half as avidly ten years or even five years earlier, it might have carried much greater weight. Even so, it would have required interpretation based not on the currently popular United Front against Japan, but on Marxian ideology and Stalinist expediency. This background most missionaries apparently lacked. To be sure, a large proportion had immersed themselves in the local task twenty-five years or more ago, before Communism in actual practice had become a living world issue. To those who knew--and mostly dreaded--Marxism in China in its early stages, the waves of anti-foreignism and anti-religion had many roots and could be blamed on Dewey pragmatism and Russell scientism as much as Leninism. When Chiang Kai-shek threw the Reds out of his entourage, Communism in China seemed to disintegrate into guerilla bands and bandits.

The situation was very different by 1946-1947. Experienced missionaries and new appointees realized that they were embarking for a land of turmoil and ideological conflict. Even if they believed the Reds had no hope of ultimate victory, the leaven of Communism had obviously permeated every level of Chinese society. Veterans relaxing on furlough or after internment by the Japanese should have done some intensive investigation of this epoch-making force in both theory and practice. Language school curricula might well have included more modern Communism and less ancient history and culture.

Above all, the missionaries should never have fallen into popular American reading habits. Events in China during and after the Pacific conflict did offer dramatic material, but the journalists who presented it--often without themselves knowing the language--gave a one-sided, sensational picture, even assuming that the "factual" accounts were wholly true. There were volumes which told the other side, but they lacked glamor and spice. For every person who read Randall Gould's fair and moderate China In the Sun, hundreds read Thunder Out of China. China Shakes the World sounded far more melodramatic than The United States and China. For years the stirring account of the epic Long March in Red Star Over China remained the definitive work, supplemented by glowing reports of the Border Regions and resistance against the Japanese.

Meanwhile many equally first-hand, equally vivid narratives were neglected. This writer, for one, had years ago read of the Stam martyrdom and John Williams of Nanking, but he had never heard of Bosshardt's The Restraining Hand or In Captivity by Tvedt. Daniel Nelson's The Apostle to the Chinese Communists could be dismissed as outdated (1935) but Father Raymond de Jaegher did not dare publish his experiences until 1952. Even on the wider ideological level, with the exception of Matthew Spinka's volume, Christianity Confronts Communism, the sharp, incisive analyses of the heart of Marxianism in the light of Christianity were not published until mid- or late-nineteen-forties: Bennett, Hunt, MacEoin, Sheen, Cianfarra, Miller, Rogers, James, and others.

Nevertheless, recognizing that many of these volumes, as indicated in the bibliography, provided hindsight rather than foresight, it is interesting to list the publications which missionaries specifically cited as contributing to their knowledge of Communism.

John Bennett's Christianity and Communism, named by twenty people, is the most frequently mentioned single book. However if nine references to Mao Tse-tung without giving any title are applied with reasonable likelihood to The New Democracy, that bible of Chinese Communism wins with twenty-three readers, several of them in the original language. Other writings by Chairman Mao, cited by one to five missionaries, are People's Democratic Dictatorship, The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party, On Coalition Government, and Chinese Soviets.

Karl Marx has ten readers of Das Kapital and ten of The Communist Manifesto, plus eight references by name and two to Engels. Three other volumes earned five "votes" each: Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China, Richard Crossman's 1949 compilation The God That Failed, and Alexander Miller's The Christian Significance of Karl Marx, touching three different aspects of the problem.

Three or four individuals mentioned these books and authors: White and Jacoby, Thunder Out of China; Stanley Jones, Christ's Alternative to Communism; Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of Communism; Freda Utley, David Dallin, and Nicolai Lenin. Two other Chinese works were listed, the lectures of Liu Shao-chi and The History of the Development of Society, which became the standard text for dialectical and historical materialism. Also The Chinese Student Movement written in English by Kiang Wen-han of the Y.M.C.A.

There were forty-six single or double references, ranging from Sidney and Beatrice Webb to Edward Hunter, from the Amsterdam Conference to George Orwell, from Agnes Smedley to Frank Laubach. A large percentage had been published within the last four years; one can only assume that a still larger percentage have been read that recently. The net impression, therefore, is that even the missionaries who claimed to have studied most about Communism in theory and practice were woefully unprepared for the manifestations in China of well-documented ideology and/or expediency.

In Summary

There is no such thing as a composite missionary. Such a figure would be as unreal as most Hollywood caricatures of the same subject. Yet a fairly definite biographical patternhas emerged from these reports, a pattern which--for the most part--remained valid for each geographical section of China and even applied with remarkable consistency to British and European colleagues.

This non-existent "average" missionary, then, is a college graduate with an advanced degree in theology or medicine or education. He (or she, due to a slight preponderance of women replying) is in his late fifties or early thirties and has been in China more than twenty-five years or less than five, his British counterpart a somewhat shorter time.

The "typical" missionary left China at the start of

1951; therefore his length of service under the People's Government depended on whether his station was "liberated" in winter, spring, summer or fall of 1949. Using the "ten parts" so common in Chinese speech, he is three parts teacher, two-and-a-half parts evangelist, two parts doctor, one-and-a-half parts administrative treasurer, one part social and relief worker. (The European, however, is almost completely evangelistic and the Britisher equally divided among the first three categories.) He speaks the language of his region quite fluently, with a fragmentary knowledge of another dialect, but he probably reads little more than his hymnal and Bible in Chinese characters.

He _had_ a _general_ knowledge of Communist Russia, as a blend of atheism and totalitarianism, acquired from popular magazine articles. He had read one book on Marxism and one about the high morale and almost-Christian social reforms of the Chinese Reds, which contrasted bewilderingly with vague recollections and impressions of their bandit tactics. He was too busy with his God-given task, too familiar with Chinese moderation, to worry much about "Liberation."

CHAPTER 8

MANCHURIA

In the next six chapters replies to the first ten questions are summarized under main geographical areas. This method has been adopted, not only to provide some breakdown of the two hundred and twenty-five reports, but also in search of significant variations. Each chapter has been compiled exclusively from questionnaires, letters, and published materials pertaining to that area. The results are inevitably repetitious, but that accumulation of almost identical experience and reaction does in itself contribute to the weight of inductive conclusions. Manchurian data, however, is too meager to permit use of the questionnaire outline followed in the other five chapters.

Reliable reports from Manchuria have been extremely scarce for more than a decade. Even from 1931 to 1941 the Japanese were highly suspicious of foreign nationals, and missionary personnel gradually diminished. With the outbreak of the Pacific War, most Allied citizens were interned, and medical and educational missions largely terminated.[1] In central Manchuria, therefore, there have been no missionaries since 1941,[2] but in the southern extremities a few

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[1] F. C. Jones, Manchuria Since 1931 (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1949), pp. 215ff.

[2] Personal Letter, No. 37, Peking, March 6, 1950.

Scandinavians continued evangelistic work with an occasional kindergarten or hostel despite the ban on schools. Only a few others returned to the main cities following the war.

The coming of the Russians in 1945 brought a veritable reign of terror, looting, and rape. In their highly selective removal of industrial machinery, often destroying what they did not take, they included electrical machinery and laboratory and hospital equipment from Christian missions.[1] In their personal behavior they made religious work, including church services, almost impossible because Chinese women had to lock and nail their doors and windows. (Q-C8)[2] "Foreign" soldiers wandered freely into missionary homes and helped themselves as they pleased. They or the Chinese Communists--"even I am sure they got their orders from 'above'"--confiscated any desired property for their own use. For many months, however, ~~the~~ Chinese pastor resisted the seizure of the Church, pointing to the new government's proclamation of religious freedom.

Gruesome stories grow with repetition, if they are not exaggerated at the source. So one reacts dubiously when a Southern Baptist missionary tells a U.S. Army chaplain who tells a G.I. who tells his own pastor in a letter home that "since 1945, the Reds have executed more Christians in Manchuria than have been killed in all of China since the beginning of the Christian missions in China."[1] Such figures are possible but not plausbile. Even if the missionary were familiar with the history of Christian missions in China, the attributing of selective motives to these atrocities is highly suspect.

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[1] Jones, op. cit., pp. 225ff.

[2] To avoid multitudinous footnotes and individual identification, questionnaires submitted for this survey are classified in the text simply by a code number.

On the other hand, avid apologists for Chinese Communist programs have conceded the worst about the Northeast. Kao Tien-hsi, the previously quoted Communist turned Christian pastor, reported that "only in Manchuria after VJ Day did the Church have rather serious trouble."[2] He then went on to describe how ministers were persecuted as "running dogs" or agents of the Kuomintang, but expressed confidence that such treatment was due to special conditions or to local officials rather than Communist policy. The situation, he felt sure, was "infinitely better than that of the Church in the early days of the Russian Revolution and of the churches in the Communist countries in Europe."[3]

In New China: Three Views (all of them basically sympathetic) Robert Guillain, reporter and later foreign editor of Le Monde, offered a very straightforward picture:

> Reports from the interior of China also give food for thought. All of them lead to the same conclusions that the mildness or harshness of the revolutionaries

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[1] Greensboro Daily News, March 28, 1951.

[2] Kao Tien-hsi, "How Shall the Chinese Church Continue Its Work Under the Communist Government?" p. 60.

[3] Ibid., pp. 60-61.

> varies from place to place and according to the time they have been in power in the region. Shanghai has been treated more leniently than Tientsin and Peking, which in their turn are better off than the towns of Manchuria. It seems that in the rural areas and the small towns in the interior the iron hand is displayed quite openly....Religious toleration, fully maintained in the cities, exists patchily in the country areas.... There, though the persecutions of 1946 and 1947 have ceased, life has been difficult for practising Christians. Some priests have become agricultural labourers to keep body and soul together....There is liberty for the people, but not for the reactionaries. Mao Tse-tung had given ample warning that it would be so. The people are free to think as long as their thinking conforms with the orthodox creed of the regime and not with reactionary thought.[1]

Let us translate these generalities, accurate though they appear, into the experience of a missionary woman, the only foreign worker in a fair-sized city not far from the Korean border, "liberated" in the summer of 1947. At first mission work continued without interruption and with great response. But when one Christian protested the looting and indiscriminate execution of local citizens (on charges of collaboration with the Japanese, wealth, underground activity, etc.), he himself was imprisoned and killed.

The Chinese pastor, like so many others later, trusted the assurance of religious freedom and the fact that the Church property was foreign-owned. The following month he and the woman missionary were arrested, jailed in a small room with forty-four other men, women and children. The missionary was called "the (foreign) criminal" and assured that she was an imperialist because even Scandinavian countries had kings! The next day before the People's Tribunal, when the pastor had been severely beaten and carried back to prison, the missionary explained her reasons for being in China. Using her own text, "Sell all that you have and give to the poor," the Communists condemned her for owning anything and demanded confiscation of all her belongings, which had already been thoroughly looted while she was in prison. After being compelled to thank her tormenters for "good treatment," she was given a license to preach, "and nobody was to hinder me, and glad was I." (Q-C9)

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[1] Otto B. Van der Sprenkel et al, New China: Three Views (John Day, New York, 1951), pp. 106-107.

The mission station was completely stripped, the church turned into a shoe factory. The permit to preach lasted two months: after another period in jail, the missionary was expressly forbidden to preach. When she declined to nurse soldiers, she was ordered to leave town. By then, all Bibles and hymnals had been removed from Christian homes and all prayers and hymns banned.

With indomitable courage and devotion, this missionary took up work in another Manchurian city, where she observed the obstacles confronting hospitals and orphanages. The doctor was summoned to court "every other day" for helping the underground people, and prohibited from caring for wounded soldiers who escaped from Korea. The orphanage was disbanded to remove the three hundred children from imperialistic or Christian influences. By autumn of 1950 the missionary group was ordered to a northern Manchurian concentration camp, from which their Chinese friends warned they would never return. Before they moved, however, their government agent in Peking protested their treatment and insisted that they be allowed to leave the country "as other 'imperialistic' missionaries." Even this required six more uncomfortable weeks of waiting for exit permits. The hospitals and churches turned over to Chinese Christians were soon expropriated by the Reds.

This single story has been told at length because so few reports are available for that section of China. While these experiences occurred in outlying towns, conditions in the principal cities impressed those predisposed to applaud them. Alan Winnington, "first British correspondent permanently in the Liberated areas" and later to win publicity in North Korea, reported in the Daily Worker in November, 1948, that in Harbin "a few beggars are to be seen, invariably outside a temple or one of the numerous churches."[1] He also described a 72.4% increase in schools during the preceding year, with 80-90% of primary children attending, and the opening of clinics on a mass scale in factories, schools and villages.

Presumably he was not concerned about the churches, whose formal organization was completely wiped out in north Manchuria by mid-1950, and little better in the south and central districts. In October, 1949, Roman Catholic Bishop

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[1] Quoted by Arthur Clegg, New China, New World (Birch, London, 1949), pp. 47-48.

Louis Lapierre opened a bakery, since religious workers regarded as social parasites were required by law and physical necessity to find some productive vocation.[1]

The China Missionary Bulletin for December, 1951, told something of Roman Catholic missions in Manchuria. In one diocese the single remaining foreign missionary, now a "registered citizen" not a priest, could no longer officially say Mass or administer the Sacraments. He lived in a private home and worked as a farmer, occasionally allowed to visit the sick within one li (a third of a mile) from the city--this in an area once maintaining thirty-three churches and fifty out-stations. Another prefecture once had a minor seminary, four primary schools, fourteen doctrinal schools, two orphanages, three homes for the aged; all were gone. The eleven missionary priests and five foreign sisters, plus all the Chinese priests had left; four of the ten Chinese sisters were carrying on baptism, instruction, rites, and so on.[2]

Always in China and often in Communism there are exceptions which "prove the rule." When completely adverse conditions appear almost universal, a single incident or a single personality stands out with radiant clarity. When Bishop Lapierre, the aforementioned baker, died late in 1952 (no details given), he was the only free Roman Catholic

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[1] Gary MacEoin, The Communist War on Religion (Devin-Adair, New York, 1951), p. 239.

[2] Hongkong Letter, December 22, 1951.

Apostolic Vicar in all Communist China.[1] And on the border of Korea one Danish woman continues her faithful labors, recognized by the Communist government as a Chinese citizen, and presumed to be the only Protestant missionary in Manchuria.[2] One of her former colleagues wrote:

> When the other missionaries were forced to leave, (this 82-year-old single lady) was the only one allowed to stay, and she--being a great personality with a tremendous influence during some fifty years--is still doing fine work in China.[3]

Although no first-hand reports have been received from Inner Mongolia--where, indeed, almost no foreign missionaries remained--brief mention might be made of that area. Already listed by the Peking Government as autonomous, Inner Mongolia seems destined to follow the political journey of Outer Mongolia, from Chinese to Russian suzerainty, in a probably shorter period of time.

Even in 1947 Nationalist control was limited largely to Kalgan, capital of Chahar province, and that intermittently, with the railroad line alternately open to traffic and disrupted by guerilla bands. By 1948 the Methodist missionaries stationed in Kalgan were withdrawn to Peiping by request of the Chinese bishop and subsequently transferred to Szechwan. This was due almost as much to the uncertainty of communications as to the threat of Communist occupation. In the spring of 1949 the Bible Society agent shifted his base of operations because "it became more and more difficult to obtain stock from our head office in Shanghai, as the communications were interrupted by the Communists."[1]

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[1] New York Times, December 3, 1952.

[2] China Bulletin, Vol. II; Nos. 15 and 19, November 3 and December 29, 1952.

[3] Personal Letter, No. 48, Denmark, December, 1952.

George Moorad, apparently writing of a previous Red seizure of Kalgan immediately after the Japanese War, told of thirty-six missionaries of the Norwegian Missionary Alliance and the Norwegian Assemblies of God.[2] According to Communist General Nieh, these foreigners were "absolutely free to do what they want," and he was making every effort to restore the school and hospital which had been confiscated by the Japanese. Moorad, a reporter for the Columbia Broadcasting System and the London Daily Mail, found that the missionaries had quite a different story to tell.

They reported, on the contrary, that they had not been greatly molested by the Japanese, but that "the Communists were making it impossible for them to work." Two who came to the journalist's hotel despite ever-present Communist guides, spoke of the early period of looting and rapine, which also characterized the "liberation" of Manchuria, and then added: "We are not free to leave the city or to operate among the people; they say we must have passports to travel, and yet the Communists refuse to issue them."

Restrictions on travel, always galling to citizens of the free and democratic West, proved to be the most immediate and conspicuous effect of Communist control in China. Quite apart from totalitarian ideology, this restraint is natural and understandable in a state which regards itself as at war--first with the Kuomintang, then with the United States in Korea, and continually with enemy agents and aliens within its borders. Obstacles to mission work, medical as well as educational and evangelistic, belong in a different category, although even here the guiding principles are commonly social and political rather than anti-religious.

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[1] Personal Letter, July 12, 1952.

[2] George Moorad, Lost Peace in China (Dutton, New York, 1949), p. 121.

In general, the outward tolerance of missions and foreigners--which had been slipping dangerously during the Pacific War--gave way completely during the civil war of 1946-1949. On the whole, the experiences of missionaries in Manchuria and Mongolia belong to this period rather than to the subsequent period of nation-wide administration, to be examined shortly. At best, there is Gary MacEoin's acknowledgment that in mid-1950 the seminaries and schools and hospitals of Mongolia still functioned "in a limited way."[1] At worst, there has been circumscription of missionaries and persecution of Chinese Christians more severe than the treatment accorded other sections of the country.

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[1] MacEoin, op. cit., p. 232.

CHAPTER 9

NORTH CHINA

Summarizing two hundred and twenty-five questionnaires under five geographical areas (besides Manchuria) will lead inevitably to frequent repetition. Not only the background of national and international events, but the general pattern of treatment experienced by Protestant missionaries in China, applies with remarkable consistency and uniformity to the entire country. Yet it is precisely these reports, reiterated again and again, from different provinces which give meaning and purpose to this survey--these duplications plus any substantial contrasts detected.

The "Liberation" of North China (Shantung, Hopei, Shansi, Shensi) is difficult to pinpoint by date, and sometimes by resultant circumstances. Large portions of each province concerned had remained in Communist hands since the days of guerilla warfare against Japan. By 1947 and 1948 the major cities had become enclaves of Nationalist control, linked chiefly by air, for railway connections had been regularly or intermittently severed by Red attacks. When civil war resumed after General Marshall's "failure," many missionaries found it impossible to return to interior stations, while others suffered destructive Communist raids. As early as July, 1948, some Westerners came into the growing

Red orbit, and the sizable group at Tsinan, Shantung, were "liberated" in September, yet "mopping up" operations in North China extended into the following summer.

To be sure, sixty per cent of replies have come from Peking, whose surrender the end of January, 1949, (six weeks after Yenching University in the suburbs) launched the full tide of Communist victory that year. But the other six cities represented cover most of the North China stations where missionaries worked after the war. Two universities and a large number of middle schools accounted for a disproportionate percentage in educational work, but otherwise the sampling reached a fair cross section in age, denomination, etc.

First Effects

Because so many of the places reported had been literally Nationalist islands in a Red sea, the first effects of "Liberation" reunited towns with their hinterland. Unlike other sections of the country, this permitted regional and district conferences and synods to function for the first time since 1945 or even since 1937. After months of confinement within city walls, missionaries could now move unrestricted into the surrounding countryside. In some cases this freedom was short-lived; in very few did it apply to any significant distance. Derk Bodde summed up the situation thus: "I have seen no trace of discrimination against individual private foreigners other than that, for travel outside the city, they must have special passes--

apparently not readily obtainable."[1]

While the earliest change of government brought a temporary isolation from mail, radio reports (because electricity had failed), and other communication, Communist authorities offered to transmit news of the missionaries' safety to headquarters in Nanking and Shanghai. Actual fighting or seige caused some property damage in several North China missions and disrupted food supplies and economy, but the prompt restoration of order astounded many witnesses. At least four missionaries reported that they did more of their own housework after "Liberation."

Before General Fu Tso-yi surrendered Peiping, he promised that schools, banks and other institutions would continue normally, and that "aliens and alien property are to be protected, as is freedom of religion."[2] For the most part, this guarantee was scrupulously observed by incoming troops and military officials. Smaller stations reported that "curious troops never stopped coming" to inspect the foreign homes, although "this never happened in Peking." But these soldiers were characterized as "courteous and polite if not friendly" and so well disciplined that they returned everything borrowed, "even to Americans, even old boxes." Furthermore, they knew what they believed they were doing.

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[1] Derk Bodde, Peking Diary (Schuman, New York, 1950), p. 109.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 96.

From almost every place came mention of police check-ups, government regulations, investigations, questionings about one's view of the new regime, the feeling of being constantly watched. In a very real sense North China, especially Tsinan, served as a "guinea pig farm," both for Communist authorities and for the missionaries who lived under them. Even in the midst of frantic evacuation from Peiping, Shanghai and elsewhere, the eyes of all China--and the world--watched anxiously the first experimental months of "people's rule."

Tsinan, for example, was "liberated" over a year before the establishment of formal government, yet the circumstances and the problems and the reactions proved already to be very different from those in scattered areas during the Japanese War or the guerilla conflict. A Britisher noted that "from the very beginning they were anti-foreign in Shantung, accusing missionaries of being imperialist agents." (Q-140)

First Effects on Work

For a brief period the total "Liberation" of North China reopened rural work and evangelistic travel, thus bringing to Western ears a flood of persecution stories about Church members who had suffered "not under the name of Christianity, but under trumped up charges."[1] At the same time, several projects closed immediately for various reasons. A training school for refugees disbanded when they could be sent home. In one town military authorities refused permission for a Bible school to open, although civil officers later rescinded the ban. In another station, however, all relief and welfare work and a Bible school were closed for lack of funds, and never received a permit to resume. In still another city, where worshippers had been carried to church in mission trucks, attendance dropped sharply while vehicles awaited official registration.

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[1] Personal Interview, No. 160, New York, May, 1952.

At a country church the missionary and Chinese evangelist were arrested with their Bibles, hymnals and song sheets and escorted first to the village court and then to the county office, where the government agent apologized for the soldier's mistake--but forbade future travel for the foreigner without a permit. (Q-8) Street services of the Salvation Army were banned, and in some places worshippers were intimidated by registration or by sentries at church doors.

In schools all classroom work suffered disruption by incessant propaganda. Religious programs declined, due first to student uncertainty and reticence and later to requirements that all Bible classes and chapel services must be off school property; when this included the missionary residence, in one case, groups were forbidden to join in hymn-singing and prayers even there. More often, however, students continued to attend Sunday School classes and Bible study in churches and homes. Two educational institutions in the hinterland came at once under government control when they could offer "no clear case of ability to continue as mission schools." The universal ridicule and propaganda against religion as a superstition and a tool of Western imperialism extended occasionally to confiscating and burning Bibles and other Christian books.

For nearly three years universities continued with only minor restrictions on religious activities. History and social studies, as taught by foreigners, decreased, but for a time English more than held its own in competition with Russian. The American principal of one Bible school received a letter, presumably from a departed student, complaining that she did not eat with the students often enough, that she did not help a sick one, that she had not invited former students to return after "Liberation." But when the missionary, grateful to be spared the usual charges of imperialism and Western domination, showed the communication to the other students, it solidified their loyalty around her so firmly that she could remain as principal with no internal opposition until early 1951.[1]

In at least two middle schools, on the contrary, students demanded the ouster of missionary teachers, one as early as March, 1949, because "he is a minister; he has not made (political) progress in his thinking." (Q-131) The other continued some English instruction, but in September, 1950, declined to continue without written invitation from the school council, which was not forthcoming. Another report observed that both students and faculty showed reduced participation in church activities after the "turn over," due partly to Sunday meetings and anti-religious agitation. In many cases, however, those who remained faithful to Bible classes or church attendance displayed a new depth and firmness in their Christian life.

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[1] Personal Interview, No. 142, Colorado, April, 1952.

As Communist forces marched southward, they called substantial numbers of nurses from mission hospitals. For some time the promises of religious freedom and non-interference with Christian institutions seemed to be observed in North China, and the new administrative councils introduced certain reforms which missionaries had long advocated in vain. Because they sold drugs, however, hospitals were classed as businesses, with oppressive taxation at first. This, plus rigid reporting of all patients, and official investigation of all deaths, raised acute problems for medical missions.

From one North China hospital came an account of a typical "Examination Discussion Meeting," dealing in this case with the death of a man in the Out Patient Department after an automobile accident. The local Health Administration summoned two hundred private practitioners to a six-hour meeting. After the missionary had admitted the institution's blame in lack of heat, delay in securing a stretcher and lack of warm covering, several dozen participants spoke during the discussion. As "one of the biggest and most important hospitals" the management had been too proud in its attitude; a Chinese doctor was criticized for providing inadequate care.

Finally the head of the Health Department summed up, in over an hour's resumé, the following points: economy was an insufficient excuse for lack of heat, for one must not economize on treatment of emergencies; the OPD handled too many patients with too few doctors and not enough specialized care; prescriptions were prepared wholesale and "dished out" to patients. Obviously, concluded the missionary physician involved, the meeting was intended to stimulate all hospitals to better work, not just the one, and "I went well prepared by prayer, and I must confess that I felt a sense of stimulation to better effort rather than any irritation."[1]

Changes in Personal Life

As early as April 1, 1949, only two months after "Liberation," Derk Bodde noted that "suspicion of foreigners seems to be growing, and annoying incidents have been reported."[2] The same month in the interior missionaries were forced to move upstairs in their home, and curious crowds were "not always polite."[3] In still a third province, an administrator wrote: "The first three or four months of the new set-up seemed very hopeful, and of course we said as much....Things aren't too bad now, but there has been a decided change in 'their' attitude."[1] In the summer of 1949 a city worker noticed an increasing number of police visits; whether checking on residence permits or electric wiring or paper strips for windows during air-raids, the inspection usually covered the entire house. Foreigners were eased out of administrative offices early in 1949. All these changes, be it reiterated, were specifically dated before the formation of the People's Republic and a year before the Korean War.

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 104, undated.
[2] Bodde, op. cit., p. 144.
[3] Personal Letter, No. 109, March 29 and April 23, 1949.

More and more Chinese friends avoided missionaries in public and visited them only at night if at all. More and more obstacles were imposed to travel permits, even to main cities for medical treatment or on hitherto commonplace visits. More and more life became "as private as a gold-fish's," (Q-8) as new inspection and controls were introduced, servants interrogated, radios "borrowed," etc. One missionary, "constantly spied upon," could anticipate that"whenever a guest from out-of-town called on me, I would within a matter of minutes have one or more high school boys sitting in on our talks." (Q-8)

> We have it more or less from the horse's mouth that the Communist immobilizing of missionaries.... is because the government has evidence that one (or some) missionary in the south actually was used by his government as a spy. Therefore there is to be no running around for the "mishes." So here we are,

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 110, April 10, 1949.

suspected by the government as spies and by the USA as Communists (for staying).[1]

Others complained that their mail was opened (by students, and protest to officials ended that),[2] that their desks and papers were ransacked, that police inspectors walked into bedrooms unannounced, declaring that they were not guests but had the "right" to enter.[3] Seventy Communist officials moving in "brought a revolution to our quiet compound," but they informed the missionary cordially that "we want you to remain and live with us."[4] When Derk Bodde, on being told that "foreigners have been given protection and freedom," commented, "Not quite freedom; I should like to go to Tsinghua (University) but cannot do so," his friend replied as follows: "Communist anti-foreignism is the result of the humiliation and oppression suffered by China for the past century....When the time comes for concrete negotiations, they will modify their tone."[5]

Changes in Work

Growing restrictions on missionary service were characterized by one person as an effort to remove anything (program or project or institution) not under Communist control. Within three months after the political change in one district all special classes and meetings had to be registered. We always thought, said one missionary, that regulations had been complied with, but often some error was found too late for correction, and the crowds assembled had to be sent home. As a result, some regular chapel preaching and almost all special services had to be discontinued. Bible classes of even a half dozen fell under these arbitrary rules.

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 108, May 6, 1950.
[2] Personal Letter, No. 103, January 21, 1951.
[3] Personal Interview, No. 142, April, 1952.
[4] Personal Letter, No. 104, April 29, 1950 (13).
[5] Bodde, op. cit., p. 158.

Other obstructions hampered church programs, some universal and general, some local and deliberate. Most if not all rural churches were closed during land reform, under a government ban on public meetings. One Chinese pastor who took down a picture of Mao Tse-tung from the sanctuary had to flee his village. In some cities the authorities prohibited new evangelistic work, religious instruction, and even pastoral calls, limiting freedom of religion to worship services only. Occasionally church notices had to be censored--or discontinued.

With the inauguration of the "Three-Self Movement" (self-support, self-government, self-propagation), all church groups possessing foreign ties took steps to prepare for complete independence. Even before that, in the spring of 1949, some school boards were reorganized with no foreign members,[1] but after the Manifesto that summer all boards and committees found Westerners an increasing embarrassment. Chinese church leaders made compulsory statements against the use of foreign funds and foreign personnel, and individual accusations became steadily harsher, some trivial but true, others viciously irresponsible. All of these were, in one form or another, efforts by the government to control the Church for political purposes, or by the Christians to preserve their faith and unity at the expense of ecumenical ties.

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 110, April 10, 1949.

Social pressure accomplished more "reforms" in schools than in other mission institutions. Many students--and teachers--were afraid to attend worship services, especially when--as in at least one case--the political dean, a government appointee,stood at the church door to see who entered.[1] In direct violation of "Three-Self" principles, faculty members sometimes damanded higher salaries directly from the mission treasurer. By early 1952 "students with loaded rifles are guarding all school grounds lest someone escape."[2] For some Christians, however, especially at the college level, the heavy atmosphere of materialism and atheism created a deepening of religious experience and interest; a few insisted that they must study the Bible as much as they had to study politics, a minimum of an hour a day. On campuses where liberal denominations and the conservative Inter-Varsity Fellowship had frequently clashed, the two groups drew closer together as the one-time "modernists" were driven back to Christian fundamentals.[1]

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 103, October 29, 1950.
[2] Personal Letter, No. 103, April 1, 1952.

In hospitals both medical and educational standards suffered critical slumps. As in every institution, labor unions were encouraged to dictate policies. Nurses with only middle school background could graduate in a two-year course, but in at least one instance they found they had no freedom to change jobs, if the government wished them to stay where they were. Chinese colleagues advised one missionary surgeon to abstain from all operations, for fear of possible political repercussions or legal suits. (Q-211)[2]

In the spring of 1951 North China mission hospital representatives met in Peking to discuss their problems. Three conditions were laid down for each medical institution:

> 1) There must be no retrenchment; at least the same number of hospital beds must be maintained; they could be increased but not decreased.
> 2) No employees could be fired, however new ones could be hired.
> 3) The quantity of drugs on hand at the time of the inventory must be maintained at all times. (This was the stickler because who could guarantee that we could always have 20 bottles of penicillin on hand?) If the hospital could meet these conditions and be self-supporting, well and good; if not it could apply for government assistance or complete government control.(Q-20)

The official who spoke at this same meeting warned the hospital staffs against the "tainted influence" of American money, which is "only one of America's very clever ways of trying to hoodwink the common people of China."

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[1] Personal Interview, No. 122, New Haven, January, 1952.
[2] Cf. Personal Letter, No. 103, April 1, 1952.

Similar problems and restrictions confronted all types of work. An Audio-Visual Center registered its equipment, which was ultimately requisitioned to show anti-American propaganda films. With all the emphasis on community service, the government refused permission for a church to administer vaccine it had received, as "nothing can be done unless Communists get the good name for it."[1] Doctors' lavatory facilities were torn out of one hospital for "official" use elsewhere, with the assurance that a basin and pitcher would do for the staff. Like all other "businesses," mission institutions had to meet assigned bond quotas as well as taxes.

For the first year generally hopeful signs came from all parts of the country. In one area, where the uncertainty of transition cut Scripture sales in mid-1949 to 130 Bibles, 59 Testaments and 83 Gospels in six months, the succeeding half year (October, 1949, through March, 1950) showed 1,293 Bibles, 787 Testaments, and 7,478 Gospels sold.[2] Missionaries who had resigned from all posts of authority were cordially appointed as advisors to various types of work. Bible schools and seminaries gave foremost attention to vocational training for self-support, including such handicrafts as weaving, towel-making, barbering, tailoring, farming, fitting wooden bathtubs. Every incident, favorable or unfavorable, needs to be dated to present an accurate picture, however.

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[1] Personal Interview, No. 160, May 1952.
[2] Personal Letter, No. 104, April 29, 1950 (13).

Definite Stages

The periods of development in Communist policy are, therefore, important, even though extremely difficult to delineate sharply. A few "reporters" noted a stiffening attitude in the latter part of 1949. Earlier that year preaching had ceased in some small towns, although in one case foreign complaints brought about the reopening of a church closed by police. Missionary administrators were "eased out" of office, but in general the year was characterized as "an uneasy truce (if one can speak of a truce between forces so unequally matched)....with the government program developing but not yet explicit." (Q-31)

To be sure, at least half a dozen reports declared that no definite stages were discernible, that changes were gradual throughout the period surveyed. Some found school contacts somewhat improved by early 1950; youth fellowships, at first uncertain and apprehensive, began to revive in an atmosphere of limited toleration.

> We feel a little more free to have Bible classes and friendly contacts with Chinese who may come to our home, for there is no suspicion of our taking part in organized opposition to the new government.[1]

However, the same private journal for June continued:

> Christian students are wary of the promises that Christians may join (the New Democratic Youth League and Young Pioneers) and still believe. League

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[1] Personal Journal, No. 105, June 18, 1950.

> meetings are at church time on Sunday morning, and the whole atmosphere is against belief in God. As one formerly Christian member put it, "After you join, you see there's no need to believe in God any more."[1]

At the close of that month the outbreak of war in Korea caused a chain reaction of repercussions in China. Henceforth few travel permits were issued; "there seemed a definite policy then not to give to missionaries." (Q-44) Some foreigners were not invited to teach that fall, and occasionally all relations with missionaries stopped. Study groups were discontinued or transferred to Chinese leadership in the church; the Communist Youth League began active spying on Christian youth. In small towns no special meetings could be held in 1950. A bishop advised it was time for nurses and teachers to leave.[2] On July 30 Derk Bodde recorded, "The past month has been bad for the foreigner."[3] After citing numerous incidents in Shanghai, he described the reregistration of the entire foreign community in Peking:

> The procedure is long and onerous....several visits, the writing of quadruplicate answers in Chinese to a fairly detailed questionnaire (rejected if answers are incomplete or wrong), and submission of six photos. The climax is a personal interview, lasting anywhere from fifteen minutes to an hour, at which all answers are carefully recorded....

Although the realization permeated missionary circles only gradually, a major factor besides the Korean

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[1] Ibid., June 21, 1950.
[2] Land of Sinim, Ss. Simon and Jude, 1950.
[3] Bodde, op. cit., pp. 219ff.

War had already entered the scene. This was the Peking Conference between Premier and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai and a selected group of Christian leaders in May, 1950. Because it dealt largely with the Chinese Church and has been reported at length in other places, the Conference and its resultant Manifesto cannot be reviewed in detail here. The portions relating to foreign missions, however, are significant enough to be mentioned in this study.

In a total of twelve or thirteen hours of consultation, Chou En-lai plainly told the religious deputation that it would be government policy to allow missionaries to remain until their passports or their terms of service expire,[1] but neither new nor returning workers would be allowed. In other words, the foreign Christian staff would be tolerated on the assumption that time will remove their unwanted presence. It was implied--or perhaps only inferred--that after a few years some doctors or teachers or other specialists might be permitted to return, but not for any evangelistic work.[2]

Since no minutes or formal statements issued directly from these conferences, all information is based on individual reports by the participants. These obviously reflect the sympathies and preconceptions of the person reporting, tempered slightly for Chinese churches asked to concur, but not at all for Western sensibilities. Since the clear, succinct conclusions above grew out of elaborate charges of missionary imperialism, a few words of explanation attributed to Y.T. Wu[1] may be worth quoting:

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[1] "Until they retire or die," according to Fitzgerald, Revolution in China, pp. 138-139.

[2] China Bulletin, No. 89, June 13, 1950.

> Imperialism....is the policy of any country that uses money or force to impose its culture and ideas on other countries or peoples....The Christian Church has been linked with imperialism--the use of force and aggression by foreign powers...Missions and missionaries have enjoyed special privileges under the unequal treaties....Therefore the government pays special attention to the activities of missionaries. ....Most missionaries, it is true, have no political purpose, but they cannot separate themselves from their own government, political background and culture, etc. and manifestations of imperialistic thought.
>
> ....As to missionary personnel in China, Premier Chou said that those who are not under question, those who are not problems in any way, may stay on. Those under suspicion of imperialistic connection must leave. ....Premier Chou may issue later an order for protection of the Christian Church. But we must do our part first, to disassociate ourselves from all imperialism. The government has no desire to wipe out religion in China. Religion will continue.[2]

After this conference had been enthusiastically reported in Shanghai and other centers, the participants drafted a Manifesto, submitted first to some forty church leaders for signatures and later circulated throughout the country for endorsement--and action--by local congregations. Government approval, if not outright sponsorship, had already been secured before denominational and organizational officers had opportunity even for revision. Despite the pretense of several drafts, therefore, they were actually offered a fait accompli, to be signed--or unpatriotically rejected.

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[1] A long-time "leftish" secretary of the Y.M.C.A. in China, Wu was chosen by the government as a Christian representative to the People's Political Consultative Conference, which ostensibly established the People's Republic of China; as chairman of the "Three-Self Committee" (to which Oppose-America-Aid-Korea has been added) he has become virtual dictator of the "domesticated" Church and its activities.

[2] "Confidential Notes on Reports of Conferences with Premier Chou En-lai Regarding the Church in China."

The first third of the document consists of an introductory denunciation of imperialism and its sinister employment of Christianity. "Our Duty in General" is to "oppose imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism." "Our Fundamental Aims" include the following:

> ....to make people in the Churches everywhere recognize clearly the evils which have been wrought by imperialism, recognize the fact that in the past imperialism has made use of Christianity, purge imperialistic influences from within Christianity itself, and be vigilant against imperialism, and especially American imperialism, in its plot to use religion in fostering the growth of reactionary forces.[1]

The second set of fundamental aims covers the "Three-Self Movement," plus self-criticism and reformation in the Church. As to "Concrete Methods:"

> All Christian Churches and organizations in China still relying upon foreign personnel and financial aid should immediately work out concrete plans to realize within the shortest possible time their object of self-reliance and rejuvenation.[2]

Presumably in an effort to avoid signing this Manifesto, the House of Bishops of the Episcopal Church in China issued a moderate and admirably Christian statement of its aims and purposes (although several of these men have subsequently entered wholeheartedly into the "Three-Self Movement" with all its political ramifications). Leaders in most other denominations and Christian institutions apparently felt that signing the Manifesto would save their churches from some measure of embarrassment or worse, without compromising their basic personal faith. At the time, however, there were rumors of both forged and forced signatures, and individual reservations which were ignored or over-ruled.

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[1] "The Path to be Energetically Pursued by Christianity in China within the Effort of New China's National Reconstruction."

[2] Ibid.

Through the first summer of Korean conflict these negotiations were under way among the Christian leadership of China, but the Manifesto was not published until late September, with an announcement of some 1,500 names. It was October, November, or later before it actually reached many local churches for adoption, and by that time Chinese participation in Korean fighting, and the resultant propaganda, had become intense. It is, therefore, quite impossible to separate the Manifesto from political and military developments in marking out definite stages of attitude toward foreign missionaries. That both played a vital role in overall experience can hardly be disputed; the important factor to bear in mind, however, is that Chou's ultimatum antedated the Korean War.

For the majority of missionaries in North China, then, the "first signs of any attempt to get rid of us" (Q-140) came in November or December, 1950. A few dated the tension after Korea "but growing anyway before that," especially in rural areas and applying to Chinese as well as Westerners. One report listed three stages as tolerance, intolerance, and confiscation; another as toleration, suspicion, and hostility. All through the closing months of that year there was "drastic propaganda, not so much anti-religious as anti-foreign, especially anti-American and anti-British, (although) religion came in for attack according to the Communist line." (Q-131)

The mutual Sino-American freezing of assets in December brought further sharp changes in attitude, although the "Three-Self Movement" had led in some places by October to a registration of all organizations receiving foreign funds. One missionary attributed the tightening restrictions to better organization on the part of the new government. Another traced the source of pressures farther back: "The Communists have a regular system from Moscow or whereever it comes from; you do one thing a certain number of weeks and then something else--the same thing all over China." (Q-160) Although several mission boards issued advice tantamount to orders for the withdrawal of their entire personnel, there were many people who still "imagined that (as before) the bark was worse than the bite." (Q-140)

If conditions had "worsened until worst" that winter, "all hell breaks loose" in the spring (to use direct missionary quotes). For some it was the actual imprisonment of foreigners; for others it was the anti-spy purges, which thoroughly alarmed Chinese Christian leaders.

In both cases the "government object of definitely getting rid of all missionaries was only apparent to us in April and May, 1951." (Q-140) The final crisis came with propaganda charges of germ warfare in 1952, but by that time all but a handful of foreigners had left the country.

One missionary summary is worth quoting at length because it runs the whole gamut of universal experience:

> Liberation, January, 1949, to conclusion of Sine-Russian Treaty, January, 1950: a real Chinese revolutionary movement winning the respect of the Chinese people......
>
> January to June, 1950: the need for outside economic aid....and the hostility of the U. S. .... made China turn towards Russia....
>
> June to November, 1950:....the initiative of the U. S. in opposing the North Koreans played into the hands of the Chinese Government....America was again interfering in the internal affairs of a country which was only striving towards liberation and unification. ....At this period the National Christian Council comes out denouncing Western imperialism and proclaims its new motto--Self-support, self-government, and self-propagation.
>
> November 1950 to March 1951: the entry of China into the Korean War made us Americans enemy-aliens. The propaganda (of "cultural aggression") became more fanatical. The freezing of Chinese assets by the U. S. and the natural retaliation.... inventory of capital, both institutional and private... taking over of mission institutions by the government....increasing tension and suspicion. (Q-20)

Few if any significant deviations from this pattern were reported. In answer to specific queries, one missionary insisted that Tsingtao did not suffer abnormally because it had been an American Naval base, but another reported the vast quantity of German and Japanese property there was more ruthlessly seized. One "outport" woman denied--although no Peking resident had claimed--

that the capital was a "showplace" receiving more lenient treatment; it was simply later in the same program, she asserted, and other reports confirm that.

For most "reporters" the "correlation between a previously planned program and its realization seemed obvious," so obvious as to omit comment. One difference of opinion at this point concerned the order of events. "We always found that propaganda, popular demonstrations, and official acts followed each other, in that order," declared an English missionary. (Q-140, italics his.) "Propaganda always preceded any new policy, official acts following it more quickly than general popular acceptance of its line," said another. (Q-115) The discrepancy, if any, probably lies in terminology, for "popular demonstrations" and "popular acceptance" mean two very different things.

Differences in Treatment

Individual variations in treatment within a single mission or station appeared to be very minor, in both suggested cause and effect. Medical workers received greater courtesy, said one, because the Communists wanted their help; said another, because hospitals were more fully in Chinese administrative hands than were schools. Three nurses rated tacit exemption from the law that overnight movements must be registered, because authorities recognized the irregular nature of their midwifery. One missionary, detained four months after all his associates left, had worked in that area nearly forty years and knew the province and the Church and the institutions intimately; "I think they considered he knew too much," a colleague remarked.(Q-140)

Where half the foreign staff received exit permits promptly and the others waited more than a year, one of the former group suggested three explanations: the nature of work (and cooperation with government programs); freedom from administrative responsibilities, especially financial; and simplicity of living standards ("it took the official 20 minutes to inventory our house and 2-3 hours to go through the others"). (Q-20) In a totally different province one couple had apparently been singled out for difficulties culminating in arrest. Why? Perhaps because they were the only foreigners in their section of town, perhaps because they engaged in enthusiastic evangelistic work among students, perhaps because they represented the only entirely American missionary society in town , perhaps because they were, as a colleague put it, "just the kind of scapegoat...they wanted for their propaganda." (Q-140)

Undoubtedly too there were instances related to purely individual temperament and background. A report concerning one British and one American missionary who had difficulties in schools suggested diffidently that there may have been "a very small basis for the allegations." (Q-138) Sometimes delays in exit permits could be traced to a casual but undiplomatic remark, exaggerated and made the most of. An American, once liberally enthusiastic about the New Democracy, later adopted a defiant, insulting attitude which apparently increased subsequent punishment. A British woman, aggressive not only in evangelism but in comments on the Korean War, had finally to appeal to British diplomacy for aid and was expelled from the country on two days' notice. (Q-169, Q-211)

A large number of reports stressed the harsher treatment accorded to Roman Catholics in every city. Some attributed this to their holding of extensive property, to the firm outside controls of the Vatican, and to Catholicism's world antagonism to Communism. Others suggested that Archbishop Paul Yupin had been close to Chiang Kai-shek, that Rome inflexibly opposed an indigenous Chinese Church, that some priests undoubtedly were spies, that charges of murdering children in orphanages had become widespread. One professor expressed the belief about the "ugly" situation at Fu-Jen University, first Christian college to be taken over by the People's Government, in the summer of 1950, that the "Fathers had asked for it."[1]

One person felt that Quakers and those whose traditional position against imperialism and war had become clearly established fared better than the average. At least two reported that Methodists suffered the worst attack among Protestant denominations, perhaps because the North China bishop had baptized the Generalissimo, perhaps because episcopacy in itself was ipso facto evidence of bureaucratic imperialism (although British Methodism seemed to come under the same disfavor without bishops), perhaps because their institutions received such large foreign subsidies.

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[1] Personal Interview,No.122,January,1952. To others further removed it appeared that the priests had taken a courageous stand against political control, When Christian institutions across the country faced the problem of how long they could conscientiously use mission funds for programs increasingly opposed to religion. (Cf. Chapter 14 below)

A great many reports claimed no discernible difference in the treatment of various nationalities. A few suggested that Americans had the worst time "for obvious reasons," but Peking incidents seemed to involve British subjects in at least proportional ratio. Outside the missionary circle, Fulbright Scholars came under acute suspicion because their income arrived as United States Government drafts, positive "proof" that they were employed in espionage for capitalistic imperialism, and three of them were still being held in the spring of 1953 after nearly two years.

Both centers in Shantung, where German influence had flourished since 1898, reported rougher handling of German missionaries. Many were dispossessed of property, heavily taxed or fined, restricted in movement more than Protestants, etc. The only other Continental group mentioned in North China were Swedes. One said they were treated the same as Americans at first, later more leniently, but another referred to severe pressures at their station, where all residences but one were occupied promptly, and the missionaries finally transferred to the nearest big city.

> When I left China in the late autumn of 1949 (wrote a visiting professor) foreigners in Tientsin and Peking certainly took the view that they were considerably better off, from all reports, than those in Shanghai and the cities even more recently liberated further south.[1]

Reasons for Staying

As "guinea pigs" under a new, still unorganized regime, North China missionaries had perhaps the hardest decision as to whether to evacuate or remain at their posts. On the whole, reports from "Border Regions" under Red control during the past five years had not been favorable to Christian work. Some Chinese Church leaders, remembering Japanese internment, advised their Western friends to leave for safety's sake. From the College of Chinese Studies and individual missions scores of recent arrivals withdrew because of small children or because, without language or work assignments, they would be adjudged liabilities.

Against this background, and without the prior experience of others, which encouraged staying elsewhere in China, these missionaries made their unregretted choice. A dozen believed that Christianity should meet a need under any regime; another half dozen specifically affirmed the decision as "the guidance of God for us;" the same number felt a need for ecumenical witness to strengthen the Chinese Church. The piercing query, "Quo vadis?" inspired one woman to face "Liberation."

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[1] Vander Sprenkel, New China: Three Views, p. 24.

At least eight were convinced that it would be wrong to desert their Chinese friends, many of whom urged the foreigners to stay. A number of others thought that medical work or Christian education or their administrative duties could and should be carried on. One admitted the influence of colleagues on the field, and two spoke of the need to uphold the missionary enterprise in the sight of home churches. Several wanted to make the experiment out of curiosity, believing,one said, that Chinese Communism was not the same as Russian Communism.

Significantly four replies stressed the factor of personal integrity in making the decision, to avoid the frustration of retreat, or because they felt guilty over previous evacuation from the Reds or the Japanese. One of these, after two successive "Liberations," added: "Now, the matter of personal integrity settled and world conditions being what they are, it would take a tremendous sense of need of me and my work in a situation to produce a repetition of the decision to stay." (Q-205)

Finally there were four North China missionaries who confessed that they did not want to stay or plan to stay. There was new equipment not yet set up, or the nurses or the school faculty threatened to leave en masse if they withdrew

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abruptly, or the patients could not be abandoned or moved as rapidly as the retreating Kuomintang ordered. None of these regretted the force of circumstances. Another missionary, who at the beginning "took a dim view of my opportunity for service," found herself after three months continuing her same work uninterrupted. In another three months, however, she wrote:

> After six months I think it is still a 50/50 proposition whether we foreigners can stay or not. We stayed to show our good intentions and willingness to work with the new government, and they still view us with suspicion most of the time, convinced that we are either KMT or American agents.[1]

The unanimous verdict that the same choice would be made again carried hardly a qualification. One person answered "probably," a second affirmative "but would not return even if asked," a third "but would leave sooner," a fourth "providing I was sure I would not handicap my Chinese fellow-Christians."

Only to North China did even a handful of missionaries succeed in returning after "Liberation." The few such permits forthcoming can probably be accounted for by the fact that approximately eight months elapsed between the political transition in that area and the establishment of formal national government and official procedures. In a few cases readier access to top level authorities undoubtedly facilitated such applications.

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[1] Personal letter, No. 108, July 9, 1949.

A missionary nurse employed by the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund was "one of the first Americans to return to China after Liberation." (Q-12) The fiancée of a university teacher entered a few months after the turn-over. In June, 1950, a British woman landed at Tientsin, where her husband met her and escorted her back to their station.[1]

A treasurer departed on furlough in June, 1949, and returned with his wife the following April; "she feels that it is because their lives have been so blameless and useful that even the Communists have heard about them. Could be. My theory is that it is because he handles U.S.A. money, and they need lots of it."[2] In this case, a Chinese "adopted daughter" or protege married to a prominent Communist official may have had something to do with securing a re-entry permit. The postscript to this episode, however, is that the missionary wife found so cool a reception amoung committees and church circles where she had been active that she turned around and returned to the United States after four months, leaving her husband to repatriate in May, 1951. (Q-6)

In October, 1949, a doctor and his family entered North China on the invitation of the Chinese Church and the mission hospital, whose official appeals helped to secure the entry permits. Soon after their arrival, each member of the family, including children, was quizzed by officials concerning past and present activities, with special reference to the doctor's religious work. Assured repeatedly that although not an ordained man, he was in China as a missionary and frequently engaged in religious work, the official "was not satisfied, and....I felt this did not please him at all."[1]

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[1] Land of Sinim, Ss. Simon and Jude, 1950.
[2] Personal Letter, No. 108, May 6, 1950.

In addition to these reported instances of ten individual re-entries to North China, at least one couple and one single man received permits to transfer their work and residence from other sections of the country in 1949 or early 1950, although a similar request shortly thereafter was flatly refused. Again the earlier "Liberation" of North China and the opportunity for direct appeals to government officials in the capital probably accounted for the greater freedom in this regard. Yet during the same period applications for re-entry from Hongkong, at least one of which had been promised at the time of departure, were shunted from North China to Shanghai, where officials disclaimed any authority.[2]

Reasons for Leaving

The first voluntary departure from "liberated" territory came in December, 1948, when the English and American missionaries in Tsinan agreed to send one representative "outside," partly to report their experiences of the first three months, hoping to reassure missionaries in other parts of

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[1] Personal Letter, No. Q-211, January 6, 1953.
[2] Personal Letter, April, 1950, quoted in No. 136.

China and thus prevent a general exodus. (Q-205)

Very few withdrawals took place during the first year and a half, usually on grounds of health or furlough. Most missionary societies left complete freedom of decision to the individuals involved, guaranteeing full and sympathetic support for any course. As early as April, 1950, one university teacher wrote: "We feel it's just a matter of hanging on until they shake the limb a little harder and then landing."[1] In a few isolated cases Chinese or foreign colleagues urged departure that summer of 1950, and one administrator was informed on July 28 that he had exactly one week to get out of town.

> No reason was given in the order, which was transmitted verbally....(and) repeated efforts, both in writing and by calls on the officials, to have the order withdrawn or at least to have the time limit extended, were without avail. (Q-192)

For the vast majority, however, events of November and December cast the deciding vote. Even before Chinese entered the Korean fighting, rumors spread "that the U.S.A. was planning to drive right through Manchuria and attack Russia," and some Christian friends became apprehensive. (Q-211) By October a British woman wrote: "We have come to the end of what we SHOULD do here, not what we could do."[2]

In November the Manifesto was presented to local churches for endorsement. Sometimes the foreigner himself determined to prove his sincere faith in an independent Chinese Church. Sometimes Christian leaders or the rank and file exerted pressure to break Western ties after the Manifesto appeared. Sometimes government officials suggested that a congregation or an organization should demonstrate its good intentions by requesting missionary resignations. All three added up to the same result. In one instance Chinese friends who had considered evacuation for their Western colleague premature changed their minds within two weeks, so rapidly did tensions mount toward the close of 1950.

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[1] Personal Letter, April, 1950, quoted in No. 136.
[2] Land of Sinim, Ss. Simon and Jude, 1950.

Two days before the United States embargo on funds to China, one missionary wrote: "Our usefulness is slowly but surely decreasing to the point where we might be a serious handicap to the work almost any day."[1] Within a week his own home board, which had previously hinted it was "time to start for home,"[2] cabled in positive terms: "Definitely request complete missionary withdrawal China earliest possible." Similar advice came the next month from at least one British society and one Chinese synod. With the commencement of public accusations in addition to financial problems, few missionaries felt much inclination to resist the tide any further. As one put it, "General pronouncements that you are either for us or against us began to mean that one could not make any reservations." (Q-15)

Individual circumstances reinforced these decisions to apply for exit permits. One missionary was discharged from his church and seminary ~~seminary~~ work under government pressure. Others found it difficult to carry on dependable medical work amid the anarchy imposed by labor unions and academic license. By fall of 1951 those few Americans remaining on the field were told it would be unwise even to conduct music at religious meetings. A Scandinavian official enjoying diplomatic relations with the People's Government nevertheless advised his missionary citizens to repatriate.

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 103, December 14, 1950.
[2] Personal Letter, No. 107, December 8, 1950.

Exit Procedures

The first two missionary "exits," one from North China and one from Central China to the metropolis of Shanghai, included Red Army permits and military escorts, after full assurance of the safety of the routes. Both individuals concerned were emissaries of optimism, resolved to testify to initial good treatment from the new regime and to return to their work in "liberated" areas. One of these had a rough but revealing ten-day trek over distance that should normally be an overnight train trip. The other made her last lap on a U.S. Navy LST evacuating the Yangtze Valley,yet that fact was apparently not held against her when she re-entered Communist territory.

With the exception of one early departure, two weeks in June, 1950, very few North China missionaries reported leaving in less than a month after applying for an exit permit. In January, 1951, two different people got away in approximately three weeks, part of which was steamship delay. Even the man so abruptly ordered to leave town within eight days waited three weeks at the port for transportation, and secured his exit visa from China during that time.

Six weeks to three months of waiting constituted standard procedure in most of this area, and sometimes even that length of time produced only a travel permit to district headquarters or a port. Securing a pass in one month (May to June, 1951) was admittedly unusual for a city where some missionaries had already been imprisoned for weeks. One permit was granted in two months and then rescinded for another two months. An application made in November, 1950, had by February not even been forwarded to the provincial office; when it was, the pass came through on March 10, 1951.

In another case, where re-entry had been promised, the exit visa was never validated on departure (as all such documents should be), apparently with the deliberate intention of providing an excuse for refusing the previously guaranteed re-entry. Some applicants, told pointedly not to pester the Bureau of Public Safety (which handled all such affairs), had their patience rewarded after six weeks. Other favored individuals in the same period were urged by their institutions, perhaps under government order, to remain at work.

At least three missionaries in North China reported having made direct appeal by letter to Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, when their permits had been withheld for several months. Although he had assured Chinese Christian leaders that law-abiding foreigners would be allowed to leave the country whenever they wished, there is no hint as to whether these communications expedited matters or not. Certainly no other section of the country felt as free or as close to the government even to send such petitions. One American in North China, who had also presented his case to the British Charge d'Affaires, concluded:

> We have no indication as to whether any of these efforts had any effect, or whether simply (we) had served their purpose and were serving no good purpose in their opinion, so that they released us. My personal opinion inclines to the latter view. (Q-214)

The usual procedure seemed to be an application for exit, and a summons weeks later to receive the pass or to be told when it would be granted. Apparently North China cities in general did not require the three days' newspaper announcement in advance, since not a single person mentioned this requirement. Some, but not all, did need financial guarantors. Once, when two such endorsements were demanded, only one Chinese friend proved both willing and economically qualified, so an unknown businessman consented to serve. On another occasion, two different guarantors were required for a man and his family--a hint, as it subsequently proved, that their permit would be granted months before his.

Some evacuees reported six or eight copies of their baggage lists had to be submitted, and health certificates (of vaccination and inoculation) were often necessary. Foreign currency had to be turned in or accounted for, gold and silver jewelry appraised, and after January, 1951, every single item of property had to be listed, whether personal or institutional, whether left in China or taken out. One person mentioned snapshots confiscated at the port of embarkation. Another said, "The deciding question put to me in the matter of my radio and stamps was 'Are you an American?'"[1] In most North China experience, however, baggage examinations prior to 1951 proved to be extremely casual and courteous, and the vicious thoroughness occasionally suffered thereafter came usually from students and other self-appointed vigilantes rather than customs officials. One police agent bid the missionary farewell with "God bless you!"

Public Charges

> The screws are tightening and not only Americans but also Chinese are in the grip of an increasingly relentless and ruthless police state, in which personal rights and justice, as we understand it, have virtually disappeared....There is no such thing as trial before impartial juries. No lawyers to plead, no witnesses permitted on behalf of the accused. The police arrest, frame the charges, find accusers, and tell them what to say or read. A mass trial is called with representatives of every family or group forced to attend. The accused kneels in silence and listens to the accusations. Then the crowd is asked, "Is he guilty?" Anyone failing to shout assent is in danger of being considered reactionary.[2]

Such treatment befell foreign missionaries very seldom, and the most extreme cases--with a few glaring exceptions--occurred in student groups. Here are a few comparatively minor examples reported by North China residents.

Twice in 1950 a doctor was charged with imperialism.

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 103, April 1, 1952.

[2] Ibid.; cf. Robert T. Bryan, "I Came Back From a Red Death Cell" (Saturday Evening Post, January 17-24-31, 1953); also Hunter, Brain-Washing in Red China, passim.

In the first instance two students who had failed their course stirred up the agitation, but the majority backed the Westerner. The second occasion involved the appointment of a faculty member, after Chinese colleagues who also disapproved had been pressured into withdrawing their opposition. Only the foreigner dared stand on principle, but no formal action was ever taken against him.

A university newspaper exposed "the true face and mouth" of a missionary administrator, with the following charges: passing on Voice of America news, selling Chinese curios in the United States for profit, serving as an agent of the U.S. Ambassador, hoping to return to China (thus implying a resurgence of imperialism), and saying that the United Nations forces would stop at the 38th Parallel (but they did not).

In a middle school assembly students and faculty stood up to denounce the foreign teacher for taking too many pictures (always at school request), for trying to win Chinese friendship by serving tea and cakes, for inquiring in a discussion group, "How much do you think the Russians can help you?" "I was a danger....perhaps a spy, at least an imperialist." (Q-15) Such charges were "not too devastating," and some parents admitted that their daughters had to make them but did not believe them.

A missionary in another school was castigated for occupying too large a house, for withholding eggs provided for undernourished students, and for having a wife who took things from an old ladies' home for her personal use. A Swede in a different city and province was charged in the newspapers with being as imperialistic as the Americans and having too lively U.S. connections; as a result he was excommunicated from his church. The last three Americans in one institution remained under house arrest (by the students) with telephone line cut for several months and were finally expelled from the country after public accusations. Because they were highly respected and had voluntarily deferred application for exit permits, "the faculty members were very despondent that they were forced to make the accusations against (them) that they did. They reluctantly did it, hoping that it would be a means of getting (them) out and home safely." (Q-211)[1]

Just one dramatic incident can be recounted here in fuller detail, partly because it reveals the extreme elements (and the extreme emotionalism) operating in certain cases, partly because it has already received considerable publicity. As the May, 1950, conference with Chou En-lai launched the anti-imperialistic "Three-Self Movement," so a similar gathering in April, 1951, set loose an epidemic of accusation meetings. Propaganda demands required intense and vitriolic denunciation and defamation of Christian missions as a plot of imperialist governments to enslave China. The targets selected included such figures as John R. Mott or Timothy Richard, who arrived in 1870 and became "one of the greatest missionaries whom any branch of the Church, whether Roman Catholic, Russian Orthodox, or Protestant, has sent to China."[1] The attacks became critical only when they chose their victims among Chinese or foreign Christians still living under the People's Government.

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[1] Cf. Personal Letter, No. 54, August 13, 1952.

When instructions had gone out from Peking that such accusations must be held to purge the Church of reactionary elements, leaders of the Preparatory Committee of the Oppose-America-Aid-Korea Three-Self Reform Movement of the Christian Church in China frankly intensified the orders, presumably to consolidate their control of the National Christian Council and all related religious bodies. In national organizations and local congregations, therefore, Church leaders found themselves under obligation to stage a public denunciation, as evidence of their patriotism and good faith. Sometimes it was difficult to decide who should accuse whom. In this case, the missionary believed she was chosen because she had been longest of the foreigners in that station and connected with more different types of work; thus to discredit and humiliate her would carry greater influence and glory.

As the plot developed, the victim had been designated, but no one could be found to accuse her. At last the prisons were combed and a Christian was released after two months on condition that he would launch the anti-foreign charges. He promptly reported the matter to the missionary and secured her "permission," on the ground that she had no family to protect: "I could take it--go ahead." At a mass meeting in June, 1951, this Chinese associate accused her of his own crime: hiding, not reporting, and finally destroying a radio sending set. Other church leaders were horrified by the vehemence of the denunciation, and newspaper propaganda magnified the affair into mass hysteria, so that the victim, still free to move about, chose back streets away from crowds lest mob riots flare up.

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[1] Latourette, A History of Christian Missions In China, P. 378.

Meanwhile, she reported,[1] she could follow the trial of Papal Nuncio Riberi in Nanking from the daily papers and recognize the pattern as so identical that she could almost anticipate forthcoming events from day to day. A second accusation meeting in her own church called for her arrest. A third for all Christian leaders in the city was scheduled for mid-July. Before this climactic rally a colleague from another mission wrote the facts to his own church leaders. They, in turn, denounced his interference by publishing his factual defense of the "arch-spy," which was then confirmed by others.

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[1] Personal Interview, No. Q160, May, 1952; cf. Printed Letters, Nos. 111 and 112, July, 1952.

This exposé effectively broke the government's propaganda position and dissipated the fervor of demands for violent punishment. In an effort to rebuild the shattered case, written endorsement of the charges were demanded from every district, every school, every organization, every church (70 letters), every minister and evangelist (180 letters). An exhibit of evidence against the missionary was displayed in a local temple, and newspaper editorials demanded to know why she was still free to walk on Chinese soil. The British consul, friendly but helpless, could offer neither protection nor escape.

At three o'clock one August morning, after being warned by her cook not to go out the evening before, the missionary was told at the police station to be ready for deportation in two hours. Allowed to pack her personal belongings but not her radio or other equipment, she was hustled aboard a ship before dawn, and the captain had to sign a receipt for her custody. Convinced that she would have been arrested had she been younger or a man, the "Arch-Criminal" asserted later:

> I know it for a fact now that I was to have been mobbed and probably killed the next day. The government snatched me and got me out. Why? My feeling is this: if they had martyred me, it would have been turned on them and they would have lost their propaganda value.[1]

Miscellaneous Comments

Replies to the last three questions submitted fell necessarily into a very disconnected and subjective realm. In fact, they were devised as a sort of safety valve for the release of personal opinions and emotions, in the hope that other questions might be answered more objectively and factually. Nevertheless these random comments and illustrations shed a good deal of light on the overall experiences and reactions of missionaries.

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[1] Personal Interview, No. Q160, May, 1952.

One admitted that he had stressed a "genuine Chinese agrarian revolution and no Russian assistance," and was impressed to find the Communist leadership "capable, self-sacrificing, very often highly intelligent." (Q-205) For that particular missionary, as for many others, a few months' experience brought a liberal education. "I feel that the Communist line was definitely softened temporarily to take over a community which had had sixty years of Christian missions, but that in the two years I was there we saw the old line coming strong." (Q-8)

"Chinese Communists are just like other Communists, against religion, family ties, individual--only thing that mattered was 'The Party'." (Q-41) "Ten years ago," said another, "I would never have believed China could change so quickly." (Q-92) "I'm glad I learned that Communism is FORCE and Hate," said a third. (Q-145) "Communists (are) sure that only they have the truth," added a European. (Q-C1) Rather bitterly one missionary listed a four-fold definition of imperialism, Communist-style: anything American, anything missionary, any loyalty above Russia, any thought of social service apart from the government program. (Q-160)

With these gradual revelations came deeper understanding of the government's attitude toward religion. An exceptional keen and sympathetic observer, who told her Chinese students fifteen years earlier that "I can't be a follower of the Communist Revolution because I already belong to the Christian Revolution," came to the conclusion that "in China at least no Christian can be a Communist or even a fellow-traveler."[1] Said another formerly popular teacher, who endured weeks of isolation,

> ....culminating with search, accusations, house arrest (six weeks), third degree, and expulsion from the country on two days' notice....I now realize that they thought we stayed for espionage purposes and could not really believe that our real motives were Christian.[2]

As early as October, 1950, one North China missionary wrote that the New Democracy was "anti-Christian in a way that amounts to persecution in spite of the guarantee of religious freedom."[3] Less than four months earlier the same observer had remarked:

> It seems to me that Communism as practised in China has already modified its attitude greatly since twenty years, when Christians and missionaries were hunted and killed in Suth China and churches burned. A significant victory has been won in the interest of freedom of religious belief in the new Constitution."[4]

One of the few unpleasant incidents reported occurred when two servants demanded supplies from a nurse and then slapped her "hard, finally knocking glasses off." Not only the hospital authorities but government officials "were quite upset over the incident," which apparently had no political significance whatever. (Q-208) For the missionaries, as well as Chinese Christians, however, the pressures were never put on religious grounds, but on social and political charges. Even if all the attacks against foreigners, as spies and imperialists, could be proved, freedom of religion as Communists interpret it would continue to exist. (Q-160)

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[1] Personal Interview, No. Q122, January, 1952.
[2] Personal Letter, No. 54, August 13, 1952.
[3] Personal Letter, No. 103, October 29, 1950.
[4] *Ibid.*, July 2, 1950.

Derk Bodde justly insisted that "regardless of how right the foreigners may be in certain criticisms, the thing that really counts in China, after all, is what happens to the Chinese, and not to a handful of outsiders."[1] He left too early (the end of August, 1949) to witness more recent developments. Yet as late as January, 1951, a police officer assured a departing missionary that the propaganda was not aimed at Christian foreigners, who were "all good people,........and........repeated several times that he KNEW and that I MUST believe that in three or two years he could go as he pleased to my country and I could do the same to his country." (Q-44)

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[1] Bodde, op. cit., p. 145.

CHAPTER 10

EAST CHINA

As a missionary focus, East China (Kiangsu, Anhwei, Chekiang) has several distinctive characteristics. Centering around Shanghai, once the fifth largest city of the world, it possessed the greatest concentration of aliens, both businessmen and church workers. Because headquarters for most major denominations, as well as united agencies, were located in that metropolis, nearly forty percent of all treasurers' and administrators' questionnaires came from East China experience. With six of the thirteen Christian Colleges located in Shanghai, Nanking, Hangchow and Soochow, nearly one third of the educators replying resided in this area.

In the early months of "Liberation," shipping was available from Shanghai. Thanks to Communist construction-- and the elimination of their own guerilla sabotage-- railroad facilities soon linked East China to the two strategic ports of Tientsin and Canton. The presence of so many foreigners led to more minor "incidents" than were reported from other places,[1] yet at the same time helped to soften and moderate the impact of the new regime, for events in Shanghai received world publicity. As a result, many observers felt that East China received the most lenient overall treatment of any section. Certainly this is indicated by the fact that only one questionnaire from a remote inland town indicates any imprisonment, and even those missionaries held until early 1953 in East China suffered no serious house arrest, much less public trial or persecution. On the other hand, the earliest and perhaps most extensive student demonstrations against foreigners took place in Nanking.

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[1] Cf. Harrison Forman, Blunder in Asia (Didier, New York, 1950), pp. 111-125 *et passim*; Lynn and Amos Landman, Profile of Red China (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1951), pp. 44ff, 164-176, *et passim*; Hunter, Brain-Washing in Red China, p. 75.

Returns on this questionnaire have produced a remarkably representative picture. Although twelve of the fifty-~~six~~ seven East China reports came from Nanking and twenty-~~three~~ four from Shanghai (a necessary preponderance to cover the amount and variety of mission work in those two cities), the other twenty-one replies deal with thirteen or fourteen smaller towns and cities. In many of these the missionary personnel totalled half a dozen or less, in a few only one or two foreigners. With the exception of three stations north of the Yangtze, this entire area was "liberated" within a five-week span, from late April to late May, 1949. All of these factors combine to make East China the most homogeneous area surveyed, even though reports cover the whole gamut from huge metropolis to isolated village, from office executive to local (no longer itinerant) evangelist, from four months to forty-one months under the People's Republic.

First Effects

With rare unanimity missionaries cited as the first effect on their personal lives their immobilization. Two missionaries caught en route from Shanghai to Nanking spent sixteen days at an intermediate junction and then completed their journey, carrying thousands of dollars in hard cash. But two others a Central China man in Shanghai and a woman on evangelistic tour in the hinterland, never did receive permission to return to their original stations.

Residents in the Nationalist capital of Nanking could picnic on Lotus Lake, and for two days at cherry-blossom time might visit Sun Yat-sen's Tomb and Spirit Valley. Otherwise they were not allowed outside the city wall--except on trips to Shanghai. These latter permits were granted fairly frequently in early months, although no Shanghailander ever made the reverse journey. During the first summer one missionary from the port city spent two months with a youth camp at Soochow, another visited Hangchow, and a very few others traveled brief distances outside of Shanghai. In general, "passes for religious or other organizational duties are frequently refused, and almost never has a pass been granted for movement from a major center to a smaller place."[1]

As in the North, the excuse was sometimes offered that travel restrictions were for the foreigners's safety.

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[1] Mimeographed Letter, No. M1; August 1, 1950.

Some officials harbored genuine fear that Kuomintang agents or guerillas might attack Westerners to create incidents which would discredit the new Communist law and order. Some missionaries agreed that "bandits" or robbers did operate in certain localities, although no misfortunes are reported to have befallen any of those who did travel. In some cases, especially in smaller towns, the problem was one of bureaucracy, lack of procedural "know-how," or unwillingness to assume responsibility without higher authority.

Within municipal boundaries only a few individuals reported hampering of movement. In some smaller places guards were stationed at compound gates for the first day or two, a sort of "protective custody." As a strange exception to the prevailing freedom of the city, one piece of mission property in Shanghai had sentries posted "for protection." Residents had to fill out blanks each time they wished to go out, reporting why and where they were going, for how long, and release the guard from any responsibility for their safety during their absence. No other compound, apparently, was so circumscribed, but these sentries were removed within about two months. (Q-107, Q-108, Q-127)

Missionaries living north of the Yangtze, cut off from Nanking and Shanghai three or four months before those major cities fell, suffered real economic privation for a time. One who had been travelling and failed to receive her last allowance had to restrict her expenditures drastically in order not to become a complete burden on Chinese colleagues. Others borrowed supplies from hospitals and schools and used yarn as a medium of exchange for four months. Even in the metropolis of Shanghai, one missionary reported that financial pressures as well as social ones led to a closer fellowship in the simpler living which she shared with Chinese associates.

For most of the area, however, the "turn-over" came so quickly and smoothly--after months of tension and uncertainty--that business and finances were not seriously interrupted. Shanghai offices suspended operations for a couple of days, due to sporadic fighting, but within a fortnight financial communications reopened with the outside world. Despite an enormous number of investigations and statistical forms and taxes and reports, sale and remittance of funds, according to one treasurer, were actually "easier under Communists than under the Chinese Nationalists." (Q-105)

In many places, especially the smaller stations, Communist soldiers wandered freely in and out of homes. One woman estimated 1800 in five months (Q-33) and a rural resident claimed 600 in one day.[1] For many of these country boys a foreign house and its furnishings, or even the accoutrements of a modern city, stirred incredulous curiosity.

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[1] "Report on Protestant Missions," Monthly Report, December, 1949, p. 5.

At other times official visits had the object of thorough search, either on general principles of for incriminating evidence which might be expected in the residence of an "imperialist spy." Although in general there was plenty of vacant or expendable housing in Nanking and Shanghai, soldiers in other places often invaded mission compounds in quest of living quarters. Sometimes institutional buildings were requisitioned temporarily; in no case reported were foreign homes occupied at the start.

As posters appeared on the walls announcing that foreigners would be protected _if_ they obeyed the laws, some Westerners felt encouraged, while others recognized such a statement in itself as evidence that the "white man's rule" in China had ended. The rapid control of inflation, the improvement in public utilities, the discipline of the troops, the continuance of civil servants at their posts (albeit under Communist supervisors)--all these gave considerable reassurance to foreign residents.

On the other hand, several "reporters" mentioned even at the outset a feeling of restraint, of tension and resentment. At least half a dozen referred to constant questioning or tedious bureaucratic requirements. Others told of continual conscious effort to avoid giving offense, whether by the slightest automobile or bicycle accident, or the carrying of a camera, or an inadvertent word. Several gave up their visits to Chinese homes immediately, although for the majority this step came much later. Agitation among servants and other employees or among students soon affected the lives of a number of missionaries, although this seemed more critical in some other areas.

First Effects on Work

Restrictions on travel put a virtual end to all district and rural work by foreign missionaries, although for a time Chinese pastors and Bible women came to the cities for advice and encouragement. One missionary visit to a nearby town in the first few months brought serious difficulty and suspicion on the local preacher, so that administrative supervision passed more rapidly to Chinese. It was not long, however, before their movements too were drastically curtailed.

With the isolation came immediate tightening on many country churches. Only three months after the change in government, one missionary wrote from East China: "Pessimism pours in from the countryside, where religious liberty is honored more in the breach than in the observance."[1] Five weeks later he added: "In villages and country areas more than half of the churches have been closed, either by action of the local Communist officials, or by the fears of Christians, or the desertion of pastors. There are still stories of actual persecution of Christians."[2] In most stations large enough to have missionary witnesses there were few outright interferences with church services. One person reported lower attendance in Nanking and another, of a different denomination, reported larger congregations after the first fear and uncertainty wore off. In one small town, where the church building was "borrowed" for political meetings during the week--but not on Sunday--Christians protested when the Communist flag was hung over the Christian Cross, and the offense was not repeated.

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 102, August 27, 1949.
[2] *Ibid.*, October 3, 1949.

Evangelistic work outside of the churches met prompt criticism from the new authorities. Street preaching and the distribution of tracts were banned, in most places except in Shanghai,[1] and no new programs could be opened up. Before very many months, Chinese pastors were examined for their political beliefs and the nature of their foreign associations. Uncertainty about the "rules" and the rapid increase of thought control and public apologies for minor offenses contributed to an attitude of caution in all types of church work. Several missionaries were asked to discontinue preaching, except in a few larger city churches. On the other hand, among ordinary congregations as well as educated circles, the barrage of Communist propaganda inspired a genuine need for deeper study and faith in Christianity.

The earliest and strongest impact of the new regime on mission work lay in primary and secondary schools. Administrative councils, including students and junior faculty and sometimes servants as well as former deans and principals, set the pattern for most institutions. Student demands for lower tuition took precedence over equally vital salary increases, although many budgets literally broke apart on these irreconcilable issues.

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[1] Cf. Anne Hazelton, God of the Valleys, p. 33.

More than any other one item in the educational field, missionaries reported that classes were disrupted by constant propaganda meetings, parades, song and dance rehearsals and all the trappings of emotional indoctrination. Chinese teachers were forced to study the New Democracy and all other features of Marxist thought; in some places only pastors and primary instructors were exempt. Just one missionary, however, reported being required to attend such classes, although several others voluntarily took part in faculty discussion groups.

By the end of 1949 one foreign teacher was boycotted by her students, who demanded a replacement; another was deemed by the local Bureau of Education "inappropriate as a foreigner to teach education."[1] Some smaller schools early sought to eliminate all Western influence.

In orthodox Marxist fashion, religion had to be wiped out of the academic curriculum immediately. This was more drastic in some places than others. It frequently meant dropping Bible classes or making them strictly voluntary. One report specified "no mention of religion" in any classroom. Some school councils demanded the removal of all religious emblems from the buildings. Many Bible classes and religious discussion groups expunged from the campuses continued in churches or in missionary homes for a good many months.

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[1] Personal Letter, March 1, 1950, quoted in No. 136.

Christian Youth Groups discovered that their center ought always to have been the church. But some of these disintegrated under the comprehensive government program for young people. One Youth Fellowship broke up because five of its seven members went into government service; dozens of others were summoned or lured into "revolutionary schools" away from the taint of Western and Christian influence. A city youth council disbanded to avoid the political pressures which would inevitably attempt to use and control[7] it.

At the college level revisions in curriculum and education were conducted in more gradual and mature fashion. Initial discussion of university departments dealt with textbooks and overcrowded facilities and administrative procedures, showing little evidence of deliberate obstructionism. An American continued as dean in one college for several months, but encountered trying disciplinary problems under the "new freedom." Another instructor mentioned the deafening rivalry between music practice rooms and the adjacent auditorium, where political rallies were continually being held. On the whole, however, it was nearly a year before the colleges felt much drastic change, other than the introduction of required courses in dialectic materialism and social development.

Even less affected were theological seminaries and Bible schools, treated as adjuncts of the church rather than as educational institutions under government purview. In other words, these religious training schools were almost completely ignored during the first year or more. One superintendent reported that a child feeding station probably helped to prevent the occupation of her Bible school grounds by Communist troops.

Hospitals and clinics, on the other hand, proved of much greater interest to the authorities. Detailed registration and reports were demanded, including information on all patient admissions within twenty-four hours. The reduction in number of patients at both hospitals and clinics may be attributed more to economic factors than to their being foreign institutions. Several hospitals reported the cessation of all evangelistic work; one was allowed to hold services and Bible study for Christian patients and staff, but not for others.

Like schools and other institutions, hospitals ran into serious labor problems, as servants demanded wages which reduced budgets could not meet. Gradually internal frictions and jealousies were capitalized upon, and non-Christian or anti-Christian nurses or doctors undermined the religious atmosphere of the institutions. Staff members were liable for conscription into government public health projects, and this weapon could be used to discipline "unpatriotic" individuals. Hospitals were taxed as profit-making business organizations, although appeals sometimes brought reductions or exemptions.

Relief work appeared to be most highly suspect of all, and the first to be wholly discontinued in many places. Neighborhood centers and social service projects endured frequent inspections, for the state assumed responsibility for underprivileged people as rapidly as administrative machinery could be set up. This deprived the Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. of many of their accustomed functions--e.g. mass education--and according to one report freed the most conscientious workers for more directly Christian work.

Administrative offices found themselves beset by constantly changing regulations and a plethora of bureaucratic forms and reports. But the currency stability and the establishment of "parity deposit units" (based on the prices of essential commodities) made it possible to establish savings accounts and transact ordinary exchange with a very welcome freedom. Most building programs were brought to a halt, if not by government red tape then by financial uncertainties and the virtual certainty of military occupation.

Publication and literature programs continued with relatively little interference. Circulation of Bibles, tracts, religious periodicals, and the like remained fairly steady during 1950, although somewhat lower than in 1949. Here again labor agitation and frequent political discussion meetings during business hours hampered normal operations. One publisher reported that "leftist" editors soon utilized certain Christian magazines for political purposes, and could not be safely ousted. An interdenominational bulletin early found itself censored by a "patriotic" staff member. Thus many aspects of Christian work yielded to internal rather than external pressures, so gradual and subtle that resistance proved inexpedient or ineffectual.

Changes in Personal Life

After six months of being ignored, the missionaries began to notice a gradual, "deceptively polite" tightening of restrictions. "From the beginning," said one, "the Communists opposed mission work, but took time to execute it." (Q-137) "New developments along the same old lines," another called it. (Q-13) "Right from the start," declared a third, "the avowed policy towards 'imperialists' was that of elimination." (Q-166) As Question 5 will indicate, the acute pressures began with Chinese participation in the Korean War, in the fall of 1950, but anti-foreign propaganda and feeling antedated that.

The Communist conviction that all aliens must be imperialist spies led to increased observation: direct searches and police interviews, interrogations of servants and colleagues, "the feeling of being watched." Fewer travel permits were granted, none after October 1, 1950. Ther was little freedom to talk frankly even among close friends, and students and "leftish" associates became noticeably less cordial. At least one radio was "borrowed" and returned with short-wave useless; when servants or neighbors were quizzed about the aerial, it was promptly taken down.

In some places long before the Korean War street children accelerated their insults and even mud-slinging at the foreigners. Often their elders reprimanded them; some even explained that they had been instructed to act thus by soldiers or school teachers. One missionary was expressly warned not to carry a camera. Another, who had been attending faculty indoctrination sessions through the fall of 1949, was challenged as to his motives in the spring of 1950, so all the foreigners withdrew. (Q-58)

One by one, specific requests were made for the termination of missionary service: to stop teaching, to resign from boards and committees, to omit hospital visits, to turn over Sunday School classes to Chinese, finally in several instances to cease attending church. By 1951 the lone missionary in one outpost was asked by her pastor to take her meals in her room instead of with the other Christian workers. Another, asked about plans for leaving, replied that she still had work to do (back in the summer of 1949): "What work? Since we have come, you need not stay," the Communist official assured her. (Q-33) "Gradually it was made plain that the foreigner couldn't do anything." (Q-107)

Late in 1950 there commenced, also, what one missionary termed "nauseating accusations" against foreign colleagues, dead or alive, as well as against fellow Chinese Christians. Although Westerners in Shanghai continued to move about freely up to their departure dates as late as the end of 1952, others in smaller towns sometimes did not leave their mission compounds for months, even if they were not under official house arrest or imprisonment. Yet in many ways the psychological restraints were harder to endure than the physical. From the beginning of Communist rule, missionaries were confronted with the practical and moral dilemma of whether to keep tactful silence or to give one's witness for truth in any realm. For example:

> Miss---propounded the question as to whether we missionaries should discreetly keep our mouths shut when our countries are slandered, their motives misrepresented, their social arrangements distorted, and this doctrine of inevitable war preached, in order that we might continue to have a constructive religious influence on the lives of those with whom we come in contact, and persuade the authorities that Christianity after all is not tied up with reaction and imperialism. The trouble is that every discussion on any issue tends toward the political, and missionaries, interested in accuracy and truth for its own sake, are always being decoyed into defending truth in areas where defense creates suspicion.[1]

Changes in Mission Work

In large measure the missionary personnel in China has been intimately connected with Christian institutions, and this became increasingly evident under the People's

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 102, November 4, 1949.

Government. Not only did attacks on mission work and program deal heavy blows to the daily life and morale of the missionaries, but criticisms of foreigners as imperialist agents proved to be powerful entering wedges against the Church itself.

One such instrument was the "subtle identification of Christian missionary work with Americanism. I believe the aim of the Communists was to stamp out all Christian missionary influence, and they think the Christian Church will eventually die out." (Q-68) Since "all mission agencies were accused of being spies and subversive groups," (Q-63) the condemnation of every program which had Western contacts did much to destroy the total organizational life of the Church. At worst the missionaries were charged with mass murder or collecting information for their respective governments; at best they were accused of luring Chinese from patriotic devotion by gifts of food and clothing or the corrupting influence of education.

Foreign participation in the evangelistic program of the Church, already at a low point, fell off still more sharply when missionaries were asked not to preach or conduct Sunday School classes or pronounce the benediction or even attend worship services. The demand for complete devolution of authority to Chinese leaders came often from outside, semi-political pressure. It was designed to discredit missionaries as un-Christian and the churches as tools of imperialism, without launching a frontal attack on religion or Christianity.

As propaganda and bureaucracy vastly expanded, they needed greater space for their respective activities, and earlier promises not to confiscate property dwindled away. More and more chapels and churches were used by Communist authorities for barracks or offices or special meetings. This was understandable in small towns where imposing and mostly idle churches offered the only adequate auditorium space. But more and more political gatherings were scheduled, with apparent deliberateness, for Sunday morning. And more and more incidents arose where "the Reds burst into one of our Church auditoriums, tore down the beautiful decorations, put up the pictures of Lenin, Stalin, Mao and Chu and for ten days during the Christmas season carried on their propaganda exercises."[1]

In the schools, too, pressures of all sorts gained momentum as international tensions mounted. Not only the sharp bayonets of ridicule, but the heavy artillery of science, attacked religious teachings at every turn. At times it seemed as if evolution must be a keystone of Marxist thought, so diligently was it taught to bank clerks and soldiers as well as biology pupils--and so vigorously were doubts or denials condemned as evidence of anti-governmental sentiment. Teachers privately confessed that academic freedom had disappeared, and that they must be constantly wary about deviations from the party line, whatever their academic field might be.

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[1] George A. Hudson, "Communism In China and Its Challenge" (Decatur Presbyterian Church, August, 1951), p. 11.

Even missionaries found that they must teach orthodox materials or none at all. English readers gave way to propaganda booklets in the English tongue. A music teacher finally made her decision to leave when she discovered that her choruses expected her to lead them in violently anti-American propaganda songs, and that not even coaching the music without the words would satisfy the radicals. In one of the universities students denounced Western methods and materials in education and sociology, but also in music and home economics. (Q-203)

School administration fairly quickly dropped into the hands of the Communist students and faculty members on the executive council, and the principal--if at all conservative or Christian--became a mere figurehead. This led to outright conflict between Christians and non-Christians, or "pro-American" versus so-called "political" teachers, within many faculties. The whole weight of society and livelihood, if not direct government interference, sooner or later won a Communist victory. One missionary reported that the Board of Education in a major city made it difficult for mission schools, which were singled out for criticism and example in educational meetings. (Q-94)

Hospitals, too, had to be reorganized, often under pressure from disgruntled nurses or ex-employees, who spread "smear campaigns" against either Chinese or missionary doctors or superintendents. In later months equipment was simply moved from mission premises for military hospitals or other government branches, perhaps on the assumption that it was all People's property. In actual fact, a number of mission hospitals had, very early in the new regime, to make a "deal" with government agencies because of the financial "squeeze." With higher wages and staff salaries, skyrocketing prices for supplies if obtainable at all, complete elimination of well-paying private patients, and drastic reduction in clinic or charity receipts, hospitals rented their property, amalgamated with a government medical unit, or frankly turned over their facilities to government operation, hoping that a few Christian staff members might continue their witness in a quiet, individual manner.

So in these, and many other ways, the "circle of religious freedom grew smaller." To attempt any greater detail than this would lead too far into the experience of Chinese Christians, beyond the withdrawal of most foreign missionaries. As will be indicated in a later summary, all mission institutions have long since been merged, abolished, or taken over by government authorities. In each case internal administrative problems, as well as the severance of all foreign funds, combined with political expediency to justify the action. One missionary, however, put the total situation thus: "They (government officials) were always careful to say that their policy was neither anti-religious nor anti-foreign, but the Chinese Christians knew differently." (Q-172)

Definite Stages

With very few exceptions, the missionaries in East China recognized clear-cut stages in the treatment of foreign missions and personnel. One who left in October, 1949, felt already that the "stages were on the whole planned and well-executed," (Q-104) largely neutralizing the populace through uncertainty and fear. Another observed Communist policy as "erratic and unpredictable;" a third regarded developments as gradual rather than clear-cut. Among the remainder there was almost universal agreement.

Some efforts were made to classify general periods apart from specific dates and events. The first year antagonism centered on the landlords and the wealthy, the second year on the Nationalists, and the third year on the Americans, suggested one Old China Hand. (Q-94) An introductory period of normal activity, three or four months of stiffening Iron Hand, and then complete control, another characterized the stages. A third missionary, who found the first two or three months such a "period of sweetness and light" that "many Christian leaders were won to the idea that Communism was essentially a pure form of Christianity," dated the end of that "honeymoon" with the coming of civil government to replace the military.

(Q-87)

The almost unanimously acknowledged pattern, however, ran somewhat as follows: from May, 1949, to June, 1950, a time of relatively little interference or change; July through September, 1950, a period of transition and growing tension; October through December, "definite moves to oust missionaries;" from January, 1951, on, a complete break with the West.

To be sure, there were some who recognized the "handwriting on the wall." The same missionary who proposed the stages given in the preceding paragraph had already commented: "By March 1950 it was quite evident that Foreign Missions as such could not continue." (Q-62) For many people this was confirmed by the slowly seeping rumors from Chou En-lai's May conference with Christian leaders, referred to in the previous chapter. But no one took the matter too seriously--as more urgent than perhaps a three-year goal--until the Korean War broke out.

Although propaganda grew apace through the summer of 1950, East China missionaries apparently felt little or no repercussion. Perhaps a few less travel permits were issued; a Youth Conference held in a hospital because forbidden on the campus was declared "illegal," but the students rallied instantly and unitedly to defend the missionary against single responsibility for the offense. (Q-172) Such demonstrations of popular feeling as arose seemed clearly stirred up rather than spontaneous.

"When the change came, it came with a bang," said one missionary, referring to the autumn of 1950. In one town September brought required house registration and travel permits for all Chinese, a sign of "something in the wind." With the first trickle of Chinese "volunteers" into Korea in October, the Aid-Korea-Resist-America movement included anti-missionary overtones. (Q-166) Travel permits were completely denied, presumably on account of troop movements. Immediately one missionary recognized efforts to discredit the authorities of all American institutions, finding in subsequent events "all a pattern used in city after city, varying only in local details here and there."

By the time the trickle of "volunteers" had become a flood of Chinese participation in Korea, the accompanying wave of propaganda was beginning to sweep foreign missionaries out of East China. On November 9 came the first major accusation against a Western college professor, followed three days later by a cause celebre which echoed around the world and is referred to under Question 10. In November, too, began clear-cut pressures for the missionaries as a whole to evacuate. Chinese friends frankly urged it; newspaper articles threatened it; student gatherings demanded it.

As the condemnations of missionaries grew more frequent and more vitriolic, similar stories arrived from other sections of the country. Said one report: "There was no theory that could divorce the missionary attacks from top-level planning and direction." Said another: "All this seemed clearly to be a planned program on a national scale with minor local variations as to date and details." (Q-66)

Through December these accusations continued. In one city they took the form of "Hate-America-Love-Russia." (Q-166) In a remote outpost two women ended their school work and prepared to leave, when hordes of students on an unscheduled holiday visited them all day, embarrassed and awkward, perhaps under orders to heckle the missionaries into an incident. (Q-207) In still another town public accusations against the foreigners were rumored but never came off. (Q-172) "It was clear that the time had come when even the die-hards among us who had wanted to stay as long as possible would have to make the choice between leaving China and probable imprisonment or even death." (Q-80)

Then came the deciding factor for any who still hesitated. On December 16 the United States Government placed an embargo on any funds into Communist China without State Deparment license. On December 26, announced three days later, the People's Government retaliated by freezing all American assets in China. This was the ultimate stage. Chinese Christian leaders had counted on three to five years of transition toward complete self-support. Missionaries who had felt themselves not yet political burdens to their colleagues now faced the prospect of becoming economic liabilities. As far as East China was concerned, the die had been cast.

Differences of Treatment

For some reason, this question, more objective in content than certain others, brought a surprising variety of subjective replies. With the exception of Roman Catholic experience, those who asserted dogmatically that there was no noticeable difference of treatment by individual, denomination, or nationality probably came nearer to the overall pattern than those who cited minor exceptions in their own locality. Yet those assorted exceptions are of interest if not of great significance.

At the personal level, one man who had dined with Chou En-lai in Chungking and during the Marshall mission felt that he received special consideration when lower Red officials learned of this honor. A few colleagues applied together for exit permits in December, 1950; one received the pass in eight days, the other remained in China until September, 1952. On the fortunate end of a similar discrimination, one missionary remarked: "We guessed that the difference was that of the nature of our previous activities, and our relative importance in their political and propaganda activities." (Q-127)

This estimate, obviously valid in one case of exit permits, was confirmed in other experiences. A labor union showed greater hostility to a woman who had served there for twenty-seven years, in contrast to her associates of two and four years respectively. She was never openly accused of crime, but only carefully watched, in the apparent hope that over the years she must have committed many offenses against the Chinese people and could probably be caught in another vulnerable mis-step.

When it came to public accusations, however, particularly in educational institutions, the victims seemed to be chosen more or less arbitrarily. Not that personal missionary attitudes or personal student resentments did not play a vital part; in some cases, on the other hand, the more closely identified a foreigner might be with his Chinese companions, the more strategic a target of propaganda attack he was. In the final analysis, however,

> ....it was the general opinion of most missionaries and Chinese friends that illustrations had to be made of somebody and they were"it." It seems to have been pretty well known that the "propagandists" had looked over the field and considered several missionaries as likely prospects, but for various reasons dropped some and took these. (Q-1)

Similarly, differences noted in the treatment of various mission groups appeared to have minor, local explanations--if any. Severe opposition that led to early withdrawal from one station may have been due to participation in relief work,"which the Communists hated," but it had naturally made matters worse when "one young man lost his temper and was somewhat rude and demanding in an early encounter." (Q-68) A conservative, evangelistic mission was criticized for inviting children off the streets for religious meetings, songs and stories.

In conspicuous agreement, however, a large preportion of reports stressed that Roman Catholic missioners had received much worse treatment than the Protestants. Illustrations ranged from longer inspection of photographs and wider confiscation thereof, to imprisonment and persecution. In Nanking a furore mentioned by several questionnaires began in the summer of 1950, when a baby in the Catholic orphanage was scalded and later died (of other complications). The charges snowballed from individual torture to mass murder. As late as January, 1951, bones were displayed in a distant town where no Roman Catholics resided, to prove the slaughter of thousands of children in Nanking. Demands were made for the imprisonment or deportation of the two Sisters Superior; finally a jail sentence was suspended in favor of expulsion. Nearby a wall was erected between the Catholic Fathers and their school so that they might do no religious work among students.

Reports offered three major explanations for this bitter antagonism toward Catholics: the open opposition of the Vatican to Communism in any form or place; the large real estate holdings, in one town four times all the Protestant property put together; and the rigid papal, control, which withstood--for the most part successfully--all efforts to create an indigenous Catholic Church.[1]

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[1] Cf. Eugene E. Fahy, "Burial Above Ground," Life, September 8, 1952.

Insistence that the Roman Catholic Youth Group was incompatible with the Communist Youth Corps caused added resentment, although many Protestants took similar stands. Individual differences counted of course. An authoritarian Father Superior--with attitude to match his title--was permitted to visit Shanghai on business but not to return, while the young Irish priests at his mission shared the same courtesy and tolerance as the Protestants.

Few significant national differences were reported in East China. Several people suggested that Americans received the worst treatment, due largely to the Korean War, with the British close behind. An English couple applying for an exit permit a week after an American received it several days earlier. From another town came mention of more British privileges, perhaps due to simpler living standards closer to those of Chinese colleagues--an economic as well as political expediency. However, the only imprisonments reported, indirectly, from one majority were of a British couple, and the first significant student agitation attacked an English college teacher. This latter case, after three or four apologies, was completely dwarfed by more violent and widespread condemnation of Americans in three different institutions.

Other nationalities showed little discernible variation, pro or con. Two reports suggested that Germans were more har~~r~~assed than Americans even, but a third said they were freer with Chinese friends. Up to the end of

1950 a Spanish priest had been quite unmolested, but public charges began then against his school. According to one questionnaire, an elderly Swiss lady was still being held in September, 1951, unable to work. Another missionary insisted that Hungarians and Czechs in several instances had suffered severe censorship, interrogation, denial of passes, etc.[1]

A few East China residents specifically referred to geographical distinctions. One felt that this area had been much better off than West China, that it was still easy to leave the coastal cities at the very moment when major trials and countless baggage examinations plagued those in Szechwan. "On the whole," said a second, "official treatment of foreigners and of local Christians was considerably more tolerant than that in other parts of the country." (Q-130) If this was so, as these area surveys indicate, the explanation may lie in the enormous administrative burden posed by huge cities, or it may rest with the relatively large number of foreigners involved and consequent world publicity.

Reasons for Staying

At best the motives for facing uncertainty or even danger are vaguely expressed and inextricably interwoven. Yet they can be summarized under comparatively few general headings.

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[1] The only political explanation would be that these expatriates had criticized the new regimes in their homelands; whether they were missionaries or businessmen, Communists or Christians, the comment did not say.

More than half the East China reports gave in one form or another the conviction that there was still constructive work to be done and that they could be of help to their Chinese colleagues and the people they had come to serve. This was especially true of specialized workers: doctors and nurses, treasurers and technicians. In addition to the specific task, the presence of foreign missionaries might lend a stability and confidence to the Church in a difficult period of transition. To leave, on the other hand, would suggest to Chinese Christians that their friends were running away (from a future they themselves could not escape) and to the government that Christianity was (as charged) a political and imperialistic agency.

On the contrary, most missionaries felt that they had a call to Christian witness under any governmental system, that there were Communist souls to save, and that it was God's will for them to remain at their posts. Several, apparently not overly optimistic, were willing to see if they could "make a go of it," and one of these quoted an older colleague later on: "Well, we have tried it, and it doesn't work." (Q-68) Others frankly wanted to observe firsthand what happens when Christianity challenges Communism--and vice versa. "Unless I had learned the nature of Communism through personal experience, I should have felt like a Christian in ignoble retreat." (Q-69)

Others were willing to trust the assurances of

Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai that foreign missions could continue, that the People's Government would grant religious freedom. This hope had been buttreesed by a few missionary reports of early and tolerant "Liberation." One hoped to see Communism reconstructing China, not destroying the country as in 1928. Another found instead "steady pressures along a definite and patterned route." (Q-61) One had faith in the Chinese people to "mediate (moderate?) Communist evils." But still another "had no illusions:"

> Study of practical Communism had prepared me for the pattern as it developed. I was caught off base only by the apparent ease with which the ruthless and determined small group running the country had their way.[1]

With overwhelming and emphatic conviction the East China missionaries declared that they would make the same decision again. Yet on the whole there were more reservations and hesitations at this point than in North China. One woman was doubtful because her health suffered, but she added that she had learned much and felt closer to the Chinese people than ever before in her missionary career. Another woman, in an isolated station, would choose again to stay but questioned whether the Chinese pastor would again choose to have the foreigner remain. A seminary professor qualified his reply: "I think I would make the same choice again (recognizing of course that I did not have the clairvoyant powers to read the future)." (Q-1)

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[1] Personal Letter, No. R21, January 23, 1952.

The question, clearly, is susceptible of varying interpretations. Hypothetically given the identical circumstances a second time, most people would follow the same course of action. Practically facing a similar situation with accumulated wisdom and experience, the answer might be reversed. On another mission field, for example, one's position might be highly suspect and vulnerable under another Red regime for having served previously in Communist China. A woman analyzed her decision in retrospect thus: "I think I was right to remain then, but I would not make the same decision under the present circumstances; i.e. since so many of our colleagues have been killed because of their contact with foreigners." (Q-154)

Among the East China contingent just one reply gave an unequivocal "Definitely No." Because this was the only unsigned questionnaire, it is difficult to find and interpret the explanatory factors, especially as the "reporter" consistently indicated lenient treatment for himself and his mission, no trials or charges or imprisonments--but one experience so "unusual and certainly not typical" that "for ample reasons" it was not divulged. (Q-63)

This happened to be the same missionary who felt that he was treated much better--"though I cannot prove that this was true"--because of the "sacrifice on my part" in staying on the job when his family had left two years earlier. (The faculty advisor who suggested this question presumably anticipated some hint that the People's Government might regard family departure before"Liberation" as a sign of mistrust or opposition.) No such evidence has appeared. On the contrary, most husbands who remained in China without their wives (on account of health problems or small children) detected no reaction whatsoever from the authorities. Two specifically regretted that their families had left, for they would have stayed much longer had it not been for the separation. "I thought - how naive - that I could return with them." (Q-104)[1] Another, "liberated" while his family was at sea,advised them to come on to Shanghai before the "turn-over" there and thus be available for a permit (five months later) to rejoin him in their mission station.

Reasons for Leaving

Although individuals were evacuated from East China at frequent intervals, the majority made their decision to leave in November or December of 1950. In particular cases of health or lack of work or inadquate language or furlough due, both missionary colleagues and Chinese friends recommended some withdrawals as early as September, 1949, when the S.S. General Gordon entered Shanghai for that purpose. Several others were advised to leave at the close of the school term in June, 1950. Within that first year many positions had been transferred to Chinese associates; in some schools academic levels had already fallen too low to justify a foreign faculty, especially in unpopular English classes. Said one college professor of history, "The mere remaining without a satisfying job is hardly good enough."[1]

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[1] Cf. Personal Letter, January 22, 1950, quoted in No. 136.

The important object for study here is not the individual reasons for departure, but the fact that so many such reasons operated prior to the Korean War. As early as August, 1949, "one Chinese woman whose judgment I consider good said, ''You are making the only right decision; a host of other foreigners should really go at this time too.'" (Q-33) In February, 1950, one denomination held a consultation regarding missionary withdrawal. While none of the Westerners favored such a move at that time, five of the thirteen Chinese already advised "substantial immediate reduction" of that church's foreign staff.[2] By May, in another mission, "only two Chinese" suggested that missionaries should leave for their own safety. These straws in the wind, these minority voices raised before Korea and even before the "Christian Conference" with Chou En-lai, throw doubt at least on the belief of some that "we might still be there today had it not been for the Korean War, bringing with it the Hate America program."[3]

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[1] Mimeographed Letter, No. M1, August 1, 1950, p. 11.
[2] Informal Notes on Conference, February 22, 1950.
[3] Personal Letter, No. R4, January 27, 1952.

Rumors and unofficial reports concerning the Peking Conference were circulating through East China by the time of the Korean outbreak at the end of June, 1950. In the months that immediately followed, such thoughts as these began to be formulated: An American is no longer able to present Christianity effectively.... I do not wish to seem to approve Communist policies by remaining....Local church adoption of the "Manifesto" clinches my expendability....The quality of hospital work is now too poor to be a part of....School administrators had been taunted for being intimidated by "two imperialistic old ladies living on the campus."

As indicated in Question 5, the entrance of Chinese "volunteers" into the Korean conflict introduced an entirely fresh and demonic dimension into Communist propaganda. Then Chinese Church leaders and foreign mission boards began to urge with reluctant firmness the complete withdrawal of missionary personnel. To some it became apparent that personal "attacks were not isolated affairs, but thoroughly planned and directed by top level authorities." To others the possibility of internment even harsher than that endured under the Japanese looked intolerable. One missionary stated frankly that he could no longer feel impartial and objective, that he found rising within himself a bitter resentment instead of the Christian love he came to preach and practice. For all these types of people it was time to evacuate.

Although a large number, probably a majority of those still at their posts, had already decided to request their exit permits, the December freezing of funds made the choice practically unanimous. No one knew then if and when both governments concerned would consent to continue transmission of funds for missionary expenses; without such agreement the situation was "untenable." The abrupt necessity for self-support seemed critical enough to the Church without the financial burden of foreign missionaries. Added to this was "the assurance through one of our Chinese friends that the officials were fully determined that Americans should eventually leave." (Q-68)

Amid all these psychological and financial pressures, the tactful but definite concurrence of Chinese friends, mission board advice which had become tantamount to orders, the outright cancellation of certain missionary tasks (even including medical), loomed the almost inescapable realization that at last the Westerner was a liability, not an asset, an acute political and social embarrassment if not a direct physical danger, to his Chinese Christian friends and colleagues. Even those who applauded the new regime agreed that the time had come for the Church to stand on its own feet unencumbered by any taint of imperialism.

It should be added that several reports specifically stated: no officials had ever advised foreign withdrawal. Some of them hinted broadly; others put obvious pressures on Chinese Christians to eliminate the missionaries; still others frankly coveted property which the Westerners continued to occupy. But direct government policy appeared to be surprise or even protest that these villified imperialists should find any necessity for leaving China. Nevertheless, beyond the unruffled loyalty and cordiality of Christian friends and fellow-workers and other non-political Chinese, there lay a growing sense of basic change. For years the official Communist line had proclaimed hatred for American and other imperialistic governments, but not for the people; when individuals, missionary or otherwise, were attacked as spies and saboteurs and agents of cultural aggression, their opportunity for Christian witness was over.

Exit Procedures

Although fundamental procedures for exit remained fairly uniform throughout the country, transportation facilities determined local modifications even more than did bureaucracy. During the first year steamship travel from Shanghai could be secured occasionally, but that method confronted some people with the dilemma: no exit visa without steamer passage booked, no steamer bookings without exit visa guaranteed. For two designated evacuation ships, local authorities expedited most permits efficiently.

Later on, however, when Tientsin and Canton became the two approved points of departure, East

China residents set out by train. This did not mean they had a choice. For months there existed an anomalous situation in which Nanking residents were required to travel through Shanghai to Canton, whereas Shanghai residents were required to travel through Nanking to Tientsin. From several smaller towns foreigners received passes, after some weeks, only to Shanghai, where they went through a similar process to secure exit permits from China. In two or three of these cases reported, this included obtaining a personal and/or financial guarantor in Shanghai (to cover any offenses or debts accruing there) in addition to the guarantors in their original station.

In general, however, East China missionaries departed much more speedily than those from other sections, both permits and transportation being easier. The usual procedure required newspaper publication of intention to leave. Even at the end of 1950 one person was authorized to "advertise" her departure just five days after filing application. Twelve others from this area received their exit permits within two weeks of request, sixteen took three weeks to a month, twelve more required up to two months, six needed three or four months, and three were detained from five to nine months. Although most of the long delays extended naturally into 1951, as late as May of that year a permit was granted within a few weeks, and in June another was issued without the usual newspaper "advertisement."

There is thus no discernible pattern in regard to exit procedures. Some of the formalities mentioned in certain reports may simply have been omitted or considered unimportant by others. For example, a comparatively few people mentioned a required guarantor, but those who did included very early evacuees as well as later ones. Sometimes this was purely a financial matter, and a reputable--and courageous--businessman had to vouch for the missionary's debts, if any. In other cases, the guarantor had to assume responsibility for past and future behavior, pledging that the foreigner had not embezzled funds, had not sabotaged records, and had committed no crimes of any kind whatsoever.

One missionary who left in December, 1950, had no newspaper notices printed and no customs examination. Others reported up to six baggage inspections, and as many as thirteen "chops" (official stamps or seals) on the travel permit. Some had to present seven copies of their complete baggage lists and get special permits to export certain articles. Passes were required to take out foreign currency, but those from interior towns awaiting their exit visas in Shanghai could not get bank permits there and had to sell their American money. One missionary was forbidden to take his radio and camera but allowed to sell them; another could take personal possessions including a radio but could not give it away. Especially after the December, 1950, freezing of American assets, inventories were often required of all church property and all personal property left behind (which might be neither sold nor given away without police approval), as well as personal belongings to be taken out.

Innumerable individual obstructions and irrational bits of red-tape were imposed on various missionaries. One man expecting to leave at the end of 1950 was delayed four months by investigation of his permission to give away the contested trucks, but no one could secure permission to receive them. When it became rumored that the government wanted them but would not ask for them, they were presented to the government relief agency, which finally accepted them only after delaying a month and scolding the foreigner for attempting to win official favor by such obvious bribery.

One woman who applied for an exit permit in late December, 1950, was not allowed to advertise her departure until March; when she received her pass ten days later, it was dated January 5, 1951. Another missionary waited two months for application forms, in a small town, only to file a second set later because of "mistakes." Rarest of all came a report from one isolated station that the foreigners had been refused permission to apply for exit until outside officials could examine photographs, movie films, etc., "then two months of delays perhaps in order for corrupt police to see if they could get more out of us." (Q-56)[1]

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[1] This same questionnaire referred elsewhere to "greed on the part of local police, who were a former bandit group," the only such reference to corrupt Communist officialdom.

Public Charges

It is sometimes difficult to separate public trials and accusations from the petty attacks so common in schools and other institutions of Communist China. On the whole, East China experienced a minimum of both kinds of incidents. Yet the most notorious episodes in the country occurred in Nanking educational institutions and stirred repercussions elsewhere, not to mention worldwide publicity. They are included briefly here, although second-hand, because they have been so universally exploited.

According to several statements from Nanking, student demonstrations began on Founders' Day at one of the Christian colleges, November 9, 1950. They were aimed initially at the British head of the biology department, but included skits and jabs of denunciation against the Chinese president and all the Western ties of the institution. After several attempts, the British teacher submitted an apology which proved acceptable, and her share of the incident was closed. As Harrison Forman put it, "From the day the Red conquerors first entered Shanghai, they manifested a positive mania for public apologies,"[1] and students soon followed suit.

Three days later the venom was turned on an American, "who had taught sociology until the summer of

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[1] Forman, op. cit., p. 121.

1950 when all agreed no American should be teaching such a 'hot potato' subject." (Q-80) She had "corrected" an English composition about the Korean War by changing "the United States" to "the United Nations."[1] This proved to be not only defiance of the official "party line," but a deep and sinister imperialist plot to distort truth and corrupt the youth of China. Rather than apologize to the student body, this missionary chose to resign from the faculty; her resignation was accepted, and she applied for an exit permit. A few weeks later the case, assumed closed, was "fanned into flames that threatened to engulf us all" and used on a national scale as the chief propaganda story for a Hate America campaign.

Meanwhile very similar incidents had been seized on in a neighboring university and middle school, where one of the victims had so closely identified himself with the "revolution" and the New Democracy as to join the teachers' labor union. Frenzied demonstrations, mass rallies, parades and mock trials took place; petitions for imprisonment, deportation, or even death were signed and shouted in many schools, not simply the original campuses. Cartoons, posters, songs, and poems were especially composed to publicize the events.[2] Miles away across the Yangtze middle school students ordered to dramatize the affair borrowed Western clothes from their missionary teachers "with the greatest of friendliness on both sides." (Q-207)[1]

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[1] Peggy Durdin, "Red China's War Against God," Saturday Evening Post, June 7, 1952, p. 25.

[2] Personal Account given in New York, May, 1951.

None of these offenders was attacked physical, but the mental and emotional torture spread to other missionaries, not only in the same city, but throughout the area, where similar denunciations were held. Public newspaper apologies were finally accepted, but most of the Western faculty, including former teachers long since in America or dead, were attacked in some way before the "digging-up-the-roots" movement came to an end. Some associates felt that the whole series of demonstrations had been set off from the "top level" to feed Korean propaganda drives. "My impression," said one, "is that each institution had to stage at least one big attack and that the individual chosen as the victim was relatively unimportant." (Q-66)

In a very different situation back in March, 1950, ten policemen searching at night for a wireless sending set came across some rusty swords, a few bullets and a picture of Chiang Kai-shek in a missionary residence. The foreign occupants did not even know of this incriminating cache, apparently inherited from Japanese and Kuomintang tenancy. Eight months later, as part of the nation-wide propaganda campaign, this incident was resurrected, the missionaries held responsible, and an apology demanded. ~~In~~

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[1] In like manner they borrowed Western furniture to show in propaganda dramas how the vicious capitalists live.

In the final publication, however, the local government appended a statement which acknowledged the rooms to be church property and made the specific but subtle distinction "that although they considered us responsible they did not blame us." (Q-207)

Innumerable minor incidents arose, some of them obviously under official pressure, all of them designed to embarrass Westerners in the eyes of the Chinese people. One missionary paid eighteen American dollars to publish three newspaper apologies for going outside the city wall without permission. Another was denounced by her students for not teaching Music history from the Marxist viewpoint, a third for trying to keep girls from joining the Communist Youth Corps. When church leaders were required to accuse their foreign colleagues, the charges were often purposely unimportant and inane; e.g. saying, "Till we meet again" (the everyday Chinese phrase for parting), implied an expectation of American conquest over China. (Q-56)

One elderly couple in a small town were promised exit visas if they would (a) submit a list of belongings they wished to take with them, and (b) turn over their revolver. The authorities rejected their denial of owning any such weapon, ignored their plea for evidence, dismissed them without countermanding the order, and for two months even refused entry to the police station. (Q-7) In another province police tried to implicate the missionary in pro-Japanese spy activity during World War II, until the Chinese university president proved he had not even been in that city at the time stipulated. (Q-147) Several attempts, besides the aforementioned "trucking deal," were directed at those who had handled relief supplies, as spies or the criminal arm of imperialism. When one such Westerner submitted records in perfect order, he was reprimanded for having distributed some of the antiseptic foot powder to the hospital staff.

The only first-hand report of imprisonment in East China--and the only such intimation before mid-1951---occurred just four months after "Liberation" and lasted five weeks. The victim's passport was seized, but no charges or explanations were ever made. When the same missionary suffered house arrest for three months early in 1951, "friends wept, officials looked shamefaced."

> Christians were required to show a severance of relations; this they did at a meeting attended by official representatives who themselves were not antagonistic in any extreme measure....The real settlement was probably not this meeting, but when we turned every article of our personal property, mission funds, etc., over to a committee which allowed the police to take it over, a big grab.... Probably it was due to over-zealous officials trying to curry favor. (Q-56)

Miscellaneous Comments

The continual paradox of Communist attitudes showed itself in various situations. One nurse had been entreated to stay, and "city authorities urged our superintendent to assure me of their willingness to assume responsibility for my welfare and happiness if I would remain." (Q-69) Even at the end of 1950 many Chinese Church leaders failed to comprehend that the issues compelling missionary repatriation had become far larger than individual safety. On one hand, anti-American propaganda was avowedly objective and impersonal, involving no intended offense. On the other hand, one foreigner's understanding of the Chinese language was questioned because she failed to react outwardly to an anti-American tirade in a commencement address. "The Communists were at a loss to explain the stay of a missionary who had spent nearly thirty years there; an idealistic motive was untenable for them." (Q-69)

One prominent Westerner who had mediated points of controversy with government authorities and even served as advisor on a Communist reconstruction project, reported this conversation:

> One of my assistants commented to the Communists on one occasion that not all of the foreigners were bad and pointed to my effort for the rehabilitation scheme and to what Church World Service had been doing in regard to the child welfare program. The comment of the Communist was, "I am expendable, you are expendable, and the foreigner is expendable. The Party is the important thing." (Q-210)

A young missionary who served less than six months under the Poeple's Government had a number of experiences which convinced him (a) of the rigid discipline, with orders coming from above, and (b) of the flexibility of specific programs, when the "pressure will be off and on, depending on what they want at the moment." (Q-104) With a very different background of the earliest East China "Liberation" and several weeks in prison, another wrote: "After carefully study of their policies, I judge them to be quite faithful to the Lenin-Marxist-Stalinist Communism ....100% police state, with frequent efforts to purge deviationists." (Q-56) A third, vainly seeking permission to return to his own station, never had opportunity to see the "decision-maker," but was finally told it was not a foreigner's place to ask, but to do as he was told. (Q-148)

According to another seasoned observer, the Reds found it difficult to generate anti-foreign feeling in areas where a century of missionary service had borne fruit, while no benevolent funds had ever come from Russia. By early 1951, "it seemed to be pretty evident that officials were looking for Americans to make an example of as the anti-American tension and propagahda increased." (Q-62) A similar verdict came from an inland town, where officials did their best to discredit Americans and their work because, for propaganda purposes, "all U.S. nationals were spies, cultural aggressors, and enemies of the people." (Q-144)

In all but the actual handling of taxation, the homogeneous area of East China showed a remarkable uniformity of experience in both metropolitan and rural areas. Proportionately there were fewer cases of public trial and imprisonment than in other sections, but several missionaries were detained without exit permits through most of 1952, the last Shanghai couple until January, 1953. Despite vitriolic propaganda and the frenzied patriotism of students and the studied coolness of police officials, the attitude of the Chinese populace remained cordial and sympathetic. In the last analysis, however, opinions among fifty-~~five~~seven missionaries were bound to differ. Said one: "I still believe Mao and Chou En-lai were sincere....when they said missions could continue and be justly treated." (Q-62) Said another:

> I think the comparatively easy time we had (in the first year, May 1949 to June 1950) was because of the quick Communist victory and their unpreparedness to deal with all problems. "Religious freedom" was purely a policy, and a most restricted freedom. (Q-13)

CHAPTER 11

Central China

The Central China area, with thirty-~~three~~four missionaries reporting, offers no exceptional characteristics or problems. Twelve of the questionnaires deal with the "triborough" river junction of Wuhan (Wuchang, Hanyang, and Hankow), but the others cover nine stations in four provinces, (Honan, Hupei, Kiangsi, Hunan). Honan is included somewhat arbitrarily, since its main centers lie between the southern ends of Shantung and Shensi (but south of the main Yellow River line). Most of that province was "liberated" in October, 1948 (or had been in guerilla hands for years), whereas Mao Tse-tung's home province of Hunan "turned over" in the late summer of 1949, the Wuhan cities in May.

First Effects

Since no time limit had been designated for "first effects," several missionaries reported none whatever. Most, however, referred from the outset to restricted movement. In at least two stations vehicle permits were refused for the mission jeeps and even ambulance, and gasoline was unobtainable. Travel passes were difficult to secure even for medical purposes, and later impossible. Here individual differences appeared: one family journeyed to Shanghai and back for dental treatment, while a colleague could not even go to another medical center in the same province, since her own station had a hospital.

More than half a dozen referred specifically to frequent visits by soldiers and police, sometimes out of curiosity, sometimes for thorough searches or interrogations. Those who spent the night away from home could not merely report; they had to secure permission. Several missionaries spoke of restricted communication with the outside world, a complaint no other area shared. Order, discipline, cleanliness, and lower costs were positive achievements cited as relevant to daily life.

Some foreigners were early requested by Chinese friends to cease home visits or invitations, other dated this step in social pressure from April, 1950, and still others continued such contacts until August of that year. Five or six replies mentioned greater caution in remarks made, either casually in public or more confidentially but embarrassingly among friends. During the first year one missionary group attended the weekly "political" assemblies at school, though not required to submit the written reports expected from every Chinese teacher; after a few weeks, however, the Westerners were asked to discontinue the small cell meetings which are an integral part of the Communist indoctrination program.

First Effects on Work

From the beginning of the new regime, many churches experienced a reduction in attendance. Some rural chapels were closed, others were occupied by troops; in a number of instances buildings were "borrowed" for weekday meetings and vacated for services on Sunday. One missionary reported that "everywhere some property had to be relinquished;" if these demands could be met with unused buildings, the mission was fortunate, but otherwise some Party agency was likely to seize the desired quarters.

Evangelistic work outside of the church met prompt suppression in most places. Parish visiting was frowned upon and reduced. A tract which mentioned the atomic bomb was severely criticized, and public distribution thereafter was confined to Scripture portions. Missionaries engaging in discussion of religion on the street were, in one town at least, escorted to the police station and ordered to desist; another was told to remain in his house. (Q-S13) After eight months of "Liberation" evangelistic work in one hospital was stopped; seven months later worship services for the staff had also to be discontinued. Yet an occasional missionary reported carrying on his teaching, preaching and visiting until the end of 1950.

Schools immediately came under greater student control, and some classes refused to take final examinations during the spring of transition, ultimately receiving their diplomas nevertheless. At least half a dozen reports mentioned the disruptive way in which propaganda rallies and political meetings replaced class sessions--as well as religious exercises. One missionary stopped high school teaching as soon as the institution was registered with the new government; a second found English banned from junior high school and reduced in the senior department; a third discontinued middle school classes but went on teaching in a government university and medical college. One school of nursing promptly ousted its principal. Another institution forbade religious music in any classroom, or the mention of "anything religious or American." (Q-9)

Hospitals, busy immediately after the "turn-over" with hundreds of wounded soldiers, discovered that the military government encouraged management by the labor unions (putting a coolie in charge in one instance). When the civil administration arrived in that city, four "comrades" moved at once into the hospital and took complete control, introducing direct anti-Christian indoctrination among the staff. One missionary declared that the superfluity of questionnaires and reports "reminded one of the New Deal."[1]

With all of these irritations and provocations and limitations, at least one person reported that the first effect on Christian work was "increased zeal." (Q-21)

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[1] Cf. Vander Sprenkel, New China: Three Views, p. 24, re "partiality for forms...in triplicate and for photographs... in sextuplicate."

Changes in Personal Life

At least half a dozen persons asserted that they did not believe there were ever any changes in the Communist attitude toward foreigners. They went on to explain, however, that they meant officials had been consistently "formal, correct, anti-foreign" (Q-182); "cool, aloof, enigmatic, unsmilingly polite" (Q-35); "personally neither polite nor impolite, obviously instructed to leave foreigners strictly alone" (Q-2). On the other hand, a young and fair-minded first-termer noted a shift from "tolerance and courtesy to hostility, arrogance, suspicion, and downright spitefulness." (Q-113)

Over the months of "Liberation" the majority detected a gradual deterioration of attitude, a growing suspicion of everything Western. The Communists had arrived with sincere promises of protection and personal assurances that they were opposed to imperialistic governments, not individual citizens, yet as time went on the most serious charge against Chinese was their association with foreigners.[1] "Not all Americans are bad....just Truman and Wall Street," and several missionaries were consoled with the promise of America's imminent "Liberation." Soldiers walked in "to see how we lived;"

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[1] Cf. Hazelton, God of the Valleys, pp. 31-33.

officials came on periodic inspections; Chinese associates from servants to university presidents were questioned about the foreigners. All movements and gatherings were closely watched, and in one station the missionaries could not even hold a meeting for business without submitting an agenda in advance; prayer meetings were exempt from that particular regulation.

More concretely, one missionary in Wuhan dated unrest and anti-American, anti-religious propaganda as especially in the spring of 1950. (Q-71) Work was interrupted and Americans accused of "buying" the Chinese people with mission funds. Another individual was asked exactly how the United States Government sends salaries to missionaries. (Q-182) There seemed to be a growing disregard for foreign property, a stricter enforcement of the ban on overnight visits. Radios in one metropolitan area were registered but never confiscated or forbidden.[1] One person found that letters mailed during the first six months of 1950 had never even left town. Gradually in more and more places, especially in 1951, foreigners felt it dangerous to go on the street, and some reported actual cuts and bruises from sticks and stones hurled by children. (Q--195, Q-S13)

Changes in Mission Work

As pressures tightened on the foreign personnel, so did they on the daily routine of Christian churches. Sometimes there was door-to-door visitation by officials getting the names of Christians; elsewhere "comrades" stood at chapel doors and recorded the names of those who attended services. Government representatives were more frequently noted at church meetings of all kinds. Pastors had to report all meetings and often the contents of their sermons in advance. In at least one town church bells were forbidden to ring, on the ground that under a government guarantee of religous freedom, nobody should be summoned to worship. (Q-102) One complete answer to this section of the questionnaire read as follows: "Missions repudiated and the Church wooed for Government purposes." (Q-21)

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[1] Mimeographed Letter, No. Q 182, January 30, 1951.

With the government or agents thereof controlling all schools, chapel services were mostly abandoned, and Communist students and teachers were "planted" to spy on their fellows. Individual faculty members and institutional budgets were expected to purchase war bonds at a patriotically sacrificial rate. More and more buildings were taken over for government purposes, especially after the "freezing" of foreign assets late in December, 1950. Even the seminaries, heretofore ignored as outside the scope of educational programs, were caught up in the tumult of propaganda and encouraged to introduce political lectures and courses. One letter written only six months after "Liberation" summed up the situation as follows:

> Under the present regime mission schools lose a good deal of their purpose....(They) are carrying on

> (but) doing next to no, and some no, mission work, i. e. Bible classes, etc....None have foreign principals....Foreign teachers are acceptable as long as they come to teach a specialised subject and have the qualifications....Great difficulties will be found in financing schools....1

The same letter (November, 1949) went on to say:

> Hospitals....have a very privileged place, for it has been announced that medical knowledge will have to come largely from U. S. and England rather than the U.S.S.R....Mission hospitals will have to fit in very closely with (the very ambitious plans for medical work in China). Some of them have been taxed very heavily; we haven't. There has been a lot of trouble with law suits....They say they will welcome foreigners on the staff but not as superintendents or in any administrative position....In the future we may lose control of our hospitals and our mission staff be appreciated for their technical knowledge purely.2

Despite this cautious estimate, other doctors and mission adminstrators encountered accelerating problems. All foreigners were, as indicated, eased off of committees and boards, out of positions as matrons or treasurers. In several cases the financial burden forced a request for the government to take over hospitals; in others staff agitation was deliberately encouraged by the labor unions. A leper hospital was commandeered for a military hospital, and the lepers moved to a temple. Nurses in one institution were told that a missionary might continue English classes, "but don't listen to her if she starts to talk politics."(Q-18) One doctor wrote: "Our religious exercises are not disturbed in the hospital, according to the assurance of the

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 113, November 27, 1949.
[2] *Ibid*.

government. Morning chapel and youth fellowship are well attended."[1] Another, however, noted a "steady and persistent effort to discount and make difficult to operate." (Q-110) When the staff of a Hankow hospital protested that seven hours of political indoctrination per day meant neglecting patients, they were told: "The sick are secondary. Nothing counts as much as changing your thoughts."[2]

Other phases of mission work met opposition too. No relief or humanitarian efforts of any kind could be carried on by churches for very long. The government preferred to set up its own cooperatives and eliminate similar private groups. By the spring of 1950, less than a year after "Liberation," the head of the Education Bureau notified a Chinese principal that it "would not be convenient" for Americans to continue teaching. To the plea that basic English courses, under government direction, were still necessary, came the reply: "Every teacher today must teach against feudalism, imperialism, and capitalism, and how can Americans do that?" (Q-119) The same attitude applied to all foreign mission work.

Definite Stages

Several missionaries, usually those who departed earlier, felt that no definite stages could be detected in the treatment of foreigners. The majority, however, suggested a large variety of turning points. Although the Korean War and subsequent developments naturally played an important role, more reports from Central China than from either North or East pointed to other criteria.

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[1] Mimeographed Letter, No. M-4, November 8, 1950.

[2] Durdin, "Red China's War Against God," Saturday Evening Post, June 7, 1952, p. 59.

Two or three persons made reference to differences between the military and civil governments of the Communist regime: the first marked by efficiency and order and innumerable rallies and parades, which, "on surface spontaneous, lacked 'heart'" (Q-177); the second by an obvious tightening on Chinese and Westerners alike. Others designated the first six months of "Liberation" to the spring of 1950 as a preparatory "honeymoon" period. One remarked that land reform during this initial stage brought severe restrictions to the churches, especially in rural areas. Another was forced to discontinue teaching as early as January, 1950. A third noted "increased interference and hostile attitude" by March of that year. Still another added that that spring "there were numerous questionnaires, which phenomenon I understood to be nationwide." (Q-47)

These developments appeared, on the whole, to be gradual, but they served as "straws in the wind" before Korea. One report traced these general trends through a hospital. (Q-183) From May to May, 1949 to 1950, there seemed to be little interference, and a new hospital building was erected. In April, however, the Ministry of Health requested cooperation which the mission did not feel ready to give. In May came a virtual ultimatum, following an "example" in which a doctor had been sued in People's Court on "trumped-up charges." By June the desired "cooperation" had been forced, and the entire property and equipment turned over to the government. July and August this same report characterized as "chaos;" August to December marked by indoctrination classes and the departure of foreigners. And in 1952 (or 1951?) the hospital was "officially closed to members of the general public--open only to PARTY members and government supporters and servants." This particularly case history simply served to confirm the comment from another province, that Communist policy was a "progressive move to secure possession of property for political uses, not be force but by pressure." (Q-110)

Central China produced surprisingly few references to the outbreak of conflict in Korea, not many more to the entry of Chinese forces four months later. One teacher reported continuing classes throughout that autumn; a medical worker who left that summer observed no diminishing of the number of patients after Korea; a third "reporter" specified no noteworthy change until December, 1950, when anti-American propaganda took a decidedly vicious turn. This became still more violent after the financial freeze that month, followed in January, 1951, by complete inventories in almost every institution, down to the last pill or hypodermic needle, since all now belonged to the People.

The one event not mentioned hitherto, but cited more in Central China than elsewhere, was Warren Austin's speech before the United Nations. In November, just as Chinese participation brought Korean fighting to a bitter peak, the American delegate referred to the Christian Colleges in China as a powerful instrument of Western democracy.[1] From the Communist standpoint, without significant distortion of the words themselves, this proved heady grist for the propaganda mill. On every campus and across much of the country at large this "admission" of cultural aggression by America and the Christian Church became a burning issue. One report declared, "The official attitude seemed to change and the mission program came under direct attack." (Q-71)

Of just such incidents and statements, however innocent and well-intentioned, the Communist propaganda campaign consisted. As one missionary leader put it:

> Where an opportunity fell into their hands without their planning, it was taken advantage of, but the pattern in widely scattered cities was so often the same that there can be no doubt of the planning of 'incidents' by a central planning agency. (Q-82)

One example cited was the widespread outcropping of charges against Roman Catholic orphanages when the hierarchy in China refused to sever its ties with Rome. The Austin speech, advance and retreat in Korea, the embargo on funds from America--all these proved to be convenient excuses or backdrops for public hue and cry. But behind and between such events lay the May (1950) Conference, which produced the Three-Self Movement, and the April (1951) Conference, which called for nation-wide Accusation Meetings. Here and there alert observers

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[1] For report of a comparable incident in Communist propaganda drama, cf. Hunter, Brain-Washing in Red China, p. 123.

"were able to get an inadvertent admission from the police officer that he was acting on specific orders from 'above'." (Q-206)

Differences of Treatment

Without tabulating subjective viewpoints, it is nonetheless possible to acquire a "sense of the meeting," a consensus of ideas, a "climate of opinion," which may differ from area to area. More people in Central China, for example, specifically suggested that differences in treatment might be due primarily to personality conflicts, although this obvious fact has been mentioned elsewhere.

This is no value judgment reflecting on those individuals who ran into difficulties with Chinese Communists. In the first place, there are noteworthy exceptions to any vague generalization; the victims of the most widely publicized incidents in Central China were, according to their colleagues, among the best loved teachers and doctors on the field. In the second place, characteristics which might antagonize Communist officials are not necessarily shameful traits in the "Free World."[1] The observation is included here simply because of the number of casual comments made on Central China questionnaires. An exit permit was delayed for six months; no reason, but probably personal, an associate commented. There were definitely differences, said another report, as the government sought to "isolate and destroy," but some had made enemies. (Q-82)

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[1] Cf. Bryan, "I Came Back from a Red Death Cell," Saturday Evening Post, January 31, 1953.

This individual discrimination took many forms. A woman was refused permission to travel a few hours for medical treatment, though others in her station had been given passes for less urgent reasons. A woman who died subsequently from starvation and multiple diseases had been allowed to teach months longer than her colleague. In one city authorities were openly hostile to a doctor but friendly to a nurse. In another, a nurse was mistreated and insulted and her clothes strewn on a muddy station platform, delaying her departure by an entire day. (Q-53, -60, -70) Once the older leaders of a mission were required to speak to officials through interpreters, while younger companions had to stumble through with poorer language. In certain cases, administrative missionaries had a more difficult time than others, and some believed that medical workers fared better.

All of these facets of what one called "operation irritation" (Q-60) applied for the most part to individuals rather than groups. (Q-113) It may be overestimating Communist bureaucracy and foreign importance, but at least one missionary came to this conclusion:

> I personally believe that the Police had decided beforehand what attitude to take toward every individual, especially as regards what delay, or punishment, he should have before he would be permitted to leave. (Q-53)

Not a single Central China report mentioned any denominational distinction other than the apparently greater persecution of Roman Catholic missioners. More of them were imprisoned, more of their houses searched, more of their property confiscated earlier. One priest was confined to his room for months, another completely disappeared. Yet here again personality conflicts had their influence, and a Catholic in the Wuhan area told a Protestant friend that he felt no difference of treatment in that locality whatsoever. Where there seemed to be anti-Catholic discrimination, "reporters" suggested property-holdings and the Vatican's anti-Communist stand as sufficient explanation, or, as one put it, the obvious fact that Roman Catholics "never would be friends."

Between nationalities Central China observers noted few significant variations. Several reported with some surprise that the British had not been treated any better than Americans, despite the difference in home government policies. The only two entries into China after "Liberation" reported from (and presumably coming into) this area were Britishers, but here the"favoritism" apparently ended. To be sure, the only reported imprisonments were of Americans. But reports commented that Indians left fast after the change in government, that Germans quite readily received travel permits for dental treatment, and that Swedes, whose government had recognized Peking, were greatly restricted from 1948 to 1951 (Q-110) and had a more difficult time than either Americans or British. (Q-82) In an incident almost as unpleasant and full of potential tragedy as those involving Americans, a Norwegian woman was rudely searched, and her protest so displeased police that they demanded the return of her exit permit, which she was allowed to keep and use only after humble apologies.

One young missionary remarked that officials were "easiest at first on those who seemed to sympathize, but later cracked down on them the hardest." (Q-2) Without knowing the personnel more intimately, it is impossible to assess this judgment, but it is clearly valid in a number of individual cases in other parts of the country. Although Central China, with a somewhat smaller total of missionaries, reported fewer major incidents than other sections, the consensus of opinion for the area can be summed up in this comment: "I believe the Communists have originally had the plan of driving all missionaries out, and as in everything else decided to achieve their objective by slow stages." (Q-71)

Reasons for Staying

When one mission board reported that its foreign personnel had withdrawn from a portion of Central China in December, 1947, the date sounded erroneous (as many a questionnaire date had proved to be). On re-questioning, however, the general secretary sent this further reply:

> (The Chinese leader of our Church) had met with all the members of our staff and told them that it was only a matter of time till the visitors from the North would occupy the Province. He pointed out that it would be in the interests of the Church to place as wide a gap as possible between the departure of the missionaries and the date of the arrival of the visitors. He, therefore, advised that all of them should leave before the end of the year 1947.
>
> ....When the members of another mission.... heard of this, they protested vigorously. They thought that for our missionaries to leave would be very unwise. However within two months of their departure these....missionaries also left....not on the advice but on the request of their Chinese colleagues.
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> Although our Board has been criticized by some

> of its members here at home for our missionaries thus "running away," subsequent events have abundantly justified this action.....Since December, 1947, the Church has had no foreign leadership whatsoever. From reports received (very meager it is true) the Chinese staff have done very well.[1]

This communication has been quoted almost in full because it raises a question relevant to this entire study. Although no answer has been attempted in the questionnaire or in the total survey, it is a moot point whether missionaries should have withdrawn en masse before the Communists came into an area. In the overwhelming majority of cases, denominations (perhaps less authoritarian than that cited) left the decision to individual missionaries. In a majority of cases, too, the Chinese colleagues consulted urged the retention of a token force of Westerners. The above statement, including provision for a suitable interval to avoid the appearance of frantic flight, offers genuine food for thought. Here and there it is seconded by a lone voice sincerely regretting the decision to remain--for the Church's, not the individual's sake.

Nevertheless two-thirds of the Central China missionaries reporting affirmed that they would make the same choice again; others doubtless implied it. One couple called it "the only one we could have taken." One Britisher brought his wife and children back into the area in the spring of 1950 after a long wait. Yet on the whole this group of questionnaires revealed a substantial number of sincere doubts and hesitations. Two elderly couples in their sixties, from two different provinces, asserted frankly: "I am sure we would have decided differently could we have gone back two years;" (Q-185) and "of course knowing what we now do, we would not have remained." (Q-180) Two other widely separated men in their early thirties replied as follows: "I am really glad that we stayed, but I don't want to do it again;" (Q-71) and "in other lands (I am) not so sure." (Q-113) Finally, two middle-aged men half-way between in the age brackets, expressed their reservations. One felt it wise that his wife and son left before "Liberation;" (Q-53) the other, faced with this question, answered; "not if we had the assurance that we do have now that Chinese Communism and Russian Communism are the same." (Q-206)

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 5, October 31, 1951.

Why did they stay, these and the others who have no regrets? At least half specifically stated that they hoped to continue medical or educational or administrative work, that evangelism was a mission to all peoples, that relief projects still had a *raison d'etre*, all these regardless of the form of government. It was God's will for some (or all); "I hoped to be able to combine enthusiasm of new Communism with Spirit of Jesus Christ," said another. (Q-183) Several were convinced that the majority of Chinese Christians wished them to stay. Four admitted a determinative curiosity. Still others had been encouraged by Communist assurances of religious freedom and by reports from the first few months of "Liberation" in North China; "We were not convinced before seeing it that it was really Russian Communism." (Q-206)

Reasons for Leaving

Among Central China questionnaires, the reasons for withdrawing are more easily classified under a few general headings than in other areas. The largest single group reported that Chinese friends had suggested their departure. In view of traditional Oriental courtesy, and the reluctance of most Chinese Christians to lose their missionary colleagues and supporters, the fact that such advice came in some instances in May or August or October of 1950 carries considerable significance.

In March of that year, at least one student had been condemned for "fraternization" with foreigners and threatened with the loss of his diploma. Church officials told one missionary that spring that "when the Communists find anyone in their way, it is just too bad for that one, as they roll right over him....It is a pity to make a useless sacrifice." (Q-9) At about the same time in other sectors Chinese Christians told some American colleagues they might as well plan to leave, although there was no urging before the May Conference and the Korean War.

From the summer on, it became increasingly evident to most missionaries that they would soon be an embarrassment if not an outright danger to their Chinese associates. A doctor was dismissed from his hospital in December and advised by the staff the following month to repatriate, although police officials still stressed that they were not asking him to leave. (Q-110) Under pressures from the Three-Self Movement and the Manifesto, one municipal Christian Council initiated a Hate-America Week as early as July, 1950, and in another province the Church of Christ in Christ requested foreign withdrawal in January, 1951. "One of the more optimistic church leaders said (on December 31, 1950) that he had given up hope of convincing the officials that we were in China for any purpose but to spy for the government." (Q-119)

At least half a dozen reports cited two other reasons for leaving. Most of those who evacuated within the first year of "Liberation" did so because their term of service had expired and furloughs were due, although several others left because of health or family reasons. A number of missionaries had simply come to the place where they felt there was no constructive work for Americans to perform in an anti-Christian environment. By July, 1950, one local committee had agreed that "fruitful work was increasingly impossible" and that attempts to carry on much longer would probably handicap the Chinese.

The factor of home board advice apparently loomed larger in Central China than elsewhere. No other area reported definite instructions to withdraw before December of 1950, and many denominations right up to the end left the decision to individual judgment. The previous section of this chapter mentioned withdrawal from one Central China province back in 1947, before the Communists began their victorious drive. On July 12, 1950, women and children of one mission were advised to repatriate. A Chinese Church leader, independent of American headquarters, advised his missionary constituents on November 15, 1950, to withdraw, although the university president simultaneously urged them to remain. Following a home board resolution of December 8, 1950, one group of foreign workers was "ordered out" on Christman Day. Only the single Roman Catholic "reporter" in this area was actually told by government authorities to leave China, and he had requested permission to transfer to another station. Protestants who waited weeks or months for exit permits were, of course, given orders as to when they could and should depart, but the applications to leave had been "voluntary."

Exit Procedures

On the average Central China missionaries took considerably longer to secure exit permits than those from North and East China. Two of those replying to questionnaires were granted visas in a fortnight; one of them received a pass to Canton, where it was immediately stamped for crossing the Hongkong border the next day, and the other so little expected prompt action that he had to request a delay of a few more weeks. Another half dozen departed within about a month of application.

Most waiting periods ran much longer: six or seven weeks (5); two months (6, including April-June, 1951); three months (3, at least one as early as May-August, 1950; four months (3); six months (3, one of them starting back in November, 1949); eight months (2, one after forty-one days in prison, the other only when a government agency coveted the mission compound); nine months (1, while institutions and individuals brought forward financial claims against the mission treasurer); and up to one year and seven months.

Not only the length of time involved, but the procedures for leaving Central China appeared to be more complex than elsewhere. While three days' advertisement of intention seemed to be customary in most places, at least eight individuals reported having to insert four, five, or even seven notices of departure, in one case costing US$32. Where authorities in many towns required no guarantors whatever, some half a dozen Central China missionaries (nearly 20%) had to produce two. Sometimes pastors or hospital associates proved acceptable; other times the proposed (and willing) guarantor was rejected as unsuitable, and another person had to be found who would testify to--and be responsible for--the character and the unpaid bills of the departing foreigner.

As one missionary put it, "each area seems to be in full control of its own business." (Q-18) As late as September, 1951, when the foreign exodus had largely subsided, one woman secured her exit permit without any guarantor, although after a nine-months wait. She believed it was because she "was accepted as a (Chinese) citizen," (Q-86) since she had a legally adopted Chinese boy and had been granted a registration book to record her own overnight visitors (as no other foreigner had). Whether the explanation lay in disorganized bureaucracy or deliberate obstructionism, Central China exit machinery on the whole moved cumbersomely. In fact, two women found it far more difficult to transfer a few hundred miles down the Yangtze River than to secure exit permits from East China a few months later.

Some missionaries had to submit all photographs and papers for inspection three days in advance of departure, and nothing that would show the "New China in a bad light (was) allowed to leave." (Q-183) Another had to rewrite her biography until it reached thirty-six pages of fine Chinese characters. Almost all had to draw up detailed baggage lists and often inventories of personal belongings left behind. In the spring of 1950 a woman missionary encountered three successive refusals by the police even to accept her application, then some forty hours of interrogation. In the end, without any public accusations or charges against her, she suffered rude and destructive baggage examinations and had to have a police escort to the border. (Q-60)

Sometimes baggage inspections and body searches were casual and routine; sometimes they were downright "malicious." (Q-71) Although most, if not all, evacuees had to report and exchange any gold or foreign currency, one person had his actually confiscated with no Chinese currency given in return. (Q-113) Another had his home ransacked twice and was ordered to buy back his radio, already sold, and give it to the police. This same young man (Q-71) had approximately thirty interviews in five weeks with the Bureau of Public Safety, which handled foreign affairs.

At the time of departure, one doctor had his cameras and Chinese curios taken: the first because they had not been registered, the second because they were supposedly "treasures being stolen from China." Eventually he was told that he could appeal the case and "undergo trial" about the items confiscated, or he might leave in three days. "We chose to go." (Q-206) Another missionary was summoned eighteen days after application and told his exit permit had been denied.

> In reply to my query as to why? I was told it was none of my business. They never did tell me why. I learned through other channels that the Police had nothing against me but merely wanted to teach me my place. Since I had been ordering Chinese around, they would now tell me what I could, or could not do. I was to learn patience. (Q-53)

Public Charges

Accusations and criticisms of missionaries in Central China covered a wide range of subject matter, with hospitals perhaps taking precedence over schools as the principal arenas. For example, one doctor was sued six times (according to second-hand reports), apparently in an effort to secure hospital equipment by expropriation. In one case, a family was incited to accuse the missionary physician of murder, but the matter was settled in court with an apology. Of the earliest suit, he himself wrote: "It was thoroughly investigated by the authorities and then they said the people had no case and refused it in court...In a meeting of all the doctors...no fault was found and the matter was then quietened".[1]

In another province back in October, 1949, an American doctor was tried before the "medical association" and party members in an open-air theater, on the charge of refusing to go to visit an out-patient. "For very good reasons" he had sent an assistant, for which act he was "soundly berated," but no public verdict or prosecution was ever demanded. In fact, the missionary continued to practice until the end of 1950, dismissing the whole incident because "it was obvious to me that it was really an anti-American demonstration, and initial step for occupation of property." (Q-110)

The cause celebre among Central China schools followed close on the similar East China demonstrations and the statement of Warren Austin applauding the China Christian Colleges' role in the "cold war." Because so many students were leaving school late in 1950 to "volunteer" for the Korean battle, "one of the most loved teachers on the campus" (Q-82) set a short examination before the end of the term, and when that was protested, she dismissed the class. Her action was denounced as an insult to the students, and the incident flared into a virtual replica of the Nanking affairs. Wall posters, plays, parades, mass meetings (to which other schools were invited) were used to attack this teacher and the college treasurer, who had become involved. So critical were the repercussions among all missionaries that the entire foreign faculty resigned. The Communists on the college council insisted that resignations from the two chief culprits should not be accepted, but demanded. After three months an apology required by government authorities was published, and exit permits were granted a few weeks later. After all this the victim herself reported:

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 113, November 27, 1949.

> I was assisted in making my departure by loyal students who assisted me in repacking boxes after the rather thorough inspection at the railway station. As with all faculty members, an impressive crowd of students gathered to wave farewell and to be of help. (Q-193)

Beyond the personal element, however, this affair--like so many others--coincided with Chinese intervention in Korea, the Austin speech, and the freezing of funds. "The upshot was the elimination of the foreign staff, the renunciation of foreign support, and the nationalization of the university." (Q-82)

It is of course impossible to ascertain how much of this correlation was deliberate, how much accidental or opportunistic. "While we were in China, accounting for Communist acts was our favorite indoor sport, but it was all based on guesswork; nobody ever knew." (Q-71) It was convenient for the authorities when a case "fell into their hands without their planning;" such as, charges of homosexuality on the part of two young American teachers in a boys' school. (Q-71, -82, -198) On the other hand, incidents could be laboriously manufactured, as when a public apology and fine were demanded for "interfering with communications," because a missionary had taken down an old telephone pole long out of use and turned over the equipment to the government. (Q-18)

All the city schools were summoned to a half-day accusation meeting, replete with antiphonal slogans and songs, to hear a missionary denounced as a foreign spy and arch-imperialist. The specific charge: that he had forced a student to lick up spit from the floor. The fact: that on the second offense, having cleaned up once himself, he handed paper to the boy and told him to wipe the floor. Despite numerous evidences of spying introduced, the police were never called to take action in the case, and the American was simply ordered to cease attending church or even entering the school compound. Whether this indirectly accounted for a year and a half's delay in exit permit, nobody can say. (Q-195)

In almost all such instances, however, the public charges and accusations died down with no serious consequences. Newspaper attacks could not be substantiated. Hours of questioning failed to produce proof that a missionary had mishandled funds. A search of a mission residence revealed no hidden landlords. A failure to register house guests could be condoned as ignorance. On the other hand, an individual missionary would be singled out occasionally for high public praise; e.g. over loudspeakers as well as the press one morning came an announcement that "An American woman...because she loved the Lord, had given her precious blood for the Chinese people," referring to a transfusion made during the Japanese War. (Q-86) The explanation may have been psychological inducement for blood donations at a time when "hospitals were full of wounded soldiers and perhaps some of them would be needing transfusions." Whatever the explanation, the incident stands.

Miscellaneous Comments

"If you are out to prove that the People's Government is a mere stooge of Moscow," warned one missionary "reporter," "this won't help." (Q-26) To be sure, that individual experienced just a year of "Liberation" and left before the outbreak of the Korean conflict and its resultant China propaganda. But even subsequent developments could hardly substantiate such a sweeping hypothesis, however striking the parallels between Russia and China may be. Great allowance must be made for the preconceptions and the ideological presuppositions behind each person's interpretations of events. After remaining on the field until 1951, a young British missionary still believed that China will develop her own form of Communism and shake off the Russian yoke (which he apparently recognized in the same city where a colleague denied it twenty months earlier). (Q-183) Many American missionaries would concur in that hope, and in the conviction that the push to the Yalu River and the exclusion of People's China from the United Nations fed Russian propaganda.

At the opposite extreme, an elderly man who had served on the mission field for forty-two years asserted: "During all our years in China....under many regimes I do not hesitate to declare that this present regime is the worst that I have experienced and observed." (Q-180) He went on, as many have done in letters and reports, to deplore the fear now become terror, which grips the Chinese populace under a police state. One of the missionaries who in late 1948 journeyed from "liberated" territory to Shanghai, partly on business and partly to reassure fellow-missionaries of Communist order and toleration, concluded in retrospect that "their promises and good beginning meant nothing." (Q-98)

Nevertheless the evidences of official goodwill --not to mention individual friendliness--are too numerous to quote here in full. One missionary attending indoctrination classes disappointed her companions by being unable to sing all of the world Communist anthem; "we know you have often sung 'The Internationale' in America." (Q-112) At least two persons were assured that the United States would soon be "liberated," one with an expression of sympathy that the capitalist nation had no decent houses and no shoes for its children. (Q-195)

The Central China missionary with the longest Communist tenure (of those reporting) referred to a newspaper statement early in 1952 to this effect:

> ....that any American missionary who wished to stay on in China to work in such capacities as the Chinese Church directed might do so by renouncing his old nationality and applying for citizenship in People's China. (Q-195)

Writing a few months later, he added: "But the chances are that not even in that way would an American be permitted to remain in China at present."

In summary, then, it might be said that Central China reported proportionately more bureaucratic delay and slightly less discipline. There appeared to be more minor incidents of wantonly tearing up gardens without replanting, women soldiers making themselves at home in missionary residences even on the beds, uncontrolled beggar gangs, children throwing sticks and stones, soldiers stealing a bicycle (which police later returned), crazy students and gunmen invading homes. (To secure an exit permit a year later the missionaries involved were asked to sign a statement that these gunmen were Kuomintang agents seeking to embarrass the new regime; they compromised by writing that so they had been told.) (Q-206)

On the other hand, if Central China officialdom was somewhat less efficient, they seem to have been somewhat less calculating and systematic in their treatment of foreigners. Within the scope of these questionnaires only one imprisonment was reported, and that from the semi-northern province of Honan. Yet one of the most brutal episodes of all, resulting directly in one of the few missionary deaths, occurred in Kiangsi Province in the same compound where hospital service and chapel exercises had continued unusually long.[1]

A missionary doctor wrote to his home board six months after "Liberation:"

> If they go ahead and put all their present theories into effect, they will continue to follow closely the Russian system of collective security. Then the future for missions in China I do not think is very bright....At the present time we are being tolerated, and regardless of the final outcome I feel that we must carry on hospitals, schools, churches, everything that we can (since) everything is going on theory, which the authorities admit themselves is open to change constantly.[2]

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[1] Cf. Chapter 15.

[2] Personal Letter, No. 113, November 27, 1949.

CHAPTER 12

SOUTH CHINA

In some respects South China (Fukien, Kwangtung, Kwangsi) represents the least homogeneous area surveyed. Covering hundreds of miles of coastline from Chekiang to the Indo-China border, it reaches far inland across Kwangsi. Its experience of earlier Communism included the start of the Northern Expedition from Canton in 1926 and the occupation of western Fukien by Mao Tse-tung himself in 1929. Instead of a nucleus like Shanghai or Wuhan, or an axis like Peking-Tientsin, Nanking-Shanghai, mission stations in the south clustered around three or four main centers some distance apart: Foochow, Amoy, Swatow and Canton. Although all four are ports, designation of Canton as one of two or three exit points forced many later evacuees to make a long, round-about journey overland to the border of Hongkong.

Of the sixty-~~eight~~nine questionnaires returned for South China, twenty-four came from Foochow (and its suburbs), eight from Canton. But the remaining thirty-~~six~~seven covered twenty other towns in three provinces. Despite the wide geographical distribution, the People's Liberation Army moved into this area along the major lines of communication. That meant that northern Fukien and some stations in Kwangtung "turned over" in May, 1949, while southern Fukien and the Canton region fell almost simultaneously in mid-October. Yet the experience of these scattered missions revealed few striking disparities.

First Effects

"Fear, amazement, then admiration, then complete disillusionment;" (Q-134) thus did one missionary characterize his reactions to the new regime. Another called it "maybe not as bad as I had imagined, perhaps it was not Stalinism." (Q-126)

There were good reasons for the fear. At least one could be blamed not on the Communists, but on the Nationalists ensconced on Formosa, who sent bombing or reconnaissance planes along the coast almost every clear day for months. This policy disrupted schedules in schools and offices far more than any military or political program, and helped to solidify popular sentiment against the Kuomintang.

From the outset, however, there was fear of making a false step which would antagonize the new government. Conversations grew more circumspect, even in private. Two women were reprimanded for moving their residences, and one had to publish a newspaper apology. After being assured by military authorities that no restrictions had yet been placed on travel, an administrator journeyed without incident to a neighboring station, only to learn on his return that "Liberation" did not mean freedom to do what had not been forbidden, but only freedom to do what had been expressly permitted. Civil officials delayed his registration until suitable apology had been published.[1] (Q-161) Another missionary was warned the day after the Reds moved in that he was suspected as an informant for the United States government. (Q-191) An evangelistic worker had his car commandeered with himself as chauffeur to transport army officers from one part of town to another, giving rise to a rumor that the Communists had brought in Russian drivers with them.

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[1] Personal Diaries, Nos. 137 and 141, September, 1949.

Within eight days in one city missionaries were stopped for passes which had not yet been issued.[1] Less than two months after "Liberation" a missionary was searched three times in one day for arms, and three days later police and a soldier visited his home to interrogate his wife.[2] Several people were quizzed about their radios, and one had troops and hostages billeted in the house for a short time.

Perhaps half the reports referred to travel limitations, not only from town to town, but for anyone wishing to spend a night away from home. Such action was either forbidden or closely restricted by registrations in one's own district and the temporary residence. One person spoke of occasional trips across the border to Hongkong and back, which were later banned, and a schoolgirl in the Crown Colony twice received permission to visit her parents in Communist China. (Q-103) Yet several missionary men were unable to secure permits for their families to rejoin them from Hongkong. (Q-111)

There was cause for amazement too. In sharp exception to the general travel ban, two or three reports mentioned rural trips until June, 1950. Where restrictions were in force, their excuse of bandit activities in the countryside was often genuine. Some places did not even have registration of foreigners for five months. The eight-point program posted on countless walls and telephone poles guaranteed protection of life and property for those who obeyed the laws, but a warning spread through one city that some people in North China had been found to be United States Navy agents working with the Kuomintang, and any such would be punished.[1]

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[1] Personal Diary, No. 137, August 25 and 27, 1949.
[2] Personal Diary, No. 116, December 10 and 13, 1949.

A military commissioner's secretary admitted that there was "little encouragement for better relations with the American Government,"[2] and lesser officials took "great pleasure in keeping the foreigner in his place." (Q-27) Yet on the whole, the treatment of missionaries at the start was largely to ignore them, and to leave their homes alone when it came to requisitioning property.

First Effects on Work

Two European questionnaires summed up the answer to this question succinctly: "to stop it," (Q-C2, -C3) although a colleague added that some did go on throughout the first year. (Q-C4) However certain types of work really did cease rather abruptly, among them many phases of the Y.M.C.A. program, rural clinics, foreign teaching in some government institutions (but not all), most new projects in church or hospital, country evangelism, and street preaching in some places.

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[1] Personal Diary, No. 137, August 30, 1949.
[2] Personal Letter, No. 139, August 30, 1949.

Church services continued for some months, with a few exceptions, but attendance frequently dropped; one church shifted from English to the local dialect for worship, and at least one missionary discontinued her musical participation for awhile. Occasionally an unfamiliar visitor was reported--unfamiliar to the regular members and with the usual ritual. On the whole Communists and Christians in their initial contacts were mutually impressed; one even suggested that Communist cell meetings resembled the Oxford Group confessional techniques.[1]

Almost immediately it was obvious that Communist underground workers had been "planted" in most Christian institutions,[2] and the Propaganda Corps sent in its agents for indoctrination and recruiting. Especially in high schools immediate results of "Liberation" were noticeable: textbooks were changed, academic standards were lowered by indifference and a competing round of propaganda rallies, lectures, songs, dances, dramas, slogan-posting, and "educational" visits to neighboring villages.

English became optional, or was replaced by required courses in civics, often as much as six hours of lectures and six more of discussion per week. This left little or no time for religious activities, and the continuous meetings left no place for chapel or other Christian services. Sometimes students protested the use of electricity and schoolroom space by the Christian minority. Small groups continued to gather in churches or missionary homes for worship and Bible study.

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[1] Cf. Mark Tennien, No Secret Is Safe (Farrar, Straus and Young, New York, 1952), pp. 134ff.

[2] Rennie Acronius, "China and Communism" (Missionary Monthly, Vol. 56, No. 646, November, 1951), p. 306.

Colleges fared somewhat better, although Marxism became a required course for all freshmen, and seniors had to spend seventeen of their twenty-two weekly hours (Q-81) in some phase of "politics:" The History of Social Development, Dialectical Materialism, The New Democracy, etc. Teachers too were given indoctrination classes, sometimes deferred until vacation periods, occasionally examined within a couple of months for "educational fitness" in the New Thought.[1] For the first year, at least, most colleges reported no interference with religious work (fellowship groups, chapel, Sunday church, prayer cells, Bible study); some even found "new life in our religious program." (Q-150) Yet almost invariably the propaganda barrage induced subtle changes in student attitudes toward Westerners and the desire to eliminate them gradually from the scene; one librarian, for instance, was asked to move her typewriter (and herself?) from the front desk into the stacks. (Q-43)

Hospitals suffered very little change during the "honeymoon" period, except a drastic increase in paper work, as reports on every patient were demanded by the government.

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[1] Personal Diary, No. 116, December 13, 1949.

Doctors, nurses, and medical institutions acquiesced in requests to participate in official public health programs, even though it meant reduction of regular clinical service. One hospital was ordered to reduce its charity work, apparently because government institutions could not provide so much free service. (Q-200) For awhile most worship and Bible classes for nurses continued, but gradually evangelistic work in the wards had to stop, tracts could not be distributed, and military patients were told not to listen to religious remarks.

One missionary reported that the church's social action program seemed to be welcome, but others found that their attempts at community service of various kinds proved futile, and only aroused suspicion. (Q-134)

Changes in Personal Life

By the middle of 1950 a shift in attitude became evident. Officials and soldiers and students, if not the general populace, grew less courteous and friendly, more suspicious and hostile. More children threw stones; more individuals spat in contempt as the foreigner passed. Guards were stationed near several houses, and calls from loyal friends or curious soldiers gave way to rigorous interrogations of missionaries and their servants and colleagues. Students and associates, even those who were cordial in private, ignored the foreigners in public. Chinese teachers, even a boy with high fever on the way to a hospital, were ordered by sentries to get out of a Westerner's car. (Q-40, -67)

Officials continued to show either "Olympian indifference to our existence" or "stern justice and rectitude in dealing with foreigners." (Q-46) Passes for travel or overnight stays were more strictly required and inspected. In one city suburban missionaries were allowed to enter town only on prescribed days between prescribed hours, and the permits had to be renewed each fortnight (in town). Foreign patients in the hospital had to register with the police before entering and when leaving, no matter how sick they were.

Various explanations were offered for these growing restrictions, before and after Korea. The missionaries were classed as "keepers of idol temples and leaders of other superstitious practices." (Q-201) They must be spies, for only a government would erect buildings and start schools solely for propaganda purposes. (Q-83) Initial sympathy for those Americans enslaved by Wall Street, Truman, Acheson & Co. changed gradually to a conviction that "all foreigners, consciously or unconsciously, are imperialistic and party to the sins of America." (Q-150) Charity work could be only a cloak for spying and informing other governments.

As a result of this changing atmosphere, missionaries became more careful than ever of their conversations. Mail was obviously censored in some towns; radios were taken and sealed, or the short wave attachments cut out; some foreigners stopped going to church in December, 1950. At the end of that month, detailed inventories of personal and institutional property were carried out, and shortly thereafter (if not before) accusation meetings were held against Chinese and foreigners, current residents or long-departed. It became clear at last that "neither (Christian) work or worker was welcome to any place in the New China."

Changes in Mission Work

Increasingly the religious liberty promised by Peking could be seen as freedom for worship "with no outreach in society;" the Church would continue to exist "only as it buckled under....only if it did not interfere with some government program." (Q-134) In many places worship services were suspended entirely, especially as land reform took place in the spring of 1951, with an accompanying ban on public meetings of all kinds. Sermons and even prayers were censored in some places. Church offerings were stopped by police in other districts, although a Chinese bishop protested successfully against that ban. More and more often church buildings, heretofore used for political meetings throughout the week, were requisitioned for Sunday as well, or soldiers billeted in the grounds smoked and chattered and played cards in the church balcony during services.

With the outbreak of Korean propaganda, a missionary summed up the school situation as follows: "nothing anymore we could do among the students." (Q-126) By the fall of 1950 the Communist Students Club in one institution had compiled a list of all Christians for intimidation, and any remaining religious activities were expelled from the campuses. Even that spring a Young People's Christian Association had been unable to hold elections, and its night literacy classes were taken over by the Communist Youth Corps for political purposes. Administration passed into the hands of various committees (e.g. School Council, living conditions, budget, etc.), and the so-called "progressive" members, both faculty and students, soon took control.

As in the schools, so in the hospitals, frequent indoctrination sessions and popular rallies upset the schedules of nurses and workmen. At least four reports declared that labor unions or committees ran the institutions, and a fifth added that all hospital salaries were cut ten percent except the servants'. (Q-200) Medical standards declined, and Western doctors deplored the government's accelerated program to turn high school graduates into physicians in five years.

Up to the departure of the missionaries, no interference in theological seminaries was reported by anyone from South China. In fact, one missionary continued to serve Communion until February, 1951. A blind school was provided with propaganda material in Braille, and required to emphasize more practical work, such as basket weaving, broom making, and other bamboo crafts. Yet when foreign funds were cut off early in 1951, that institution received in April a sizable anonymous gift of food through the mayor's office.[1]

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[1] Alwine Berg, Hildesheimer Blindenmission E.V., Nr. 4, Advent, 1951.

Definite Stages

The turning-point for most South China missionaries was the Korean War. Perhaps ten percent referred specifically to the "great" change after the financial freeze; only one or two mentioned the conference with Chou En-lai in May, 1950, and not a single person cited Austin's speech about the Christian colleges as a significant factor. The chief difference within the area concerned which phase of Korean operations proved decisive. Father Tennien, describing the "Liberation" of rural South China as vividly if not as objectively as Bodde and Landman did for Peking and Shanghai, revealed the two sharp turning points: "A sudden change from tolerance to terror came after the beginning of war in Korea....In December, 1950, after China joined the Korean War, a new policy of severity was in evidence."[1]

Early in July the three north Fukien missions agreed on a plan of gradual withdrawal by the end of the year. Behind this decision, lay a first-hand awareness of Communist preparations for attacking Formosa, preparations both military and psychological. When President Truman ordered the American Seventh Fleet to patrol the Formosan Straits, the action did not end Kuomintang flights over the mainland, but it did effectively preclude amphibious operations. Whatever the outcome of any attempt to "Da Dau Taiwan" (attack Formosa) might have been, it was clear that frustrated troops, material, and propaganda would have to find a new outlet. Enemy aliens might well have become the target instead of Korea. Certainly the intensified resentment against American interference in Chinese plans made effective work by foreign missionaries unlikely, not to mention the possibility of full-scale war and internment.

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[1] Tennien, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

These considerations apparently did not play such an important part in South Fukien and northern Kwangtung, although their coasts were even closer to Formosa. For them, and particularly the Canton region, Chinese entry into the Korean conflict and the subsequent frenzy of propaganda in November and December made it "clear that the Communists did not want foreign missionary workers to work in China." (Q-C4) So effective was anti-American propaganda that one person in official custody reported his guards wore hospital masks against germ warfare during April, 1952. (Q-216)

Although Korea drew more mention than any other factor, it is worth noting that most reports which outlined definite stages began earlier than that. One blamed America's failure to recognize the People's Government for a deterioration of attitude through the spring of 1950. Another dated the period of "alienation" from January to August that year. A third said that "smiling approval" of mission work (August, 1949, to January, 1950) was followed by "gradual suspicion" (January-March) and "open criticism" (March-June) before the "hate propaganda" following Korea. Still others recalled that "tolerant," "lenient," "cordial" attitudes ended in

February, March or April, rather than the end of June. Even a Swiss missionary, innocent of American imperialism, felt that he was "loyally (or faithfully) treated" up to December, 1949; then propaganda "poisoned or tarnished" mission work; after July, 1950, "defamed" it; and by November tried to make it impossible and to destroy it. (Q-C5) "All these petty annoyances failed to halt our work, so they ordered it stopped....months before war in Korea--so it was not an anti-American move; it was anti-religious."[1]

Differences in Treatment

South China "reporters" detected fewer evidences of denominational or national discrimination than those in other areas. Such individual differences as they noted were attributed far more to position and prestige than to temperament and character. At least two mission administrators, over sixty years of age with more than three decades in China, appeared to have been "singled out from the very day (the Reds) arrived." (Q-16, -188, -191) Others suggested that persecution was based on "greater propaganda value" (Q-111) or "in proportion to the power or authority wielded by the missionaries." (Q-29)

There were other distinctions. Westerners engaged in medical work generally seemed to have more lenient treatment, although one doctor was detained an extra five months because the government refused to recognize his resignation from administrative responsibility. (Q-151) Several spoke of greater harshness toward those in educational institutions. Individuals in isolated rural stations often found it harder to secure exit permits, especially if they had travelled freely through the countryside or possessed linguistic aptitude--for spying. "No woman would have stayed alone after all other foreigners had withdrawn unless she were a government agent." (Q-201) Automobile owners were conspicuously capitalists. Missionaries in one suburb were presumably restricted because of troop movements past their gate. Older colleagues who had difficulty making social and psychological adjustments to the New Democracy were less popular than younger, sympathetic first-termers--according to one of the latter.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 217.

Approximately twenty-five per cent of South China questionnaires reported no discernible difference in treatment whatsoever, even on an individual basis. Others said that officials were guided "solely by caprice," or that there seemed to be "no rhyme or reason except that some were in positions that made them good targets." (Q-124) On the other hand, certain people in the south, as elsewhere, believed that programs and victims had been plotted and calculated in advance, perhaps on a local level to fulfill general directives from above. "The Reds show leniency or harshness depending on what their plans call for." (Q-179)

Although several reports agreed that Roman Catholics suffered more unfavorable publicity, a greater number asserted that their treatment was not more severe in South China than that of Protestants. One priest who had been in correspondence with an American consul was placed under house arrest and public trial in December, 1950. Some Europeans were expelled or sentenced to eight to twelve months in jail for slapping a Chinese, hiding guns in a well, etc. but their American colleagues up to the time of report had been unmolested.[1] In at least one district Czech, German and Swiss Roman Catholics were allowed to travel when Protestants could not do so. (Q-151)

The Chinese representative of an American mission, quizzed about discrimination, sent this reply: "The attitude of the People's Government toward missions without foreign missionaries (particularly American) was little better in my opinion;....that the People's Government has no love for missions is very obvious."[2]

Although many observers fully expected that Great Britain's offer of recognition to Red China would produce gentler treatment, few examples could be cited. In one locality the British nurses suffered much greater indignities than Americans, although the cause probably lay in institutional frictions. An English banker had countless obstacles to closing his business, discharging employees, and securing exit permits. In one province the British mission was the first to decide to withdraw en masse. After the financial embargo some English representatives were exempt from inventories and accusations, but elsewhere their properties were confiscated as readily as American.[1] In only one town did a Britisher state his conviction that "Americans (were) definitely treated worse than we were." (Q-170)

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 140, November 17, 1951.
[2] Personal Letter, No. 11, November 30, 1951.

Swiss missionaries on the whole received equal treatment with Americans, whereas some Canadians and some Germans met with heavier restrictions. In short, although a majority of Continental questionnaires and a number of British answers came from South China, none felt any significant national discriminations.

Reasons for Staying

A third of those reporting said they chose to remain under the Communist regime in the hope that they could render valuable service to the Chinese Church. Others put the same motive in different words: they saw no reason to give up the work to which they were committed; they believed it might be possible to carry on under a "benevolent dictatorship;" they felt their Chinese friends wanted them to stay; or Christian brotherhood required that they share the struggles and dangers with their colleagues. The Gospel was more needed than ever in China, said eight; it was God's will, said half a dozen, a demonstration of trust in Providence.

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 138, January 13, 1951.

At the political level, ten were motivated by reports from missionaries already "liberated." An equal number hoped for a genuine meeting of East and West under a new government that might prove nationalistic rather than communistic, that might grow conservative, as the Kuomintang had done. Four referred to this attitude as an "ignorance of Communist policies and purposes." (Q-3) Several people were reassured by the eight-point proclamation from Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh; a couple did not want to appear spies or enemy agents as flight might imply. One British missionary apparently based her decision chiefly on disgust with the "other rotten regime," adding: "I did hope we would have freedom to live as Christians in Communist China, but in about two months realised that atheistic-materialism matters more to a Communist than anything else." (Q-170)

Two missionaries reported a rather clear-cut attitude by their home board, desiring them to stay but not ordering it. Half a dozen others admitted curiosity about Communism in action as a motivating factor. And seven in a rather resigned manner decided that if others were staying, they should do likewise. One frankly did not intend to remain, but was forced by circumstances, interpreted as Divine Guidance, and another was told from the beginning that missionaries would have to leave.

A substantial minority of South China reports carried retrospective doubts about the wisdom of trying to carry on Christian work under Communism. To be sure, approximately two-thirds of the total, including all the Europeans, indicated that they would make the attempt again, but the remainder were very dubious. Even the affirmative replies were qualified by such phrases as "I suppose," "I think," "I hope," and an ambiguous, "Yes, I feel sure I should decide to stay, although preferably not under Communist rule." (Q-202)

"This experience has taught me that the chances of being allowed to preach the Gospel in any area under Communist domination are extremely small," commented an English woman. (Q-201) An American nurse would repeat her choice, but with "no hope of being able to work permanently under the Communists." (Q-16) An evangelistic missionary would make the same decision only "if I sincerely felt at the time that I would be helping the work and the workers in so doing." (Q-36) "We did never anticipate such hatred against foreigners," added another. (Q-126) With increasing vehemence the answers came:

> Would certainly repeat decision to stay, which I do not regret in the least, but under subsequent knowledge and experience I would not make another effort now to work under a Communist regime. (Q-161)
>
> We are not sorry we stayed, but knowing what we do now, we would definitely not do it again, should "Liberation" be imminent in some other mission field. (Q-141)
>
> Knowing what I do now about the pattern of Communism and how it actually works, I doubt whether I would make the same decision again, but I am not absolutely certain. (Q-52)
>
> With my later knowledge and experience, I should NOT make that choice again. (Q-81)

> I have no desire ever to be liberated again, and I do not intend to remain in (Southeast Asia) if there is time to get out. (Q-83)

> Naturally I would not do so again. (Q-24)

> Knowing what I do now, I would not make the same choice again; I certainly would advise others to leave a country before Communism takes over that land. It is impossible to carry on Christian work and remain true to one's own Christian faith and God in a land under Communist rule. (Q-125)

> It proved to be a mistake, and it is possible that the Chinese Christians themselves might have fared better had we gone earlier, though that of course is open to question. Now I certainly would advise any and all in similar circumstances to get out ahead of the storm, both missionaries and natives, wherever possible. (Q-124)

~~It~~ The question is raised again from West China. As a hypothetical retrospective problem, it can never be answered. But it lies behind the response of another experienced missionary of thirty years' service, who declared: "Knowing what I do now and what we went through, I would not make the same choice again," and then added that the only real accomplishment by staying on was a deeper fellowship with Chinese friends, which later became a burden to them. (Q-134) It may even lie behind the conclusion of a young Britisher, who remained partially because of "sympathy with the general social aims of Communists," yet concluded as to repetition: "Not as I see the matter at present." (Q-129)

A social psychologist might well analyze the fact that half of the quotations included on these two pages came from the same town, a town where there were no public trials or imprisonments of missionaries, no incidents sufficiently critical to influence an entire group. It is easier to suggest reasons for this widespread doubt across South China as a whole. One already mentioned is proximity to Formosa, with the tensions (among the Chinese populace as well as missionaries) which that entailed. Another is the length of the "honeymoon period." Workers in North, East and Central China had more than a year of comparatively normal activity before the Korean embroilment accelerated anti-foreign feeling. Those who had only eight to ten months of semi-effective service may well doubt whether the decision was worthwhile. For all but Canton, furthermore, South China despite its seacoast position was more isolated from communications and exit points than any other area except the West. These factors--and perhaps others--are reflected in statistics concerning procedures for evacuation.

Reasons for Leaving

As indicated above, the factors inducing withdrawal from South China came earlier than in most other sections, and a few new elements were added. Some two dozen questionnaires gave as a paramount reason for leaving the conviction that foreigners were an embarrassment and real or potential danger to Chinese colleagues. For the majority, apparently, this motive became decisive in the summer of 1950, although one Kwangtung missionary dated it in April, 1950, and another in January, 1951. As early as February, 1950, one person had "an impression" that Chinese friends wished him to leave, and that impression became general by the end of the year. On June 17, a week a half before the attack in Korea, a Chinese principal wrote to the mission board supporting her institution that "missionaries should withdraw from China for the present period."[1]

Earlier that same month, in a missionary discussion group on Christianity and Communism, the remark had been made: "The end of the missionary era is near, and I wish we could be farsighted and think of planning a strategic retreat rather than making it a rout." (Q-5) Over a hundred miles away a school teacher reported that "even before the Communist attack in Korea, one or two people had suggested it might be well for us to leave." (Q-74) On June 14 an evangelistic missionary in the hinterland wrote her board secretary: "A few Chinese think for safety's sake it would be better to get on (out?), but most of them beg me to stay."[2]

With the war in Korea and the "neutralization" of the Formosan Straits, the South China environment altered drastically. In one town the various denominations called an Inter-Mission Committee, which met several times to discuss policy and procedure. Some groups consulted their Chinese associates, individually or collectively. Despite traditional courtesy and reluctance to sever ecumenical ties, certain leaders said frankly: we do not want you to leave, but unlike the Japanese invasion, if war does come, we shall be enemies and cannot help you. From a similar inquiry elsewhere came this report: "Our Chinese colleagues....felt that if we continued to stay, it might mean another concentration camp for us." (Q-29) Very few Chinese seemed to realize that early that the presence of foreign personnel--and even funds--would come to be a liability and a threat to the Christian Church in China or individuals therein.

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 130, June 17, 1950.
[2] Personal Letter, No. 126, June 14, 1950.

Within two days of the Korean outbreak one church Standing Committee advised a gradual evacuation of all its foreign missionaries, a British group not American. A week or two later the other Protestant denominations followed suit less officially, although for months individuals were reluctant to follow such a sweeping recommendation. In only one district was such an early and inclusive policy adopted, and the advice--but not orders--went to small inland stations of the various boards too.

One very powerful factor in such action had been the judgment of a Chinese Christian leader, so respected and admired by the entire community that his counsel was accepted and quoted by members of all denominations to justify their evacuation. Pressures from the Chinese Church in other localities came later and less directly, but none the less clearly. A synod which in October urged missionaries to remain, begged them in December to leave. (Q-111) Christian workers in one community gave a farewell luncheon, with appropriate gifts and speeches, for their foreign associates on December 1, although few if any had made any move to leave before then. By the end of the year some European missionaries were told, "It will be difficult for us if you go, but it will be more difficult if you stay." (Q-C5) Way back in July one American in Kwangtung had it suggested by Chinese friends that he "might find life easier in Hongkong or Macau." (Q-116)

To be sure, there were other reasons for leaving. Exactly the same number spoke of hindrance to their work as mentioned embarrassment to Chinese colleagues, but the former was not as impelling a factor as the latter. Many missionaries had been prepared for a "holding action" in which their chief contribution would be companionship and moral support. Eight reports gave furlough due as a reason for withdrawal, five mentioned family concerns, three health, and two retirement. Four concluded that when church leaders endorsed the Manifesto, with its avowed rejection of foreign missionaries, their excuse for remaining had disappeared. One said she could not live contentedly where she could not in any sense support the government. (Q-30) Five mentioned Chou En-lai's statement that those with expired passports should leave.

By fall of 1950 most mission boards including more cautious British societies, recommended repatriation. Here and there a Chinese official advised secretly, when the "volunteers" entered Korea in October, that foreigners might wisely withdraw. There were some individuals unwilling or reluctant to accept these recommendations. A Swiss missionary did not agree with his board when he was called home, but later acknowledged the wisdom of the timing. Another saw no reason for leaving until June, 1951, although all other missionaries had gone home in February.

For the most part, however, the progress of the Korean war and its corresponding propaganda made the decision to leave inevitable. Six or eight reports stated that these events strengthened convictions as to the general trend. Several expressly doubted that missionaries could have remained actively in China for three or more years, as Church leaders envisaged prior to Korea. One person had even decided sometime earlier that any change in the status of Formosa would be cause for withdrawal, as such a move would make constructive mission work impossible. (Q-46)

Exit Procedures

One probable reason why a larger proportion of South China missionaries would not repeat their decision to stay under Communism is that they waited much longer for exit permits.

Five people got out in a week or ten days, one in April, 1950, another in July thanks perhaps to "good connections with a certain official," (Q-46) another near the border as late as February, 1951. Two others received their passes in a fortnight, but one of them waited two months longer for a ship and finally travelled overland. Half a dozen more, including one expelled under armed escort, got out of China in three to six weeks.

The other fifty-six reporting waited anywhere from two to eleven months for exit visas--not including those who served prison terms. There seemed to be no consistent pattern of time or place, for one missionary took two and a half months back in February, 1950, before propaganda or procedural pressures had become acute. All of the Germans reporting came in the nine-months category, whereas Swiss diplomacy expedited a three-months pass in the spring of 1951. Some people were delayed a "few days" which stretched into weeks after their permit had been granted; others found that officials denied receiving applications, so the process had to be repeated. Always delays were attributed to "higher up," but that could mean another office in the same bureau, the municipal government, the district headquarters, the provincial government, or regional headquarters.

Considering the hundreds of miles separating South China mission stations, their exit procedures appeared more uniform than those in other areas. The submission of autobiographies in Chinese and/or English accompanied or immediately followed application. Baggage lists might be general descriptions of pieces and content categories, or detailed record of every item; after 1950 inventories of every possession to be taken or left behind were often required. Autobiographies had frequently to be rewritten for greater detail, and were usually followed by personal interviews (one person reported twenty-three). If the application was approved, the "candidate" might advertise in the local newspaper his intention to repatriate, usually three times, occasionally seven. Generally three days (but fifteen in one isolated town) after publication, the permit would be issued, valid for hardly longer than the journey to Hongkong or Swatow would take.

The additional requirement of one or two financial guarantors was cited by some missionaries from south Fukien, most in Kwangtung, and none in North Fukien. In many cases a "release" from the hospital superintendent or school principal or synod committee was needed for police endorsement. One person had formally to remove his name from both local district and city residence files before departure. Where no newspaper was published, wall posters sometimes sufficed; at other times the "advertisement" had to appear at the county or provincial seat. Occasionally the process would be deliberately impeded by the wrong seal or stamp, or a "jurisdictional dispute" among government agencies and departments. A party ready to sail the next day had their permits rescinded and had to reapply through provincial headquarters, with another seven or eight dollar series of advertisements, although "it all looked very much as if the delay and inconvenience were all engineered right there in the (local) office." (Q-216)

One group of evacuees, having completed notices and other formalities, was on the verge of departure when police inspectors decided to remove from baggage all China-made articles (and some mistaken for such) as curios or treasures which could not be exported, under a decree of June or July, 1950. Not an exit permit was granted for two months while the police interrogated the owners about the source, value, purchase date, salesman, etc. of every item. Despite rumors that a crate of ancient treasures stolen from the Imperial Palace in Peking had been traced to South China, many people considered the curios merely an excuse for some other delay. Back in April, 1950, however, twenty-eight pieces of porcelain had been confiscated from one withdrawing missionary in a distant province. The outcome of this later incident was the return of some items and the retention of others for a cultural museum, "on loan until the owner returned to China." Obviously the police were unqualified to assess genuine curios, too jealous of the customs officers to admit their appraisal, and too proud to let the foreigners carry their belongings to one of the authorized exit points, where examiners could discriminate between treasures and junk.

Baggage inspections were by no means completed at the starting point. Since the government decreed an overland journey for most people, even from the prot cities of Foochow, Amoy and sometimes Swatow, examinations occurred repeatedly along the route, as many as eight or nine times, at every truck or launch or rail junction and most overnight stops. Playing cards were sometimes extracted, for gambling is forbidden under the new regime.[1] Books were scrutinized with exceptional thoroughness--although sometimes upside down! Pictures, slides and films might be carefully selected (allowing nothing derogatory or of military value to go out), returned complete, or confiscated en masse; some that passed the home town censors were seized at the port of exit.

Guns seldom got through; typewriters were suspect, especially by soldiers who thought they were radio sending sets. Two portable radios were carried on a ten-day journey, examined at the border town, and an export license granted for $250 (about one American penny for the two). Police commented that 6,500 victrola records were too many for one man to own, and they had been in China long enough to be considered People's property, yet they were shipped out by sea along with other fragile or heavy pieces, whose owners had to travel roundabout by land.[2] Those missionaries who left after 1950 were usually ordered to leave behind everything that belonged "to the church or the United States Government"--with wide latitude of interpretation. Some people who had sold goods had to list every item with price and purchaser, or buy back each piece because it now belonged to the People's Republic. One who waited eleven months for an exit visa was not allowed to pack or dispose of any goods during that time, but simply had to "wait" until the pass came, then leave hurriedly.

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[1] Cf. Tennien, op. cit., p. 33.
[2] Personal Letter, June 26, 1951 (not in writer's possession).

The equivalent of U.S. $100 per person in foreign currency might be exported under government bank permit, but when authorities in one town denied the necessity of written permission, officials en route confiscated both money and passports. (Q-16) On the whole, however, South China missionaries referred to confiscated goods and inordinate delays because they had no worse treatment to complain of, perhaps due to the fact that a majority of those reporting had left the country before 1951.

Public Charges

South China presented a fairly typical assortment of public charges and accusations, only a ~~f~~ew of which can be summarized here in any detail.

There were two hospital cases reported. The first very early in 1950 involved a civil suit over the death of a child, obviously an attempt at extortion. After the missionary doctor had proved his innocence, he gave a financial "present" to the family to help "save face." Feeling that the "court (had been) very fair in handling (the) case," he added: "The court experience impressed me with their desire to administer real justice when there was no political significance involved." (Q-11)

The other case developed in entirely different fashion; apparently there was every "political significance involved." Early in December, a few days after a nurse had applied for exit permits along with half a dozen colleagues, the neighborhood blossomed out one evening with posters and slogans against her, one hundred and thirty between the hospital and her home. Crowds of students and servants beseiged the house, knocking and demanding entrance, prying at windows, singing anti-American songs (one to the tune of "The Battle Hymn of the Republic"). When she had to appear in public, there was no molestation, although placards exhorted the public to "prevent (her) from planting explosives" or to "give (her) no opportunity to poison things."[1]

Two weeks later ten army men ransacked her home, reading every paper, searching every inch of space for five hours, finally carrying off ninety-eight books and periodicals and letters for further study. For the second accusation meeting early in January, representatives came from schools throughout the city, and excitement reached fever pitch. The vice-mayor had promised personal safety if she would attend the rally and supplied a guard during the three-hour session. "The terrible wrongs perpetrated by this imperialist American citizen over a period of thirteen years cannot be enumerated," cried the students; "they are countless." Most of them had some basis in fact but completely twisted the motive; e.g. wearing a Dutch costume was hiding citizenship; owning a wire-recorder and typewriter was proof of espionage; selling American mosquito netting cheap was defying China's boycott; requiring some nurses on duty during parades was interfering with bond drives; objecting to politics in a nursing examination was opposing patriotism and the New Democracy.

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[1] Personal Letter, No. Q123, February 22, 1951.

After innumerable interrogations, and student orders to move out despite police orders against changing residence, soldiers came to inform her that for crimes against the People's Government she could remain on Chinese soil not a minute longer than the next train. Meanwhile the sentries sang and smoked in her room while she packed, and then escorted her to the border, shouting, "Make way for the prisoner!" As in the similar North China episode, it seems probable that authorities feared the consequences of student frenzy and instigated deportation to forestall a possible lynching. The victim herself considered the real motivation to be propaganda appeal; "they happened to choose me in that area to represent America to the students." (Q-123, -103)

Elsewhere various hospital incidents miscarried. An attempt to stir up one staff against the foreign doctor solidified support behind him and resulted only in three days' exit delay. (Q-200) When everybody in one station had to be accused of something, a woman doctor was charged with killing a patient years before with a hypodermic injection. After investigation the Public Health Department, which wanted her to continue working, announced "in small type" in the newspaper that it had found the charges untrue. (Q-124) Another missionary physician was denounced in the press for having criticized Communism before "Liberation," for failing to visit Communist patients daily (because some of them not really ill remained in the hospital for ulterior purposes), and for not condemning the foreign nurse during the accusation meetings. (Q-103)

There were school cases reported. When the government apparently ordered charges against educational, medical and evangelistic workers, the first could usually count on the roughest treatment because of student emotional fervor. Although a colleague owned religious magazines opposing Communism, a teacher was made the public target because of a map of the town hand-sketched a decade earlier. The twenty accusations included most of the party-line terminology: she used religion as an opiate, was an imperialist, had insulted China by walking during flag-raising, displayed her American pencil to belittle Chinese products, used school property for her home, and hit a child for calling her "foreign devil." Had the last charge been substantiated, the government declared it would have punished her, but the student petition for expulsion was never acted upon. (Q-136, -146)

At one university the foreign faculty members were charged with building up an arsenal when guns were found on the campus, but they finally convinced authorities that they had no administrative responsibility for the institution whatever. (Q-19, -103) Newspapers condemned another missionary as an "American spy, an agent of world imperialism, a terrible man, a cheater in distribution of relief." (Q-134) A British evangelist was placed under surveillance for using his camera on the way out of China. (Q-129) A young first-termer and a woman ready for retirement were thoroughly interrogated on the suspicion that his audio-visual equipment was a radio transmitter and her flagpole the antenna. (Q-30, -141) A Swiss missionary was questioned for five consecutive days because a Christian executed as a "lawless feudal landlord" had left personal property in his care; the foreigner was finally exonerated because he had befriended the farmers and saved a Communist life. (Q-C6) Two itinerant evangelists ~~was~~ were held in a church for two days on a country trip, and had to apologize publicly for "breaking a law they did not know existed." (Q-170)

In general, according to a Chinese mission representative, the charges against Protestant missionaries usually followed this pattern: imperialism, enslaving the Chinese people with education, reactionary activities, killing Chinese people in cold blood (the orphanage and hospital accusations), or spying and "intelligent service" for the American government, based largely (he said) on the number of missionaries who served with the armed forces against Japan.[1] An American doctor, commenting that it was mostly students rather than police or populace who proved alarmingly belligerent, expressed his conviction that "each organization had to pick one foreigner for the attack." (Q-103)

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 11, November 30, 1951.

Miscellaneous Comments

South China missionaries proved themselves prolific with personal observations, many of which shed light on Communist policies or foreign interpretations thereof.

One first-term teacher and evangelist had been impressed from the start that

> ....soldiers and officers....of principles and high ideals (possessed) a sincere aim....to build a New China, (but their) emphasis was primarily on the materialistic side (and they would use) any means at their disposal to gain their avowed ends. (Q-135)

As some officers appeared in expensive cars or at feasts, with bodyguards and prestige, another observer expressed "the feeling that policies come in packages from Moscow, and that motives have a way of slipping." (Q-43) At the opposite end of the South China area, a young man with less than four months under the Reds concurred: "Their motives and policies have seemed just as directly 'party motives and policies' as could have been applied with any success in China." (Q-96)

The attitude toward America appeared to be cut from a familiar piece of cloth. In an exit interview a police chief commented confidentially: "We want you to understand that we are not against the American people but against the imperialists of your government, like Truman and MacArthur." (Q-14) An elderly army officer on a train insisted that there would be a third war, that with fighting in Korea it could not be avoided, but he radiated confidence that American labor was ninety-five percent Communist and ready to overthrow the United States Government. (Q-5) Soldiers who occupied a foreign residence for forty days assured the missionary that every worker in America, including children, paid taxes to Wall Street. (Q-134)

Similarly the Communist attitude toward Christianity produced the "outstanding impression that the new government and the people, both civilians and armies, were very ignorant of the work and significance of the Church." (Q-67) Describing how a Youth Fellowship picnic was broken up in early 1951, a British missionary explained, "They were very afraid of another movement arising against them." (Q-202) A few officials knew more about Christian missions; said one:

> Your work is all right. It is an effort to help the *lao bai hsing* (common people) and to root out selfishness, but your method is too slow. You have been in China a hundred years, and there is no change. We are going to root out selfishness in one decade. (Q-96)

There were some who could cite the orthodox Marxist position: "You are free to believe what you please, but we are free to attack that belief;" the corollary of freedom to oppose Communism was lacking, the missionary added. (Q-124)

From these firm convictions about the West and about religion came the program dealing with foreign missions. "They are opposing us missionaries because they honestly believe that we are imperialists, out to fleece the Chinese and send wealth home to our own country."[1] A young evangelistic worker detected "always inexorable progress everywhere, now slow, now more rapid, in the direction of ultimately squeezing the missionary and his program out of China." (Q-133) Political developments, added a British citizen with few regrets, "only accelerated what was already planned to happen by the very nature of the Christian mission; i.e. the building up of the Chinese Church and the withdrawal of the missionaries." (Q-19)

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 131, December 25, 1949.

To some observers this acceleration appeared most pronounced in South China. Asked one: "Did not this 'anti-' feeling grow as it moved South? Why? And had it not begun before the Korean situation?" (Q-43) Another, noting that this was one of the last areas to be "liberated", remarked: "Perhaps we (in South China) were more aware that they definitely intended to oust us and were preparing to do so from the beginning. The onset of the Korean War definitely speeded up this process." (Q-170) Said a third, who first came to the mission field in 1914, it was "evident in South China that everything was done following directives from above; no deviation was allowed." (Q-111)

CHAPTER 13

WEST CHINA

West China, (Kansu, Szechwan, Kweichow, Yunnan, Sikang) offers the sharpest paradox of this survey: its missionaries seemed most generally favorable--or at least hopeful toward the new regime--and they received the worst treatment. Although a number of reasons can be adduced to account for both facts, none of these explanations comes out in the thirty-one questionnaires received. Whatever factors relate the area to the rest of the country seem to be lost in the comparative isolation and brevity of West China experience.

Only two questionnaires have been received from Kansu and Yunnan, although personal letters and published reports supplement them. Relatively few foreign missionaries served in those provinces after the Japanese War, and most of them were connected with the China Inland Mission or with European societies not replying so fully. However, eleven of the questionnaires represented seven smaller towns between and beyond the two centers, Chungking and Chengtu. These Szechwan stations were all "liberated" between November 30 and December 31, 1949. This meant that the People's Government had already been established in Peking and its program set in motion, however slowly, for religion and foreigners as well as all of Chinese life. It meant, too, that West China residents had just six months of gradual adjustment--and "catching up" with the rest of the country--before the Korean War intensified propaganda and accelerated events.

Wrote one missionary, speaking for many: "This study you are making seems worthwhile....but I wonder how you can evaluate the answers without also evaluating us who make the answers!" (Q-72) This problem is particularly acute for West China. Published material alone indicates a sort of "enclave" of exceptionally "progressive" individuals, representing several nations and denominations. One of these resigned from his mission board over certain expressions of his views.[1] Another asserted on his arrival in Hongkong: "I have heard nothing whatever of any persecution of church people. I haven't met anyone in China who did not feel that the new government is a popular one."[2]

In addition, however, there appeared to be in West China a widespread, though not universal, climate of opinion favorable to the Reds when they came. This was obvious in letters from personal friends, some of whom later suffered Communist imprisonment. It shows up in casual, little remarks throughout the questionnaires, references to earlier naiveté, hoping for the best, "progressive" colleagues, etc.

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[1] New York Times and Waterbury American, January 23, 1952.

[2] China Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 4, April 16, 1952.

Such viewpoints are not to be condemned; on the contrary, tolerance and hope are Christian virtues. But they do make more surprising the actual treatment meted out in West China.

It is possible here only to suggest a few reasons for the liberalism of Szechwan. That remote western province has never been closely integrated into the Chinese Republic, or even the Empire; a substantial degree of autonomy and independent warlord rule has characterized it. During the war years, 1939-1945, deep resentment grew up against the Eastern refugees, who set up their capital in Chungking and overwhelmed the Szechwanese politically, financially, educationally and culturally. This sectional antagonism increased as the Kuomintang sank in the mire of corruption and inefficiency as well as exploitation. The Communists, therefore, moved into an area already bitterly hostile to the Nationalists and eager to "make up for lost time" in being "liberated" so late, long after the Red success was assured and consolidated. Red leadership in West China, under General Liu Po-cheng, had a reputation for being "tough," and the memory of U.S. forces during the war "had to be impugned."[1]

There were contributing factors on the mission front as well. The Christian Church in West China was far younger and weaker than in any other section of the country, dating largely from the Boxer Rebellion or even the First

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 171, March 1, 1953.

World War. Opportunism and selfishness and even corruption had plagued the Church in West China for decades.[1] Only West China Union University and a temporarily-refugee Oberlin-in-China offered higher education; most hospitals and schools were small and new and primitive compared to those elsewhere. The indigenous leadership included very few outstanding Christians, deeply rooted in the faith through two to five generations. By the end of 1949 missionaries and Chinese alike had been filled with enthusiastic reports of comparative "normalcy" in other areas and were eager for reunification and peace. Yet with all these determinants, the ultimate explanation of personal attitudes lies in the individual. Since none of the extreme "left-wingers" replied to this inquiry, and most of those who did are personal acquaintances of the writer, even West China offers a pretty accurate cross-section.

First Effects

Although missionaries elsewhere had expressed a sense of relief at the politico-military "turn-over," the longer wait plus the aforementioned hopefulness made this attitude fairly common in West China, as many felt "some share of Chinese enthusiasm." (Q-57) One person reported mingled admiration for efficiency and resentment at unfairness during the first few months. After long isolation from the rest of China and the world, communications were reopened. After unbearable inflation and assorted currencies, comparative stability and transmission of funds from Shanghai counted heavily in favor of the new regime.

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[1] Personal Interview with a board secretary, March 22, 1953.

To be sure, many group activities stopped: Rotary Club, the Chungking Christian Council, some Bible classes, etc. but usually from apprehension or caution, not force. Several people reported early surveillance and self-imposed conversational restraints. Soldiers wandered freely into many homes, although one city resident reported that occurrence only once. Especially in smaller towns mission propperty was occupied, and missionaries in two different stations told of having to wear official badges to go in and out of their compounds. Some places had promptly to submit detailed lists of radios, cameras, guns, etc., and radios were especially subject to "borrowing"--whether from government policy or individual covetousness. "The government borrowed our 'ears' - even gave us a receipt for it, and may possibly return it when the battery is worn out and irreplaceable."[1]

As with every area, more people in West China cited travel restrictions than any other "first effect." Yet most registrations of foreigners took place two or three months after "Liberation," contrasted with one month in Fukien,

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 160, June 6, 1950.

Some missionaries could not move about thereafter; others visited Chengtu or took a three-day hike through the countryside as late as May, 1950--but were refused similar requests in the summer, "after Korea." (Q-90, -181)

A unique pattern of discrimination, paralleled nowhere else according to any report, occurred in a West China city. Residence permits "were given out in significant preferential order" as follows: first day, three "progressive" families of American, British and Canadian nationality; second day, all medical personnel and British educationalists; third day, Canadian and American educational missionaries; fourth day, ministers and evangelistic workers. Furthermore, those on the first two days received residence permits for a year, those on the last two for only six months, subject to renewal. (Q-196) Since no such "favoritism" appeared elsewhere, this may be presumed a strictly local classification. On the other hand, this was the last registration in a city large enough to include distinct national and vocational categories, so it may reflect a crystallizing national propaganda and discrimination.

First Effects on Work

Despite government proclamations of religious freedom and protection of church property, Christian work imme- showed bewilderment and uncertainty, perhaps greater because of the insecurity of the West China Church, referred to above. One-third of the questionnaires reported decreased attendance at church services and/or religious education classes, with one Sunday School dropping from two hundred and fifty to ten members. Three people noted interference with street evangelism, or even preaching in halls that opened on a public street.

Freedom to oppose religion seemed to be utilized earlier in West China, again traceable to the weakness of the Christian organizations. Where registration and tabulation of Church members appeared in some other areas late in 1950 or early 1951, several Szechwan missionaries reported that among "first effects." Pastors had to report all members, and in some cases no others would be allowed to attend services. (Q-181, -212). Worshippers were questioned and criticized for their participation, and in some places a church offering was forbidden, yet pastors and congregations were compelled to purchase bond issues.

In one district all religious activities were stopped within a month for both primary and high schools, although youth fellowships continued in homes. At the very least, chapel was strictly voluntary. More disruptive, students were constantly called out of classes for propaganda campaigns, political rallies, and the like. One report mentioned a week or ten days of indoctrination every month, in addition to cell meetings each day; as a result there was little interest or incentive for study. Prescribed materials for every course frequently included such deliberately anti-religious topics as the Scopes trial condemning evolution. Here again the rapidity with which such programs and materials were adopted in contrast to other sections of China revealed the advantages (?) of such belated "Liberation."

One of the first steps in hospitals was to investigate every patient, to make sure that none was hiding there under assumed illness, with the result that many patients feared to remain. Detailed reports were required on all aspects of the institutions. Government agencies in one case sent in hundreds of carelessly and pointlessly collected blood samples for hospital analysis. As in the schools, nurses were subject to constant summons for political parades and indoctrination. An odd note of discrimination appeared in the report that government medical schools were not subject to the educational department, which issued most of the calls to mission hospitals for special meetings.

Although some missionaries observed an increased interest in social service projects,[1] others found that rural centers, Goodwill Industries, and similar projects collapsed under Communist jealousy or obstructionism. (Q-212)[2] The government promptly seized trucks belonging to the Economic Coordination Administration, on the ground that they had been given to the Kuomintang and were therefore legitimate war loot; in this interpretation the relief agent reporting concurred. (Q-89) By fall of 1950 all medical and other supplies originating with E.C.A. or the Joint Commission for Rural Rehabilitation were confiscated as government property, although unlabelled--and therefore indeterminate--cans and bottles were scrupulously spared. It took relief agencies two months to get licenses for their trucks, and foreigners who desired to drive vehicles in Communist China underwent rigorous health and driving tests, which should have been required by the Nationalists.

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[1] For a discussion of the overemphasis on social service by China missions, cf. Leonard Outerbridge, The Lost Churches of China (Westminster, Philadelphia, 1952), pp. 159-167 and Chap. VIII.

[2] "Our Story" (typewritten account, Q75), passim.

Changes in Daily Life

Many of the missionaries reported a growing hostility toward Westerners, an effort to "work up a kind of feeling against the foreigners." (Q-57) On the other hand, several expressed the conviction that "from the first there was suspicion and definitely an anti-foreign attitude," (Q-212) "anti-American propaganda almost from the first," (Q-159) so that later developments were simply "more of the same." (Q-22)

Nevertheless it was not "typically Chinese" for children to be slapped by their elders for greeting the Westerners with a thumb-up "very good," or for friends to turn away rather than be noticed smiling or speaking to missionaries on the street. As time went on there were more often sentries at the gate, fewer friendly visitors came to the homes, school girls absorbed hostility from the incessant propaganda. Some foreigners who had been registered for only six months were denied new residence permits--a clear, official invitation to leave. As early as March and April, 1950, two isolated women missionaries were summoned to the police for weekly harangues and interrogations about their thoughts and reactions to the regime, to local and world events, to changes and improvements under the People's Government, etc. etc. (Q-117)

When heavy pressures were placed on churches and Chinese Christians to purchase war bonds, and missionaries wished to help, they were told they might cash an American check if they wished to buy bonds. Though they cost about seventy-five cents each, US$101 netted a hundred and one bonds --and no cash.[1] With the freezing of foreign assets late in December, 1950, missionary houses were given a complete inventory (as officials insisted had been done to every Chinese in the United States). In a small town this meant sealing every cupboard, box, and drawer, requiring monthly reports of each item used: each bar of soap, can of food, etc. And the city government's seal had to be affixed to the one check cashed each month, though the amount was never limited. "In other places this freezing business was very short-lived, and people disposed of their goods as they liked." (Q-156)

Changes in Work

"Freedom to believe what you want to believe, but not to propagate your religion." (Q-93) This familiar slogan seemed to sum up the Communist attitude toward Christian work, yet there were startling exceptions. Although street preaching and itinerant evangelism encountered frequent opposition, the government put no restrictions on mailing Scriptures, and half a million Bibles, Testaments, and Portions were thus distributed from the northwest agency ~~after~~

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[1] "Our Story," op. cit., pp. 31-32.

after the Reds took over. (Q-197) In another province school chapel services continued without interference, at least until November, 1950. (Q-57) In still a third, some religious work was carried on in a government university until Christmas of that year. (Q-181)

Yet all of these activities employed less and less foreign assistance, in realization that it was "evidently a policy to eliminate mission work," (Q-120) and "their wish to gradually *stop* all foreign mission work and *control* Chinese churches." (Q-197) By August, 1950, the Propaganda Corps in a small town had taken over the entire compound, moved the clinic to an inconvenient spot, closed the free school, and crowded out all religious instruction. (Q-117)

As to the schools, "it seemed to be the policy for a member or members of the Communist party to be planted in our institution and there stir up the trouble that resulted in their getting their own way, and that was more insidious than working right openly." (Q-90, -175) The various methods have been described in other areas, but the Reds were adept at fomenting discord within almost any group. More than one middle school was closed by the principal "in his apprehension of the situation." According to one report, the chief obstacle to school work was often a "case of opportunism, having little to do with Communism as such."

~~[1] Earl Willmott, "A Chengtu Diary" (*China Weekly Review*, Vol. 117, March 4, 1950), pp. 8-12.~~

(Q-57) But if internal frictions existed, they were effectively utilized.

After three months "Liberation" had "already begun to affect the University--just a little," despite government assurances of no immediate change.[1] Faculty sharing in a remarkably egalitarian way led one missionary to wonder why such democratic procedures were not adopted in Western colleges.[2] As example, he cited an accusation meeting against a department head who "deserved it all (and was) given ample opportunity to answer." The same correspondent admitted that government representatives living at the university for the past six weeks attended these meetings.

Nevertheless it was an achievement to be publicized when the English department made "The Bible as Literature" a required course instead of dropping it,[3] or when students needing scholarship aid could be persuaded to clean sewers, plant vegetables, press bean curd and soy sauce, or run a barber shop.[4] It was an achievement to hold a Christian University Conference simultaneously with the first days of the Korean War.[5] It was an achievement that six of the Western faculty were asked to remain and promised government salary and foreign food after the embargo on funds from aborad. (Q-159) According to a colleague, "two of these were pro-Communist, while the others were too valuable to lose because of professional ability." (Q-139)

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[1] Earl Willmott, "A Chengtu Diary" (China Weekly Review, Vol. 117, March 4, 1950) pp. 8-12.

[2] Earl Willmott, "New Deal in a Christian University" (ibid, April 8, 1950), pp. 91-92.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Dryden L. Phelps, letter (ibid, April 22, 1950), p.140.

[5] Dryden L. Phelps, "A Christian University Conference" (China Monthly Review, September, 1950), pp. 7-9.

Beginning the first of February thousands of teachers were brought together for six weeks of intensive indoctrination, while university students engaged in a month of "high pressure (political) study." Thereafter competing ideologies and programs virtually destroyed Christian work in government schools. Attendance at Sunday worship dropped 60-75%, the Christian Fellowship "dried up altogether." In fact by summer "the total environment has changed radically and poses a severe challenge to religious work."[1]

Hospital conditions were not quite so favorable. Little by little the institutions were taken over by the government, or drugs and equipment were "borrowed," never to be returned. (Q-139) Religious services ended, not so much from outside pressure as because nurses and others were too busy with political meetings to attend. In March, 1950, three rural clinics were closed when the foreign doctor was advised not to visit them. (Q-72) Two months later a series of lectures with slides on public health and nutrition were discontinued because an official had criticized the public appearance of a Westerner. (The doctor herself reported that the Chinese supervisor voluntarily suggested discontinuance after being interrogated; a missionary colleague made the affair sound like a government order, which

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[1] Mimeographed Letter, No. Q181, August 1, 1950.

> ....showed that for all the current talk about Communists being interested in poor people, and in public health, actually they'd rather have people--poor, rural people they claimed to be interested in --go blind of tracoma than have prevention and cure of tracoma carried on by an American doctor. (Q-45)

This offers one conspicuous example of needing to interpret the individual as well as the questionnaire itself.)

Definite Stages

Few West China missionaries outlined definite stages, perhaps because their initial period of normal activity was so brief. Two or three called the first two months "friendly," followed by four months of "suspicion and distrust" or "restriction of movement." As another put it, for the first six months missionaries were ignored; then the propaganda machine went into violent action. In the university, always a sensitive barometer in China for popular emotions, speeches even before the Korean flare-up spoke of imperialistic influences on the campus and warned students against foreign agents. Two reports denying any apparent stages admitted that trends were "sharpened by the Korean War." (Q-212)

Two or three others mentioned Korea, but placed greater stress on China's entry than on the original invasion. If one accepts the assertion of a Canadian missionary, "I know of no Chinese who believes that the North Korean People's Army was the aggressor,"[1] the campaign of hatred against the United States that fall becomes fully understandable. Whatever the intentions of the United Nations Command, the march to the Yalu River looked to the Chinese like an invasion threat. When an isolated missionary asked a Chinese friend about world events, the reply was this: "Look on the streets here. If there are lots of executions and accusations, then the news outside is bad. If it is peaceful here, the news is good." (Q-156)

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[1] Earl Willmott, "Chengtu Since Liberation," China Monthly Review, November, 1950, pp. 74-76.

Factors emphasized by "reporters" in other areas were mentioned only casually by one or two West China people: the Austin speech, the freezing of funds, the public accusations, which, however, "had not been much in evidence in Chungking." West China missionaries added a few later dates: a "spy roundup" in March, 1951; a tightening of control over the daily life of missionaries in July. Sentries were posted at every mission compound, and foreigners might leave their homes only on official business, yet "non-missionary foreigners' residences were not similarly guarded"--another unusual discrimination!

> My personal opinion is that missionaries who did not apply for exit permits as soon as possible after the publication of the so-called "Christian Manifesto" simply missed the point, and were sure to place everybody involved in a ~~very~~ delicate spot. (Q-57)

A few others concurred in this judgment, and gave the Manifesto as the decisive reason for their application to leave. But since its full impact was not felt in West China until fall, with the flood tide of military and political developments, that document does not mark for this area the definite stage that it did in some places. Another missionary, who left in March, 1951, stressed the accusations against foreigners at the end of 1950, as the clear-cut turning point.

> Foreigners who left before December took out quite optimistic reports of Communism; after that date the program of hatred became so clear that only the few most determined friends of Communism could still hold that opinion. (Q-175)

Those few "reporters" who answered the question about correlation agreed: "Sure--all popular attitudes and official acts followed (the) propaganda line." (Q-212) Another person cautioned, however, against attributing all delays to a stiffening of official policy against foreigners or missionaries, when troop movements or rice shipments down the Yangtze (to take but two examples) offered valid but unrelated reasons for deferred permits. (Q-89) Such reservations, however, do not refute or change the conviction of many people, expressed thus by one:

> The pattern was set by the official newspaper, new laws and regulations were framed as desired, from the withdrawal of silver as currency, the arrest of foreign and Chinese alleged law breakers, to the mass trials and intensification of accusation meetings. (Q-99)

Differences of Treatment

Again the reported differences of treatment were primarily individual and "depended on the personality and attitude of the missionary," (Q-51) according to West China questionnaires. Stubbornness and a willingness to argue were listed as distinct liabilities in dealing with Communist officials. "Those who were outspoken and indeed even rude....were treated accordingly and made to sign confessions for their offenses." (Q-55) Some people had been asked in police interviews for their criticisms of the government, for frankness was encouraged under the New Democracy. But when one woman "let them have it, and gave several," she "had to make apologies....and had rather an unpleasant time before she got out." (Q-164)

There were other interpretations, however. One observer suggested that an individual's treatment followed his "supposed category within the Foreign Office files." (Q-196) This would presumably extend to social and political sympathies, yet several of those who experienced prison terms had been most optimistic and enthusiastic about the overthrow of the Nationalist. A colleague said of the doctor banned successively from rural clinics and public health lectures: "Oddly enough, she had been the one to insist on seeing 'only the best' in the Communists." (Q-45)

Far more tangible factors entered into certain cases. A surgeon who had operated to save the life of a Communist Party member received very friendly treatment thereafter. A relief worker felt that he reaped the harvest of earlier non-partisan service. Two Negroes were shown "slight preference, perhaps." Treasurers and others in administrative positions encountered more difficulties. Workers in a rural social service center, which might well have anticipated Communist approbation, were assured by Chinese Church leaders in May, 1950, that"no other missionaries had been having so much trouble so far."[1]

Within the West China area one district claimed to be a "crucial center of unrest" with more restrictions than the rest of the province. Conditions seemed "particularly favorable on the campus of West China University in Chengtu," (Q-99) and a neighbor in another institution agreed that "in Chengtu we fared better than did those in more isolated stations." (Q-22) Here resided the largest concentration of "progressive" missionaries; here originated most of the peans of praise for the New Democracy; here--and here only --a group rather than scattered individuals were offered government salaries to remain. Undoubtedly these facts reflect a mutual cause-and-effect relationship, yet not even this university was exempt from the arrest and imprisonment of foreign staff members.

The widest agreement on any subject in West China was that Roman Catholics received harsher treatment, "more adverse attention," than other missions. From various sections came reports that more of them had been jailed, that they paid higher taxes, that their property was confiscated sooner.[2] In the summer of 1951 a wave of violent persecution swept across the province, based on the familiar charges of espionage and cruelty to orphans. "The same kind of popular outcry against their institutions....happened in many places simultaneously," said one report. (Q-196)

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[1] "Our Story," op. cit., p. 36.

[2] Three Canadian families reached Hongkong with a total of ninety-seven pieces of luggage, while "two Catholic priests who had been in prison (one manacled for fourteen months until his hands are useless) only were allowed to bring out a small brief case apiece." (Personal Letter, No. 155, March 25, 1952)

Behind such specific attacks lay a number of motives. The official Vatican attitude toward Communism loomed paramount. Roman Catholics had taken special advantage of the "unequal treaties" and extraterritoriality over the decades of China's "semi-colonialism." The Church had become a major landlord throughout Szechwan province. Archbishop Paul Yupin, and to a lesser degree Cardinal Tien, had identified themselves closely with the Chiangs during Chungking days and now on Formosa. After the Japanese War Roman Catholics had received United States Government equipment, and according to one report, a priest--later jailed--boasted of deceiving Communist authorities by burning his accounts and removing labels from E.C.A. medical supplies, so that they would not be confiscated.

One report listed Methodists and Canadians as next to Catholics in order of mistreatment. Both had representatives imprisoned, but always on ostensibly personal charges. Furthermore these were the two largest and most centralized denominations in West China. Two reports claimed the China Inland Mission had more thorough investigation and surveillance than others, but in a third district its German and Swedish members (perhaps on nationality grounds) were granted travel passes, earlier exit permits, and immunity from detailed inventories. The residence and church in a Friends' mission were occupied sooner than neighboring Christian property. One person commented that churches without foreign missionaries seemed to fare better on the whole.

As to national discrimination, one observer "marvelled that the Chinese attitude was so lenient to Americans in China, rather than the reverse." (Q-89) Opinions differed as to whether initial hostility to Americans spread to other groups later, or whether original impartiality turned to sharper anti-American propaganda. The first month after "Liberation" one missionary wrote, "I have learned the lesson that now an American is, because of his nationality, *de facto* (*ipso facto*?) in the wrong in any difference of opinion."[1] Canadians, a sizable percentage of the foreign population, appeared to be slightly favored, but in general "we were a colony of the U.S. and *had* to follow along the footsteps of the Americans." (Q-189) Despite Chinese assurances that non-imperialistic, diplomatically-recognized Swedes would be cordially received, one of them felt definitely that suspicion extended to all foreigners. (Q-197) Two or three people suggested that French missionaries ran into trouble, perhaps because most of them were Roman Catholic, perhaps because their consul (whom Communist officials insisted on registering as "ex-consul") had secured some tax reductions on mission property by writing directly to Mao Tse-tung, thus causing local authorities to

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 103, January 28, 1950.

"lose face." (Q-45)

Added to the imprisonments recorded in Chapter 15, these assorted evidences of discrimination assembled from only thirty-one questionnaires serve to confirm the view that the "most severe(treatment) seemed to be in West China or remote areas." (Q-158)

Reasons for Staying

West China missionaries expressed a large degree of hopefulness for both political moderation and Christian work under the approaching Communist rule. Admittedly this was based in part on favorable reports of earlier "Liberation" in the north and east. Some put their trust in Chinese practicality and compromise. Several others voiced the hope that nationalism would triumph over Russian influence; or the belief "that the Communists would be agrarian reformers, rather than the full-blooded Marxists they turned out to be;" (Q-164) or the "erroneous idea that the Communists would be favorable toward work of definitely demonstrable social value, as mine was." (Q-175)

Even those who felt less optimistic believed that there were many areas of service to China on which Communists and Christians could cooperate, and that missionary help could be rendered non-politically. Nearly half agreed specifically that they should not surrender the opportunity for Christian work without at least making the attempt. It was clearly God's will, the Gospel is for all men, and Chinese friends desired the fellowship and support of their

Western colleagues. Twenty-five percent admitted an element of curiosity, or a willingness to learn from and about Communism first-hand, in their decision to remain in China. One wished to prove that she was not under the American Government; two mentioned the influence of missionary friends "who were (and still are!) profoundly pro-Communist." (Q-175)

Having hoped, said one relief worker, "as a non-Communist to work in a Communist land, (I) now think that is impossible by Communist choice, either from mistrust or fear of invidious comparison." (Q-158) A missionary who spent many months in prison, and emerged with deeper spiritual sensitivity rather than bitterness, concluded: "It was the wrong decision. It would have been better for the Chinese and for us if we had all pulled out before the Reds took over." (Q-212) Said another, "I would not do it again, as it would be hopeless and fruitless." (Q-51)

As in South China, where the period of uninterrupted work covered less than a year, a substantial proportion of West China missionaries were doubtful about choosing again to serve under Communist rule. Only a very few said certainly not, but some "would hesitate," "think so," "don't know," or simply answered with a questionmark. At least three would probably not repeat their decision, "knowing what I now know about the pattern of liberation," (Q-159) that "it is useless to try to carry on organized mission work under their government." (Q-93) One Canadian, still very favorable to the independence movement of the Christian Church, had in advance "realized we would probably not be wise to remain long....(and feared that) some harm may yet come of having remained, so I'm not sure if I would do the same again." (Q-57)

At least three individuals felt that it would have been better if they had left earlier, for the sake of the church and Chinese colleagues rather than themselves. (Q-42, -75) Others were "glad I did remain but have no desire to face another 'Liberation'," (Q-120) or "almost believe I would make the same choice again." (Q-197) One of those who would repeat his decision added the admission: "even though I realize how naive were the hopes I entertained for the possibility of continuing work for any length of time." (Q-22)

One missionary "jailbird" answered this question:

> "I think so, though with some qualification (as to) my hopefulness regarding the possibilities in the new regime; and my desire to have first hand knowledge of and experiment with work under Communism." (Q-181)

Approximately half of the responses stated without hesitation that they would do the same again. "I would go back now at any time I could if such a thing could be possible," declared one. (Q-90) Said another, who had seriously considered the possibility of concentration camp but not the months of individual imprisonment actually suffered:

> That missionaries would be accused of sabotage, espionage, and other like crimes, that our good deeds would all be attributed to evil motives and so counted against us, never entered our wildest imagination about the future. We supposed Communists more humanitarian than they are. We would make the same choice again. (Q-117)

Reasons for Leaving

A private musing on this subject in the spring of 1950 seems worth quoting at length because of the number of issues raised:

> Here writes one whose efforts to be generous in his understanding of what's going on in China are rapidly giving way under the pressure of developments. ....We're certainly not getting on with the job of education, and as a Christian enterprise I'm more and more doubtful about our mission schools and colleges.
>
> If we're not doing our job, why do we stick? To protect investment? That's the lousiest reason I can think of. In the hope that given a little time things will change? We're kidding ourselves....for this thing is to be with us for a good long time....The best reason I can think of is certain old and good friends among our Chinese colleagues who are also going through a tough experience and are counting on us.
>
> I'm not at all sure that the time won't come, and soon, when we'll discover that we're more embarrassment than help, but that time hasn't come yet. I am beginning to feel a widening breach....I'm recalling Jesus instructed his disciples to "shake the dust off their feet" and shove off when they were not received. Has the time come for us?
>
> I'm coming to think that the optimism which led me to think there was in this situation an opportunity for a creative solution to the differences between Christianity and Communism was more than a little naive.... This doesn't meet the argument that we've got to keep channels open, except insofar as there's no point in channels if there is no possibility of communication through them.[1]

In each area the cessation of effective Christian work (by foreigners) and the embarrassment caused to Chinese associates headed the list of reasons for leaving. But neither of these seemed so sharp or decisive in West China as elsewhere. Hardly a third of the total mentioned them explicitly, although they were implied in every other factor. Rather events and attitudes and emotions developed gradually and cumulatively during 1950.

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[1] Personal Letter, April 28, 1950, quoted in No. 136.

Weeks before the Korean outbreak there existed for some "a despairing feeling that we'll be kicked out and on our way home before you could receive a letter.....For the last two months we have been continually in doubt as to whether it wouldn't be best to skip off home."[1] To be sure, local circumstances contributed to that impression, but it is that very conglomeration of pressures, almost all pointing in the same direction, that became increasingly significant. By August a missionary very sympathetic to the new regime concluded:

> American missionaries in China are in a most precarious position and probably in most cases far more of a hindrance than a help to the Chinese Christian movement....In my earlier letters I didn't weigh heavily enough the international situation....(which) has become one of the dominant factors deciding the issue.[2]

For one person the Korean War guaranteed that things would be "worse before they became better." For a second, departure in August was the proper time for mission work, for the church, and for himself. To a third, it was "better taste" to leave when things were "at their best" in November. In this last case, however, the deciding factor was local publication of the Manifesto, which a few people regarded as immediately applicable; the majority apparently considered it a long-range goal.

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 160, June 6, 1950.

[2] Mimeographed Letter, No. Q181, August 1, 1950.

The usual handful of excuses cited health, furlough, and retirement, generally true but secondary issues offered diplomatically to the Foreign Office.[1] A relief worker referred to a speech by Madame Soong (Madame Sun Yat-sen?) to the effect that "in future China would be able to handle her own relief problems" without foreign assistance. (Q-89) Other government statements convinced other missionaries of their expendability, and even a few police officials handling exit permits "asked Why? and also said Good!" (Q-42)

A higher percentage of West China people reported withdrawal advice from their home mission boards, ranging in date from July, 1950, up to a full year later. Earlier "suggestions" left the decision to the individual, but one clearly implied that a "permanent stay would not be possible."[2] One society sent no definite instructions until January, 1951, but six months earlier Chinese and foreign representatives on the field had ordered isolated missionaries into the cities (some without radios had not even heard of the Korean War and and could imagine no reason for the summons). When pressed for explanations, those same administrators advised weighing the following factors: health, self-sufficiency if funds should be cut off (five months before the fact), effectiveness of current work, judgment of Christian associates, and the implications of the Manifesto.

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[1] West China missionaries refer commonly to the Foreign Affairs Office (Wai Chiao Bu) rather than to the Public Safety (or order) Bureau (Gung An Chu), the term used in most other localities for the police agency dealing with Westerners.

[2] Personal Letter, No. 1, October 3, 1951.

The high proportion of questionnaires particularly mentioning home board advice may suggest several things. An external, overall perspective may already have revealed the relative severity of West China conditions. The difficulty of transportation from Szechwan may have led to earlier instructions for evacuation from that area. But the fact that three societies issued no such "orders" until the end of 1950 or later indicates that West China missionaries may have been slower than others to respond to political and financial pressures which had already started the exodus from the rest of China. This in turn could be attributed to several causes: the isolation of West China from national movements, the reluctance of missionaries to withdraw after less than a year's "trial" under the New Democracy, or the once-prevalent sympathy--and even admiration--for the "progressive" government. By early 1951, however, it

> ....seemed to be increasingly true that foreigners could continue to work in China (1) if they were individuals only, in a group essentially Chinese (i.e. not connected with foreign missionary societies--CL); (2) if as individuals they wholeheartedly supported the new regime. (Q-158)

Exit Procedures

Added to the delays experienced by South China missionaries seeking exit permits, West China people had to wrestle with even greater transportation problems. A few individuals managed to secure air passage at least part-way to the coast from Kansu or Yunnan or Szechwan, but the majority encountered a shipping "bottleneck" between Chungking and Hankow, which caused weeks of waiting.

Two separate parties were en route within two weeks; one called it "normal" for June, 1950, and the other in November: "I believe practically record time for our area." (Q-57) One group waited two weeks for a travel pass to Chengtu, then two weeks more for an exit permit from the country, not to mention the journey itself. More West China people in small towns found themselves shunted to the county seat or district headquarters or provincial capital, sometimes needing as many as three different passes for evacuation. Two others waited three weeks for a visa and three for a ship.

All the rest required at least a month for permits and weeks more for transportation. Half a dozen took two months to get out; another half dozen, three or four; another half dozen, six; while eight of those reporting waited eleven to twenty-four months. Often the time would be spent entirely in one's own town; occasionally a move as far as Chengtu or Chungking would be followed by weeks or months of further delay. Steamer tickets were issued in strict order, and several people spent a week or two between ships at the Yangtze River port of Ichang. One had to reapply for an exit permit in Hankow becuase the time limit had expired, and all had a two-day rail trip from Hankow to Canton, with further formalities there and at the Hongkong border. In each of these stages, as one missionary put it, "there was nothing else to do but wait." (Q-90)

Repeated inquiries served only to antagonize the authorities, who usually insisted that permits had not come from "higher up." After five months of persistence, one missionary was told by police: "If there are any questions, we'll raise them."[1] Occasionally an application was mislaid or "not received," and a second was demanded. Two permits were revoked after issuance because they were "written wrong and would be returned the next day;" four months later the husband was arrested and deported, the wife detained another eight months. (Q-156) After getting passes from three different towns in Szechwan, a nurse learned in Canton that her "permit to leave the country....did not state that we could cross the bridge to Hongkong," so more hours of negotiation followed. (Q-93)

Except for such confused jurisdiction, procedures in West China appeared to be relatively consistent. Most people spoke about having to secure guarantors; in one case five Christians signed that "they would be willing to die if anything was reported against the government" by the missionary concerned.[2] One person refused to incriminate any Chinese by obtaining a guarantor; after some months delay he was permitted to readvertise his departure as a substitute for securing a "hostage." (Q-89)

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[1] Personal Interview, No. Q181, April, 1952.
[2] Personal Letter, No. Q93, January 22, 1952.

In addition to the newspaper notice - three, five, or seven times - foreigners had to obtain bank clearance as well, guaranteeing that they had no debts or overdrawn accounts. In the summer of 1951 a government rule apparently forbade the export of more than sixteen ounces of silver; in some cases, however, this was interpreted to include sterling silverware as well as currency, but one day later it was not so applied. (Q-120)

On several occasions in West China the request for exit became a signal for an intensive searching of the applicant's home, for incriminating papers or other possessions. Sometimes cameras were taken, sometimes not. Correspondence files "borrowed" came back apparently unperused. One person reported twelve different baggage inspections, during which everything relating to Old China was removed, and the missionary promised faithfully to tell only about the New China when she returned home.

Public Charges

In line with the stricter measures noted in West China, accusations and incidents involving foreigners seemed to be initiated earlier, magnified more readily, and more often punished officially. If these observations can be validated, they presumably reflect the belated but zealous loyalty of the area.

In April, 1950, less than four months after "Liberation," a "young upstart" official rudely demanded various items of information regarding university vehicles which the missionary involved could not give. The refusal was admittedly curt--"imperialistic airs" the official account termed it. The next day the foreigner was summoned for a "tongue thrashing and compelled to sign an apology to the youngster." (Q-51) Although the public version contained numerous distortions and inaccuracies--plus the sensitive pride of new conquerors, the incident is important for several reasons: its early date, its example of the "proud and impolite manner" deplored by other missionaries, its involvement of a Canadian, and its location on the campus where so much "pro-Communist" liberalism flourished.

"The first case to come to public trial" in West China (October 5, 1950) began three months earlier, when a teacher took down and stored a picture of Mao Tse-tung, after ascertaining that no law required permanent display. When the portrait reappeared, she made some careless remark about such a custom existing only under Chiang Kai-shek, Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler. A month later she was charged with twice tearing down the "Chairman's" picture, throwing it on the floor in contempt, and comparing him with all tyrants.[1] Actually the second disappearance was apparently a "frame-up," for the picture had been borrowed by Party headquarters, and actually taken down by the girl who incited the trouble, although no one ever admitted those facts publicly. But "typically the accusation had its basis in an actual incident." (Q-175)

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[1] N. B. The unwitting inclusion of Stalin.

Although every angle had been thoroughly covered in previous "grillings," a trial was called in October, perhaps to celebrate the first anniversary of the People's Republic. Handcuffed at first (by mistake?),the teacher was marched to criminal court and interrogated for an hour and a half before five officers and a hundred students. None of the facts proved convincing enough to be reported in the press, which "could only dwell on my 'insolent and imperialistic' attitude." But the sentence was five days. There had been a few foreigners' arrested before that, none tried and sentenced in West China, almost none elsewhere. In this early stage, students still wept in sympathy for their Western friend, and one even shouted out, "Unjust!"

In proportion to the missionary population, a significant number of West China accusations resulted in prison terms, to be described in Chapter 15. Yet many other incidents which might have been capitalized upon came to nothing.

Becuase of former association with an arrested Chinese, a woman "actually more progressive than my missionary colleagues" was accused as a spy and "the worst imperialist in the school." (Q-196) In April, 1951, students ransacked her house for four hours, searching for radio transmitters and guns. Instead they found soy sauce and lysol, proving by similar appearance "our intention to poison Chinese people;" Chinese and Negro dolls, "set on display to show our superior attitude to Chinese;" and two highly suspicious documents: an old questionnaire on the aims of Christian education under Nationalists and Communists, and a list of cross-stitch thread numbers, "supposed to be the numbers of our spy ring." When the cross-stitch self-help project was finally explained, the missionary in charge was accused of exploiting Chinese time, money, and eyesight. The Foreign Office, however, dismissed such absurd indictments, although through May and June they sent officers "to make weekly visits of a most friendly nature;....by June there seemed a sort of easing as the main stress of the anti-revolutionary suppression movement had gone over."

Innumerable minor episodes revealed the sensitivity of Communist authorities. A five-and-a-half hour search, enforced with a warrant plus drawn revolvers, disrupted one teacher's home. His guess was that someone had reported a radio transmitter, mistaking the gasoline generator; in any event, radio receiver, generator, and transformer were confiscated, correspondence seized but later returned. (Q-22) Another missionary had to write a formal confession for having failed to register his radio. (Q-139)

Financial dealings also proved highly suspect. A Chinese pastor and his missionary colleagues were accused of hiding silver and weapons in the church, though repeated searches brought none to light.[1] A teacher was warned by friends to give no financial help to Chinese, as she had been severely criticized even for asking about a student's eye treatments. (Q-159) A complicated bank case involving checks forged a year before "Liberation" threatened to become a court suit against the foreign institution, but was settled by typical Chinese compromise. In one relief investigation --an area acutely open to Communist suspicion--a missionary frequently questioned before received a telephone summons to the Foreign Office, where he was told the matter had not yet been determined and he could go home. "This might be interpreted as more discipline or just mental cruelty." (Q-99)

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[1] "Our Story," op. cit., pp. 18, 25.

Miscellaneous Comments

Most of the random speculations attached to the questionnaire have concerned one phase or another of the ultimate question: What makes Communism tick?

For practically all missionaries, whatever their political convictions, it was difficult to imagine "how greatly Chinese characteristics would change in such a short time." (Q-99) Some regard Communism as a judgment on the Christian Church for its emphasis on a social Gospel instead of individual salvation; others for its inadequate social practice of the Gospel. In either case, one must "give the Communists credit for uniting action to their faith; they have beaten us at our own game." (Q99)

Very early in the "New Day," however, experienced observers began to have doubts about the long-range effectiveness of the Communist program. A bitter critic of the Kuomintang, who had looked forward hoepfully to the New Democracy, wrote four months after "Liberation:"

> I remain skeptical in the field of the practical application of the Communist theory to the meeting of the needs of the people. I fear it will not mean a real lifting of the economic life of the people, and that the burden of poverty will rest ever more heavily upon (their) shoulders....I have been under the impression that China needed nothing quite so much as trained personnel in every field. But I guess my ideas are all screwy. What China needs are boys and girls who can beat drums, carry banners, shout slogans, and collect taxes without getting shot....I do not believe that sincerity and hard work and faithful attendance upon the patient quite take the place of the right kind of medicine.[1]

Some attempts were made to explain and defend the widespread attitude toward missions and missionaries. For example, it is "quite beyond the Chinese (unless he is a Christian) to conceive of a foreigner living in the country without some ulterior motive." (Q-57) The pragmatic, utilitarian Chinese finds such altruism suspicious, quite apart from Marxist concepts of imperialism and class warfare and religious opiates. Behind the facade of friendliness, it is probably true that the average Chinese holds "a genuine fear of the foreigner and his intrigues and a genuine belief that he is not what he purports to be." (Q-167)

Communism is the dynamic plus superimposed upon this passive, underlying attitude. Even a Chinese principal unversed in ideological currents returned from an indoctrination course convinced that "what she had learned during that month showed that Communism in China is no different than in other countries." (Q-177) That being so, one can expect the

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[1] Personal Letter, No. Q212, April 22, 1950.

People's Government to follow what one missionary called a "dialectic plan," carried along more by momentum then by detailed blueprints, yet adhering to legal procedures in its treatment of people and property. (Q-196)

One extensive British analysis of the Communist treatment of foreigners included the following points:

> (a) Foreigners are a convenient scapegoat for.... patriotism and nationalism....
> (b) The Communist honestly believes that a Missionary is a spy or an agent of a Western Government.
> (c) Communism is totalitarian in outlook and regards its own Government as the sole source of welfare, goodness, strength, and justice. By its nature it cannot tolerate a rival--of any sort. None else must give to the people those things which Communism alone can give. Therefore Missionaries must be derided, their works destroyed, and themselves eventually dismissed.
> (d) Foreigners are largely Christians and therefore must be attacked, for Christianity must not be identified with the good works of the foreigners.
> (e) Communists like most other men are selfish at heart in spite of propaganda to the contrary....I do not believe that a Communist is selflessly devoted to his cause....The party members looked after themselves better than anyone....(Q-167)

Turning to specific policy in China, one report stated that "newspapers had already announced the determination of the Government to wipe out every trace of one hundred and fifty years of foreign imperialism by missions and mission boards." (Q-139)

Yet how high the cost of this self-confidence! A missionary who spent nearly three years under Red rule concluded briefly: "Communists in China are doing a good job internally at the price of all liberty. Internationally they are headed for war." (Q-212) Presumably because they had only six fast-moving months in which to observe, no West China "reporters" indicated major anti-foreign and anti-religious trends before the Korean conflict. In fact, two questionnaires took the contrary position:

> I've an idea that had not the war in Korea broken out the government would have moved more slowly in its anti-American campaign, and some of the hope we had had that a _modus vivendi_ might be worked out might have been justified. (Q-22)

Unquestionably the movement would have been slower; would the end have been the same? A missionary said, "I believe work could have continued longer if it had not been for the Korean affair," but then she continued, in the vein of thought already expressed by another, "but I really do not believe that the Communists want our ideal nor any person but themselves to hold the confidence of the people." (Q-42)

CHAPTER 14

INSTITUTIONS AND PROPERTY

A large proportion of American missionary investment--in money, personnel, and prayerful interest--has gone into Christian institutions in China.[1] The wisdom of this policy lies beyond the scope of this study, except to point out the fate of these institutions under a Communist regime.[2] Each of the area surveys has revealed a great many developments within schools and hospitals and other agencies. By the end of 1952 every Christian institution in China had been taken under government control, merged with other public organizations, or disbanded. Yet this review of Protestant missions would not be complete without a brief analysis of the process and methods followed.

Direct attacks on churches and their worship services--by no means absent from China--involve a violation of "freedom of worship" which might well impede the achievement of a domesticated, politically subservient church. Obstructive individuals--Chinese or foreign--can be eliminated on charges of espionage and counter-revolutionary activities. But the institutions, whose effective service has exerted a disproportionate influence on the country for decades, can be criticized and absorbed only on the ground of "cultural aggression." In fact, this is the one valid and largely unavoidable definition of imperialism, according to Communist terminology. Speaking of the movement to denounce "cultural aggression," John Clews of the Manchester Guardian wrote: "In its most extreme form the campaign is against the missionary work, either in the hospitals or schools."[1] To these institutions, therefore, the People's Government gave prompt and vigorous attention.

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[1] All China work, not institutions alone, has used as high as 33% of total North American Protestant missionary personnel around the world (1925) and 23% of total expenditures (1948) (Beaver, "A Report on the Reallocation of China Missionaries and Funds," p. 1).

[2] Cf. Outerbridge, *The Lost Churches of China*, Chapters VII and VIII, *passim*.

Schools

In all sections of the country, at all academic levels, schools felt the first and sharpest impact of political change. For half a century, at least, Chinese social movements have responded sensitively to a small minority of students and intellectuals. The "student class" has been a reality wooed and feared by each succeeding government. The Kuomintang might have continued its reign of corruption and exploitation much longer, despite growing agrarian unrest, if it had not terrorized and alienated the educated circles. Its futile attempt at thought control stemmed, of course, from its phobia about Communism. The weapons of fascism employed during the nineteen-forties merely served to aggravate a malady which only genuine reform could have cured.

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[1] John Clews, "Peking Visit" (Manchester Guardian, June 28, July 5 and 12, 1951).

The Communists, then, knew the importance of youth movements from their own experience, as well as from their Marxian ideology.[1] Long before "Liberation" Red agents had been planted in most institutions, among faculty and students and staff. Sometimes these were merely anti-Kuomintang sympathizers; others later acknowledged long years of Communist Party membership. From the "inside" they could spot existing frictions, rivalries, and weaknesses. These "progressives" proved adept at exploiting individual and organizational tensions, and as soon as the opportunity arose, they dominated their more passive colleagues, who did not dare appear "out of step" with the New Age.

Student agitation demanded representation, occasionally even control, on joint school councils. The semi-official Labor Union stirred up servants to demand drastic wage increases. A few faculties jin-bu-ed ("progressed") en masse and forced out the principal.[2] More often he remained as a figurehead, while an aggressive Communist teacher or even janitor assumed authority. In some cases the local Bureau of Education appointed a vice-principal or a social science teacher, who made all "political" decisions for the school.[3]

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[1] Cf. Chapter 3 of this study.

[2] Personal Letter, March 16, 1950, quoted in No. 136.

[3] Personal Letter, March 9,1950,quoted ibid;cf. Charles C. West, "The Response of Youth to Communism in China,"World Council of Churches, mimeographed, August 18, 1950, p. 1.

There were immediate changes in most curricula: English became an elective, although Russian could not be substituted promptly because of teacher shortage. Certain high schools reported six hours of "politics" or civics or social studies, covering some phase of Marxism or the _New Democracy_, plus six more hours of discussion groups. Textbooks were changed as fast as they could be printed; even English classes concentrated on the new terms: imperialism, colonialism, capitalism, feudalism, exploitation; compositions dealt with the glories of "Liberation" and the Soviet Union, or the sins of Chiang Kai-shek and Wall Street. The greatest disruption to education, in any normal sense, drew comments from every area reporting; namely, the incessant round of propaganda lectures, song practices, drum dances, indoctrination classes, parades, dramatic rehearsals, etc. etc.[1] A West China questionnaire mentioned seven to ten days of this ~~days of this~~ each month. In districts where students drilled their "new thought" by reproducing it for villagers, they might be absent for at least a week at a time on such propaganda tours.

An East China teacher wrote that "our _jyan_-_tau_ (self-examination-discussion) centered around the religious problem almost exclusively."[2] The results in that particular school were suspended vespers and the abolition of grace at meals.

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[1] West, _ibid_., p. 2.
[2] Personal Letter, March 1, 1950, quoted in No. 136.

From most areas came reports that Bible classes and chapel services on the campus were discontinued (within a month in one part of West China). Other institutions forbade mention of religion (or America) in classrooms, and this sometimes extended to religious pictures, emblems, and music anywhere in the school. In at least one case, it was applied even to group hymn singing and prayers in the missionary residence on campus.

Colleges and universities, during the first year or two at least, allowed much greater freedom for voluntary religious activities. The report of a required course on "The Bible as Literature" is rare,[1] even for the first semester of "Liberation," but elective study of religion continued on most college campuses. Cell groups, with decreased membership but increased zeal, met at whatever hours the Propaganda Corps left free, and chapel exercises drew fair attendance from faculty and student body. In general the ridicule and social pressure against believers appeared less intense and less immediate in universities than in middle schools, but the atmosphere was similar.

Whatever the Communist program may have been for assuming complete control over education, the freezing of foreign funds provided full justification for the government and a limited alternative for the institutions. "At the end of December, 1950, the Ministry of Education decreed that all foreign subsidized and foreign-run churches, hospitals, schools, and universities were to come completely under Chinese control."[1] Within a few months the Christian colleges, "and presumably schools of middle school grade and possibly lower," were given the choice of three courses: (a) complete nationalization, (b) continuance as private institutions with government subsidy, (c) continuance privately on their own resources.[2] Since many institutions had received a majority of their income from churches abroad, the last course seemed hardly a live option. A few managed to struggle through that spring, but by the opening of the fall term, 1951, "most middle schools have been taken over by the government."[3] Nor did nationality make any perceptible difference in this process; a church accusation meeting denounced America for its imperialistic influence on a Christian high school in Central China which had been built and financed by Scandinavian Lutheran missions.[4]

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[1] China Weekly Review, April 8, 1950, pp. 91-92.

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[1] *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, June 28, 1951.

[2] *China Bulletin*, No. 106, April 12, 1951, p. 2.

[3] *Ibid.*, No.115, October 2,1951, p. 1. When the oldest Methodist boys' school in eastern Asia was merged with nearby girls' schools to form a provincial institution, the Hongkong paper reviewed its "history of American cultural aggression done to youth...(when) American imperialistic elements (individuals named) were sent to carry out slave education, to spread worship-America and fear-America ideas, and to engage in intelligence work; they collected information of the social conditions and the rural economic situation..." *Ta Kung Pao*, August 15, 1951; cf. *China Bulletin*, No. 118, November 12, 1951, p. 2.

[4] Hongkong Letter, September 10, 1951, p. 3.

A survey of the school situation in mid-1950 showed that the trend was dependent on neither the Korean War nor the financial embargo. After reviewing the expulsion of religion from these institutions (leaving Christian fellowships rightly church-centered) and the social pressure and ridicule confronting Christian students, the writer concluded:

> The next few years will see the closing or turning over to the government of a number of Christian middle schools and hospitals. Some interpret this as an indirect attack on Christianity. I would not regard it as such....I do believe that there is little doubt that the government eventually wants to have in its own hands the entire educational apparatus. It is just a matter of time, shorter for middle schools and a bit longer for the universities.[1]

Although no comparable figures are available for mission institutions, it is worth nothing that the People's Government Ministry of Education claims a vastly increased enrolment at all levels. According to statistics issued on September 16, 1952, the following advances have been made since 1946 (using Kuomintang figures for the earlier year): colleges: 129,336 to 219,750; middle schools, 1,878,523 to 3,078,826; primary schools, 23,683,492 to 49,034,071; etc.[2] Part of this growth has been financed by imposing "patriotic" subsistence salaries for teachers, part by a generous scholarship program, ranging from 10% of the enrolment in private schools to 30% in public senior middle schools and up to 100%

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[1] A Missionary, "Inside Communist China" (Christian Century, Vol. 67-2, August 23, 1950), pp.994-997.

[2] China Bulletin, Vol. III, No. 2, January 26, 1953.

in technical schools. Amounts vary from US$2 to $7 per month, with still greater benefits for students in higher institutions or suffering from tuberculosis.[1]

Colleges

A very live issue arose in the summer of 1950, crystallized by the "voluntary" closing of Fujen University in Peking, one of the two chief Catholic higher institutions. The question, as a government sympathizer put it, was "whether or not a small minority of foreign churchmen could continue to dictate school policy in return for financial support; ...(it) had nothing to do with religion."[2] The question for Protestant as well as Roman Catholic missionaries had a great deal to do with religion: how long could church funds, contributed by Christians abroad for mission purposes, be used to carry on institutions which had become not merely non-religious but anti-religious?

When the issue came to a head over the employment of five professors at Fujen, the Minister of Education told the foreign president: (a) that such matters were within the power of university administration, not Church authorities; (b) that foreigners in most countries are not even allowed to establish schools; (c) that mission institutions in China had been allowed to continue because of their long history, but

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[1] Ibid.

[2] D.C. Lee, "Why the Government Took Over Fu-Jen University" (China Monthly Review, December, 1950), pp.130-131.

"the government reserves the right to take them over if necessary;" (d) that since religion and education are "distinct and separate matters," the Catholic Mission may not interfere in university administration, and no religious services or Bible classes were allowed in classrooms; (e) that "religious courses are admitted in higher missionary educational institutions, but they are definitely not compulsory;" (f) that "freedom of belief is acceptable, but disbelief and criticism of religion is also one's freedom and should not be taken as an act of anti-religion;" and finally that...

> (g) all schools and universities in China have political courses....Politics is a science which holds views different from religion. This does not mean political classes are anti-religious. It is China's educational policy to conduct political classes and to ensure freedom of religion.[1]

Perhaps, in rejecting this interpretation and closing the school rather than submitting to political control, the Catholic fathers "asked for" trouble.[2] The arguments convinced many Protestants. With hardly an exception, home boards and societies had assured the field of continued support as long as their institutions could carry on. Whether they understood the extent of anti-religious propaganda or the degree of pressure applied to Chinese faculties and administrators is a moot point. Christians in China and abroad showed themselves far more willing to remove foreign personnel than foreign funds (in response to Chou En-lai's admonitions).

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] Personal Interview, No. 122, January, 1952.

But the subversion of missionary gifts became increasingly a profound moral issue, which Protestants would have had to face as frankly as Fujen authorities did, quite apart from the Korean War or other external events. The embargo on money from abroad, however, spared Protestant missions from making a clear-cut decision; the problem had become an academic one for China--but not for other mission fields.

In late 1952 Huachung University, the last of thirteen Protestant colleges, which had weathered the storms and migrations of the Japanese War, became a government Senior Normal College "with the aim of preparing middle school teachers."[1] Three other institutions or departments thereof were merged with the Central China union university. A year earlier, however, Huachung had become a "Public University," but received little attention except for an occasional patriotic pronouncement and a report of thirty-seven graduates in the spring of 1952, all of whom offered their services to the Motherland to "fight against the wicked imperialist powers that destroy world peace."[2]

In Foochow, Hwanan College and Fukien Christian University were united, nationalized, and merged with several government institutions in the spring of 1951,[3] various combined departments occupying the respective campuses. Yenching University outside of Peking was nationalized at about the same time, but continued with missionary staff until the fall of 1952. In the spring of that year, however, it was amalgamated with Tsinghua and Peking Universities; the Yenching name was dropped, the other two perpetuated in colleges of technology and of arts-science-law respectively.[1]

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[1] ~~Ibid.~~ China Bulletin, No. 1, January 12, 1953.
[2] Hongkong Letter, September 19, 1952, p. 9.
[3] China Bulletin, No. 106, April 12, 1951, p. 2.

The University of Nanking and Ginling College were formally taken over by the Education Department of the East China Military Government on September 19, 1951, under the title, the Public Ginling University.[2] Administration was placed in the hands of a committee of thirteen, representing faculty and students and workers; since then further amalgamation or collaboration has been worked out with National Central University. At last reports the former president of Ginling College still served as head ("temporary responsible person") of Nanking Normal College, one of the eight component schools carved out of the triple merger.[3] This is one of the few instances of a Chinese Christian "pre-Liberation" administrator still in a prominent position of academic authority.

The University of Shanghai (formerly Baptist College) closed by mid-1952, when faculty and students turned the property over to the government for a workers' Technical and Industrial University.[4] The ex-president has been reported imprisoned since the spring of 1951. St. John's University was discontinued in the summer of 1952, its campus occupied by three government schools: The East China School of Physical Education, the East China Normal College, and the East China Political and Law College.[1] "Most of the books in its library have been sold as old paper,"[2] its faculty scattered, and its outstanding medical branch joined with two others to form Shanghai Medical College No. 2.[3] Hangchow Christian University surrendered its property to the government in June, 1952.[4]

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[1] *Ibid*., Vol. II, No. 7, May 28, 1952.

[2] *Ibid*., No. 118, November 12, 1951, p.2.

[3] *Ibid*., Vol. II, No. 18, December 15, 1952.

[4] *Ibid*., No. 13, September 29, 1952.

Two months later Lingnan University in Canton vacated its campus to make way for Sun Yat-sen University, a government institution. The previous February the president of Lingnan, then still in office, made a public confession of "erroneous thought" and promised to purge the university of "American imperialist influences."[5] In fact as early as December, 1950, in an atmosphere reminiscent of 1926,[6] students, faculty and laborers at Lingnan demanded from all American professors an apology for "imperialistic tendencies" and a pledge not to "commit similar offences" (unspecified).[7] At the anti-American demonstrations students also insisted "that the school hymn, originally in English, and the school emblem be replaced by others which would show the severance of ties with American missions."

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[1] *Ibid.*, Vol. III, No. 3, February 9, 1953.
[2] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 16, November 17, 1952.
[3] *Ibid.*, Vol. III, No. 3, February,9, 1953.
[4] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 13, September 29, 1952.
[5] *New York Times*, February 3, 1952.
[6] Cf. Chapter 4 of this study.
[7] *Hongkong Standard*, December 17, 1950.

West China Union University, where Western faculty continued to serve until early 1952, had been taken over by the Cultural Affairs Department of the Southwest Military Government on October 6, 1951. A new president was installed, and reports at the time indicated "that his word is law--no more committees with coolies on them helping to decide University policies."[1] By the following summer, however, the institution was merged with Szechwan and Chungking Universities, its campus used by the medical department of the combined schools.[2] Cheeloo University at last reports continued to operate as a government institution, with its School of Pharmacy moved to Nanking[3] and other departments redivided and reorganized. Soochow University has been similarly taken over and dispersed; in fact its Law School always had been located in Shanghai.

It will be noted that a consistent pattern has been followed with almost every one of these thirteen Christian Colleges, largely between the spring of 1951 and the summer of 1952. First, the school was nationalized, placed under government control, often as much a financial as a political necessity.[1] Second, it was merged with other universities and/or technical schools, usually within a municipal area, although West China's amalgamation seems to have been on a provincial basis. In Nanking and Foochow two mission institutions, a girls' college and a coeducational university, were joined first and then united further with government schools. Third, the unified institution is redivided and assigned to respective campuses by departmental fields. Usually the original Christian name is discarded for one of the government titles, Ginling (the Chinese name for the University of Nanking as well as the famous girls' college) being the chief exception. These latter moves, whatever their academic efficiency, serve to annihilate the institutional identity of the mission schools, and thus to eliminate any surviving unity or loyalty which might redound to Anglo-American credit.

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[1] China Bulletin, No. 118, November 12, 1951.
[2] Ibid., Vol. II, No. 13, September 29, 1952.
[3] Ibid., No. 6, November 17, 1952.

A familiar pattern has been established for many of the Christian faculty members as well. In a few cases besides Ginling College the "pre-Liberation" president (more often his or her "post-Liberation" replacement) has continued in office as a vice-president in charge of a component department or technical college. But almost all, in office or out, have been "exposed" to some form of political indoctrination. The Study Committee of the national Ministry of Education reported in 1951 more than three thousand professors and lecturers from

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[1] Cf. A Missionary, "Inside Communist China" Christian Century, (August 23, 1950), pp. 994-997.

Hopei universities enrolled in "thought reform" classes,[1] which were subsequently extended to other sections of the country and specifically included some Christian ex-presidents.[2] The fact that four of the five who failed to win approval after student condemnation in Yenching were known to be Christians "may be taken as evidence that Yenching party members have been discriminating against Christians" in their "thought reform" movement.[3]

"Political understanding is valued more highly than educational qualifications"[4] for students as well as faculty. Although only 36,000 pupils were expected to graduate from middle schools in 1952, many of whom would not go on to college, the Ministry of Education ordered the universities ~~to~~ to enroll 50,000 freshmen, the balance to be selected from Communist cadres (party workers) who have rendered outstanding political service. Hsiang-ya Medical College (Yale-in-China) was listed among the first ten out of thirty-seven higher institutions in the Central-South Region to compete their "ideological reform"[5] Even in heavily stressed scientific training, the reorganization plan for Yenching University stipulated the following aim:

> To strengthen the leadership for political education of all the colleges of technology in the nation,

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[1] Hongkong Standard, October 25, 1951.
[2] China Bulletin, No. 118, November 12, 1951, p. 2.
[3] Ibid., Vol. II, No. 16, November 17, 1952.
[4] Ibid., No. 7, May 28, 1952.
[5] Ibid., No. 17, December 1, 1952.

> the various schools should make preparations to try the system of political tutors with special tutors appointed at different levels charged with the responsibility of guiding political study and ideological reform.[1]

Seminaries

For the first year or two of "Liberation" the People's Government treated most Bible schools and theological seminaries as church adjuncts rather than as educational institutions. Even the injection of political courses came usually by student request or pressure from the Propaganda Corps rather than government order. Three months after the currency "freeze" no theological college had closed or made plans to close, although government supervision had apparently increased.[2] In many cases funds already on hand enabled these institutions to complete the spring term without serious difficulty.[3]

Before the end of 1951, however, financial and political pressures forced drastic reorganization. In Nanking, following the university pattern, the union Theological Seminary and Bible Teachers Training School united, with the presidents serving as chairman and vice chairman respectively of the Administrative Committee.[4] By the following spring the Peking Union Bible School had been closed, its students permitted to study at the Peking Theological Seminary if they wished.[5] The same issue of China Bulletin reported that ten students from North China Seminary, moved to the Yangtze River town of Wusih, were receiving scholarship aid from the government. West China Union Theological College closed when the university joined the government merger; a prominent professor and a few students were reported "trying to make their living by running a dairy."[1] An unknown number of Bible schools and other institutes for religious training have disappeared because of lack of funds and students.

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[1] Ibid., No. 7, May 28, 1952.
[2] Ibid., No. 104, March 21, 1951, p. 2.
[3] Ibid.,No. 109, May 21, 1951, p.2.
[4] Ibid., No. 120, December 11, 1951.
[5] Ibid., Vol. II, No. 7, May 28, 1952.

Meanwhile, however, a national amalgamation has been achieved, which has the dual advantage of relieving economic pressures and placing all substantial theological education (by major denominations, at least) under the domesticated Church. In the fall of 1952 ten seminaries and Bible schools united to form Ginling Union Theological Seminary in Nanking, with a Board of Directors chosen by the Preparatory Committee of the Oppose-America-Aid-Korea Three-Self Reform Movement of the Christian Church in China.[2]

To show the denominational participation, it may be worthwhile to list the institutions joining in the merger: Nanking (union), South Fukien (Reformed Church of America), Cheeloo (union), North China from Wusih, Hangchow (C.I.M. affiliate?), Kiangsu (Baptist) from Chinkiang, and Trinity (Episcopal) from Ningpo. Representatives of Huachung, Yenching, Chungking, and Canton shared in the first planning session but have not yet joined.[1] No mention is made of Peking (Methodist) or West China (union).

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[1] *Ibid.*, No. 13, September 29, 1952.

[2] *Ibid.*, No. 19, December 29, 1952; cf. Nos. 16-18.

> In respect to denominational differences, UTS receives all groups, honoring each, with the understanding that each group is willing to learn from others. UTS is prepared to accept the forms and customs of all denominations, recognizing the various gifts and work of the Spirit in each. We honor and are willing to study the history, organization, foundations, liturgy, etc. of the various groups.[2]

Plans called for a graduate school for college alumni, a theology school for high school graduates, a Bible school for junior high school graduates, and miscellaneous short courses. The president of the new institution is a former secretary of the World Student Christian Federation, who returned to China after "Liberation" "when his approval of the new regime aroused the suspicion of Washington authorities."[3] The Board of Directors includes many of the outstanding leaders from most major denominations, men and women who are known to hold fast to their ecumenical ties and spiritual foundations, as well as others avowedly "progressive" in their politics.[4] Although specifically affirming allegiance to the patriotically **orthodox** "Three-Self Committee" (which has replaced the National Christian Council), the General Principles of the new seminary include the following:

> The aim of this seminary shall be to nurture spiritual life, study the Bible, raise the level of understanding on national loyalty, prepare workers

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[1] _Ibid_., No. 17, December 1, 1952.
[2] _Ibid_., No. 19, December 29, 1952.
[3] _Ibid_., Vol. III, No. 3, February 9, 1953.
[4] _Ibid_., Vol. II, No. 19, December 29, 1952.

> for the New Church in China who will serve the people, and press forward the Three-Self Reform Movement.
>
> The Old and New Testament revelations shall be the basis of faith of the United Theological Seminary.
>
> The plans for the teaching methods and the livelihood of UTS shall be in accordance with the Common Program adopted by the People's Political Consultative Conference, which shall be the foundation for professors and students.[1]

Hospitals

The ultimate aim for mission hospitals differed little from that for educational institutions: complete government control and integration into a national plan of reorganization. Even more than schools, Christian clinics and hospitals represented an absolute necessity for New China, yet at the same time they were charged with cultural aggression and exploitation of the people.

In May, 1950, even before the Chou En-lai conferences, a detailed survey of mission work reported that "as yet, nearly all Christian hospitals are carrying on, but it seems probable that many of them will before very long be forced to appeal to be taken over by Government authorities."[2] The reasons given were largely financial, "for most or all of the difficulties experienced by certain hospitals in the earlier days after 'Liberation' came from within." Already, however, taxes were becoming an "almost insurmountable burden," since most medical institutions (as questionnaires confirmed) were taxed as commercial enterprises.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., No. 89, June 13, 1950.

Hospital incomes dropped critically, not only because the wealthy "first-class" patients had disappeared, but because poor patients could no longer afford clinic fees or medicines. "Of several hospitals recently reporting, all anticipated deficits on this year's running expenses, to an average of no less than £4,000 for the year."[1] One South China hospital reduced charity work by official order, presumably because government hospitals could not compete in providing free services. (Q-200) At the same time, supplies of drugs were running low, and neither financial conditions nor transportation offered much hope of replacement. When in West China--and perhaps elsewhere after 1950--the government reclaimed all medical supplies distributed by E.C.A., many institutions were left virtually destitute.

Other problems bedeviled the hospitals as well. Every single area reported trouble with labor unions and employees, chiefly demanding higher wages despite reduced income, but also involving administrative control. Staff and nurses and even doctors were subject to summons for propaganda rallies, parades, indoctrination lectures, and cell groups. West China reported that mission medical schools were placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, with all its attendant demands on time and "thought reform," whereas government medical schools were not so assigned.

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[1] *Ibid*.

The national Ministry of Health also had a plan. It involved far-reaching reorganization, amalgamation and redivision of medical units throughout the country, quite closely akin to the program carried through for colleges and universities. Each Region was to have its top-ranking hospitals, with subsidiary branches at the provincial level and local hospitals below them, in addition to an extensive public health system. The original plan called for integration of mission institutions into this network of hospitals, clinics, and rural stations, and even through 1951 strenuous efforts were made to persuade certain missionary doctors to continue their work.

At least three factors have seriously hampered this overall program: shortage of personnel, shortage of funds, shortage of medicines and equipment. In frantic effort to remedy the first lack, medical school requirements were lowered to provide a two-year course for nurses after high school graduation, and a five-year college course for doctors. In one of the few letters written directly to America after missionary withdrawals, a medical student in a formerly Christian institution dared to say:

> College of Medicine is going down and down.... I fear what kind of a doctor I am going to be. I scarcely can believe it will be good doctor by studying only five years (after high school).[1]

Although this student hopes to return to his home in Southeastern Asia after graduation, reports indicate that doctors and nurses--like most other scientifically-trained Chinese --have no freedom to choose the location or type of work they enter.

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[1] Personal Letter from China, spring, 1952.

Soon after "Liberation" the government imposed strict bureaucratic controls on all hospitals. Each of the five areas studied told of having to report every patient admitted or discharged, and close investigation followed every death. Some of the trials or "public discussions" involving hospitals appeared to be genuine efforts to improve medical service. Others, however, seemed designed to discredit foreign missionaries. These charges were usually brought by disgruntled individuals or stirred up by staff members and students. In a substantial number of cases (Q-11, Q-110, etc.) civil courts exonerated the missionary and lauded his work.

Approval of foreign medical service did not extend to evangelistic work in hospitals or clinics. Almost all areas reported a gradual curtailment of religious programs. First, evangelism among non-Christian patients or staff was prohibited. Then classes and services were limited to Christians, still later they were banned entirely, or nurses found themselves simply too busy with propaganda meetings to attend religious exercises. In North China a British woman who had been "aggressive" in her hospital evangelism was later deported, and an American doctor encountered obvious displeasure from the police at his insistence that a medical missionary expected to engage in religious work. (Q-211)

The Communist public health program has been vastly expanded, and praised in various reports as one of the most admirable achievements of the People's Government.[1] It has, to be sure, leaned heavily on germ-warfare charges for its incentives and enthusiasm. Among scarce reports available it appears that the hospital plan has been less successful and less altruistic. "One of the best-equipped and best staffed medical institutions in China," operated chiefly by cooperating British societies, had been coveted by two government agencies and finally accepted a contract for joint management. By the summer of 1951 "the last of foreign mission staff....had been squeezed out....but even before their leaving the Government had officially taken over the institution." In October an official proclamation appeared in the local press announcing on behalf of the Central South Military Council and the Sanitation Ministry that

> ....they have therefore decided to change Union Hospital into an organization serving all members of the Communist Party with their families within the South Central District (Honan, Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi), into a special medical institution to be known as their main hospital....Only members of the Military Council and Party Workers and their families are to be accepted for medical treatment, and....the ordinary citizens are not to be received, nor are Military or Political Workers or their families outside the South Central District to be accepted for treatment. Dispensary services are to cease (except for eye, ear, nose and throat, and special children's cases).[2]

Some months later the order was modified to admit "the people" to afternoon dispensary, by appointment only.

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[1] Cf. China Bulletin, No. 124, February 12, 1952.
[2] Hongkong Letter, November 9, 1951, pp. 2-3.

At the same time it was announced that another ex-mission hospital in the same area could not even be visited without "a letter of introduction from a high military or Government organ."[1] Peking Union Medical College, the most famous institution of its kind in the Far East, is now used for foreign (i.e. Russian) official personnel, and another mission hospital in the same city had become the Central Municipal Hospital with a 500-bed capacity.[2] Such redeployment of mission facilities and some Christian personnel, pays tribute at least to the quality of service rendered by these and similar institutions.

Social Service

A comparatively small amount of Protestant social service in China was conducted through formal institutions; e.g. orphanages, old people's homes, blind schools, etc. Nevertheless various aspects of that program seem significant enough in the light of Communist policy to warrant inclusion in this survey, albeit briefly. In the spring of 1950 the Rural Work secretary of the National Christian Council wrote:

> Social welfare institutions are unexpectedly in difficulties. These difficulties are not caused by prejudice, but by the imposition of regulations, chiefly economic in intent, which although not discriminatory against Christian institutions, are such as to create tremendous problems for them.[3]

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[1] *Ibid*., June 19, 1952, p. 5.
[2] *China Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 16, November 17, 1952.
[3] Quoted *ibid*., No. 89, June 13, 1950, p. 7.

This realization had come as something of a surprise after nearly a year of "Liberation," for it had been assumed that the People's Government would tighten restrictions on religious programs as such, but be very tolerant of social service projects. Communists and Christians shared the conviction that "after these (land) reform measures have been carried out, there will be little room for Christian rural service other than work definitely based upon rural Churches;"[1] (e.g. Christian home materials). It was taken for granted, however, that scientific techniques and technological aid would continue to be welcomed by the people and the government authorities.

Another new factor in Church planning along social lines was the realization that Christian programs had been less creative and constructive than Communist emphases. A Christian Community Conference held in Shanghai in April, 1950, declared in its report:

> We have been too busy with the people who have not been working, the unemployed, the little children, therefore we have failed to know and understand the needs of working men and women....We have been too busy with child welfare, feeding and relief programs, and not on productive programs that helped the people to help themselves....We have been too involved in the thinking of indigent people and not thinking with the healthy and self-supporting productive workers.[2]

This self-assessment might be applied to the Church in every land. Implicit behind it lay the Communist critique of religious charity as an opiate dulling conscience to economic injustice and social inequality.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 4.

A third factor brought out in this report, but not generally recognized, was the fact that certain Western politicians have frankly asserted their faith in relief as a weapon against Communism. Whether valid or not, such attitudes and statements only served to increase inherent Marxist suspicions about relief goods and money from abroad. Added to this was national pride, first against accepting charity in any form, second against allowing distribution by foreign agencies. Within a few months after the establishment of the People's Government in Peking, a Chinese People's Relief Commission was set up, "to mobilize and organize the people to help themselves," but also to "accept genuine friendly help from international friends."[1]

> It is perfectly clear that relief and welfare work, along with education and all social services, are to come step by step under the complete direction and control of the Government. The part played by voluntary agencies, in so far as permitted at all, will have to fit into the total pattern.[2]

With these considerations, which far too few China missionaries kept in mind, the Christian Church made a belated effort to win government approbation for its social program. The attempt was foredoomed to failure. Not only conditions in China, but experience already cited from Russia and the European satellites, led to the certainty that no totalitarian regime can tolerate relief or humanitarian service by any other agency. From North, East, South, West, and Central came similar reports: a church could not administer vaccine on hand, Goodwill Industries were the first to close, no foreigner should deliver public health lectures in a church, relief projects disintegrated at once.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 14-15.

[2] Ibid.

The situation regarding organized institutions of social service developed more slowly but just as consistently. A questionnaire from Manchuria told how Communist authorities disbanded an orphanage to remove children from imperialistic and Christian influences. (Q-C9) Early in 1950 a denominational conference in Shanghai noted that "it is the definite policy of government to take over all orphanages inside the next two years."[1] By the summer of 1951 a number of orphanages and schools for the blind had been placed under a Government Board of Charity.[2] This move for an Old People's and Cripples' Home was accompanied by charges that missionaries who had run the institution had "dragged the patients around by the hair and had given them poison to kill them off."[3] No single accusation against Roman Catholic missions incited more hatred and frenzy than that of murdering children in orphanages, due originally--no doubt--to the thousands of babies left dying on mission doorsteps. The furore in Nanking in the summer of 1950 was followed by a similar case in Canton, and then in Wuchang, "where the Government claims that in twenty-three years' time the Mission murdered 16,000 infants."[1]

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[1] Informal notes on discussion, February 22, 1950.
[2] China Bulletin, No. 115, October 2, 1951, p. 1.
[3] Hongkong Letter, September 29, 1951, p. 5.

There were exceptions, of course. A Bible school superintendent felt that her campus was spared occupation because of a child feeding station there. A German teacher in a school for the blind reported a generous food donation given anonymously through the mayor's office early in 1951. Missionaries connected with the Christian Rural Service Union carried on successful programs for many months, although a few suffered weeks in jail and inordinate exit delays. More often, however, the popularity of effective social welfare projects inspired jealousy and resentment on the part of Communist authorities, who sometimes retaliated.

> (Two missionaries) have been having a rough go....A week ago the local authorities were threatening to turn them out at the point of a gun....There were a lot of fantastic charges. The minister there was accused of dealing in silver. The radio was read as a sending set. They were accused of hiding arms. This is all the more significant because the job they were doing is outstanding in terms of rural work and their position was solid with the people.[2]

Another peripheral area of Christian work has to do with literature and other mass communication media. Little data is available on audio-visual programs under the Communists. A few questionnaires told of confiscation of equipment; others mentioned inviting officials to censor films they had banned--and having the ban rescinded. Clearly the Reds were so adept at audio-visual propaganda techniques (drama, loudspeakers, dances, drums, songs, etc.) that they would look with suspicion on any rival. Within eight months the Christian Broadcasting Station, which had operated in Shanghai for many years, was placed under military control and suspended from broadcasting. The charges were contravention of laws, collaborating with Kuomintang bandits, including among the Board of Directors "a large number of war criminals and well-known secret service agents," and concealing this fact in reports to Communist authorities.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, June 9, 1951, p. 4.
[2] Personal Letter, April 2, 1950, quoted in No. 136.

Religious publications, likewise, were denounced as a powerful instrument of cultural aggression. By Septamber, 1951, barely fifty Christian periodicals survived, out of some hundred and thirty-six prior to "Liberation;" these figures of course include local and denominational organs.[2] Undoubtedly others have been discontinued since, leaving the field to a handful of magazines registered with the government, supervised by the "Preparatory Committee," and devoted to political interpretations and responsibilities of Christianity. "It seems evident that the aim is to monopolize the information for the Church under one single small body of control."[3]

Like the schools and churches, each Christian publishing group had to have its accusation meeting, condemning reactionary religious literature in these terms:

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[1] Hongkong Letter, February 23, 1951; cf. Anne Hazelton, God of the Valleys, p. 36.

[2] Hongkong Letter, August 25, 1951.

[3] Ibid., September 29, 1951.

> Even if thisliterature is not directly drawing the people to love and honor America, it does at least lead them to oppose Russia and Communism, and causes the Church to consider itself above Government Control. There is no telling how much damage has been done through this type of literature....(Christians must recognize) the bitter venom and intrigue with which American Imperialism had used Christian Publications for aggression in China. What aroused their anger most was the way the American Imperialists had used the precious Bible and its organization, the China Bible Society, as a tool for aggession.[1]

As partial result of such diatribes, the China Secretary of the American Bible Society waited two years for his exit permit, until January, 1953.[2] He and his wife were the last regular missionaries to leave Shanghai, although one woman, apparently independent, continued to work in the Christian Book Room.[3] Scripture distribution, however, continued good through 1951; since then efforts have failed either to ship Bibles into Communist China or to export printing plates presumably held idle in Shanghai.[4] In April, 1952, the Chinese edition of the devotional booklet, The Upper Room, ceased publication because "it is not considered fitting or necessary for the masses of Christians in China and it was spreading much harmful and poisonous thinking."[5]

Christian book publishers and stores have fallen under similar condemnation. Translations and publications of past decades have been scrutinized from the politico-religious standpoint, after a conference of Christian publishers with government officials in April, 1951. Using the following criteria, printers and stores, schools and seminaries, were expected to destroy stocks that came under disapproval or suspicion:

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[1] Ibid.
[2] China Bulletin, Vol. III, No. 3, February 9, 1953.
[3] Ibid., Vol. II, No. 17, December 1, 1952.
[4] Personal Letter, No. 17, May 22, 1952.
[5] China Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 10, July 31, 1952.

> (a) The author a recognized traitor.
> (b) Direct or indirect opposition to Communism, Soviet Russia, or the People's Government.
> (c) Expressions of the imperialistic, capitalistic, or feudalistic point of view.
> (d) One-sided expressions of internationalism that harm the patriotic spirit.
> (e) Statements on behalf or imperialism or imperialistic elements.
> (f) Any depreciation of Chinese culture that might do harm to Chinese self-respect or self-confidence.
> (g) Any contentious writing that might prevent a full accord of the Chinese people with their government.
> (h) Any writing that expresses doubt of the Oppose-America-Help-Korea principle.
> (i) Any imperialistic expression of the ecumenical church which does not distinguish friend and foe.
> (j) Any opposition to the "Three-Self" Movement.[1]

Even casual analysis reveals that these categories are broad enough to include most religious publications, especially when all missions are deemed imperialistic and the supremacy of God "might prevent a full accord with the government." The Christian Literature Society, one of the most active, independent publishers, had about eighty per cent of its publications destroyed.[2] Among other conclusions reached: "there is not a single publisher (of forty-one in Shanghai) that is not used as a tool of the imperialists;" of three major companies, including the Y.M.C.A. press, between one-half and two-thirds of the books issued were rated questionable; and this summary

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[1] Ibid., No. 113, September 5, 1951, p. 1.
[2] Ibid., Vol. II, No. 15, November 3, 1952.

> ...applies to all Publishing Houses and to all types of literature, whether it be Modernistic or Fundamental, whether it be Social Gospel or Spiritual, whether it be Conservative or Liberal; every publishing group has been influenced by imperialism.[1]

To be sure, one of the chief pressures against religious books and periodicals has been financial. With no foreign subsidy and few Chinese Christians able to afford reading material, the wonder is rather that any literature still does appear, not all of it supported by the "Preparatory Committee." Yet there is money for Sunday School lessons, sold by the Baptist Press and Sundary School Association at one-and-a-half to three cents per series, on such topics as New Men, New Matters: "studies of the accomplishments of the new government during the past three years, with appropriate Scripture passages."[2]

Early in 1950, a Chinese Christian executive wrote, "We can now see clearly that Christians enjoy far more freedom today within the Church itself than within other Christian institutions."[3] The hopeful ramifications of that statement have not been fulfilled, but the basic fact remains. Freedom of worship and even belief have been circumscribed,[4] but religious liberty is still guaranteed for a politically loyal Church within the Marxian framework. Relief, social welfare, education, literature, medicine, agricultural service--all these applications of the Christian Gospel are suspect because they represent a competitor for the power, prestige and popularity of the totalitarian State. From the Communist standpoint, these institutions and programs must be controlled absolutely, not because they are religious as such, but because their very existence implies a rival motivation, a rival philosophy, a rival way of life.

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[1] Hongkong Letter, September 29, 1951, p. 2.
[2] China Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 8, June 12, 1952.
[3] Ibid., No. 89, June 13, 1950, p. 7.
[4] Cf. Chapter 16 below.

Occupation of Property

Another aspect of institutional missions which must not be omitted is property. This survey has dealt largely with foreign personnel and the programs they conducted. But the Christian Church around the world has had a "vested interest" in mission property in China. The People's Government, on the other hand, has regarded these extensive holdings of land and buildings as "proof" of imperialism. Most inland cities and towns offer visible evidence that both Protestant and Catholic missionaries in the past used the "unequal treaties" plus their economic power to acquire the finest tracts on a hilltop or a riverbank. How did the Communist authorities treat these properties?

In China's New Democracy (Chapter IV) Mao Tse-tung proposed that, aside from "big banks, big industries, and big commercial establishments....the state will not confiscate other forms of private property." Officially the People's Government has adhered to this policy. One missionary expressed his conviction that authorities in Peking considered the property question too thorny to handle under present internal and international conditions. They would therefore use whatever was necessary at the time, leaving the complicated problem of ownership, compensation, etc. to a later date.

This theory is borne out by the apparent absence of any clear, uniform procedure. The Landmans in Shanghai maintained that "a single body of law applied equally to all citizens throughout the domain. All taxes were authorized or levied by Peking. No lower echelon official was empowered to impose any other levies."[1] If this was so, the official policy was difficult to find. A North China missionary reported that taxes were fairly interpreted and published, administered generously and in a friendly spirit. No other questionnaire indicated so definite or consistent a program. Amid the welter of facts and figures furnished at this point in two hundred and twenty-five replies, only general trends emerge, with multiple exceptions.

The prompt seizure of unoccupied buildings appeared to be universal, either by troops in transit or by government agencies of some kind. In Shanghai and other large cities where housing was plentiful, the issue hardly arose during the first year of "Liberation." In other places, especially if an official or semi-official group (e.g. Labor Union, Propaganda Corps, etc.) coveted a particular piece of property, it was usually expropriated, public promises to the contrary notwithstanding. Occasionally there was a subtle hint that the owner or occupant might request the government to take over.

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[1] Landman, Profile of Red China, p. 188.

> All of our vacant buildings were occupied by the Communists, some of them with our permission, some without any permission. One set of dormitories was occupied by force of arms. The international cemetery was appropriated by the new government and the graves were required to be moved....Appropriation of (city churches, as distinct from the university campus) was the rule rather than the exception.(Q-192)

In areas "liberated" in the spring or summer, it was very common for soldiers or indoctrination conferences to use school compounds and dormitories during vacation, but most of these were restored for school use that fall. Churches and auditoriums proved particularly popular for the endless succession of meetings held in every locality. The most common argument was that all such assembly halls remained idle so much of the week, they might as well be used. Another claim was that institutions had been given for the Chinese people, and "the people" were now demanding use and control.

During early months the new occupants, especially military forces, showed themselves scrupulous in respect to property. Instances were cited where troops provided thorough cleaning when they vacated buildings, and even repaid wood used--in greater quantity to compensate for lower prices.

Later civil authorities grew careless and "borrowed" whatever they wanted, from cooking pots to pews for firewood, without repayment. Even the use of church auditoriums became "destructive and unsanitary."

A number of questionnaires reported that churches borrowed during the week were vacated for Sunday services, but as propaganda intensified this courtesy diminished. Several told of soldiers chatting, eating, and playing cards in the balcony during worship, and in one case this pyschological warfare meant that "sometimes they stayed and played with the machine gun mounted on the pulpit platform." (Q-112) The first West China prison sentence followed removal of Mao Tse-tung's picture from a school assembly hall (Q-175), and in North China a Chinese pastor had to flee for his life after committing the same offense in his church. Yet in East China a protest was made against draping the Communist flag over the Christian cross, and the action was not repeated.

As a general rule, soldiers and officials avoided foreign residences, at least until 1951, when all Western-owned property was legally placed under government custody. Long before that, however, several areas reported an obvious "camel-in-the-tent" technique of occupation. Troops or some office staff would move into a single room, then gradually expand into additional "urgently-needed" space. Frequently officials moved in within a few hours of missionary departure; sometimes exit permits were expedited to secure a residence, sometimes they were delayed while competing agencies disputed the right of occupation. One household was told, on a day's notice, that it must find a responsible person to take charge of the residence, grounds, and belongings remaining in it. When that was deemed impossible, a delegation presented a letter suggesting that the neighborhood government be asked. "And so it was that they graciously consented to accept our house, lot, and all goods. They didn't take it--we asked them to do it." (Q-156)

Some authorities were less gracious. In at least three reported instances, all of them from South Chian, officials simply demanded that missionaries vacate their homes, one to a church (while Communist generals moved into his home), another to a small apartment. Three foreigners in Central China moved progressively from home to house to hospital to a Roman Catholic monastery--only to discover that their original residence had been used but briefly, with the obvious inference that the ouster had been arbitrary prejudice. (Q-195)

In contrast to such discrimination there were rare but scattered cases in which Communist agencies rented the property they desired. They paid rent on one Huachung University dormitory in Central China. Several institutions in North China, including the College of Chinese Studies, made arrangements for government leases,which usually netted no rent but assured the payment of repairs, insurance, and taxes for some years into the future. Of one such agreement a missionary stated: "I happen to know that the first two years after the take-over, this government organization actually paid the taxes, as the receipts were shown to the custodian." (Q-211)

Most spectacular of all was the offer to rent China Inland Mission headquarters in Shanghai for a hospital. The Foreign Affairs Bureau threw minor obstructions in the way, but dared not forbid the deal because the hospital had military backing and finally purchased all remaining furniture and equipment at a time when other foreign organizations were forbidden to sell anything. The receipts covered almost the entire cost of withdrawal for all C.I.M. missionaries still in China, including severance pay for servants and staffs. For a mission subsisting largely by faith donations, it seemed divinely miraculous to get

> ....a large sum in rent from the only property in China from which we had gained any financial benefit, and of which we still hold the title deeds, whereas hundreds of our stations were confiscated, together with the deeds.[1]

The question of property ownership plagued the missionaries, the Chinese Church, and the People's Government. Despite long-standing administration by Chinese or joint committees, most institutional and church property in China still belonged legally to Western boards and societies; in fact, many of the deeds were actually in England or America. One reason for this was the "imperialist" psychology, of Chinese as well as missionaries, who had found foreign ownership a distinct advantage under extraterritoriality and Japanese rule. A second was inertia or procrastination. A third was persistent, often subconscious distrust of the judgment or integrity of Chinese Christian leaders, coupled with the valid realization that such transfer of ownership would place new and undue pressures, temptations, and jealousies upon already overburdened Church councils.

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[1] Anne Hazelton, The Hand that Guided (China Inland Mission, London, 1952), pp. 24-26.

The common and sincere explanation offered after "Liberation," was, however, the complete absence of any legal procedures.[1] Neither the last chaotic years of the Kuomintang nor the first harried years of the People's Republic provided any official method of reregistering and transferring property titles. Many a mission board and many a Chinese Church body belatedly sought to legalize a shift in authority and real ownership which had existed for years in spirit and in fact. It was too late.

> Nearly all Missions indicate a long-standing desire to transfer property to the Chinese Church, but failure for the most part to achieve such plans, due to conditions in China during the past decade or more....It was agreed that transfer of property at the present time could easily be misunderstood; should any "imperialistic" stigma attach to any particular property, this would pass over to the Chinese body now accepting ownership...Where taxes had become so high that Missions could no longer afford to pay them, it was unrealistic to attempt to shift responsibility to the Chinese Church, which in present circumstances was even less likely to be able to bear the burden..... In any case, the legal processes for such transfer

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[1] Cf. Whitener, "The Growth of Church Self-Government in North Hunan as Influenced by the Communist Movement," p. 31.

were at present in abeyance. In short, as a general principle, transfer of property from Mission to Church would now (early 1950) be regarded as an untimely act.[1]

One or two questionnaires reported that government machinery for this transfer was finally established in the summer of 1951, months after foreign assets in China were "frozen." Meanwhile local authorities had adopted temporary expedients. In a number of cases the government had demanded registration of deeds, but they were never returned to mission or church representatives. (Q-99)[2] A North China professor simply reported his intention to give his summer home to the university Christian fellowship; A South China teacher who tried to do exactly the same thing was refused permission. Another South China missionary, presumably after transfer procedures had been legalized, was taken by police and other officials with the Chinese seminary president to point out exactly what property he wished to give to the union theological school.

These illustrations involved private ownership alone. With the embargos of December, 1950, all foreign property came under government jurisdiction. Officials regarded schools and hospitals as given in trust to China, and their land and buildings have gone with the institutions, whatever its reorganization or new identity. Ultimate ownership remains unstipulated.

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[1] China Bulletin, No. 89, June 13, 1950.
[2] Cf. Tennien, No Secret Is Safe, p. 70.

Taxation

In a footnote to his definitely "progressive" book, Jack Belden remarked that "the Communists give some indications of wishing to drive Western interests out of China by means of heavy taxes."[1] Some missionaries harbored similar suspicions, when assessments seemed "so high they would sooner or later have wrecked the institution financially." Yet almost without exception objective observers conceded that government tax policy was applied without discrimination. To be sure, rates were higher, on most individual landholders as well as foreign institutions, than they had been under the Kuomintang, which had never collected more than nominal taxes from Christian missions. But compared with charges in Western countries, most of them seemed reasonable. Of still more importance, even when they were branded "too high to pay," they were recognized by most missionaries as "fair" and "in line with other institutions."

A comprehensive analysis by a Western secretary of the National Christian Council said on this subject:

> It was difficult to determine whether present issues in this severe taxing were essentially economic or political, but probably the former....There was no indication to date of discrimination against Christian institutions as such...(in) general practice. There has been discrimination in several individual instances, especially by local authorities....Before long the comparatively small number of Christian institutions which

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[1] Jack Belden, China Shakes the World (Harper, New York, 1949), fn. p. 491.

have as yet been forced to close down for financial reasons will begin steadily to increase.1

The most universal levy in the Communist scale was land tax, but this was seldom applied against mission property except where (as in many Roman Catholic instances) an institution possessed revenue-producing farm acreage.[2] An East China university paid a nominal $2 fee for a small rice plot, in return for which the house tax was completely waived. Another university which did own rice fields, however, was charged five times their annual productive income, retroactively including 1949. A rural missionary was assessed spring grain tax and autumn grain tax, as well as "occasional" taxes and a heavy house tax, but the grain taxes were cancelled when he pointed out that the mission owned no farm land. (Q-56)[3] A few Central China reports mentioned land tax, one "very high," another "not unduly heavy." South China ran far behind other areas in introducing any tax program whatever, yet one rural missionary spoke of a land tax imposed "immediately."

The house tax most commonly affected foreign property but varied tremendously in amount. The Boddes in Peking paid US$1.50; North China missionaries reported $28 per half year, or $70 for two residences (period unspecified). One in East China paid $5-6 for three months. House taxes, based on number of rooms excluding bathroom and kitchen, were called very

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[1] China Bulletin, No. 89, June 13,1950,pp. 11-12.

[2] Cf. Tennien, op. cit., p. 78.

[3] This same report said Chinese peasants were being charged 30-100% of their total produce,plus bonds and loans.

high, small, higher, and "the same as others" in Central China. Only two people from South China referred to them, and gave no figures. West China levies were retroactive for at least three months of 1949, but "not particularly heavy;" one house tax came to more than $125 for the second half year, but was still regarded as "not excessive or discriminatory."

Policies apparently varied in regard to church taxation. North China reported frequent exemptions _if_ the building was in use, _if_ it was Chinese-owned, or _if_ the organization had severed its foreign connections, the last two conditions indicating types of discrimination generally denied. Two East China questionnaires told of full rates on buildings for worship, but thirty to fifty per cent refunds on social welfare rooms.[1] Two indefinite hints of church exemption came from Central China. A larger proportion of South China churches seemed to be taxed fairly heavily (e.g. several score American dollars per quarter), with only two indications of possible reductions for primary schools or other service projects. Nevertheless, Forman, describing only the first year of "Liberation" in Shanghai, reported that "most of the churches, schools, and other non-profit institutions were later exempted altogether from the payment of taxes, or assessed nominal amounts."[1]

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[1] When the Anglican Holy Trinity Cathedral in Shanghai was billed for $56,000, the dean remarked that it must be a mistake, "It is doubtful if there is any mistake; the Communists seem determined to get rid of "imperialist' influences." (Belden, _op. cit._, p. 191)

Charges against educational institutions, often including Bible schools and seminaries, proved universally lighter. Usually in North China they were remitted in full, but one school paid where a hospital did not. In one East China station school buildings were given a fifty percent reduction; in another they were free, but dormitories and teachers' residences paid one-quarter, the church in the same compound full rate. Central China reported taxes on all property except (registered) schools and colleges: South and West China schools were either exempt or "not so heavily" taxed.

Only hospitals suffered obvious discrimination: in this conclusion every area concurred. The first reason was that medical institutions, because they included drug sales, were classified as pharmacies; i.e. commercial or profit-making enterprises. The second factor was the group allocation method of apportionment.[2] In business affairs a blanket assessment was leveled against a certain group, and all the publishers or all the pharmacists--for example--would subdivide the sum within their own ranks. What often happened was that the committee or guild, assuming all Westerners wealthy, would deliberately assign a disproportionate share of the total to the Christian organization; since the division was "democratically" arrived at, there could of course be no redress. Even a government representative was quoted as declaring, when told that mission funds were contributed by humble church people in America: "We know that afterwards the money passed through Truman's hands." (Q-73)

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[1] Forman, Blunder in Asia, p. 133.
[2] Cf. Landman, op. cit., p. 188.

This procedure had the following results for clinics and hospitals in every section of the country. An initial assessment of three or four months' total income, plus a monthly rate thereafter. (North China) An appeal for reduction punished by an additional 75% fine, at the rate of 3% per day, for all delay in payment over ten days. (East) The necessity to sell blankets and other medical supplies to purchase compulsory war bonds. (North and Central) A hospital income tax amounting to approximately 40% or US$100 per quarter. (South) A 10% monthly business tax, or another of about US$1,000 on property and buildings. (West)

Sometimes these levies were broken down into sales tax, temporary merchandise tax, local tax, income tax, etc. in addition to assigned war bond quotas, which often ran as high as $150 worth in six months. One hospital claimed that total assessments by the government equaled half the year's operating costs; another paid $3,000 for each of two years, the second apparently a deliberate scheme to get control of the property.[1] At least one report stressed that "no other hospital (was) similar treated." In many instances charges were "retrogressive" (as one missionary termed it), covering from three months to three years of pre-Communist operation. Occasionally they carried fines for failure to pay within three to five days. One levy of some $500 forced a direct cut in salaries, food, drugs, and charity work. Yet there was seldom any amelioration.

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[1] Personal Letter, No. Q189, August 29,1952.

The adjectives employed in questionnaires are revealing. North China called the tax burden high, exorbitant, no small amount, not unreasonable, large but not beyond ability to pay. East China termed it enormous, terrific (three persons), prohibitive, outrageous, excessive, confiscatory but not discriminatory, high but not discriminatory, abnormally high and unjust. Central China said heavy, very high, ruinous, steep, but also fairly reasonable, higher than average, moderate, mild enough. For a West China community program with no ongoing income, it was an "intolerable tax burden," but for a rural service unit, "not as heavy as we feared." Such subjective reactions obviously depend both on local circumstances and individual standards of judgment.

The important fact is that only two people, one in East China and one in South China, asserted that "the Reds are definitely discriminatory," (Q-179) and no evidence was cited in either case. This does not by any means rule out the possibility that ultimate confiscation may have been a major motive. Several missionaries so concluded.[1] It recognizes that Chinese institutions were similarly pressed, and that--with few local exceptions--missions taxation was "not different from national policies and practices in regard to schools, hospitals, etc." (Q-181)

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[1] Some Chinese, however, hoped that "it was sheer economic necessity which caused....the present high taxation, and that taxes might be somewhat lighter after 1950."

> Authorities concerned felt that....they had been too lenient in granting tax exemptions, and....the Government was unlikely to give favorable consideration to any appeal on behalf of Mission or Christian institutions as such.. No such taxes as are now imposed were intended by the (previous) Government or by those who set up the institutions, nor were such taxes on philanthropic work levied in other parts of the world. On the other hand, Chinese philanthropists had also built institutions for the people, and these were taxed....As time goes on, little or no private educational or philanthropic work is likely to be permitted, whether Christian or non-Christian.[1]

The last sentence provides the key to the whole situation. Communist China's rigorous tax policy almost certainly had the dual purpose of producing revenue and forcing institutions into government hands. Even so, it was but part of the larger program to bring all social, educational, medical and other public service under state control. The taint of foreign imperialism undoubtedly offered additional incentive and justification, as shown by chiselling English language names from buildings. Obviously, too, welfare work was more suspect and more sharply circumscribed when linked to Christian evangelism.

But foreign and religious ties were simply extra complications, accenting the need and the methods to secure government control. No totalitarianism can long tolerate any institution or program, however valuable its contribution, which is not one hundred percent subservient to the political state. The experience of Protestant missions in Communist China merely demonstrated afresh that truism.

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[1] China Bulletin, No. 89, June 13, 1950, p. 11.

CHAPTER 15

IMPRISONMENTS

It is comparatively easy to understand, if not to accept, the Marxist critique of religion as an unscientific superstition with socio-economic origins. In terms of political power one may comprehend, if not justify, the totalitarian insistence on controlling educational, medical, and welfare services. But Westerners find it very difficult to realize that Communists genuinely suspect other people of being spies, saboteurs, agents, at least counter-revolutionaries. Propaganda against Christianity, subversion of institutions, confiscation of property--all these may be indefensible but not inexplicable. The deliberate mental and physical persecution of foreign missionaries, who have dedicated their lives to helping the Chinese people, seems as incomprehensible as it does intolerable.

This chapter is an attempt to sketch and to clarify that situation as it pertains to Protestant missionaries in Communist China. It is not a complete survey, although it touches all the known cases of actual imprisonment. It makes no effort to reproduce detailed accounts already published elsewhere; several participants have described or will describe their experiences more vividly and accurately than any third party could. It does not aim to be melodramatic or spectacular. On the contrary, the most exciting and emotional episodes, with very few exceptions, did not culminate in formal arrest and imprisonment. Examples of these have been included in the area studies. It is recognized, too, that certain house arrests or even long periods of unrestricted detention produced more mental and nervous strain than jail sentences. They are simply too numerous and too intangible to be analyzed here.

The actual incarceration of foreign missionaries by Communist authorities, as distinct from "popular" trials and student demonstrations and journalistic charges, at least provides concrete data for study. Minor inaccuracies inevitably creep in, but there is no reason to believe that reports and statistics compiled do not represent an authentic overall picture. Apart from earlier local incidents, the wave of alien arrests began late in 1950, as propaganda swelled with the intensity of the Korean War and Chinese "volunteer" participation. By March, 1951, an acute observer in Hongkong wrote:

> A number of missionaries are in prison in various parts of China. I do not know how many are in this situation, but ten persons are known to me....In every area known to me, some missionaries have been kept for several months after applying for exit permits.[1]

For the next two years, 1951-1953, the American press carried almost weekly stories of Roman Catholic trials, imprisonments, and tortures, ranging from systematic beard pulling[1] to "tying wasps in the sleeves and bonnets of the Sisters."[2] Protestants, on the contrary, adopted a policy of silence, fearful of repercussions on Chinese and foreign colleagues if mistreatment drew publicity. When Senator Knowland produced a list of thirty-two Americans imprisoned in Red China, the State Department explained that it had previously refrained from publicity for two reasons: requests of relatives concerned with the individuals' welfare, and "warnings by countries assisting in making representations to the Chinese Communists that in their opinion official publicity might jeopardize the success of their efforts."

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[1] China Bulletin, No. 104, March 21, 1951, p. 1.

Finally under greater pressure for publicity--and action--than for secrecy, the Department of State issued on April 21, 1952, its fullest list of Americans held in prison or under house arrest by the Chinese Communists.[3] A breakdown of these sixty-one names may provide some revealing data. The first classification is by denomination or occupation. In prison: Methodist one, Presbyterian (U.S.A.) four, Conservative Baptist one, Lutheran one, Christian Missions in Many Lands one, Yunnan-Tibetan Christian Mission one, Churches of Christ one (erroneously reported as China Inland Mission), Mission to Lepers one, Independent two (erroneously labelled

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[1] _Waterbury American_, September 15, 1952.

[2] Francis Spellman, "How Red China Tortures Protestant and Catholic Missionaries" (_Collier's_, May, 10, 1952).

[3] _New York Times_, April 22, 1952, p. 3.

Presbyterian), Roman Catholic nineteen, students three (two on Fulbright Scholarships), businessmen six. Under house arrest: one Methodist, six Presbyterians, four Northern Baptists, eight Roman Catholics, and one student.

A second breakdown by geographic areas gives the following results: in prison, North nine, East nine, Central six, South eleven, West six; under house arrest, North four, South sixteen. Protestant missionary totals read thus: in prison, North one, East none, Central none, South seven, West five; under house arrest, North three, South eight. Various errors have since been revealed, as to denominational affiliation, location in China, and actual condition at the time. The definition of house arrest, for instance, even where circumstances were known, might equally well have applied to other missionaries.

Almost a year later, as of April 1, 1953, the following Protestant figures are as nearly accurate as possible: in prison, three Presbyterians U.S.A. (South China), one Lutheran (North), one Conservative Baptist (West), three Independents (South); under house arrest, two Independents (North and South); en route, one China Inland Mission (West). In addition to these eleven Americans,[1] there are believed to be still in China these nationalities: one British (C.I.M.,

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[1] Out of some 2,535 American Protestants serving in China in 1948 (Waterbury American, April 17, 1952).

West), one Australian (C.I.M., West), one German (retired Presbyterian U.S.A., North), one Finn (Finnish Lutheran, Central), and the Danish Lutheran Chinese citizen in Manchuria.

Each set of statistics reveals the greatest number of missionaries detained in South China, but in proportion to the original number at work in each area, West China still shows the highest percentage. As far as the individuals are known, there seems to be no discernible pattern in these arrests or detentions, either national, denominational, or geographic. Those still in China include doctors and nurses, evangelists and teachers; they include missionaries with over thirty years' experience and at least one "first-termer;" they include theological conservatives and liberals. One might conclude, as many observers did, that each section of the country sought in some way to make an example of at least one foreigner, as "ammunition" for the propaganda barrage; how the selection was made remains a mystery.

First-Hand Accounts

Out of two hundred and twenty-five questionnaires received, thirteen--covering twenty-one people--reported actual periods spent in Communist jails, ranging from one night to twenty-three months. Another twenty-two Protestants are definitely known to have served prison terms; the number of Roman Catholics is undoubtedly much greater. A far larger group suffered weeks or months of house arrest, under various definitions of that term.

Forty-three Protestants, as an absolute minimum, represent two to two-and-a-half percent of those "liberated" in China. Six percent of those sending in questionnaires had been jailed. Catholic figures would certainly raise the proportion. The most conservative statistics, therefore, show an incidence of alien imprisonment (as distinct from wartime internment) almost unprecedented in international relations. This chapter seeks to examine very briefly the charges and circumstances surrounding these cases, insofar as the facts are available. It does not aim to recapitulate life in a Chinese Communist jail,[1] although a few unpublished accounts will be summarized at greater length as illustrations.

In succeeding chronicles no names are mentioned, except where references to printed articles indicate previous publication. A chronological approach has been selected in the hope that some pattern, some "rhyme or reason" for this official behavior might possibly emerge.

Within four months of "Liberation" a rural missionary was arrested and confined for five weeks, without any charges or explanations. Passports were taken up, but no other "punishment" invoked, and the couple remained in town another year and a half, under house arrest or close surveillance only the last three months before their departure in 1951. He himself offered two comments: "possibly due to local military operations," which should have affected his wife and colleague as well, and "probably due to over-zealous officials trying to curry favor." (Q-56)

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[1] Cf. Bryan, "I Came Back from a Red Death Cell" Saturday Evening Post, January 17 through February 7, 1953); and Tennien, No Secret Is Safe, pp. 96ff.

Less than five months after their "Liberation" a young couple were jailed overnight for visiting a country church without permission from the local government. At the time of registration two months earlier they had been told they were free to travel as they pleased, and the husband had done so several times. "This sudden objection and arrest was perhaps partly due to a change in government policy and partly due to wish to 'show the foreigner up' or 'put him in his place --but hard.'" In any case, no explanation satisfied the "hard-boiled" officials ("first time they stepped down from their smiling, friendly attitude"), and the pair spent a night in jail and published a confession of "wrong" actions in the local newspaper for three days. They too carried on almost a year more. During a later house inspection their radio was sealed and the missionaries threatened with a firing squad if it was moved or tampered with, yet police refused to take it to their headquarters for safe-keeping.

> That worry would have to hang over us. We believe it was their purpose to make us afraid and to try to create some incident to bring us to trial or disgrace in the public eye. The missionary's good name had to be smeared somehow. (Q-32)

The other eleven first-hand episodes occurred after the Korean War, although the first of them antedated Chinese participation. It stemmed from an incident in July, 1950, when a teacher had removed and stored a picture of Mao Tse-tung and later criticized the portrait-hanging custom as a mark of dictatorships. During police interrogation she erroneously confessed to a second removal, which had actually been engineered by a student accuser and the picture loaned to party headquarters. The first confession satisfied the foreign office, but the case was then transferred to the criminal court. After futile explanations and interpretations, the missionary was sentenced to five days in jail--and released on the minute.

She was assigned to a room with twelve other women, plus bedbugs and rats, for which she secured DDT and Skat on the third day. Once the prisoners were sent out on a work detail to clean up a garden within the warden's quarters. Repeatedly propaganda officers tried to impress upon the foreigner the enormity of her crime "and get more material against me." Her own cook and friends sent in food, although no one was allowed to visit her. She attended some compulsory indoctrination classes and "thought reform."

Her own explanation of the case stressed the propaganda effect just after the first anniversary of the People's Government. Despite previous distinctions between American citizens and their imperialistic leaders, a prison official had declared:

> Americans in China have always been above the law; they could do anything they liked, and Chinese law couldn't touch them. But a Chinese in America who broke the law would be judged and punished by American law. Now, at last, we have shown that we are masters in our

> own country. An American has broken Chinese law, and The People have judged and condemned this criminal.

The law cited was a proclamation against "interfering with the freedom of a Chinese," which had originally applied to obstructing "Liberation" or hiding Kuomintang refugees. The missionary felt certain that there were at least three Americans on the foreign office list, against whom they had secured accusations. This appeared to be the most opportune occasion. Involved too--perhaps more deeply--was the resentment of a student who had been reprimanded in the past for her "campaign of lies and half-truths and vicious misrepresentations against the principal." Probably, also, propaganda was already being built up to justify "volunteer" action in Korea within the next few weeks. Anti-American sentiment, however, was still overshadowed by effusive friendliness publicly displayed when this teacher emerged from her five days of incarceration. "Some have been forced to retract their stand and confess that they were wrong to show me sympathy, but I know what their unforced reaction was." (Q-175)

The longest Protestant prison term yet completed and publicized was that of Olin Stockwell in West China.[1] Arrested on November 26, 1950, this Methodist evangelist and administrator was held as a "counter-revolutionary spy"[2] and charged with the following crimes: misusing medical supplies from the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction, disseminating Voice of America broadcasts, harboring an international spy, sending code messages, and instigating public disturbances.[1] As mission secretary for West China, Stockwell did pass on world news items to isolated missionaries who had no radios. He did house an American journalist for awhile, but "the espionage charges were all bosh."

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[1] Cf. F. Olin Stockwell, With God in Red China (Harpers, New York, 1953).

[2] Associated Press radio tickertape, November 29, 1952.

For fourteen months the prisoner was kept in solitary confinement, no direct word of his whereabouts reaching the outside world. For the next nine months he was transferred to an indoctrination center for the avowed purpose of thought reform or "brain-washing." (Q-212) Any defense of democracy was branded as decadent and reactionary; no interpretation of American facts or ideals could be reconciled with Communist "truth." He came to realize eventually that "settlement (was) possible only as I admitted all 'crimes' and took the Communist attitude toward all social, economic, and international problems." (Q-212)

> "They have no idea of truth that is not associated with Communist standards. The barest of lies becomes the 'truth' if it advances the Communist cause.... They always judge everything on the basis of its relationship to the cause."[2]

When this position became absolutely dogmatic and irrefutable, Stockwell concluded that he "would be in jail until I died unless I interpreted myself as they interpreted me."[1] He therefore confessed not only to the valid but misrepresented charges of circulating letters and pictures, harboring a "spy," carrying on economic work under the cloak of religion, etc. but also to sending six code messages (the Reds had one code forgery as exhibit) and owning a rifle. "He says he gained his release when he came to understand that to argue with the Communists is as useless as to argue with a drunkard; he signed such statements as the Communists desired."[2]

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[1] New York Times, November 25, 1952, p. 3.

[2] Quoted by T. Otto Nall, "From a Prisoner of the Communists to a Prisoner of Christ" (Christian Advocate, March 5, 1953, p. 26.)

The missionary emphasized, however, that his confessions came neither from torture nor from drugs. "The Communists do not have to resort to such methods to get their prisoners to confess; except through a confession there is no other means of getting out."[3] His treatment was never cruel or brutal or even rude; after nearly two years' imprisonment he was still in comparatively good health. "Under arrest I was treated (the) same as other missionaries and Chinese." (Q-212). In addition to his well-worn New Testament, he had a poetry anthology, in the margins of which he wrote a 50,000 word account of his physical and spiritual experiences, requesting ink whenever a new confession had to be signed.

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[1] New York Times, November 25, 1952, p. 3.
[2] Associated Press radio tickertape, November 29, 1952.
[3] Nall, op. cit., p. 9.

Of Christianity and foreign missions, Stockwell said:

> "All religion is superstition, according to the Communist belief....So missionaries are counted as 'spies' using superstitious ideas to promote what is called 'cultural aggression.' Missionaries are thought to be the tools of American 'imperialism,' the puppets, willing or unwilling, of American capitalists, the dupes of the 'bosses of Wall Street.'"[1]

As fighting in Korea and propaganda in China grew in bitterness, the imprisonment of Olin Stockwell touched off a chain reaction of missionary arrests all across the country. Wrote Father Tennien: "After November 1950.... restraint in jailing foreigners was cast aside. The Communists' chances for recognition or entry into the United Nations were thrown to the winds and there was no need of playing the game any longer."[2] Dozens of foreigners already victims of student demonstrations or journalistic charges momentarily expected worse. Scores more, previously hesitant about withdrawing at last recognized clear-cut justification for evacuation.

In December, 1948, a teacher in Central China left her "liberated" territory north of the Yangtze and journeyed to Shanghai, part of the way on a U.S. Navy LST. She came for supplies and to assure other missionaries that the new regime was tolerant and cooperative toward Christian work; she carried a permit from Communist authorities to return to her station--and used it. Nine months later her school was registered with the government and preferred to eliminate all Western staff. She moved to the provincial capital and continued dispensary work and teaching in a Bible school.

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[1] Quoted by Nall, op. cit., p. 26.
[2] Tennien, op. cit., p. 221.

In December, 1950, she and three guests were arrested on "a trumped-up charge" of failing to register her visitors. After nearly six weeks in jail, one of the guests had a fit of epilepsy. Next day officials, apparently fearing responsibility for his death, ordered the Chinese pastor to secure two shop guarantors. When that effort failed, church groups were tried, but finally that night "we were let out on that one pastor's guaranteeing us; no other Chinese dared guarantee foreigners." (Q-98) Both the missionaries inside and the Chinese Christians outside had been told that the prisoners would not be released until America had been defeated.

Because the two men were held at the same time in the same political section of the Public Safety Bureau, and even had "constant behind-the-back communication,"[1] the case of Stewart Allen has been linked in the public mind with that of Olin Stockwell. Long friends and colleagues in Chungking, almost the same age, Allen was a Canadian doctor, Stockwell an American clergyman. Yet except for the partial overlapping of time and space, these two imprisonments proved more striking for their differences than for their similarities. Since Allen's story had been recounted in print,[2] it will be reviewed here only enough to bring out salient points.

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[1] Personal Letter, No. Q189, February 14, 1952.

[2] Cf. Allen, "I Was a Prisoner of the Chinese Reds" (MacLean's Magazine, April 15, 1952).

Whereas Stockwell had been arrested by police with no public trial, Allen and a foreign nurse were summoned to a hospital staff meeting on December 20, 1950, ostensibly to denounce Warren Austin's speech at the United Nations. Instead it was a well-organized accusation rally against the foreign superintendent, with charges of the "usual type so familiar to all who know Communist China today:" espionage, mistreatment of patients, connections with American imperialism (he was formerly medical officer for the U.S. consulate), connections with the Kuomintang (his mission, not he himself, had once telephoned for permission to route a funeral procession across a corner of Chiang Kai-shek's property).[1]

For four hours Allen knelt before a picture of Mao Tse-tung, while frenzied accusations were literally screamed out and the audience in three squads shouted slogans set for them by cheer leaders. With one exception accusers were student nurses, workmen, and labor union officers, not fellow doctors and nurses. After two days of internment in the hospital (the missionary nurse had eight) Allen was formally arrested by request of the hospital Labor Union and Student Youth Corps.[2] That evening he was questioned by a political court, consisting of seven officials, who demanded a confession of espionage and reactionary activity. The public charges at the staff meeting, however, had been too flimsy to support any such judgment. "This was my only formal appearance before a formal court until my trial eight months later, but on an average of twice a week I was taken to an office and questioned by a single investigator."[1]

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[1] "The Case of A. Stewart Allen, M.D., C.M., F.R.C.S.(C), F.I.C.S." (prepared for Canadian Government, January, 10,1952).

[2] Mimeographed Letter, No. Q189, spring, 1952.

Prison conditions were remarkably good. Assigned, never sentenced, to eight months in solitary confinement, Allen had an eleven-foot-square room with bamboo bed, stool, and table. A few books were sent in; he could purchase soap, toothpaste, and occasionally food. The menu was "the best provided for the senior staff of the political section;"[2] it was supplemented by a Western breakfast of dry bread and milk, and when it was pointed out that the quantity of food was inadequate for foreigners of bigger build, "thereafter we were never hungry." (Q-189)

By the end of August, having failed to establish any evidence of subversive activities, the authorities transferred Allen to the "court prison" (with twenty cellmates in a room fifteen feet square) and shifted the charges to two civil counts which had been under investigation before the hospital fracas. One involved E.C.A. supplies, which were to be divided equally between government and mission hospitals. Immediately after "Liberation" the former share was turned over the Communist agencies, and only after months of trying in vain to secure official action did the committee distribute the mission share. In doing so they "concealed and forcibly seized and held goods of the 'false' enemy government which ought to have been turned over the new People's Government."[1] The other charge was failure to pay sales tax on drugs. The two overlooked transactions occurred one before the new law, the other before the hospital office had noted its publication; the total amount due, US$.89, was assumed covered by a flat $300 settlement made for that period.

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[1] Allen, op. cit., p. 56.
[2] Mimeographed Letter, No. Q189, spring, 1952.

These two convictions were handed down by a civil court on October 15, 1951. Both had been under investigation a year before; neither had any relation to the staff accusations. No political crimes had been established or confessed; in fact, the doctor could not be an all-out capitalist, since he had left school at thirteen to labor in an apple orchard.[2] The final sentence was a fine of about ninety dollars and deportation from the country, finally carried out in December, 1951.

Allen detected no distinction between American and Canadian imperialism, but traced most differences to individual reaction. "Even the least bit of....stubborness or willingness to argue the point.... is interpreted as poor attitude and works definitely against one." (Q-189) On the other hand, he agreed fully with Stockwell that the only way to escape the web of Communist accusations is to confess.

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[1] Official Judgment of Chungking People's Court, No. 2697, October 15, 1951, in "The Case of A. Stewart Allen."

[2] Allen, op. cit., p. 57.

> To clear a case where opinions of the accused and investigators differ, it is often easier to admit guilt, though one may not believe oneself guilty, except on the basis of the investigator's interpretation of the facts. Hairsplitting is thus avoided, and one swallows his pride in the interests of early release.[1]

A week before Allen's arrest two single women had arrived in his city from an isolated inland town, where they had been conducting an effective "socio-evangelistic program." (Q-118) After waiting ten weeks for an exit permit from local authorities, they now had to wait for transportation to the coast. Before it was available, they were seized by police and told that officials in their own town had brought accusations against them. These included the following charges: (a) students were forced to polish their shoes; (b) they had made a map of the town, showing government offices; (c) they had made a chart of local products, agricultural and manufactured; (d) they had sent to America pictures of Chinese life, some showing people at work and students polishing their shoes; (e) they had given Easter candy to children and told them Mao and the Communists were bad, Chiang and the Kuomintang good. (Q-117)

After hours of interrogation the two women were imprisoned, separately, in the same building where Allen, Stockwell, and a French Catholic Brother were confined. Much of the subsequent questioning had to do with one of these fellow-prisoners, not only for information but apparently because the country charges against the women were too insubstantial to pursue. Between the January cold and food allergies, one of the pair grew critically ill but was suspected of feigning sickness. At the end of a month they were taken back to their own town by six armed guards, in a station wagon rented at their expense for US$100.

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[1] "The Case of A. Stewart Allen," op. cit.

Here, however, the cells were front offices in a temple, and "it was plain that the authorities planned to treat us like guests." On Easter Eve they were given their Chinese Bibles and a week later allowed to be together, after thirteen weeks in solitary confinement. Their first public trial took place on January 30, 1951, before several thousand people, representatives of one hundred and nine schools, labor groups, and other organizations. "We stood on the ground, facing the crowd; our accusers, mostly girls whom we had befriended, stood on a platform behind us, and from notes screamed hysterically." (Q-117) Most of the charges could be subsumed under the heading of oppressing students, "especially those who had received aid from us." According to one second-hand report, they were even accused of killing a girl by stringing her up by wire.[1] The other fifteen points were never clear, but included "evidence" of subversive activities on behalf of the United States Government:

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 161, March 21, 1951.

a carton with the word "radio" on it, a typewriter "used for sending and receiving messages abroad,"[1] a discarded wire clothesline, a woman's society program on Tibet based on National Geographic Magazine maps and a 1908 encyclopedia, a similar program on Korea a year before the outbreak of war there.

The whole meeting was organized and systematically conducted by the "blue-clads" (Propaganda Corps), replete with the now-familiar antiphonal slogan-shouting: "Down with imperialism....missionaries....America....etc." The accusers petitioned the government for punishment "according to the law," but the few cries of "Kill them!" brought no response.

> It seemed to be a trial of our Christian friends rather than of us. The purpose of the meeting seemed plainly to discredit us, Americans, Christian missions and missionaries through the years, and the Church, and to put fear into the people by showing the power of the Communists over everyone. (Q-117)

Five and a half months later a second mass meeting was held, far larger than the first. A colleague asserted that the Central Government had ordered the release of these two women, but local authorities had to "save face" by formal condemnation and sentence. (Q-45) Since signs along the street urged "Deport them!" the missionaries anticipated the outcome. Speakers, including at least two Christian

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[1] Mimeographed Letter, No. Q117, October 1, 1951.

leaders, repeated and embellished previous charges, and no opportunity for defense was given. After three hours the sentence of deportation was pronounced "amid cheers." It was carried out by three armed guards, who had arrived in town for the purpose a week before the final accusation meeting.

The chief of police had been sympathetic throughout, had ordered chairs for the accused (one of whom was ill) against the protests of the Propaganda Corps. After the trial he told them that "the people wanted to kill you (but) the big-stomached government are freeing you."

> During the Chief's farewell address, he also reiterated over and over how terribly Americans were treating Chinese in America--that they were all in dungeons without food or water, dying like flies; how America is in a state of total financial collapse; how the Korean war had been entirely won by China; and how our co-workers, Chinese, "who had done no more harm than you" had been executed. Our three guards on the way out kept stressing how "your sins are not upon you; it is not your fault that you are victims of American imperialistic and capitalistic society." (Q-117)

In this case it seems quite probable that news of Allen's denunciation and arrest had incited a similar "incident."

In this crucial month of December, 1950, many long-smoldering issues burst into flame under the intense heat of propaganda--and example. Back in July a young missionary had torn down three small posters from the compound wall, posters which bore no government seal and defied the "post no bills" sign, but posters which happened to say: "Congratulations to the Communist Government!" Soldiers who saw the act presented a formal accusation to city authorities against this foreigner who "looked down on" (despised) the new regime. No official word ever reached the "culprit," but friends told him of the charge and advised an apology, which was written, presented, and almost forgotten.

After repeated unexplained delays in securing exit permits, it was revealed that his apology had never been accepted, so it was rewritten, finally approved, and sent to regional headquarters for publication. On December 30 the missionary was arrested and held in a private room near the government buildings, not a jail, with an armed guard. His bedding was sent for and his wife allowed to visit, but she "always had to taste (any food) in front of the guards, lest she was poisoning me." (Q-157)

On New Year's Day the missionary was "to meet a group of people" regarding a newly-written apology. The "group" consisted of several thousand assembled for a people's court trial. The foreigner's explanation over a public address system was drowned out by "the organized cheers of soldiers against Truman, MacArthur and Me." Uniformed workers raised their arms and shouted, "Kill Him!" and he was marched away, "not to be shot, but to be deported immediately." In one city en route he was held for nine days in a tiny, cold shack, then moved on to Hongkong. Save for "a gun in my back....I received no rough physical treatment anywhere."

It was nine months later before his wife and new-born daughter left China, seven months waiting for a pass and two months under house arrest en route, perhaps because the deported husband was waiting in Hongkong for awhile, instead of "losing face" by going on to America alone. (Q-156)

> I feel that I was just an example of American imperialism. They could have trumped up any charge but they wanted a specimen for that (New Year's) holiday. There was evidence that the whole thing was a trap--they had their own bulletin board just across from our compound. (Q-157)

Thousands of miles away events developed in similar fashion. A missionary "elder statesman" had been singled out for Communist suspicion from the very day of "Liberation," which he was accused of broadcasting to the outside world six hours in advance. Late in 1950 student feeling and government pressure for reorganizing the school had become so severe that the missionary chose voluntary house arrest, refusing to appear for a grilling by students and officials. February, 1951, was a month for universal accusation meetings by every organization determined to "Oppose-America-Aid-Korea."

When the teacher was finally summoned to a mass rally of ten thousand people, he consented to attend only when the chief of police guaranteed protection from mob violence and sent a guard of four men. The twelve accusers read their prepared statements. Knowing that refuting charges would be useless, the missionary nevertheless accepted the opportunity to explain his presence and three decades' service, for "there was never a time....when I felt China needed the Gospel as much as she does at this moment." (Q-191)

Such a sermon was promptly stopped on the ground that this trial was a matter of politics, not religion, that this alien was charged with imperialism, war-mongering, deceiving youth, non-cooperation with the new regime, insulting the flag, unjust treatment of teachers (underpay and overwork). Demands for death or imprisonment were modified to unanimous sentence of deportation. After four days in prison, the missionary was roped and led to a steamer, reaching Hongkong a few days before his wife and colleagues.

When school demonstrations achieved such emotional fervor in Nanking, their effect spread rapidly to other sections of the country and inspired attempts at imitation. In one North China middle school all students who had had contact with the Westerners were asked for material; if Christian criticisms sounded too general, they were rewritten by the Young Democratic Youth League (or New Democracy Youth Corps). "Great pressure was put on all....nothing spontaneous....and we stayed indoors with the gate barred." (Q-31)

To the missionaries concerned the charges seemed "none serious, many untrue, some laughable." Games and music were used for "doping students with American culture;" naming a cat for The Chairman was shaming China;[1] the coming of the People's Liberation Army had been compared to the famous short story, "La Derniere Classe;" and the missionary wife had allegedly refused to teach Mao Tse-tung's

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[1] The Chinese word for cat is mao in a different tone; cf. Durdin, "Red China's War Against God," Saturday Evening Post, June 7, 1952, p. 64.

"On People's Democratic Dictatorship" in English class.

During February and March most foreigners applied for exit permits and some departed. A few students came at night to warn their Western teachers of further demonstrations or inquisitions. On March 31, 1951, three policemen in a jeep presented an arrest warrant to a young American, and his wife was brought into headquarters from another part of town shortly afterwards. That afternoon he was quizzed, standing, for three and a half hours, but admitted only having advised students against joining the Youth League because it would imperil their Christian faith.

After three hours' rest, during which time the house had been searched, there were three more hours of grilling, then an hour's rest, then three more of interrogation. At 3:30 a.m. the couple were sent home but ordered to sleep on separate floors and have no communication. Two days later, charged as imperialists but not spies, they were placed in solitary confinement, deprived of glasses, watch, New Testament, pencil, wedding ring, etc., but allowed soap, toothbrush, comb, and pajamas. Breakfast the first morning consisted of steamed bread, rice gruel, and salted turnip. Occasionally through a crack the husband could see his wife pass by on the single permitted journey.

There were almost daily interviews, and as these had to be followed by written statements of fact or confession, gradually his glasses, a table, and other "accessories" were added. Questions concerned his letters to the mission secretary, other missionaries, his student Bible class, property, etc. "I considered it an answer to prayer that no attempt had been or was ever made to force me to talk about my Chinese friends."[1] Gradually the prisoner devised a schedule of Bible reading, recreation, singing, prayer; colleagues sent in food, clothing, and precious toilet paper. Twice he was taken by car across town to verify certain statements before higher headquarters.

When the couple had been imprisoned, a guard had whispered to a comrade "fifty days;" in exactly that time they were summoned to be photographed and sentenced to "deportation, never to return," then taken home to pack. All files, photographic equipment, Chinese curios, porcelains, embroideries, etc. were confiscated, along with typewriter and phonograph. The next evening students lined the street to cheer the truck carrying imperialist spies for expulsion, but some did not join in, and there were "faces full of friendship." Five sentries escorted the couple to the nearest port and guarded them in a hotel room for nine days awaiting passage.

The confessions finally signed included such items as the following: advising students not to join the Youth League represented interference in the nation's political life; a derogatory remark years before about a Communist stemmed from a capitalistic social background; a suggestion that Russia might demand Chinese grain was a rumor damaging Sino-Soviet friendship; unregistered Bible classes and student conferences were secret meetings; photographing Russian visitors concerned Chinese political activity and therefore should have had permission; sending information to America and to Hongkong about political study groups, tax policies, Mao's report, the local university, and other "matters outside my scope as an educator and evangelist" was illegal, because a retroactive law made almost everything a state secret, and "what harms (the) interest of (the) people is a crime."[1]

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[1] Personal Journal, No. Q31, April 21, 1951, et passim.

> Can't fathom motivation behind our treatment. Perhaps it was to find someone in the province worthy of the honor so that she should not be behind the others. Perhaps it had something to do with the Government's desire to get hands on property. Perhaps their hand was forced by the enthusiasm of the youth league. I incline toward the latter, though it was coordinated with the mass clean up in April, so it may have been part of the general program. Of course it was coordinated with everything else. (Q-31)

In another section of the country a rather unique form of trial and imprisonment commenced in April, 1951. For two weeks the missionaries endured "grilling interrogation in relays, mornings, afternoons, and late at night, until they wore us out physically as well as mentally." (Q-216) This "trial" with two cross-examining lawyers for the prosecution, none for the defense, took place in the mission residences, where the accused was "obliged to sleep with a lamp burning by my bedside and armed guards walking in and out of my bedroom."

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[1] *Ibid*., recorded June 15, 1951 *et seq*.

The charges were based on mission reports, minutes, and other business letters sent to America--including one reference to an air-raid blackout made not by the defendant, but by his predecessor already returned to the United States. "It became increasingly clear that they were trying to prove that I was a spy for the American 'imperialist' government, in fact, that all missionaries were more or less spies." After repeatedly rewriting and expanding "confessions" as to letters written but denying espionage in any form, the missionary reporting was marched off by police. Told earlier that there were three possible sentences--expulsion, three years' imprisonment, or execution--he anticipated the worst.

Instead of the city jail, he was taken to an outlying mission residence, where three other colleagues and later a French Catholic priest were imprisoned. In subsequent American publicity[1] these four Americans were listed as under house arrest, but one of them asserted, "This was a bad misnomer; it was prison in solitary confinement from the start, even in our own houses." Mission servants bought and prepared the food, which the missionaries paid for, yet police reserved the right to control both servants and food and even to withhold food as a disciplinary measure. One protest led not only to omission of another meal, but also to handcuffing.

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[1] Eg. New York Times, April 22, 1952, p. 3.

Other conditions followed strict prison routine, especially after the foreigners were moved to a Catholic Mission. Clothes and bedding were inadequate but could not be supplemented. Razors were produced twice a month and returned to the guards immediately after use. The red wooden "night pail" in each room had to be emptied, washed, and brought back each morning; that and a ten-minute sponge bath alternate days provided the only opportunity to move outside the private rooms. The four or five foreigners in the same house "saw nothing ~~of each~~ of each other and for a year and nine months were not allowed to speak a single word to each other."

During this period interrogations went on and on, until in June, 1952, "a legal officer (who had studied in America) was sent from Canton or Peking to review our case." Some of the chief investigation revolved around an interdenominational mission conference held in New York in 1945, where a speaker said of post-war China, "The church must be the conscience of the nation." Since a nation has no conscience, that must have meant secret intelligence, and the conference itself designed to train missionaries for espionage. Another device was to quote from another prisoner's alleged confession and demand acquiescence. Still another claimed to differentiate between being a spy and doing spy work, a subtle distinction in Chinese which would have been equally effective for propaganda.

> By that time I had begun to look upon the whole "trial" as a farce and no longer saw any principle at stake. They were determined to get what they wanted even if they had to twist and change my statements to say what they wanted me to say. Moreover, I was always dead tired and worn out, so that I began to follow the line of least resistance. (Q-216)[1]

The final self-indictment had to be retyped in quadruplicate by the "culprit" himself between three and eight one Sunday morning. The missionaries were never informed of their sentence, but it apparently fell somewhere between the first two threats, for after a year and three-quarters the four Americans were deported together.

A young missionary who applied for an exit permit in October, 1950, was allowed to advertise in November and told to "wait a few days." Five months later he wrote a formal letter seeking to expedite his case, and the police commissioner refused to accept it. After another five months he was abruptly arrested and committed to prison without any trial or even any interrogation in all this time. On the morning of his summons, however, the order for deportation was read to him, issued by the Military Control Commission. Its reasons covered espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities as follows: (a) photographs taken of the Yangtze

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[1] American Consul Angus Ward, held for months in Mukden, is reported to have said that "while no hand was ever laid on him physically...if his Chinese interrogators had questioned him for only a couple of weeks longer...he would have confessed to anything they wanted"--and voluntarily, that is, convinced of his own guilt. (Hunter, Brain-Washing in Red China, p.7); cf. John D. Hayes, "I Saw Red China from the Inside," U.S. News and World Report, March 13, 1953, pp. 31ff.

Gorges before "Liberation;" (b) dissuading students from joining the army or participating in revolutionary work ("for which there was not the slightest foundation in fact; the opposite was rather the case"); (c) frightening students with talk about atomic bombs; (d) organizing groups to listen to the Voice of America and spread reactionary rumors about the Korean War ("I had no radio from the time that war broke out until I was arrested"). The order for deportation stated that these charges had been made in writing by the entire student body of the university where he taught and worked, and had been thoroughly investigated--without once questioning him. A move to organize an accusation meeting had apparently failed; "at least nothing appeared in the papers or came to my ears previous to my incarceration." (Q-181)

After preparing his finances and baggage, the prisoner was taken to jail "to await execution--of the deportation order."[1] The "execution" took seven weeks. Aside from toilet articles and bedding, he was refused personal belongings, including a Bible, later restored. With inadequate clothing for fall weather, he developed pneumonia and only belatedly received any medical attention. Steamed bread, thick vegetable soup, and rice gruel "wasn't too bad if one was accustomed to Chinese food, though over a long time one would probably suffer vitamin and mineral deficiency." A pint of water both noon and night had to suffice for drinking, washing dishes, and "bathing"--which was frowned upon.[1] At the end of fifty days he and two other foreign deportees were escorted by armed guard to the border.

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[1] Mimeographed Letter, No. Q181, August 15, 1952.

> My brief incarceration may be interpreted as a "face-saving device" resorted to only after holding me so long in the hope of finding something on me and then failing in the end. This is a plausible theory. Another similar guess would be that the handling of my case was part of the effort to whip into line the students and faculty of the university amongst whom I had lived and worked. There was some evidence that their "hate-America" was not fully effective. By smearing one who had appeared such a real friend of the "new" China as really an agent for the U.S. "using religion as a cloak for subversive activities" (a quotation from the deportation order), one of the last reasons for not going along with the government's campaign would thus be destroyed. (Q-181)

It is impossible, of course, to draw any positive conclusions from thirteen first-hand reports, even though they cover nearly fifty percent of verified Protestant imprisonments. Certain general indices, however, support subsequent overall conclusions.

At the time of their arrest, seven were under thirty-five years of age, eight over fifty, only three in the bracket between; the ages of three, probably young relief workers, are unknown. While this shows correlation with total age statistics,[2] it is significant that only two persons had reached sixty; the other "oldsters" were all under fifty-five. This fact fits two theories about Communist selection of victims: although largely chosen for propaganda prestige value, the older foreigners "persecuted" should not be martyrs. Of the younger group, three had exceptional popularity and influence with students, which had to be destroyed; the others and the "middle-aged" trio represented "the Church" and "the West" in isolated rural stations, where affection and esteem must be undermined.

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[1] Personal Interview, spring, 1952.
[2] Cf. Chapter 7 of this study.

Two worked in North China, one in the East, four in the Central sector, seven each in the West and South. All were Americans except for one Canadian and one Australian, prpbably a U.S. citizen. There were seven Methodists, one Free Methodist, two Presbyterians (U.S.A.), four Northern Baptists, one Disciple of Christ, one Mennonite, three Friends (?), one Reformed Church of America representative, one "United Canadian." Part of this denominational disproportion may lie in the greater percentage of Methodist questionnaires received. Part of it represents the size and influence of Methodist missions, especially in West China. Part of it may confirm the impressinn of a few observers that Methodists had it "tougher" than most Protestants, because of the episcopacy, Chiang Kai-shek, or wealth and prestige. On the other hand, the last Methodist missionary was deported in November, 1952, and a number of Presbyterians (a second major American denomination in China) are still imprisoned.

As to reasons for arresting these twenty-one people, there is no consistent pattern. Espionage was charged in about half the cases but loomed paramount in only a few, perhaps because evidence proved embarrassingly slim. In the earliest cases, and maybe others, zealous officials apparently proved their patriotism--and authority over foreigners. The majority seemed clearly efforts to discredit missions and missionaries and demonstrate fidelity to the propaganda line. Only six of the twenty-one individuals arrested had public trials of any sort, and two of these were during imprisonment, not before sentence.

Second-Hand Accounts

Few details can be recorded reliably from second-hand information. Such an attempt might jeopardize those who are still being held, without adding any accurate details. One group was reported *incommunicado* while regular letters were coming through from them. Others have been moved, even hundreds of miles, and neither their charges nor their circumstances can be verified until they are released. A few available facts, however, may shed a bit more light on the prison experiences of Protestant missionaries.

One of the earliest Americans to be "liberated" endeavored a year later to visit friends in another province. Although civil war was still going on, she had requested and presumably secured permission from both her own town and her destination. *En route* she was arrested for an incorrect road pass, and after being held for a total of fourteen days, nine in solitary confinement, with armed guards, July heat, flies, bedbugs, etc. she was sent back "home" on orders from the city she hoped to visit. A protest at that end, however, revealed no knowledge of the case.[1] Her own report to family and mission board made no mention of anything more serious than "dreary waiting."[2] A year before the Korean War, excuses were still based on civil offenses or technicalities, not political accusations.

Probably the first European prisoner was arrested in November, 1950, and released in September, 1952.[3] In the summer of 1951 he was transferred to a provincial prison and the following May was sentenced to be shot, a sentence somehow commuted to deportation. The curator of a university museum was accused late in 1950 of stealing Chinese treasures and sentenced to three months at hard labor, a total of four. (Q-42,-175)[4] An exceptionally popular teacher, after surviving harsh denunciations and public trials, started for Hongkong and was arrested and jailed on the way. (Q-53, -86) A Lutheran charged with being an American spy, sent to China "to help spread economic discontent among the people," had a six-months prison sentence suspended plus two years' probation and was deported after four days in jail.[5]

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 109, July 28, 1949.

[2] Personal Letter, No. 109, August 30, 1949.

[3] China Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 13, September 29, 1952.

[4] Cf. Ibid., No. 104, March 21, 1951; the labor part was never verified, cf. Personal Letter, No. 161, March 12,1951.

[5] New York Times, January 28, 1952.

Most of the missionaries still imprisoned in China were arrested in the early months of 1951, when the wave of anti-American hatred swept most ferociously across the country. From the island of Hainan, China's southern extremity, to the western borders of Yunnan, foreigners were being arrested and held. After fifteen months authorities concluded one prisoner had been in jail long enough and should realize how generous the People's Government was in releasing him; conditions, he said, had been "not too bad," and he was given a military escort to Hongkong.[1] Another missionary reported out of a year's prison experience that there was no particular physical strain, beyond the monotony of diet, but the mental strain was severe, including forty successive days of questioning, from two to nine hours each day.[2]

Nor were the British spared entirely the taint of American imperialism. After four and a half months' incarceration for various "criminal affairs," centering around an unregistered radio, an Englishman was sentenced to deportation by a round-about overland route. More unusual, his colleague, who had not been arrested, was sentenced to simultaneous deportation as an accomplice who had "guaranteed" the prisoner and testified that he could not operate a radio transmitter if he had one.[3]

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[1] *China Bulletin*, Vol II, No. 10, July 31, 1952.
[2] *Ibid.*, No. 15, November 3, 1952; cf. Hayes, *op. cit.*
[3] Personal Letter, No. 166, August 7, 1951.

In some prisons conditions were less salubrious than those reported first-hand. One man had all his belongings confiscated, including money, paper, pencil, Bible, and glasses, so he could buy nothing extra, or do any reading or writing. He had no bedding but a Chinese prisoner shared with him, one of twenty-one other men in a twelve-by-twelve cell. They could not all lie down at once, yet they were allowed on their feet only fifteen minutes a day. For eight hours daily they listened to Communist indoctrination.[1] A colleague in another town spent nine months in prison, with no charges presented and no trial. Meanwhile his wife was ill and destitute for funds, yet she or the older children had to carry food to the jail; otherwise the prisoners would be set at hard labor to earn their meals.[2]

The foregoing illustrations admittedly lack vital details, and they are deliberately vague and jumbled as to geographic location. But again the net impact provides the same inferences. Forty per cent of the total known Protestant imprisonments occurred in West China, over thirty per cent in South China. Only one took place in East China -- early and isolated and north of the Yangtze--yet many of the most violent mass demonstrations and accusation meetings were held in Shanghai and Nanking. In a majority of cases these public denunciations did not result in prison terms, although some of the targets were repeatedly reported as jailed, and most of them fully expected it. (Q-215)

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[1] Hazelton, The Hand that Guided, pp. 32-33.
[2] Ibid., pp. 33-37.

There may have existed some friction--or at least non-cooperation--between the Foreign Affairs Office or the Public Safety Bureau, the agency responsible for handling foreign cases and preserving order, and the semi-official Propaganda Corps. Time after time the latter vented their spleen in tumultuous rallies, parades, and slogan-chanting with no punishment forthcoming beyond a school or newspaper apology. Perhaps that was sufficient for propaganda purposes. Perhaps the actual arrests and imprisonments stemmed from sincere conviction of civil or criminal guilt, although evidence too often seemed artificially concocted. Many of the missionary cases served a dual role: official punishment for law-breaking plus an effective propaganda theme.

Until 1952 there were seldom more than two or three arrests in one locality, although four missionaries in one district were rounded up together.With very few exceptions these appeared to be the men or women of greatest prestige and/or popularity. The older missionaries imprisoned were usually the seniors, the administrators, the heads--actually or tacitly --of the mission group. Said one, "I was a marked man from the start because I was Mission Secretary," and had to send out minutes, reports, and other information to the board.(Q-216) These people had served in China for twenty-five to thirty years and knew the country and the people well. They were certainly influential and generally beloved, though here and there a forthright colleague spoke of an out-moded imperialistic manner; e.g. "whatever their real crimes, it was easy to prove their 'wrong attitude.'" (Q-89)

Among the younger objects of attack or public accusation, a kindred explanation is possible. Of those known personally to the writer--from North, East, South, or West--several had won exceptional places for themselves in a short time. A number were particularly sympathetic with the new regime; one had joined the teachers' union. Most of them excelled their contemporaries, and many of their elders, in linguistic fluency, and had identified themselves closely with the Chinese people in standards of living. As one of them remarked, if this type of whole-hearted "friend of China" could be thoroughly discredited as a spy and agent of Wall Street, using religion as a cloak for nefarious acts against the New Democracy, it should be relatively easy to extend the charges of espionage and subversive activities over all foreign missionaries.

Of course there were exceptions, where the sole motive appeared to be local circumstances or individual prejudice. There were cases which seemed to fit no category except expediency. One of the latest arrests, for instance, followed close on the heels of an allegedly "staged" germ warfare raid,[1] but nothing is known of the charges or circumstances leading up to imprisonment. On several occasions, when public animosity had been stirred up to such a pitch as to threaten mob violence, government authorities intervened by arranging prompt deportation. Lynching or other physical harm befalling Westerners would not only damage the Communist cause abroad, but would wreck the internal propaganda value of a case by turning once trusted and harmless foreigners into martyrs.

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[1] Personal Interview, No. 160, May, 1952.

In only a few instances have Chinese officials overestimated the physical endurance of Americans and allowed them to die "at Communist hands." Two of these deaths came from natural causes, almost certainly hastened by inadequate medical care, on the one hand, and the nervous strain of prolonged detention, on the other. Mrs. Perry Hanson, who first went to China in 1903, had insisted on returning with her husband past retirement. Though they never reached their previous station of Tai-an after the Japanese War, they rendered valuable service to the Church in Peking, Tsinan, and Tsingtao. In April, 1951, eight months after requesting an exit permit, Mrs. Hanson died quietly in her own home, over seventy years of age.[1]

The last regular missionaries left Fukien province early in 1951; Bishop Carleton Lacy remained. Always an optimist about the Christian Church in China, he had flown back from the United States less than two months before "Liberation," and had even travelled to his major outstations, with or without government permission. By the summer of 1950, however, he concurred in community judgment that evacuation was the wisest course for the sake of Chinese colleagues as well as missionaries. On September 1, he submitted his own application for an exit visa and advised his co-workers to do likewise.

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[1] Cf. Perry O. Hanson, "A Modern Book of Ruth" (privately printed, 1952), pp. 18-22 _et passim_.

During the next fifteen months he was summoned repeatedly to the Public Safety Bureau, often unable to make the three-mile trip because of high blood pressure and a heart ailment. Many of the interrogations seemed trivial: the few months during wartime when he acted as "Dutch consul," or the more incriminating welfare service rendered in transmitting U.S. government pension checks to illiterate Chinese beneficiaries; the distribution of international relief goods; a piece of property he tried to give away. When the last Protestant missionaries withdrew, a government agency first dispossessed the Chinese church workers in the same house, then occupied part of the bishop's suite, and finally forced him to move to a nearby apartment, strewing his belongings on the path in their inspection of what he might or might not take with him.

By summer of 1951 he had spent some weeks in the former mission hospital and secured police permission to reside there "until the exit permit is granted." Even there, however, restrictions increased, and chatting with other patients was frowned upon. He saw almost no one except his cook and a European private physician--plus interrogators from the police. No charges were ever made formally, but each item investigated and cleared was followed by another. Church leaders, in compulsory accusation meetings, had blamed him for opposing self-support by urging--long before the currency "freeze"--continued acceptance of foreign funds.

When he could not produce a 1951 diary--vital instrument of Communist self-criticism[1]--because he had not kept one, police insisted that the final 1950 entry should have given full explanation of this decision to discontinue daily notes. Repeatedly the exit permit was promised soon, especially toward the end of 1951, but early in December, according to subsequent Catholic reports,[2] police announced another delay of "at least two months." On December 11, 1951, he died in bed, and was buried in the mission cemetery, with only his cook allowed to attend him.[3]

An unusual postscript was added: on request to the Foochow branch of the Three-Self Oppose-America-Aid Korea Movement (formerly the Christian Council), Bishop Lacy's personal belongings and those he had packed to bring with him were sent to Hongkong. Further, his cash on hand and in a "frozen" bank account were credited toward the expenses of shipment, although complete confiscation of personal funds as well as goods would have been fully expected.

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[1] Cf. Hunter, op. cit., pp. 15-16 et passim; also Frank Cooley, "Remaking the Minds of the Chinese People" (unpublished manuscript, 1952), pp. 37-38.

[2] Personal Letter, No. 140, January 18, 1952.

[3] Pathfinder, March 19, 1952, p. 25; April 9, 1952, p.51.

A third Methodist death, also from "natural causes," could be directly attributed to Communist "torture by neglect." Gertrude Cone had continued teaching months longer than her colleagues and did not even apply for an exit permit until early 1951. That spring there was a typical accusation meeting with no "follow-up," although she was marched through the streets with demonstrators jeering at her.[1] "They didn't have any formal charges against me--they couldn't get anyone to bring them."[2] That summer the missionary, her compatriots all gone, had an operation on her shoulder. The surgeon assured her it was not cancerous, but doctors at the time of her death insisted he--and consequently political authorities--must have known differently.

By August 10, 1951, Miss Cone was down to her last dollar, literally, and requested permission to wire Hongkong for funds. The police were evasive. For months she lived on one or two bowls of rice per day, with an occasional turnip or radish or other pickled vegetable.[3] Once she begged on her knees for a chance to telegraph for more money. In early December she fell, presumably from malnutrition, and hurt her hip, probably by this time infected if not broken.

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[1] Boston Herald, February 22, 1952.
[2] Personal Letters, No. 167, February 19-22, 1952.
[3] Ibid.; cf. New York Times, February 21, 1952.

After another refusal to allow her to send for money, she stayed in bed two days and wrote the Foreign Office that she was starving and was sure they would not wish that. Promptly a police representative called to see her and authorized transmission of the telegram to Hongkong.

Before the money could reach her she was desperately in need of hospital attention, but could not enter the former Methodist institution without cash to pay in advance. At last her servant suggested borrowing from the Church, and it was this sum of $6,000,000 (about US$300) which a second telegraphic transfer had to repay. Within five days after she entered the hospital, the exit permit requested thirteen months before was granted; "it looked as though they finally decided they did not want her to die in Nanchang."[1] A doctor, a nurse, a government official, and a representative of the Chinese Church escorted the stretcher patient to the border, the only such instance apart from deportation.

Two days later--on February 20, 1951--Gertrude Cone died, from widespread cancer, pneumonia, jaundice, and the worst cases of malnutrition and beri-beri ever witnessed by the Hongkong doctor and hospital.[2]

The case of William Wallace, Southern Baptist doctor, has been fully publicized, with various inferences.[3] Almost alone in Wuchow, he conducted what admiring Catholics called "the most modern and best equipped hospital in South China."[1] He himself was loved and respected by the Chinese people and even praised by the Communists, so much so that propaganda attacks on the man and his institution had repeatedly failed. On the night of December 19, 1950, soldiers knocked and claimed to have a sick man needing treatment. They pulled Wallace from bed, searched his quarters, and "found a pistol," although the doctor and his servant swore he had none.[2] Wallace was taken to prison in his pajamas, while Catholic missioners in the same town were similarly "framed;" one of them later described exactly how the gun was "planted" in his room. But Wallace "was the spy chief, for they discovered not only hidden guns, but radio gadgets for his secret sending set. The whole spy ring was now rounded up."[3]

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 168, February 21, 1952.

[2] Personal Letters, No. 167-168, February 21, 1952.

[3] Cf. Time, December 31, 1951, p. 59; Pathfinder, March 19, 1952, p. 24.

Not only did his Chinese associates refuse to condemn him in accusation meetings, but doctors and nurses even wrote a petition denying the charges.[4] Six staff members were arrested as reactionary pro-American agents and never heard of again. Wallace was paraded through the streets with a derisive placard around his neck until he was near collapse, but the constant inquisitions were worse. Mark

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[1] Tennien, op. cit., p. 236.
[2] de Jaegher and Kuhn, The Enemy Within, pp. 51-52.
[3] Tennien, op. cit., pp. 234-243.
[4] Durdin, op. cit., p. 59.

Tennien suggested that the serious, sensitive doctor may finally have come to believe some of the charges against him: that he worked against the Chinese people, that his incompetence had murdered some patients, his negligence others. At least he told a Sister, "If they keep this up, I'll go out of my mind."

When his mind broke into a delirium of weeping, shouting, and laughing, guards poked him with bamboo poles through the bars. One night in February William Wallace ceased screaming and moaning. Communist authorities said he had torn his sheet into strips and hanged himself, but Roman Catholic missioners in prison with him, summoned to "verify" the suicide account, found no discoloration or marks of strangulation and would only certify to apparent insanity. The head nurse of his hospital signed a statement of suicide in order to give him a Christian burial.

Admitting the possibility, with no eyewitness testimony, that "Dr. Wallace was driven to insanity by the tortures inflicted upon him and in that condition took his own life," his mission board executives nevertheless accept substantially Mark Tennien's report:

> The circumstances as described by all accounts available to us lead us to believe that Dr. Wallace died under the terrific suffering imposed upon him, and his body was hanged up in the prison by Communist guards in order to make it appear that he had died by his own hand. Those who examined the body have unanimously expressed the opinion that it gave no evidence

of death by hanging.[1]

In September, 1952, Secretary of State Dean Acheson broke a long-standing policy of discretion and moderation to denounce the Chinese Communist regime for its brutal treatment of Gertrude Cone, William Wallace, and Roman Catholic Bishop Francis Ford.[2] (Another American, a businessman, died soon after release from a Tsingtao prison, apparently from lack of medicine for a diabetic condition.[3]) Said Acheson:

> There may be more Gertrude Cones, Bishop Fords, and William Wallaces, whose cases are unknown to us. We only know that these Communist crimes will be forever condemned by those who believe in simple justice and fair play for human beings.[4]

What led authorities in these widely scattered cities to misjudge so fatally the physical stamina of these particular individuals? Why was medical advice, specifically given to officials in every case, ignored so long? Was there no awareness, as there seemed to be in so many other circumstances,[5] that foreign martyrdom would set back the propaganda cause? Did the Peking Government reprimand those responsible for these errors in judgment?

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 169, February 5, 1953.

[2] Died in prison, February 21, 1952; cf. Religious News Reporter, September 15-21, 1952, p. 8.

[3] Cf. Waterbury American, December 10, 1951.

[4] Christian Advocate, October 2, 1952, p. 13.

[5] A police officer in West China admitted that the government was not interested in killing the bodies of foreigners, but wanted to break their spirits, emotions, and reputations and then let them go. (Personal Interview, No. 276, October 9, 1951)

The answers to such questions will never be known. All of the missionaries cited fit the previously suggested category of "victims," in that they possessed particular popularity and prestige in their respective localities; they were "senior" missionaries who had closely identified themselves with the Chinese people--but also with the Chinese Christian Church. Perhaps all other factors were pure chance. Certainly no Communist propaganda or "official explanations" can keep from the Chinese people, Christian and non-Christian alike, the facts and the implications of these imprisonments and deaths. A student letter sent from North China in 1952 referred to Bishop Lacy's death nearly a thousand miles away, adding: "I still wonder WHY."

CHAPTER 16

CHINESE CHRISTIANS

The history of the Christian Church in Communist China has only begun. Reliable data are completely inadequate; interpretation of statements and events would require divine insight. Whether the end of foreign missions in that land be regarded as a judgment of God or a victory of Satan, Christianity and Christians are undergoing profound testing. It may well be that a new depth of spiritual power will emerge, utterly untapped by more than a century of missionary effort. Certainly Chinese names are being added to the roll of martyrs of faith.

This chapter makes no pretense of entering those sacred precincts. It does not even draw on published materials of the Chinese Church, most of which are now politically oriented. Rather this is a summary of reports from missionaries as to "restrictions and pressures placed on Chinese Christians." The sources and viewpoints are exclusively Western. They are included in this survey because they seem to indicate that not all the anti-religious persecution has been directed at foreign imperialism. How much of it can be dismissed as strictly social and political the reader will have to judge.

The People's Government has from the start proclaimed and reiterated freedom of worship. Violations of this clause were explained in early months as "misunderstanding" by local officials. The annual report of the China Inland Mission for 1949 specifically stated:

> Restriction and repression are the result of misunderstanding by lower officials, who, in closing churches, confiscating Bibles, or imprisoning pastors, are actually contravening the policy of the highest authorities. Certain it is that the nature and intensity of the restrictions vary enormously in different provinces.[1]

Michael Lindsay, correspondent for the New Statesman and Nation, who defended the Communist position on most questions and agreed with this interpretation, went on to add: "The point at issue is whether the Communist leadership is prepared to enforce discipline on lower officials who refuse to obey official Party policies."[2] One reason given for not doing so was the encouragement of local democracy. The ostensible reason for the meeting of selected Christian leaders with Premier Chou En-lai in May, 1950, was to protest certain injustices and to seek alleviation of some restrictions imposed on the Church in various places. Instead it became a platform for the Three-Self Movement against imperialism, which led in actual effect to the elimination of foreign missions.

The People's Government guaranteed freedom of worship. Yet from every area came reports that local authorities required registration: sometimes only for irregular meetings, sometimes for ordinary services, sometimes for any group of more than three persons. In a few extreme instances Christians had to register as individuals and receive permits to attend Church. Occasionally a pastor turned in his entire role for police records; more often sentries or political agents attended services and took note of participants. To prevent "contamination" of youth, no one under eighteen was allowed to go to church in one East China town; from Central and West China came hints that no soldiers or Communist Youth Corps members were permitted to join in worship services. (Q-181) Said one Chinese: "To get at the top in my work, I ought to join the Communist Youth Corps, but you can't belong to that and be a Christian; I'm determined to be a Christian; whether I get to the top or not." (Q-45)

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[1] Anne Hazelton, God of the Valleys, pp. 18-19.

[2] Van der Sprenkel, New China: Three Views, p. 149.

Not only attendance was discouraged. Voluntary offerings were forbidden in some groups; church bulletins were censored; crosses and pictures and other religious symbols were discouraged. At least once a wedding hymn was banned.[1] In North China (these are scattered instances, not universal rules) sermon outlines had to be submitted for official perusal in advance. Central China pastors were told what, in general, they should say, and one was arrested for preaching against materialism. A West China minister was ordered to be more pro-Communist in his sermons. The mayor of Nanking told assembled clergymen that they should have nothing to do with foreigners and should preach only on what Communism and Christianity have in common. (Q-17)

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 138, January 18, 1951.

Hours for worship encountered frequent conflict, some of which appeared deliberate. "Police permission must be obtained for Church services, even for prayer meetings attended by more than three people."[1] In every section of the country political meetings were held on Sunday, often at church time.[2] North China reported that post offices, government agencies, and the like had no Sunday holidays (perhaps adopting the Russian "rest day"), but civil servants who did find time to attend church were criticized. Several questionnaires from each area told how churches, as well as schools and other institutions, were required to send delegations to every patriotic rally, procession, and even public execution. Often they were assigned a large bond quota, despite severely restricted income.

Freedom of worship did not extend to pastoral duties, sometimes not even to private devotions. One North China minister was deprived of his work as early as February, 1949; parish visitation was definitely discouraged, occasionally even by confining the clergyman to his home during land reform. To cover that period, whenever it arrived in various provinces, a national edict forbade any public meetings while the redistribution was under way. In many, perhaps most, rural areas this was interpreted as banning regular Sunday worship, as well as Bible classes, prayer groups, etc. The obvious aim of such a law was to forestall any organized opposition to the government program, but in many localities it provided an excuse to close churches which were often never reopened.

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[1] An Observer, "China:An Object Lesson," (Edinburgh House, London, 1952), p. 13.

[2] "The Chinese Christian Church and Its Environment," notes made by a Chinese Church leader for the guidance of his ministers (mimeographed, March 15, 1950).

> Religious liberty is a very questionable thing. Several of our stations are not allowed to hold services. In some places Bibles have been taken (in other places the people have burned their Bibles in fear). The church....must submit a list of worshippers after each service. Even here in the city all extra meetings must be registered.[1]

Officially there could be no discrimination against an individual on religious grounds, and those cases which arose could be dismissed as instances of local prejudice. But they were myriad. Ranging from the primary child who asserted that Jesus was greater than Mao Tse-tung, and had to stand until she could think of a "better answer;" through high school students ineligible for elections because their citizenship grades reflected unacceptable religious viewpoints; to college students whose Christianity cost them scholarships and jobs--Chinese Christians felt the opprobrium of "unpatriotic" and "superstitious" positions.

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[1] Personal Letter, March 16, 1950, quoted in No. 136.

A surgeon who had been an active leader of a Christian youth group was accused in People's Court of bad medicinal practice, but he was warned that he would be severely dealt with unless he improved his political thought. (Q-183) "A soldier had been a Christian in his home and wanted to continue in that fellowship with us, but he was not allowed to come at will and could not read the Bible in his barracks."[1] A Christian government worker in Central China admitted that there could be "no private prayer or reading of the Bible in staff quarters," but if not in one's room, where else? (Q-177)

In isolated spots from Manchuria to Tibet, Bibles and hymnals were seized and sometimes destroyed. From Central China before the end of 1949 came a report that "officials in two country places forced the Christians to close their services; their Bibles were collected in one place and they were threatened with more severe action if they continued to meet."[2] A South China woman told her missionary friend that a group of Christians were memorizing the Bible, for the day would come when all Bibles might be burned or destroyed.[3]

As an absolute minimum freedom of religion theoretically implies freedom of belief. But in a totalitarian state even this stops short of political opinion--and every area of thought impinges on the political. To those high school students who maintained that God, rather than human labor, created the world, "freedom of belief" did not guarantee a passing grade in "social studies," even when a diploma was at stake. History textbooks expounded the "truth:"

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[1] "Our Story," p. 14.

[2] Hazelton, op. cit., p. 32.

[3] Acronius, "China and Communism" (Missionary Monthly, December, 1951), p.341.

> Jesus, the illegitimate son of a carpenter's fiancee, reformed the Jewish religion....Later the disciples of Jesus rewrote the dogma and changed it into something to uphold the teachings that the property of the rich should not be touched and that the poor should resign their fate to God so that they might enter Heaven. Thereupon, this religion was at once accepted by the Roman emperors.[1]

If a Christian presumed to interpret history differently, his opinion became not merely reactionary and superstitious, but unpatriotic and subversive. Evolution was taught as an essential political dogma,[2] but an old serving woman disposed of that by consoling her missionary employer, after rather rough questioning by a young police officer: "Don't let it bother you; what can you expect from a man whose ancestor was an ape?"[3]

This insistence on the orthodox party line, even in the realms of science and religion, spread a subtle poison through the Christian ranks. On the one hand, there was a tendency to take refuge in other -worldly fundamentalism; on the other, an over-emphasis toward ethical materialism. Each had its good points: a probing for fundamentals, an application of the Gospel. But each had its dangers too. The "escapists" lost contact, in any realistic terms, with the environment in which they lived and will live. The "compromisers" blunted the cutting edge of their religion. As one missionary put it:

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[1] Hunter, Brain-Washing in Red China, p. 272.

[2] An Observer, op. cit., p. 17.

[3] Cooley, "Remaking the Minds of the Chinese People," p. 28.

> It seems to us here that the church officially is leaning over backwards to emphasize those teachings of Christianity which have been borrowed by the present regime and is ignoring the less comfortable and popular aspects of our faith. The use of the catch phrases at present popular in official communicatinns to our churches and church workers leaves a cold feeling in my middle. We have no right to criticise others for weakness; it is not our country and our position is much more favorable, but it worries me none the less.[1]

One of the sharpest examples of this "adjustment," and one of the heaviest pressures applied on Chinese Christians, came ostensibly from inside the Church: the demand for signatures to the Manifesto, and often the Stockholm Peace Appeal.[2] This campaign proved highly effective because of what one missionary termed "a subtle confusing of Christianity with patriotism." (Q-68) Even so, resistance and apathy were so great in some places that pastors simply copied their church rolls, and for any individual to protest would have been dangerously incriminating. (Q-210) Representatives who attended the conference with Chou En-lai promptly adopted this technique of mingling political and religious issues. For example, "Acheson plans to train priests and missionaries as agents in China and Eastern Asia....We must follow the principles of not using foreign funds and foreign personnel."[1]

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 160, June 6, 1950.

[2] Cf. Hugh W. Hubbard, "Chinese Reds and Religion," Christian Advocate, April 9, 1953, p. 14.

Remarked one:

> Often missionaries know too much about China, especially rural workers....Let them go back home when their terms of service expire (at another time Chou said when their passports expire). Let their return to China wait upon the independence and Chinese control of the Christian Church.....The government has dossiers on all missionaries.[2]

Declared another:

> The People's Government will protect Christianity but does not want to give the impression of encouraging it....The Chinese Church may be able to maintain its ecumenical ties, but it will not be easy in the near future.[3]

In succeeding months the maintenance of ecumenical ties proved not only difficult, but impossible. In April, 1951, a second national "Christian" conference in Peking, which launched the official wave of accusation meetings, also issued a statement, condemning the World Council of Churches for its support of the Korean War, and "definitely, completely and forever, cutting off all connections with American and other Mission Boards (note Missions, not Churches)."[4] Both the World Council of Churches and the Vatican were publicly branded as centers of Western imperialistic influence and tools of American aggression.[5] In protest against the World Council's Toronto meeting and statement, T.C. Chao renounced his position as co-president of that organization and took his stand as "an honest and loyal citizen of the People's Democratic Government."[1] He--or political authorities behind him--recognized that he could not be both.

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[1] "Confidential Notes on Reports of Conferences with Premier Chou En-lai Regarding the Church in China"

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] China Bulletin, No. 108, May 10, 1951.

[5] Ibid., No. 107, May 10, 1951.

Six months after the nation-wide circulation of the Manifesto came renewed pressures for local churches and national organizations to hold accusation meetings aimed at Chinese and foreign associates. From April, 1951, until the end of 1952, the "religious press" was filled with pleas, entreaties, rebukes, and threats, denying official recognition to those groups which had not yet held their denunciations. A proclamation sent to all Chinese churches explained the conditions necessary to establish a chapter of the Preparatory Committee of the Three-Self Reform Movement (successor to the National Christian Council):

> Until the Accusation Movement has been successful, nothing else can be discussed, and we cannot talk of setting up a Branch....When your Accusation Movement has succeeded and you have exposed every kind of crime of the American imperialists in controlling and using the Church in the invasion of China, and when, through your Accusation meetings, you have exposed all the past and present imperialist elements and rotters in the church, and distinguished between friends and enemies, and stand firmly with the people, only then on this foundation of thinking, and when you have found out and cultivated in your movement very many more active (or positive--e.g. pro-Communist) elements, you will be able to talk about setting up a Branch.[2]

Just a few weeks after the Peking Conference the

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[1] Chinese News Agency, July 11, 1951, quoted in Personal Letter, No. 161, September, 1951.

[2] Quoted in Personal Letter, No. 161, September, 1951.

New China News Agency published an article on "How to Hold a Successful Accusation Meeting." The prerequisite was to remove the thought barriers of many Christians, contaminated by reactionary and imperialistic sentiments. Stressing the importance of preparatory work, the article called on every church and similar group to decide carefully in advance committees who should be accused, who should do the accusing, what goals were desired, what material could be used. Participants were exhorted to follow the facts, ignore sentimentality, be sincere and thorough, and hold firmly to the position of the people. Accusers should in turn build up high tension, then moderate the emotional tone, then build up mass hysteria again.[1] Some Christians obeyed.

Often these meetings condemned missionaries or others safely out of the country. For example, John R. Mott, "America's cultural spy," was charged with leading the World's Student Christian Federation in a "cultural invasion....to get China's youth to ignore politics and concentrate on Bible reading and prayer, thus diverting them from their revolutionary interests as citizens of a 'semi-colonial' nation."[2] On the other hand, some of those within China who were most bitterly attacked (e.g. Frank Price[3] and Ralph Mortensen in Shanghai) received their exit permits eventually without suffering more than

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[1] Cooley, op. cit., pp. 51-52.

[2] Christian Century, October 3, 1951, p. 1139.

[3] Cf. Outerbridge, The Lost Churches of China, Appendix 5, pp. 221-224, although Price himself says, "The translations in Outerbridge are very poorly done."

"voluntary" house arrest.

Not all of the religious discrimination was so lenient. No one can possibly ascertain how many arrests and imprisonments and executions of Christians involved *bona fide* crimes against the state, how many represented religious persecution in disguise, how many had mixed motivations. Almost unanimously missionaries reported that individuals were not attacked as Christians; "the reasons given were political or economic, and no religious issue was raised." (Q-94, -39)[1] Yet the majority added a strong note of suspicion: "Many of these, we are morally certain, were taken up entirely because of their association with us foreigners and because of their positions of Christian leadership." (Q-124) Even in this assertion the anti-imperialist and anti-religious factors are joined.

Charges against Chinese Christians covered a wide gamut of offenses, civil and political. (Q-181) Laymen were punished as landlords, reactionaries, enemies of the people, financial exploiters. (Q-182) One was imprisoned for seventy-seven days on charges of repeating rumors about Nationalist bombing. Another spent fifty-two days in jail because he could not satisfactorily account for city electrical equipment placed in his care. A third was sentenced to twelve to fifteen days for not reporting ownership of some distant family lands which other people cultivated. "All of these jailing instances," reported a missionary, "seemed to be planned by the local government to terrorize church people so that they would fall in line." (Q-32)

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[1] Cf. Personal Letter, No. 23, December 24, 1951, quoting resettlement officers in Malaya that this is "one of the devilish things about Communism."

Undoubtedly a great many of these cases originated solely at the local level, in response to certain general directives against landlords, capitalists, reactionaries, and "running-dogs of imperialism." No laws were promulgated which in any way would contravene the Communist definition of religious freedom--although accusation meetings became practically an order from the "national church." But the climate of opinion in which Christians suffered abuse and discrimination stemmed directly from official propaganda and implied policy.[1]

With these and other circumstances against them, Christian clergy and laity were at the very least under closer surveillance and suspicion than non-Christians. A Central China missionary reported of a provincial capital: "When I left, there were nine Chinese pastors in prison--

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[1] The brief Red occupation of Seoul revealed a similar pattern under very different circumstances; "The confiscation of church property and the removal or liquidation of religious leaders were both motivated primarily by immediate practical needs...Issues involving a conflict between church and state were obviously in the wind, but they were not specifically articulated during the short three-month period." (John W. Riley, Jr. and Wilbur Schramm, The Reds Take a City, Rutgers, New Brunswick, 1951, p. 159.)

some whose sentence had already been passed upon, one for seven years, another five years at hard labor." (Q--98) Said another from East China: "Christian leaders weren't imprisoned on 'religious grounds,' but other reasons were made up as excuse to imprison many leaders. Quite a number of our own leaders were killed; some shot, others buried alive." (Q-107) It is noteworthy that more questionnaires from East China, where missionaires had the easiest time, referred specifically to persecution of Chinese Christians, perhaps simply on a relative basis.

As indicated in the preceding chapter, Communists avoided the charge of making Christian martyrs, even among their own people.[1] "The Communists were making no Christian martyrs," said one East China nurse; "the Christians who were 'purged' were 'counter-revolutionaries' or some other charge, and the accusations against them were public and loud on grounds other than religion." (Q-144) Even the most devout believer has no desire to surrender his life--or even his position in society--as a "running dog of the foreigner," a traitor, an oppressor of the poor, a tool of Wall Street, or even a reactionary. One of the missionaries who later died under Communist detention remarked soon after "Liberation" that Chinese Christians would not be given even the comfort or "satisfaction" of true martyrdom. As another put it, "They were not made to suffer because they were

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[1] Cf. MacEoin, The Communist War on Religion, p.235.

Christians, nor was their suffering such as could be a testimony to their faith or character." (Q-7)

But suffer they did. It may be impossible to prove that Christians were singled out as such for imprisonment or execution, although accurate statistics would probably show a percentage of "liquidated" Christians much greater than their ratio to the total population. But mass murders have been "verified" by a number of missionary reports, including some eye-witness accounts.[1] John Hayes in an interview described the red "death carts" in his area.[2] From the vantage point of a Communist jail a woman testified:

> Five thousand Chinese in the prison where I was, crowded in until they had to ship them out for slave labor to make room for others. Still others were being taken outside the city and buried alive at night, in the big trenches dug for fortifications by the former government. I know these things to be so.. Several times I have seen the ditches that had been filled in during the night before, and have been told by a truck driver who had taken loads of these unfortunates to their graves. Chinese who have education and ability, unless they are openly going along with them, are in danger. They can't stay neutral. (Q--98)

In view of this concentration on political and economic crimes, especially those connected with Western imperialism, many people expected that indigenous Christian movements, unsullied by foreign contacts, might fare better under Communist rule than the established churches. The last Congregational missionary to leave China wrote: "It seems that the independent Chinese Churches are having least difficulty...(and) actually seem to be thriving."[1] Some Christians frankly turned to these native groups in the hope that they could escape the charges of unpatriotic reactionism without abandoning their spiritual faith. A few independent evangelists have continued preaching and even publishing religious literature with only minor interference, although others have been arrested for proclaiming an Authority above the State.

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[1] In one large mission center the first public execution was staged, apparently deliberately, directly opposite the police station where missionaries were waiting for their exit permits.

[2] Hayes, op. cit., pp. 28 and 36.

The Little Flock is an indigenous movement claiming some 470 congregations. In September, 1951, the official magazine of the domesticated church published four articles denouncing the entire Flock, not simply one or two leaders, for being reactionary and anti-Communist. The articles were speeches given by members at a special accusation meeting and included charges against half a dozen officers by name. The inference seemed to be that "the whole Little Flock may have to go underground."[2]

Another indigenous sect was known as the Jesus Family (or Jesus Home). Members "turn over all their property to the Family, and it is administered on a common basis through the leader as a benevolent patriarch or dictator.

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[1] Hubbard, op. cit., p. 14.
[2] China Bulletin, No. 119, November 27, 1951.

.....Morale and ethical discipline within the groups were excellent."[1] Soon after "Liberation" there came reports of a growing rapprochement between the intellectualism of Yenching School of Religion and the fundamentalism of the Jesus Family, with mutual interchange and benefit.[2] Possessing no foreign entanglements and following an economic pattern which "out-communalized the Communists," the Jesus Family appeared to be impervious to political attack. But in 1951 one of their leaders was imprisoned for at least a year on the charge of hitting a child. (Q-31) By late 1952, the head of the sect was denounced as a "feudalistic oppressor...clothed with a cloak of religion...living a prodigal and licentious life...(and having) secret connections with imperialism in both spiritual and material things." Concluded Y.T. Wu, chairman of the Three-Self Reform Committee, "The Jesus Home Group...due to the awakening of the people, is finished."[3]

Derk Bodde was correct in the statement already quoted,[4] that the important issue for evaluating Communist China is "what happens to the Chinese, and not to a handful of outsiders."[5] Two and a half years after Bodde left the country, a missionary from the same locality wrote:

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[1] Ibid., Vol. II, No. 16, November 17, 1952.
[2] Personal Interview, No. Q122, January, 1952.
[3] Hongkong Letter, October 17, 1952.
[4] Chapter 9 above.
[5] Bodde, Peking Diary, p.-145.

> This is the side of the picture we could not write about before. We told you all the good things we could. They still stand, an impressive list of constructive accomplishments in several fields. But our hearts fill with sadness with the knowledge of the reign of terror tightening around the rank and file of the long-suffering, hard-working, loyal, good-natured Chinese people, and especially our Christian friends.[1]

Another missionary reported the words of a Chinese colleague, "at first most favorable to the new regime," as follows: "Within five years not a detail of my daily life will not be regulated by the government." (Q-81)

It may be true that this "reign of terror" shows no partiality. It may be true, as Jack Beldon asserted, that"the Christian Church, of course, does not occupy an important enough position in Chinese life to be the subject of either violent attack or defense except in limited localities."[2] On the other hand, it is natural for Chinese as well as foreigners to see in recent events an evidence of genuine anti-religious discrimination. Christian leaders had the closest association with Westerners, therefore the best opportunity for espionage. Institutions and offices handling mission funds could be charged with currency manipulation. The Church, Protestant as well as Roman Catholic, included a higher percentage of middle-class landlords and "white-collar" workers than farmers and coolies. When "returned students" from abroad were required in public meeting to denounce some aspect of Western capitalistic culture, (Q-71, -88) a large proportion of them were of course Christians.[1]

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[1] Personal Letter, No. 103, April 1, 1952.
[2] Belden, China Shakes the World, p. 470.

One of the keenest missionary observers in China, acknowledging the justice of many Communist criticisms against religion, and praising many of the achievements of Mao's regime, nevertheless reached this conclusion:

> I believe that from the beginning the Government has had a carefully considered plan for controlling the Church, with a view to its ultimate extermination --this in spite of the genuine emphasis at present upon the reality of religious freedom; it is the seriousness with which I take Marx's philosophy which makes me believe that the authorities will gladly do their utmost to suppress religion when they feel the right time has come for such a movement.[2]

In such a situation, as controls become sharper with time, so too does the dichotomy between Communist loyalty and Christian faith. Back in 1949 or 1950 the Landmans reported seeing "a Chinese associated with the National Christian Council wearing that missionary (sic--CL) organization's lapel button, and an inch away, another button denoting membership in a Communist organization."[3] For only a very few politically reliable individuals would that be possible today. In one area of South China, when pressures were first applied to get promising leaders into the Party, no Christians were eligible. "Later the government said Christians could join, but they were given to understand that under the course of training in store for them they would soon cease to be Christian." (Q-29) Another Chinese asserted, "I am a Christian; therefore I am not a Communist;" and the missionary friend reporting added, "I assure you the line between the two is just as clear-cut as that."[1]

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[1] Cf. David M. Paton, Christian Missions and the Judgment of God (Student Christian Movement, London, 1953), pp. 37ff.

[2] China Bulletin, No. 107, May 10, 1951; p. 2.

[3] Landmans, Profile of Red China, p. 123.

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[1] Printed Letter, No. 132, May, 1951

CHAPTER 17

RECAPITULATION

Out of this inductive process, based on two hundred and twenty-five questionnaires and supplemented by published materials and personal letters, what are the facts which emerge? The cumulative data will be summarized here very briefly because universal experiences have already been reiterated from each geographic area. It should be borne in mind that even single localities offer exceptions and contradictions to any overall pattern. The human factor, in both missionaries and Communist officials alike, operates even in a totalitarian state. Subjective frames of reference, especially in retrospect, produce varied interpretations of identical happenings. Yet despite these handicaps a fairly uniform picture has developed in China in the three years since the establishment of the People's Government. As one missionary put it, "The most remarkable thing about the whole Communist control is the fact that they have been able to organize so vast a country and carry out their program so thoroughly all over the country." (Q-56) Here is that program as applied to Christian missions.

What were the first effects of Liberation on your personal life? The unanimous response was "restriction of movement." The degree varied sharply across the nation or in neighboring districts. Some missionaries enjoyed the freedom of country hikes, while others could not pass the city limits. Some people secured travel permits from one town to another on several occasions, while others were never allowed outside thieir own stations. A few secured permission to move their residence and work from West, Central and East China to Peking, or shorter distances within an area. For almost all foreigners itinerant work ended abruptly; rural evangelism, organizational supervision, mobile clinics and audio-visual units ceased or were turned over to Chinese teams. When the Korean War began, however, with a widespread movement of troops and accompanying propaganda, not only missionary movements but Chinese travel as well came to an almost complete halt.

At least three of the five major areas reported immediate evidence of suspicion and surveillance. Young soldiers wandered in and out of residences, except in the larger cities, most of them country boys curious to see how Westerners lived. Police officers came too, on a variety of excuses but carefully noting instruments of espionage: radios which had to be registered, typewriters and electric transformers and washing machines mistaken for transmitters.[1]

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[1] In Korea a pastor was tortured for three days in an effort to discover how the church organ served as a radio transmitter. (Riley and Schramm, *The Reds Take a City*, p. 189)

There appeared to be genuine conviction on the part of many officials that all foreigners were spies. To avoid this and other charges of imperialism or counter-revolution, missionaries exercised extreme caution in conversation, public movement, even purchasing. But aside from travel restrictions and an increase in bureaucratic red-tape, the lives of foreigners were affected very little in the early months of "Liberation." Several of them spoke appreciatively of improved public utilities, stabilized currency, civil and military discipline. For a great many aliens in China the report of a visiting professor applied:

> We were not regimented, nor were we bullied. Something more galling happened to us: we were ignored....Perhaps the most important thing to realize about the foreign colonies in present-day China is their absolute insignificance--from the Chinese point of view.[1]

What were the first effects of Liberation on your mission work? Almost unanimously reports indicated as initial result the disruption of schools by endless political demonstrations, parades, songs and dances, patriotic rallies. Not only was each and every class subject to interruption or dismissal for "official assemblies," but students exercising the new freedom dispensed with regular attendance, homework, or examinations--and did it with impunity. In many places educational standards and morale fell so critically low that government authorities had to step in and impose regulations and discipline.

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[1] Van der Sprenkel, New China: Three Views, pp. 21, 27.

By that time, however, other more systematic disruptions had occurred. "No private school or any other institution or business of any size is without its reporters to the government of all that goes on, of what is said and thought by students, teachers, and workers."[1] And the government used these reports, whether true or false, many of them motivated by personal animosities and jealousies. These agents, open or secret, saw to it that traces of imperialism were eliminated, whether in the form of textbooks, foreign teachers, or even the names of buildings. But their subtle attacks on all Christian activities proved that Communism was employing the freedom of anti-religious propaganda. Before long, most Bible classes and chapels--even on a voluntary basis--were forced out of school schedules. Pressures of ridicule, political suspicion, grades in social studies, popular elections, and scholarships were applied against those students who clung to superstitious, unpatriotic religious faith.

Most churches reported reduced attendance under the new regime, although here as elsewhere there were exceptions. Street evangelism or other religious activities outside church buildings were forbidden in almost every area. In a few isolated stations church members were promptly registered, and the distribution or even use of Bibles condemned. For the most part, however, the government's tolerance and toleration of Christianity as such inspired new hope for genuine religious freedom.

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[1] Barnabas, Christian Witness in Communist China (Morehouse-Gorham, New York, 1951), p. 55.

Next to the schools, the mission work most immediately and thoroughly disrupted was relief in all its forms. The Communists could not understand giving food and clothing to poor people without ulterior motives. (Q-194) They called it "trying to buy the favor of Chinese by relief work." (Q-144, -33) Here and there a social service project was able to continue until the government Welfare Ministry was established, but in the majority of cases local authorities "hated relief" (Q-68) and promptly closed any such agencies. (Q-7)

A number of methods were employed. Sometimes welfare organizations, especially under foreign auspices, were simply forbidden to operate. More subtly Communists demanded that supplies be turned over for distribution through their centers only. For example, cloth shipped to China by the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund went, in one instance at least, to soldiers instead of children. Especially when the government declined to follow the earlier procedure of matching foreign relief, supplies dwindled rapidly, and agencies no longer could import margarine, proteins, milk powder, etc. Early in 1950 some child welfare centers refused Church World Service funds, even though officials were imposing a commodity tax on Chinese and foreign welfare projects. On the whole, even during the first year of "Liberation:"

> The tendency in some places, in accord with prevailing political theory, is to bear down increasingly upon any service or social work done by the church... The state will take care of the people and will direct all social activity....At the same time, a stock denunciation of the church is that it doesn't serve the people, and is interested only in a distant, compensatory heaven.[1]

What later definite changes in Communist attitude toward foreigners did you note? Every section of the country detected a growing hostility, as a result of incessant propaganda, and this generally began months before the Korean War. Children who had greeted Westerners, especially during the Japanese War, with a thumbs-up "very good!" occasionally threw sticks or stones or spat at foreign passers-by, and semi-jocular epithets of the past became more bitter and vulgar. Non-Christian students and teachers were likely to be surly or aloof. Real friends remained friends in private, but frankly preferred not to be recognized in public or to be seen entering the missionaries' homes.

Sentries were posted at many gates, to intimidate Chinese visitors as well as to keep the foreigners under surveillance if not actual house arrest. Laws against spending a night away from home were strictly enforced as time went on, and permits for travel or even local movements became almost impossible to obtain. When the reciprocal currency "freeze" at the end of 1950 placed all foreign property in the legal custody of the People's Government, missionary residences were subjected to thorough search and inventory, sometimes by police, sometimes by students. Thereafter every item had to be accounted for, and selling or giving away was usually prohibited. Radios by this time had almost all been "borrowed," occasionally returned with short-wave reception cut out.

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[1] Mimeographed Letter, No. M1, August 1, 1950, p.8.

A published letter written in August, 1950, summed up the situation, which became much tighter in ensuing months: "We are not free. Our radios are confiscated. There is no end to the 'borrowing' of our personal effects and mission property....Travel permits must be secured, and there is such red tape as to make it practically impossible."[1] To be sure, such treatment lacked any evidence of real discrimination. On the one hand, "the foreign missionaries suffer under the same restrictions as all other foreigners;" on the other hand, "all the missionaries, both Chinese and foreign, experience many intangible difficulties and live under constant suspense."[2] What made many of them decide to withdraw was the realization that propaganda hitherto aimed solely at imperialistic governments and policies turned gradually but threateningly toward individuals as well.

> Although the Chinese Communists regarded America, Britain, and France with suspicion, distrust, and fear, they differentiated in their statements from time to time between these governments and their citizens. They promised in their Common Platform that "law-abiding for-

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[1] MacEoin, The Communist War on Religion, p. 235.
[2] Ibid., p. 236.

> eigners in China would be protected." But it was inevitable that Peking's suspicion, distrust, and fear of America, Britain, and France would be transferred to Americans, Britons, and Frenchmen in China. Combined with an extreme nationalism, it became certain that "incidents " would ensue.[1]

What later changes in Communist attitude toward mission work did you note? Even before the Manifesto attempted to purge the Church of imperialistic influence, missionaries began to withdraw, voluntarily or otherwise, from boards, committees, and administrative posts. More and more foreigners found their teaching reduced and their usefulness in schools pared to a few English or Bible classes at home. More and more evangelistic workers saw that Chinese pastors hesitated to come for advice, direct pastoral service by Westerners was out of the question, and even such peripheral activities as supply preaching, pronouncing a benediction, or playing a piano were discouraged. More and more church buildings, previously borrowed during the week but vacated on Sundays, were used for political rallies, indoctrination classes, and the like at regular worship hours--with no apology or sense of violating religious freedom.

Although hospitals labored under the weight of excessive taxation, inadequate supplies, servant demands, petty regulations, and multitudinous reports, the actual medical work of missionary doctors and nurses suffered fewer obstructions than other types of service. To be sure, most rural clinics and mobile units had to be closed; occasionally a

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[1] Landmans, *Profile of Red China*, pp. 163-164.

Westerner was advised by colleagues to discontinue surgery to avoid possible "incidents." In every case reported, where a civil suit was brought against a missionary physician, the court dismissed the charge with at least tacit support of the foreigner. In several instances, however, nurses and a few doctors were subjected to public denunciation in their role as teachers or administrators, where students rather than officials raised the issues.

A number of medical missionaries, like the handful of university professors, were invited or even urged to stay at work, for the government recognized that available personnel fell far short of the ambitious program for national health. Western practice and instruction as well as facilities and equipment were desperately needed in People's China, and in certain areas, at least, Communist officials continued to patronize missionary hospitals well into 1951, even with the understanding that prayer would be offered in the operating room.[1]

Were there clear-cut stages in the treatment of missionaries and/or mission work in your locality? On this question opinions divided sharply. A substantial minority insisted that changes came about gradually, that the whole Communist policy and program toward Christian missions and foreigners simply gathered momentum but had been implicit from the start. Even those who specified decisive "turning points" agreed that certain trends had been apparent before the Korean outbreak, although a very few did feel that mission work might have continued indefinitely if that "incident" had not arisen.

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[1] Personal Interview, March 22, 1953.

On the whole, North China missionaries dated their "crisis" in the fall of 1950. Initial moves in Korea had not affected the north as much as some other sectors, but the capital reacted sharply to the Yalu River drive and the entry of Chinese "volunteers." One British university professor testified that the Chinese interpreted MacArthur's push toward Manchuria, coupled with bombing "accidents" over the border, as a threat to China just as sincerely as the English anticipated an invasion of Great Britain when Hitler reached the Channel.[1] Their popular response was genuine, patriotic, and united, however much that fear and hatred may have been stimulated by propaganda.

East China foreigners felt the combined impact of the Manifesto and the Korean War about a month earlier. On the military front President Truman's "neutralization" of the Formosan Straits actually reduced the number of ships entering Shanghai, but not necessarily the number of Kuomintang bombing raids. More important for Christian missions, however, church committees had been meeting in the metropolis all summer trying to revise the Manifesto, which its drafters would not substantially alter because government approval had been secured in advance.[1] By September it was officially released to the churches across the nation, but already many missionaries--especially those at denominational and interdenominational headquarters in Shanghai--had realized its full implications.

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[1] Personal Interview, No. 122, January 11, 1952.

Central China, more remote from military preparations and ecclesiastical debates, appeared to be jolted into anti-American activity by Warren Austin's United Nations speech about the effectiveness of missionary institutions in spreading democratic culture through China. This coincided with bitter, full-scale fighting in Korea, which called forth nation-wide mobilization and propaganda. By then, too, university demonstrations in Nanking had set a pattern for other student centers to follow, denouncing the agents of Western capitalism and the subversion of Christianity for imperialistic motives.

South China reacted immediately to the Korean War and the Seventh Fleet, especially residents of the Fukien coast adjacent to Formosa. For months they had watched the construction of landing craft and airfields and the assembling of Communist troops. For months they had listened to the vociferous cry: "On to Taiwan! Overthrow Chiang and the Kuomintang bandits!" The defense of Formosa by the American navy[2] brought instantaneous repercussions on the mainland. On the one hand, men and material assembled for the inevitable--but by no means inevitably successful--attack could, or must, now be used elsewhere. On the other hand, the equally belligerent propaganda machine had a new target; American imperialism made conspicuously manifest in both Korea and Formosa.

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[1] Cf. Outerbridge, The Lost Churches of China, p. 181.

[2] For such it was exclusively in 1950, despite President Eisenhower's implication in January, 1953, that President Truman was protecting the Reds from the Kuomintang.

In missionary circles the effect was abundantly clear. If the Communists carried through their effort to "liberate" Taiwan, there would be full-fledged war along the South China coast. At best, every foreigner would be under acute surveillance as a spy; many Chinese as well as Westerners knew that the American Navy had charted the Fukien coast in minute detail as a possible landing point against the Japanese five years earlier. At worst, as even Chinese Christians admitted, there would be internment under conditions where the "natives" would be enemies, not friends as under Japanese occupation. In any event, the effectiveness of missionaries approached an end; such later developments as Chinese participation in Korea and the mutual embargo on funds were merely probable concomitants.

West China, like Central China, moved in its own orbit, somewhat isolated from political and military happenings along the coast. Its belated "Liberation," its heavy-handed officialdom, its hatred for the Nationalists, its comparatively small proportion of foreign residents, the weakness and corruption in its Christian Church--all of these factors contributed to a relentless pressure from the beginning of 1950. Without the year of comparative normality which most other areas enjoyed, West China naturally accepted general restrictions, the Korean War, the Manifesto, the "march of the volunteers," even missionary accusations and imprisonments, as part of the new regime. More questionnaires from this area insisted, therefore, that there were no "clear-cut stages." Those which did specify spoke chiefly of the freezing of American assets and exchange transactions, partly no doubt because inventories and control of personal belongings seemed tighter, partly because the financial predicament was accented by the government offer to pay salaries for a few selected teachers.

These varied emphases attributed to the five major areas reflect only general impressions. Of course every factor mentioned, and others besides, entered into the thinking of missionaries in each section of the country. Many people in South China saw no reason to leave until after the currency "freeze;" some in West China were urged to abandon their remote stations and come into main cities in the summer of 1950. But the variations are indicative of group reactions and the influence of external events.

The fact that Truman's Formosan order and the embargo on funds to China represented American rather than Chinese Communist policy should not lead one to conclude that "China left to herself might have been different." In the first place, no nation is or can be "left to herself" in the modern world. In the second place, these actions by the United States--whether politically right or wrong--stem directly from the Korean War and Chinese involvement therein, potential or actual. In the third place, the one factor which offered a clear-cut indication of Chinese Communist attitude toward Christian missions --namely, the Manifesto--originated six weeks prior to Korea.

Leland Stowe, writing of Europe, remarked: "In the timing of religious conquests the Communists' record to date has approached split-second perfection."[1] Few people would admit that Chou En-lai knew in May, 1950, of plans in North Korea. Yet the most calculated plot to reinforce the Manifesto and fan the flames of anti-foreign feeling inside and outside the Church could not have succeeded half so well in ensuing months as the international events which "broke" so opportunely.

Everyone who commented agreed that "popular attitudes and official acts followed the propaganda line." (Q-212) Occasionally there was difference of opinion as to whether government measures whipped public sentiment into line or waited until a favorable atmosphere had been created by mass indoctrination. But everyone testified that both these steps were closely correlated with incessant propaganda, which filled newspapers, radio programs, wall boards, and speeches. Reference to a "propaganda line" does not mean necessarily that a spokesman in Peking issues orders to every editor and agent as to what must appear at a certain time. It implies, rather, that in a totalitarian state it is wise strategy to keep in the stream of official dogma, and any medium of communication which does not actively promote current policies and practices soon ceases to exist.

Were there any noticeable differences of either leniency or harshness between your treatment and that of other missionaries? The vast majority of missionaries seemed to conclude that any differences of treatment were purely individual, with the exception of greater antagonism toward Roman Catholics. North, Central, and West China put greater stress on personality differences, on the attitudes with which foreigners reacted to life under a Communist regime. The "cultural imperialism" which stressed American superiority, the indignation which openly criticized Communist interpretations of "freedom," the stubborn defense of objective truth (from whatever Western slant)--these and other tendencies to argue a point, no matter how logical, might easily lead to immediate or later retaliation on totally different grounds.

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[1] Stowe, Conquest by Terror, p. 203.

East and South China, perhaps because they included a greater proportion of prominent executives, attributed variations in treatment to the victim's administrative position or personal prestige. As pointed out in Chapter 15, those missionaries imprisoned were by and large the senior workers in a station, by service rather than age, or unusually popular with students or local residents.

These motives are by no means mutually exclusive, even as applied to a single individual. It might be suggested that those who suffered public denunciation, especially in schools, had exhibited personality traits which alienated students or servants or others; those whom the government selected as "examples" or propaganda targets for imprisonment or long detention enjoyed a prestige which had to be undermined. This, however, is a broad generalization to which any number of exceptions could be cited instantly: e.g. a very "progressive" teacher execrated in a whole series of public demonstrations, or a young, inconspicuous "first-termer" in prison since March, 1952. Such an explanation fails, also to include those cases where authorities may sincerely have believed that they had evidence of espionage. As one letter put it:

> A recent news item in the official paper stated that missionary societies are now included with foreign business firms in espionage against this country; since most of our students consider the paper entirely reliable, this makes us rather unhappy.[1]

In this survey, at least, there is no discernible pattern of selection for those who had a more difficult time in Communist China. There is no evident correlation between missionary mistreatment of any sort and occupation, denomination, theology, age, sex, etc.[2] It is doubtful if living standards, mentioned by a few individuals, offered a tangible enough basis for either popular or official criticism.

Some people suggested that medical workers received somewhat more favorable consideration. But in at least three sections of the country nurses drew bitter attack, public humiliation, and occasionally arrest. Doctors have been imprisoned in several areas, perhaps because they continued to hold "imperialistic" administrative reins. The only Protestant missionary to die in a Communist jail was a highly respected physician, and at least two more American doctors were still being held in March, 1953. If the scientific contribution of medical missionaries was coveted on the one hand, their personal prestige appeared to be envied and resented on the other hand. An East China doctor reiterated the only noticeable criterion for treatment:

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[1] Personal Letter, April, 1950, quoted in No. 136.

[2] Slight disproportions by age and denomination appear among those actually imprisoned (see Chapter 15 and below in this chapter), but these break down when all public trials, etc. are included.

> It was often evident that those who had been there longest or who had the greater influence or held mission offices were more severely treated; this seemed to be to counteract any good feeling they might have enjoyed due to years of service. (Q-63)

At the level of nationality one can probably say that Americans bore the brunt of anti-foreign prejudice.[1] This was due not only to United States policy in Korea and Formosa, but also to the preponderant weight of American funds and personnel in Christian missions. Certainly a disproportionate number of Americans were imprisoned or subjected to public trials; comparatively few such cases involved British or Continental missionaries. Yet what surprised many observers more was the fact that national discrimination appeared so seldom. Despite the fact that Great Britain offered to recognize the People's Government early in 1950 and several European countries succeeded in establishing full diplomatic relations, their subjects and citizens seldom received preferential treatment. Two of the last six or eight regular missionaries to leave Shanghai, for example, were Britishers, although they had never been accused and denounced as violently as the last Americans. As propaganda was intensified, it became more difficult for the Chinese masses to differentiate between American imperialism and--to use an actual example--Swiss.

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[1] Durdin, "Red China's War Against God," Saturday Evening Post, June 7, 1952, p. 64.

With very few exceptions, questionnaires agreed that Roman Catholics had suffered much worse persecution than Protestants. In the Wuhan area one priest insisted that he could detect no signs of discrimination; in Fukien American Catholics experienced no unusual restrictions or pressures well into 1951--but some of them were still detained in the spring of 1953. Almost everywhere else reports told of oppressive taxes, early imprisonments, occupation of property, obstructions to worship, and vitriolic propaganda directed against Roman Catholicism. According to recent tabulations by the China Missionary Bulletin in Hongkong, four foreign bishops, thirty priests, and one lay brother had died at the hands of Chinese Communists since 1940.[1]

Protestant reporters were clear and positive about the reasons for such treatment: the avowed antagonism of the Vatican toward Communism in any place or form; ~~capital-~~

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[1] Catholic Transcript (Hartford), March 26, 1953, p.1.

istic land-holdings of the Church; the steadfast refusal of almost all Catholics to be drawn away from the Papacy into a nationalized Reformed Catholic Church; close connections between the Chinese hierarchy and the Kuomintang; the high record of deaths in Catholic orphanages, where ecclesiastical dogma led to receiving children at death's door; the "unnatural" celibacy of missioners and the "superstitious" rites of worship; resistance to state control of education, etc. There is some truth to Van der Sprenkel's charge that Roman Catholics "indeed are paying now, under the new regime, for their intervention in the politics of the old."[1]

What were the determining factors in your decision to remain in China under the approaching Communist regime, and would you make the same choice again? These answers were expressed in a variety of terms, but they can be summarized under three main headings, overlapping in the mind of each individual. The first group felt distinctly hopeful that Communism in China would be different from that elsewhere, and that a constructive and creative *modus vivendi* could be achieved between Communism and Christianity. In this group were most of those who detested the Kuomintang, those who fully absorbed the enthusiastic but narrow student viewpoint, those who knew "too much about China and too little about Communism."

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[1] Van der Sprenkel, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

The second category comprised those missionaries whose Christian call transcended politics and should not be affected thereby. A large majority took this basic position that God had summoned them to serve the Chinese people, not any one government; that they had lived through previous revolutions despite temporary interruptions in their work; that their friends and colleagues needed and wanted their support during a time of insecurity and adjustment; that their conscience and Christian witness would be worthless if they abandoned their task before it was proved impossible.

A third group admitted an assortment of motivating factors, although the basic decision was probably made at deeper levels. There was frank curiosity to see this powerful ideology in action first-hand, a sense of shame at running away when Chinese friends could not do so, a feeling of obligation to mission boards and constituents, reluctance to leave China for some other field or work, an urgent job in process with no replacement available, and local circumstances preventing evacuation "in time."

One of the most striking correlations revealed by geographic areas is this: that length of "Liberation" (or more accurately, the length of "normal" mission activity under the People's Government) increased willingness to repeat the experience. That is, not one missionary from North China declared flatly that he or she would not make the same choice again; in East China there was only one; in Central China, out of thirty-~~three~~ four questionnaires, four said No and two were uncertain; in South China approximately one-third were doubtful or negative; and in West China almost one-half extremely dubious. It has already been shown[1] that South and West China suffered the greatest number of imprisonments, but most of these answers about making the same choice again were based on experience in 1950-1951 rather than subsequent jail sentences. The conclusion, then, is that those who were able to carry on fairly active mission work, including fellowship with Chinese colleagues, for a year and a half or two years considered the effort distinctly worthwhile; those whose daily lives and service were circumscribed within a year or less doubted it.

Here again, of course, there were sharp individual exceptions, reflecting not only local circumstances but personal attitudes and preconceived prejudices. One area of ambiguity might have considerably altered a precise yes-or-no tabulation. Those who interpreted the question as asking whether, given the same conditions and the same physical, mental, and spiritual outlook, a person would make the same decision again, almost invariably replied in the affirmative. Those who assumed the wisdom of experience, the first-hand observation of Communism, the lessons of liability, the involvement of Chinese Christians as "running dogs of imperialism"--these were not so sure. Although an overwhelming majority asserted that they would definitely make the same choice again, it is doubtful whether in an actual second situation (in Korea, Japan, or Southeast Asia, for example) many of those same people would again attempt to bolster (and ultimately implicate) their native colleagues by trying to carry on Christian missions in a Communist state.

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[1] Chapter 15 above.

What were the determining factors in your decision to leave China, and when was it made? Of course, a trickle of missionaries began to withdraw within a few months after "Liberation," almost as soon as exit procedures were devised. These earliest evacuations were due to health, to family concerns, to retirement, to furlough (in the hope at that time that re-entry permits might be granted a year hence). Some of those who left had tried to go just before the change in government and then encountered problems of transportation and bureaucracy.

Not until early in 1950 did any significant number consider withdrawing because of the "situation." While some were still departing on furlough, with every expectation of return, and others were still urging their home boards to send new missionaries, a few individuals found their work so hampered that they saw no point in "hanging on." With obvious reluctance some organizations or denominational groups hinted that a gradual reduction in foreign personnel might be expedient.

Especially in the educational field, the elimination of religious courses from middle school curricula, the sharp drop in English classes, the undermining of academic standards at every level, all helped to convince many missionary teachers that their days of usefulness were over. In the humanities as well as social sciences, Western viewpoints were at best suspect. "In the fields of group and personal consultation....which perhaps are the chief service rendered, ...the range is sharply narrowing."[1] From this standpoint, a number from each section of the country, with the possible exception of newly-"liberated" West China, made plans to leave at the close of the spring semester, 1950.

With the first unofficial publication of the Manifesto, expressing the determination of the Christian Church to dispense with foreign aid, others realized that little remained for them to accomplish beyond a sort of "delaying action." To be sure, many missionaries--like most Chinese Christians perhaps--interpreted this Three-Self Movement as a long-range goal to be achieved over three or more years. So few foreigners had succeeded in obtaining re-entry permits that "staggered" furloughs became meaningless, and some people determined to "stick it out" as long as they could. On the other hand, Chou En-lai had specifically said that those with expired passports, as well as terms of service, should withdraw, and the closing of American consulates that spring had removed any means of renewing passports.

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[1] Mimeographed Letter, No. M1, August 1, 1950.

When the United Nations took positive action in Korea, it became still more apparent that constructive service by Westerners could not continue long. Some foreigners and Chinese recognized the physical danger involved in possible war in China; most missionaries would have accepted that risk in order to render creative help to the Church or to individuals. Many of them did take that risk far into 1951 before applying for exit permits, because they found their own particular job unmolested. Except for medical workers and a few selected university teachers, however, the majority were already "unemployed" by the time Chinese "volunteers" plunged into the Korean War. From that time on, propaganda became so intense, directed more and more at individuals rather than governments alone, that the remainder prepared to evacuate.

This public denunciation of everything foreign, commencing its real ferocity in November of 1950, convinced most Chinese Christians that the missionaries had at last become a liability rather than an asset to the Church and its programs. The arrest of several foreigners and mass trials and executions of Chinese demonstrated in vivid form the real physical danger confronting foreign missionaries and Chinese associates. The embargo on funds from the United States to China threatened to impose on the Church the economic support of the missionaries as well as the entire Christian program. This concatenation of events in November, December, and January jolted the most stubborn "die-hards;" any further delay in applying for exit permits reflected individual or local circumstances. Even the China Inland Mission, which had resisted evacuation through most previous crises, shifted its partial withdrawal policy to a general one early in 1951, telegraphing its superintendents: "Proceed with ordered withdrawal of all in your whole district."

> Serious complications, due to the presence of missionaries, were developing in many churches throughout the land, and it was more and more evident that our basic purpose of cooperation with the churches was becoming generally impossible....The general pattern had become clear.[1]

What procedures and time span did you go through to secure your exit permit? The customary ritual for securing an exit visa commenced with the presentation of a request (in Chinese) giving reasons for wishing to leave China. Accompanying that, or in successive installments, the applicant had ~~to~~ submit an autobiographical sketch (frequently rejected as too brief or incomplete), a "release" from his employer (school principal, synod secretary, hospital superintendent, etc.), a list of the baggage he proposed to take (even though the weather might change from August to December, the baggage list could not). Then would follow a waiting period, ranging from a week to two years, with the mean perhaps a month. Sometimes the missionary would be summoned weekly or even daily for interrogation; in other cases the Bureau of Public Safety would turn away all inquiries as to the application's progress. No one ever seemed to be sure whether the higher, decisive authority was a district office, a provincial capital, an administrative area headquarters, or Peking; officials in isolated rural towns seemed themselves uncertain about proper jurisdiction.

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[1] Hazelton, *The Hand That Guided*, p. 9.

When the permit had been approved by appropriate authorities, at whatever level that was, the applicant received instructions to insert a formal notice in the local press announcing his intention to hwei gwo (return home) and inviting anyone with civil or financial claims to submit them at once. North China reported few if any advertising requirements; other areas had to publish the notice three to seven times, and since meager newsprint was filled with official notices and propaganda articles, it often took a week to find space for three insertions. The cost of these advertisements ran from two or three American dollars to thirty-five, depending on local rates and the number of names included in each.

In most sections of the country missionaries were required to produce one or two guarantors, sometimes to assume financial responsibility for unpaid debts, sometimes to act as hostage for the foreigner's future actions and public utterances about the New Democracy. In at least one large district, north Fukien, no such guarantors were required, and conditions varied elsewhere. If the original baggage list included only number of pieces, a detailed report of every category (clothing, bedding, books, etc.) had to be prepared before inspection, and after the freezing of assets by both America and China, these had to be minutely itemized lists. Often, from 1951 on, they had to include every single possession, whether to be left behind, carried out of the country, given to an institution or individual, sold, or confiscated.

Baggage inspections were usually cursory in North China, very thorough in South China; the number, depending on inspection points traversed during the outward journey, sometimes ran as high as eight or a dozen. Export restrictions varied, but often included Chinese curios, costumes, paintings, etc.; snapshots, slides, and films which might be used for espionage or which showed China in a backward light; radios, books, papers, typewriters, playing cards (seized or passed by whim or individual conscientiousness--or even covetousness).

In time of departure, East China fared best with an average time of approximately one month, North China next in six to eight weeks; Central China people got out in about two months, West China three, South China three to four. These rough estimates represent more nearly a mean than an average, since they do not include extended prison terms or those individuals deliberately held over a long period as propaganda "examples." The differences in area time-spans are traceable to two factors: first, North and East China officials clearly expedited passes more readily than those elsewhere; second, residents there had access to the nearest and fastest transportation facilities, since most of those on the South China coast were required to journey overland to Hongkong instead of sailing from a port.

The China Inland Mission report for 1951 included a number of incidents which were typical of those recounted in questionnaires. For instance:

> It was a fairly common experience to receive the promise of a speedy departure; to make preparations accordingly, even to the disposal of clothes, cooking utensils, and accomodation, only to find a few days later that there was a hitch, and days of delay lengthened into months, necessitating cramped quarters in the heat of summer, or insufficient clothing in the cold bleak months that followed.[1]

Missionary evacuees traveled by animal, cart, bus, plane, foot, launch, truck, and train, from the borders of Tibet or of Inner Mongolia, or two weeks from the isolated coast of south Fukien (a twenty-four-hour voyage by steamer). One group arrived at the Hongkong barrier without exit permits; only an extra, unscheduled train carrying the China Travel Service agent spared them a night in the primitive inn where others spent their last hours in China. Another group got twenty feet from the barbed wire "gateway to freedom" and were already talking to friends when officials called them back for further interrogation and inspection before finally allowing their crossing. One woman was actually sent back to Canton because of some Chinese characters found in the cover of a book, but after a telephone call to Chungking, she was permitted to proceed on her way.[1]

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[1] Hazelton, op. cit., pp. 11ff.

On July 24, 1951, the People's Government promulgated a set of rules for Christian organizations having American connections. One section stipulated that those who opposed the Communist regime should be "deposed;" those who had committed any crime should be punished; those who wished to leave the country should be permitted to do so (Q-99); and those without "reactionary records" might remain for essential work if they held no executive authority.[2] Yet for at least a year and a half thereafter, missionaries against whom no formal charges had been made were refused their exit permits. By April, 1953, the eleven remaining American Protestants were all under prison or house arrest, though no official sentence had been imposed on most of them. International law and diplomacy can produce few, if any, such large-scale difficulties in securing alien exit visas.[3]

Were any public charges or trial ever brought against you? Some people found in this question a problem of definition, for a large percentage of missionaries were denounced in the press or in church accusation meetings after their departure, if not during their stay. Three general methods of attack were used against foreigners, short of actual arrest and imprisonment: police interrogation, which might be so intensive and cover so many associates as to be called public; newspaper denunciations; and mass demonstrations. Sometimes only one type was involved, on other occasions all three. The Foreign Affairs Department of the Public Safety Bureau ordinarily handled the first and the Propaganda Corps the last; press indictments might come from any number of sources, but unquestionably had police endorsement.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 20ff.

[2] Christian Century, October 3, 1951, p. 1138.

[3] Not even an undeclared war in Korea can "justify" such treatment, any more than it justifies America's gross violation of freedom in forbidding scientifically-trained Chinese from leaving the United States.

Official investigations were likely to involve such alleged "crimes" as owning radio sending sets, going outside the city wall without permission, taking down an unused telephone pole, spying for the Japanese, killing a patient in the hospital, hiding a picture of Chiang Kai-shek. Newspaper charges ranged from passing on Voice of America information, selling curios for profit, and corrupting youth with "cultural imperialism" to indicating a resurgence of American reactionism by hoping to come back to China, or using the colloquial farewell, "Return again."

Public accusation meetings, however, produced the most diversified--and far-fetched--complaints, many of them exaggerated or twisted by emotional and ultra-patriotic students. Missionaries were charged with the following crimes and misdemeanors, and many others: withholding eggs from needy students, insulting China by walking during flag-raising, failing to teach music according to Marxism, changing "United States " to "United Nations" in an essay on Korea, forcing a student to lift his spit from the floor, obstructing a boycott by offering foreign mosquito netting for sale cheap, belittling Chinese goods by displaying an American pencil, taking too many pictures of school activities, prohibiting nurses on duty from participating in parades, etc. etc.

The astounding thing about all three types of denunciation is that they could reach such peaks of frenzy and threats of violence and then come to naught. This fact in itself confirms the belief that most of these incidents were devised for their propaganda value, and when they had been squeezed of all emotional fervor against foreigners and their work, they are dropped. In several cases, apparently, officials allowed the tension to build up in press and public opinion--perhaps even encouraged it--but when it threatened to reach lynching proportions, they promptly and efficiently deported the "victim."

Were you ever under house arrest or imprisonment? Since this question has been thoroughly covered in Chapter 15, it need not be reviewed extensively here. Of forty-three Protestants known to have spent time in a Chinese Communist jail, twenty-one have been included in thirteen first-hand reports (the other eight being wives or colleagues held in the same place, though not necessarily in direct communication).

All but one were Americans; thirteen were men, eight women; two-thirds of them were evenly divided between South and West China; one-third were Methodists, the others representing eight different denominations. Of those whose ages are known, all but three were either under thirty-five or over fifty. As nearly as one can classify occupations on the mission field, they represented the following types of work, three in each category: evangelistic, rural evangelistic, educational-evangelistic, medical, educational (two of them with administrative duties too), relief, and uncertain.

Only six of these missionaries were formally tried, two of them after their arrest. Some were charged with petty technical violations: travelling without permit, failing to register house guests, taking down a picture of Mao Tse-tung. Others were directly and primarily accused of espionage, distributing information or owning radio transmitters. Still others were held without specific charges, or with feebly concocted ones, either to discredit foreign missionaries in local propaganda or because authorities did not seem to know quite what to do with them.

In more extreme cases, especially those extending into 1952, the prisoners were repeatedly interrogated, not only concerning their alleged crimes but also on their views of Communism and the New Democracy. Unanimously, although quite separately, they reached the conclusion that release depended on acquiescence, not so much to specific charges as to Communist interpretation of "truth." Actually government leaders had made it clear that neither aliens nor Chinese possessed the freedom of neutrality or silence when it came to political matters, which in turn embrace all of life; hence, "Brain-washing" is necessary.

> Premier Chou En-lai in conversation with Church leaders stated that anyone who has regrets about the program of the revolution or who compares the state of affairs on the imperialist side of the struggle favorably with that of the New Democracy is not acceptable.[1]

What were Communist policies and practices toward mission property in your area, in regard to both occupation and taxes? The People's Liberation Army first entered most parts of China in the wake of public proclamations guaranteeing respect for foreign property. For the first few months, or until the civil administration took control, this assurance was fulfilled in almost every instance. Unused buildings were subject to immediate occupation, and troops temporarily billeted themselves in schools, churches and hospitals, very seldom in foreign homes.

As the Propaganda Corps, labor unions, and other semi-official agencies were established, they were less scrupulous about "borrowing" property, whether chapels or cooking pots. Churches and school auditoriums not only offered the largest meeting places in town for popular rallies, indoctrination classes, and the like, but appeared to be generally vacant and therefore "expendable." A number of reports told how these buildings were cleared for Sunday services during the first few months or more, but later, as prejudice grew against religious institutions and foreign connections, church services had to move out.

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[1] Barnabas, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

Similarly in mission residences, especially those shared with Chinese colleagues or with work projects, the Communists employed a "camel-in-the-tent" technique. At first they requested the use of a single room for an office or storeroom; then this proved inadequate, and several more rooms were demanded; finally in a few instances the foreigners were actually ordered to move to other quarters. Especially after 1950, when the People's Government took custody over all American property in retaliation for United States seizure of Chinese assets, not only official agencies but student bodies or hospital staffs assumed control of what had been mission institutions.

Actual ownership of buildings and grounds seemed of less concern to Communist authorities than occupation. Through 1950 at least, most foreigners were unmolested in their homes, while church and school property received equal treatment whether registered under Chinese or foreign title. The vast majority of mission holdings in China still belonged legally to boards or committees abroad. Many of these groups had sincerely intended to transfer their deeds to Chinese ownership after the Japanese War and the abolition of extraterritoriality. But general mission policy, on the one hand, favored vesting property in a national or regional board rather than a local group, and most denominational bodies and religious organizations were neither willing nor prepared to assume responsibility. On the other hand, neither Kuomintang nor People's Government had established conditions and procedures for the transfer of titles. Furthermore it was recognized that belated, last-minute changes in ownership would fool no one and achieve nothing.

By the summer of 1951 government regulations for missionary organizations provided for the disposal of property.

> If mission boards wish to give their properties in China to the Chinese Christian churches, the latter may accept them, but only if no conditions are attached to the gift and the government approves the transfer.[1]

These regulations assumed government jurisdiction over school campuses and other institutional property, insisting that they must be separated from the churches and have their buildings allotted to them by the government. From any long-range legal standpoint, this procedure was equivalent to "locking the barn after the horse was stolen," for both the Chinese and the mission boards. Communist authorities had in many places called in title deeds, ostensibly for registration, and never returned them to either missionaries or Chinese Christian bodies. A goodly number of these deeds, however, were and are still locked in New York safes. Meanwhile the mutual freezing of assets has dropped a legal curtain between the two countries, in addition to the complete severance of communication between Christian groups, so the ultimate status of ex-mission property in China will require a Solomon to unravel.

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[1] Christian Century, October 3, 1951, p. 1138.

With very few exceptions, questionnaires indicated no apparent discrimination in tax policy against Christian missions. The government regulations cited above specified also that "self-supporting Chinese Churches and the Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. will be exempted from paying taxes on church and office buildings which they 'use directly.'"[1] Since schools, colleges, hospitals, orphanages, and the like were by that time all converted into public institutions or discontinued, they no longer faced a tax problem either.

In earlier years of "Liberation," however, policies seemed to vary widely in execution. Most schools secured reductions or exemptions in taxation, although rates sometimes varied for different types of buildings. Churches were usually assessed for their worship space, but granted refunds on rooms used for nursery schools, clinics, etc. Missionaries paid the same proportional house tax put on all residents, based on the number and size of rooms. In all of these cases, the actual amount seemed exorbitant after decades of nominal or uncollected taxes, and placed a burden on mission budgets which would appear impossible for the Chinese Church to shoulder.

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[1] Ibid.

The only obvious injustice fell on hospitals. Because they sold drugs and received paying patients, they were classed officially as revenue-producing commercial establishments and taxed accordingly. As in every business office, each clinical transaction, every bookkeeping entry, required its tax stamps as well. Even this, although total assessments sometimes consumed up to fifty per cent of hospital income, was comparable to the treatment of private Chinese hospitals and clinics. Clear-cut discrimination, however, reported from two or three sections of the country, arose from the group-assessment plan. "'Our hospital and equipment in Honan has been loaned to the government,' is a common-place enough sentence perhaps; but it is heavy with meaning."[1]

Opinions differed as to whether Communist authorities based their excessive tax rates on a deliberate plan to force institutions into government hands, or whether they were motivated by a desperate need for revenue. If the former, they would probably have succeeded in 1951, regardless of the "freezing" order. If the latter, they were "killing the goose that laid the golden eggs," even before the embargo on funds from abroad. In either event, the tax program appeared to be a political instrument, wielded against private Chinese institutions and organizations as well as Christian missions. The absence of any conspicuous discrimination did not prevent the achievement of ultimate government control over mission institutions; the same technique may help to persuade church groups to accept the leadership of the Three-Self Reform Committee.

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[1] Hazelton, God of the Valleys, p. 36.

What restrictions or pressures were placed on Chinese Christians during your stay? The last three words were included to limit answers to first-hand observation rather than commentary on more recent events. These replies can be summed up in the words of one East China woman:

> I do not think of any actual persecution of Christians as Christians in our immediate locality; the effect was obtained by trumping up political charges or connections and requiring the Christians to accuse missionaries and other Christian leaders. (Q-68)

What happened in other sections, or during 1951-1952, may be a different story. Most missionary reports carried the insinuation that Chinese Christians suffered various types of discrimination, but not on religious grounds.

Because of the Communist concentration on youth, students in middle schools and colleges felt the full weight of popular opinion and ridicule against Christianity, both as a superstition and as an instrument of Western imperialism. In some cases they actually faced loss of diploma because they had failed a required course in citizenship, which included such questions as "How was the world created?" or "Show how every missionary is an imperialist spy." The Christian remnant which survived often had to rise at five o'clock to share in prayer or Bible study unmolested, or free from political meetings. Occasionally authorities forbade religious instruction for children under sixteen, "even on a voluntary basis, even in Church schools."[1]

The separation of state and church meant the elimination of all religious activity outside of worship buildings: no street preaching, no distribution of tracts, no hospital evangelism, no pastoral calling in some places. Public worship was circumscribed by occasional regulations censoring church bulletins, registering attendance with the police, dictating sermon topics, prohibiting collections. In a few instances even private prayer met with confiscation of Bibles and hymnals, removal of religious pictures, and bans on personal devotions among government employees.

> Even before the conference (with Chou En-lai in Peking in May, 1950) was called, restrictions on Christian work had been increasing....It has become crystal clear since then that the "freedom of religion" clause in the "Common Platform" is subject to an official interpretation which has no resemblance to the usually accepted concept.[2]

Perhaps the most bitter demand forced upon Chinese Christians was to denounce their associates, Chinese and foreign. Because the Manifesto was pushed through as a *fait* accompli and the accusation meetings ordered as proof of patriotism, there was almost literally no escape. Some individuals participated in the hope that their personal "betrayal," short of denying the Gospel itself, would be understood by the victim and would lift pressures off the Church as a whole. Others simply read documents handed to them--and wept with remorse afterwards. Still others had their signatures forced or forged, their words twisted or invented, their lives and families threatened.[1]

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[1] An Observer, *China: A Object Lesson*, p. 16.

[2] Anne Hazelton, *Come Wind, Come Weather* (China Inland Mission, London, 1951), pp. 12-13.

"The Communists are making efforts to present their actions as directed not against religion but against foreign influences, imperialism, and acts contrary to the new order."[2] This claim convinced millions of Chinese and a few missionaries, not merely that religious liberty has been guaranteed in law and fact under the People's Government, but that only the Communist definition thereof has validity. Yet, "as a professor remarked to me some time ago, there is no freedom of silence under the present regime--nor even a freedom to be inactive."[3] This totalitarianism confronts any Christian ~~any Christian~~ with a critical dilemma.

It also presents a problem for this survey. After reviewing the experience of Protestant missions in Communist China in terms of travel restrictions and exit permits, school demonstrations and radio transmitters, taxation and the Korean War, one is tempted to accept the narrow Communist interpretation of religious freedom and conclude that all these recorded events were primarily political in nature. One can appreciate the temptation of Chinese Christians to assume that the government has forsworn religious persecution because few specific examples can be mustered. Such a conclusion is dangerously naive. Anti-religious programs and propaganda never exist in isolation; they are always blended and often disguised with social, political, material issues. The Church may be shaped by capitalism and tarred with imperialism, but it has a supernatural--the Reds call it "superstitious"-soul. The visible, tangible body may be easier to attack and even kill; the spirit is the ultimate, enduring foe for totalitarianism. Christianity believes in immortality; Communism does not.

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[1] Durdin, op. cit., p. 59.
[2] MacEoin, op. cit., p. 235.
[3] China Bulletin, No. 107, May 10, 1951, p. 3.

It is a truism that the fate of Christian missions in China does not represent the fate of Christianity there. Equally the government policy toward imperialism does not reflect the entire Communist ideology concerning religion. Yet only the outward aspects--the treatment of foreign missionaries and their institutions, for example--can be analyzed with any degree of accuracy. These outward aspects of Chinese Communism must be set against a background of theory and practice in Russia and Europe. They must be interpreted and applied in a concluding chapter. But because the Communists themselves affirm and reaffirm their unity of theory and practice, a survey such as this--based on objective fact and subjective opinion--may nonetheless contribute to an understanding of Communism and Christianity--belatedly for China but "in time" for the rest of the world.

CONCLUSION

A negative, or fatalistic, conclusion is seldom appreciated, never popular, yet that is the net result of this survey. To those who inquire "Why have we failed?" "How could we have prevented this 'debacle'?" "What should we have handled differently?" the experience of Protestant missions in Communist China offers no constructive reply. More than that, it is doubtful if a determinative answer is possible--at least on the practical, sociological level. Rather it appears that no alternative policy--of American diplomacy or missionary program--could substantially have altered the course of recent events in China. As one missionary summed it up: "I don't believe anything we might or might not have done would have changed the attitude of the Communists toward us." (Q-27)

Unlike many compositions, the introduction to this study was written before the questionnaires had been tabulated and analyzed, or the mass of printed materials digested. It asked a number of questions about Communist practice toward religion in China, with the frank expectation that definite conclusions would be difficult if not impossible. Effort has been made to follow an inductive process, although a certain amount of deductive reasoning is unavoidable for anyone who has contemplated these problems for years. The generalizations which emerge are remarkably positive from a factual standpoint. Whether equally positive programs for the future can be formulated, as Christianity confronts Communism elsewhere in the world, the readers must decide.

After initial months of toleration, while the People's Government organized and consolidated more urgent functions, it seemed clear that a pattern did exist in Chinese Communist treatment of Christian missions. Despite variations, due to local circumstances and individual responses on both sides, the experience of foreigners proved to be substantially the same in all parts of the country--often to their avowed surprise. What that uniform pattern was, in general, will be summarized once more in answer to subsequent questions.

Chinese Communism appeared to have a definite and consistent policy toward religion. As a vocal and usually negative minority, it had denounced Christianity as an instrument of imperialistic exploitation, and indigenous faiths as superstitious, unscientific, and therefore unpatriotic. As a ruling government, it guaranteed religious freedom, but openly encouraged anti-religious propaganda of every sort, and defined religious freedom in the narrowest terms of worship or belief. Within the first year of the Party's formation, it specifically attacked not only cultural aggression but the "people's opium," not only missionaries themselves but Bible teaching per se.[1]

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[1] See p. 136 and Chapter 4, passim, above.

By the time Communists achieved a position of influence and power in the Northern Expedition of 1926-1927, their opposition to Christian institutions had already shown itself in violent forms in Kwangtung, and their deliberate destructiveness toward missions terrorized the Yangtze valley. It was recognized then and now, but not so clearly in intervening years, that Soviet propaganda and leadership had been responsible for most if not all of the excesses committed by the Kuomintang. During the Kiangsi Period and the Long March, the kidnapping and occasional murder of foreign missionaries by scattered Red bands was motivated in part by anti-imperialism and a desire to embarrass Chiang Kai-shek, but it obviously reflected antipathy toward an alien religion, antipathy that was integral to Communist philosophy.

The United Front proclaimed at the start of the Japanese War included an outward modification of attitude toward both Christianity and the West. Welcome to foreign visitors in Yenan was sincerely cordial, yet the prevailing atmosphere was unfavorable enough toward religion to discourage not only Roman Catholics and Baptists, but even the liberal Y.M.C.A. from attempting to set up Christian work in the Border Regions during the war.[1] At the same time some missionaries were already learning the paradoxical meaning of "Liberation," and Chairman Mao in his mildest, most diplomatic utterance asserted: "We Communists may work in a united front for political action with people who profess religious or idealistic beliefs but should have nothing to do with philosophical idealism or religion in themselves."[1]

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[1] See Chapter 5 above, especially pp. 198-202.

With the establishment of the People's Government two additional factors determined the actual treatment of foreign missionaries. One was the widespread campaign against reactionaries, spies, saboteurs, counter-revolutionaries, etc., all of whom could be more effectively eliminated if they were exposed as "running dogs of the foreigners." The second was the necessity of achieving full control and credit for every social activity: education, health, relief, agricultural rehabilitation, recreation. Because Christian missionaries stood as a tacit or potential obstacle to this absolute totalitarianism, as well as to the domestication of the Church itself, they had to be discredited and banished.

Thus the ideological critique of religion as an opiate of the people, and at the same time an instrument of capitalistic imperialism, found practical expression in government insistence on State supremacy, and the eradication of any rival creed or focus of loyalty. Anti-religion cannot be separated from Communist doctrine as a totalitarian whole.

If Chinese Communism reveals a definite policy toward religion, the question immediately arises: How closely is it related to Marxist and/or Russian policy? The answer which seems to emerge from this study suggests one positive conclusion; namely, that *Communism in China is inherently anti-religious and anti-foreign because it adheres to a world-wide Soviet pattern*.

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, The New Democracy, Section X.

Despite its professed freedom of religion, most Marxists would admit that their creed goes beyond atheism to an active exercise of anti-religion.[1] Often social and political pressures infringe upon the most narrowly defined freedoms of belief and worship. When Bibles are destroyed, worshippers intimidated, collections forbidden, prayer meetings and religious instruction hampered, fundamental Christian tenets not only ridiculed but opposed by official dogma, one can hardly escape the conclusion that the prevailing *milieu* is anti-religious.

When the charge of imperialism--quite frankly applied to any relationship outside the Communist orbit--is added, the case becomes incontrovertible. Some observers would claim that this is the paramount issue, that religion is secondary. Perhaps they are right; foreign businessmen and students have suffered the same treatment as missionaries. On the other hand, religious groups in Russia and China with no external affiliations whatever have been equally subject to political controls. Just as the Marxist critique of religion cannot be separated from charges of economic causation on the one hand and exploitation on the other, so current attacks on the Church are intimately bound up with fear of foreign imperialism.

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[1] However a prominent Chinese educator, returning from a government conference in 1950, reported a change in official usage from "anti-Christian" (*fan Ji-du-jyau*) to the more moderate "non-Christian" (*fei Ji-du-jyau*). (Personal Interview, No.27a, October 9, 1951)

A chief result of this study is to show that Chinese Communism has followed a theory and practice basically akin to those of Russia and Eastern Europe. It was not always self-evident. Jack Belden, in a controversial book published in 1949, insisted that

> ....there exists an entirely different situation in China than exists in Eastern Europe, where the new Communist power finds itself forced to attack the Catholic Church, which still wields a great deal of influence due to its ownership of land, control of the schools, and great spiritual authority. In their battle for complete power in China, the Communists will not have to attack many intrenched lines of capitalism.[1]

If one accepts the thesis that circumstances in China and Europe were utterly different, the close correspondence of Communist procedure becomes all the more significant. Russian Tsarism, European Catholicism, and Protestant missions in China may be very dissimilar, as were internal conditions in the respective countries. Yet each provided a propaganda "scapegoat" entirely consistent with Marxian atheism.

Nor were journalists the only observers misled. One of the major mission boards issued a policy statement at its annual meeting in October, 1949, declaring:

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[1] Belden, China Shakes the World, pp. 470-471.

> There is increasing evidence that "Communism" in China is something different in a number of important respects from what goes by that name in Europe. It is likely to stay different. One indication of this is the increasing toleration shown during the past year toward Protestant missions and missionaries.[1]

Such wishful thinking was premature. The People's Democratic Republic had just been established that month; very few missionaries had then been in Communist territory as much as a year. If an overall policy had been formulated so early, it could hardly have been applied before the mainland was full "liberated" at the end of 1949. By 1951 a very different picture was revealed. MacEoin noted that "vast as are the differences between the circumstances of Eastern Europe since it fell under the Communist yoke and those of the Far East, there has been no essential difference in the program of the Communists."[2] And a keen missionary analyst reported to his constituency:

> It is impossible to take Marx-Leninism, or the concrete developments which form the common pattern in European Soviet countries, with too much seriousness (i.e. cannot be overemphasized--CL) in interpreting the China scene. There are no general evidences whatsoever of such Chinese modifications as those who have best understood China in the past have naturally anticipated.[3]

Both Marx-Leninism and its concrete developments have been reviewed in introductory chapters to this study. The pattern can be repeated here only briefly to accentuate the Chinese derivations. On the ideological level Marx and Engels held that man creates gods in his own image for the enforcement of his own social and economic codes, that religion impedes the achievement of true and scientific socialism, that Church and State must ultimately wither away. Engels' insistence that "all religious bodies without exception are to be treated by the State as private associations,"[1] became the foundation of Soviet treatment for all Church institutions and social programs. Yet from Engels and Lenin came the equally emphatic conviction that "we do not and must not forbid religion."[2]

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[1] Quoted, Personal Letter, No. 131, November 15, 1949.
[2] MacEoin, The Communist War on Religion, p. 228.
[3] China Bulletin, No. 107, May 10, 1951, p. 1.

It was Lenin, too, who attempted to bring together Marxian atheism with official tolerance, lest religious sensitivities be offended. Here, as elsewhere, Communist leaders have been exceptionally frank about their position: "We demand that religion be regarded as a private matter as far as the state is concerned, but under no circumstances can we consider it as a private matter with regard to our own Party."[3] And Stalin proclaimed with equal bluntness: "The Party cannot be neutral in regard to religion, and it conducts anti-religious propaganda against any and all religious prejudices because it stands for science."[4]

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[1] Cf. p. 14 above.
[2] Lenin, Religion, p. 10.
[3] Lenin, "Socialism and Religion," p. 8.
[4] Quoted, Anderson, cf. p. 25 above.

At the practical level, Communism has demonstrated a unity of theory and practice, not once in Russia, but repeatedly throughout Eastern Europe. Among the chief characteristics of this pattern are the following: separation of all education from Church auspices, confiscation of all property except houses of worship, elimination of religious agencies for social welfare, severance of ecumenical ties, formation of a national church under state domination, and finally the expulsion, imprisonment, or execution of recalcitrant Christian leaders, always on political or criminal grounds.

Because of Roman Catholic strength in Poland and the dream of reuniting Germany under Communist control, these two countries have only belatedly felt the full force of anti-religious pressure. In the first few months of 1953, however, the glove of toleration has been dropped. ~~adopted,~~ In East Germany, for example, several score Evangelical pastors and church workers have recently been imprisoned or have disappeared;[1] priests have been charged with mistreating children, "a frequent Communist complaint against churchmen who operate schools or orphanages;"[2] young people are encouraged to "sit in judgment on their classmates and expel all those belonging to the evangelical youth organization known as Young Community;"[1] church gatherings have been forbidden, travel permits for clergy denied, the religious press restricted, Bible-reading sessions forbidden in private homes, and pastors sentenced to long prison terms for "anti-state agitation."[2] One Roman Catholic paper concluded that East German police have begun "systematically banning all religious activities except worship services in churches."[3]

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[1] *New York Times*, February 28, 1953; *Religious News Reporter*, March 30-April 5, 1953.

[2] *Religious News Reporter*, April 6-12, 1953, p. 7.

The uniformity of this pattern in Communist lands may be attributed by some to rigid, universal orders from Moscow. It seems much more likely that this common treatment of religious organizations stems from a common attitude toward Christianity and the church, plus a common fear of any organization or group which maintains an allegiance above and beyond the State. In many respects a basic ideology is more dangerous, more inflexible, than a common center of command; that is, the fact that religion encounters almost identical treatment from Yugoslavia to China gives less, rather than more, ground for hope of modification anywhere.

> The forces which reached into South Korea on June 25, 1950....were the total forces of a planned society. ....There is a disturbing resemblance between what happened in South Korea in 1950 and what happened earlier in North Korea and in the European satellites....The

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[2] *Ibid.*, March 30-April 5, 1953.
[3] *Ibid.*, April 6-12, 1953, p. 7.

model of the Communist blueprint for Seoul was Pyongyang, Prague, Bucharest, and Moscow.[1]

From the standpoint of this survey, the chief difference between Communist Europe and China was the presence in the latter country of thousands of aliens, about eighteen hundred of them Protestant missionaries. These foreigners had built up over the decades a vast "reservoir of goodwill" which had to be thoroughly depleted before Communism could lay claim to the sole source of life, peace, and unity. Yet earlier experience in China, as well as the dicta of Lenin, warned the leaders in Peking against making martyrs out of missionaries.

These agents from the West had to be discredited, humiliated, and even convicted of crimes against the People's Government. Neither the Common Program, guaranteeing freedom of religion, nor the tolerant syncretism of traditional China would permit them to be attacked on religious grounds. Instead a curtain of suspicion was thrown over all Westerners. Charges of imperialism, war-mongering, and capitalistic exploitation aimed first at Truman, Acheson, Dulles, MacArthur, and Wall Street were gradually scattered more carelessly, until it was implied that every foreigner must be at worst a counter-revolutionary spy, at best an unwitting tool of cultural aggression. Accusations ranged from hiding weapons and radio transmitters to buying Chinese goodwill with charity and welfare services. By 1951 any association with foreigners incriminated Chinese, and even on the strictly religious level the Church was urged to demonstrate its patriotism by eradicating the influence of Western personnel and money. The persecution of Christian missions as such went no further than that.

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[1] Riley and Schramm, *The Reds Take a City*, p. v.

Despite various interpretations and emphases, it seemed obvious to all China missionaries that their own experience reflected to a substantial degree concurrent international events. Chief among these, of course, were the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950; the entry of Chinese "volunteers" into the conflict in October, as United Nations forces moved toward the Yalu River; and in December the American embargo on funds to China, together with a freezing of Chinese assets in this country, which the People's Government promptly retaliated. Each of these movements was accompanied or immediately followed by an intensive propaganda campaign, which tended to include all foreign missionaries in its villification of the United States Government. Although few expressed the conviction explicitly, most China missionaries would agree that these international developments cut short their period of effective service in that country. Several did voice their belief that prompt recognition of the People's Government by the United States and the United

Nations *might* have vitally altered the course of Far Eastern history.

Whether that is true or not, the impact of external events on China's internal policies is all too obvious. Not so obvious are two somewhat divergent corollaries. On one hand, the Korean War may have hastened the expulsion of Christian missionaries, but by no means caused it. Repeatedly throughout this survey, in fact, experiences and opinions have been dated to substantiate the thesis that foreign mission work was "doomed" well before the Korean War accelerated propaganda pressures. In the spring of 1950 a major mission board requested from its representatives on the field, and some Chinese leaders, statements and advice on future policy. This was part of the result, reported in July, but based on letters written weeks before Korea:

> None was optimistic....Practically all faced the hard realities of the present and predicted even more difficult days ahead for the Christian movement in China. Almost all recognized that the present attitude of the government will lead to gradual elimination of missionaries now on the field and that there is little likelihood of any considerable number being permitted to return to China.[1]

At the end of that year a British missionary recorded his belief that

> ....this is not just another of the many revolutions and disturbances which have troubled China... Events in China are a part of the whole world-wide movement of Communism....being determined by the Chinese, but very considerably conditioned by world forces.[2]

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[1] General Board Letters, No. 170, July 10, 1950.

[2] T.R. Wilkinson, "The Church and Mission in Fukien" (printed report, Church Missionary Society, c.January,1951).

This leads to the second corollary; namely, that international conditioning of events in China tends to strengthen the conviction of a universal, largely inevitable pattern. If occurrences in China were due to the whim of local officials--as many people first hoped--or even to trial-and-error policies of a new regime, they would not have been so sensitive to "world forces." The missionaries who frankly anticipated that "China would be different" relied not only on a geographical and historical isolation which no longer exists in the modern world, but also on ideological independence which cannot exist within the Communist framework, as even Yugoslavia proves.

The Chinese Communist Party owed its initial organization and its influence with Sun Yat-sen to Comintern agents. In 1927 and 1928 it split not simply on the rock of Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal, but on the Stalin-Trotsky struggle in Moscow. Its United Front with the Kuomintang in 1937 followed both the Japanese aggression and the Communist International adoption of a world-wide united front. The explanation probably lies somewhere between the extremes of coincidence and command, in something which might be called political parallelism or epiphenomenalism. Whatever its logical and empirical fallacies, Communism is a coherent system whose devotees must--according to the faith that is in them--follow certain uniform patterns. Their adjustment to external events, of their own or others' making, is simply that: adjustment, not abandonment of fundamental principles or programs.

If, then, general policies existed for the treatment of Protestant missions in Communist China, how does one account for sectional variations? Questionnaires and published reports indicate quite definitely that South and West China had greater difficulties and more unpleasant incidents than North and East China. Some explanations have been suggested in Chapter 15. The Church in West China was notoriously weak, but some of the oldest and strongest Christian work was located in South China. Western and certain Southern provinces presented the chief transportation problems for evacuating missionaries--and perhaps for communication with the central government in Peking. The West still harbored deep resentment against the Kuomintang, but also deep gratitude to American troops which had to be expunged. Liu Bo-cheng, the commander assigned to administer the West, had a reputation for toughness.

Probably far more crucial than any of these factors was the importance of North and East China, both for the country as a whole and for world opinion. Whether Peking or Shanghai was a deliberate "showplace" is a moot point; both had anti-foreign demonstrations and even imprisonments. But both sections had a large concentration of foreigners, including journalists and diplomats; both were key areas in economic as well as political administration; both had four to nine months of "Liberation" before the formal establishment of the People's Republic; both had to demonstrate tolerance and order to win bloodless victories elsewhere.

South and West China, "liberated" belatedly,[1] not only had to "catch up" with the national program in early 1950, but had to prove their loyalty to the new regime by excessive zeal. Yet this geographic difference should not be exaggerated. Although more missionaries from these two areas have been and still are in Communist prisons or under house arrest, the rank and file of ordinary foreigners, who waited impatiently for exit permits and finally departed in peace, reported very similar experiences from all five areas.

A few positive correlations can be made between certain categories of people and less pleasant treatment --on the whole. Even proportionately a larger number of Americans suffered public accusation, house arrest, and/or imprisonment than other nationalities. But here again the average, inconspicuous person without any dramatic experience reported almost negligible discrimination among nationalities. The British, who had proffered recognition to Peking, and the Scandinavians who had established diplomatic relations encountered just about as much difficulty with exit permits, house searches, press attacks, etc. and certainly found none of the special favors a few expected.

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[1] Opinions differed; one farmer inquired of a missionary if her country was "liberated" yet, and on receiving a cautious reply, "Not yet," he muttered fervently, "Thank God!"

It was universally agreed that Roman Catholics had a more rigorous ordeal than Protestants in each area, although local exceptions occurred now and then. Reasons given included the anti-Communist stand of the Papacy, land-holdings, involvement in vulnerable orphanages and other institutions, political entanglements under the Kuomintang, and resistance to a domesticated, national Church.

Taking only those Protestants who underwent public trial or imprisonment, there seems to be slight correlation with age, although figures correspond closely to the overall age pattern. A plurality were over fifty, most of them in the early fifties, supporting the thesis that wherever possible the older, experienced, respected mission leader was chosen as a propaganda target, to be discredited and deprived of his popularity and prestige. Occasionally a young person in the early thirties served the same function where he or she was the only missionary in a given town or district or university, or was held in special esteem.

Thus some discrimination appears in geographic locality (West or South China), nationality (American), creed (Roman Catholicism), and age (early fifties or thirties). All that can be said is that a greater number from these groups were marked for "special attention." The correlation or predominance is too slight to be very significant. Absolutely no pattern can be found as to sex, denomination, type of work, theological position, education, background (e.g. previous government service), residence (i.e. city, town, or village), or even general political sympathies. If the victims of Chinese Communist "persecution" were assembled, they would provide a thoroughly diversified cross-section of American Protestant missionaries, with a few other nationalities included.

The Communist program for schools, hospitals, welfare centers, and churches is easier to describe and to fathom than that for individual foreigners. From the very beginning Marxism has insisted that education, health, social welfare, mass communication, and all similar public services belong under state control. The lack of funds and of competent administrative personnel delayed the execution of this program in China, giving unwarranted hope to some who failed to discern the signs of the times.

By the summer of 1952 every mission institution--as far as can be ascertained--was disbanded, merged with other similar institutions, or taken over as a government project. The common pattern for colleges and universities was to unite all the schools in a given area under one general administration and then redivide into academic or vocational departments, assigning campuses (and sometimes Christian faculty) to these new subdivisions. A similar plan has been followed with a number of middle schools. Ten of the twelve or fifteen major theological seminaries in China have united into one central school in Nanking; a few have disappeared, a few more are struggling along semi-independently.

According to very meager reports, the majority of once-Christian hospitals continue to function, most of them as government institutions. Instead of outright merger, a more common practice seems to be specialization, not only on medical lines (tuberculosis, leprosy, etc.) but on political (e.g. military, Party workers and families, Russians). A Welfare Ministry has been established to handle whatever relief services remain, although the Communists claim to substitute productive vocations for charity (but have not yet eliminated beggars). Data is inadequate to indicate what has happened to the orphanages, schools for the blind, homes for the aged, etc. formerly administered by Christian missions.

The program for the churches has been clearly set forth on orthodox Marxist lines. Freedom of religion as guaranteed in the Common Program is limited to worship and belief. Even here there are drastic restrictions, stemming partly from local prejudice and partly from government insistence that most thought borders on the political and is therefore subject to censorship. Sermons have become patriotic diatribes against imperialistic abuse of Christianity. Private devotions are discouraged for anyone whose employment depends on government favor. Increasingly young people are deprived of any access to religion whatever.

For the organized churches and their united agencies the pattern is even more explicit. The Preparatory Committee of the Chinese Christian, Oppose-America-Aid-Korea Three-Self Reform Movement is headed by a Y.M.C.A. secretary, who had been appointed one of five to represent Christianity in the People's Political Consultative Conference and later almost single-handedly imposed the Manifesto on the churches. In order to receive a charter from the Preparatory Committee each local church or city council must eradicate all foreign influence or dependence on foreign support and hold a "successful" accusation meeting, as well as pledge its members to the semi-political patriotic program. This is the instrument of the reformed or domesticated church in China.

In contrast to Roman Catholic resistance, it seems to many that Protestantism in China has capitulated to government control. Let it be reiterated, however, that the fate of foreign missions, or even of the organized church in China, is not necessarily the fate of Christianity. A few able students of the missionary enterprise have analyzed recent events in theological or historical terms.[1] Their conclusions go deeper and farther than this sociological survey, but neither empirical facts nor fundamental evaluations are in dispute.

Nor is this the place to debate the practical issues raised in these volumes and in several thoughtful papers.[1] They have sharply pinpointed significant weaknesses, both in the missionary movement and in its offspring, the Christian Church in China. But as one reviewer commented: "The basic presupposition that the fact that missionaries have been driven out of China and much of their work discontinued is a proof that they have failed is a questionable one"[2]

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[1] Cf. Paton, Christian Missions and the Judgment of God, and Outerbridge, The Lost Churches of China.

Because some of those charges against missions are directly related to the Communist critique of Christianity, however, they should be mentioned in passing. First, imperialism. All missionaries deplore the abuse of unequal treaties, of political and social pressures, to advance the Kingdom of God, although self-condemnation on this score often disregards the realities of history and power politics and changing conditions. As Paton put it, "Many ancient goods have become very sadly uncouth today."[3] But in three years Communist propaganda has shifted from denouncing capitalist governments to accusing all aliens of being spies and saboteurs, if for no other reason than that altruistic motives are suspect. As a result, even the staunchest missionary sympathizers of the new regime have considered it wiser--for the Chinese Church or themselves--to withdraw, and only a handful of Westerners voluntarily remain, from purely social rather than religious motivation.

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[1] A China Missionary, "First Thoughts on the Debacle of Christian Missions in China," International Review of Missions, October, 1951; Charles C. West, "The Lessons of a Failure," and Victor Hayward, "The End of a Missionary Era in China," preparatory papers for the Willingen Conference of the International Missionary Council, July, 1952.

[2] China Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 17, December 1, 1952.

[3] Paton, op. cit., p. 34.

~~[4] E.g. Baillie School Cooperative staff at Sandan.~~

Second, cultural aggression. Most missionaries admit a tragic overemphasis on Western programs and methods and interpretations. It is humanly impossible to divorce oneself entirely from these cultural accoutrements; some of the individuals most bitterly attacked in recent years have been second-generation missionaries, for whom China was "home" in everything but blood and citizenship. One can agree that

> .... the issue in China and other mission lands today is not between old cultures and western influences. The issue is rather the search for answers to problems of human need--for peace, livelihood, meaning and direction in life. The Christian Mission is challenged in these situations, not to be more culturally adaptive, but to be more prophetic, more creative, free alike from the stereotypes of the East and the West.[1]

Yet it is precisely this creative, prophetic freedom which is impossible under Communist ideology or a totalitarian state.

Third, living standards. Communists were often impressed by simplicity and economy wherever they were found among foreign residents, although avarice for Western homes began the "moral" decline for many officers and cadres. Over and over, missinnaries of the post-war generation have begged their home boards to provide them with smaller, simpler, Chinese-style houses (frequently more expensive to build). But the chasm between minimum health standards for Westerners and the economic level of surrounding peoples is practically unbridgeable.[1] Only two or three questionnaires, dealing with very minor aspects of life, gave any hint that Communist treatment of missionaries could be correlated with living standards.

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[1] West, op. cit.

Fourth, institutions. West was correct in saying:

> In China practically every erstwhile Christian school has been lost to the Government. God has taken these instruments away from us, and rightly so. We had become attached to our institutions. They had become ends in themselves.[2]

He was correct in challenging educational institutions in other lands to reexamine their curricula, their aims, their motives, their community outreach, their approach to world problems, their Christian essence. Yet in Russia or the satellites or China or anywhere else, Communists would never stop short of complete domination over educational--and medical and social--institutions, however progressive and creative they were. And the need for private, independent, Church-related schools and colleges remains a crucial issue in the United States; how much more so in underprivileged mission fields abroad.

Fifth, self-support. Within the context of genuine religious freedom or a democratic society in the broadest sense, no one would dispute the right of nationals in the so-called Younger Churches to administer funds with a minimum of interference, coupled with the Christian duty of churches, in the West to share from their abundance with "no strings attached." But there is a point beyond which indiscriminate support becomes a betrayal of stewardship.[1] As early as June 14, 1950, a denominational executive committee, predominantly Chinese, issued this statement:

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[1] Cf. Paton, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-46.
[2] West, *op. cit.*, cf. Paton, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-41.

> When our institutions can no longer be purposefully Christian, we do not see how we can continue....The Church attaches more importance to their Christian integrity than to the preservation of property or even the continuing maintenance of an institution under the name of the Church when the institution has ceased to be Christian in either its spirit, its action, or its administration.[2]

Yet the implicit demand of "progressive" students as well as government officials was that mission support should be unconditional, although frankly welcomed up until 1951.

Sixth, ecumenical ties. To a very large extent the Protestant movement in China has encouraged efforts toward an indigenous, national church. The National Christian Council, the Church of Christ in China, the increase in interdenominational activities, the devolution of administrative control--all these furthered the trend toward independence. Whether this policy was basically sound is debatable. At least one denomination declined to join the Church of Christ in China on the ground that it would thereby weaken its ties with the world-wide organization of which it was then a part. In a larger sense, Protestantism, like Roman Catholicism, is a world Church and loses something of its essential character when national divisions are overemphasized. Obviously it has been more vulnerable to political control in China than has Catholicism, precisely because it has nothing comparable to the Papacy to maintain unity and ecumenicity. Insofar as one regards the ecumenical movement as an integral element of Christianity, it becomes _ipso facto_ a further point of incompatability with Communism.

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[1] Cf. Fujen University case, Chapter 14 above.
[2] General Board Letter, No. 170, summer, 1950.

Seventh, a theology of missions. A great deal has been written and spoken in recent years of a theology of missions. Sometimes this refers to a reinterpretation of missionary motivation and policy, a reexamination of the meaning and purpose of a world Gospel. Sometimes it refers to the need for indigenous thought patterns, more closely relating a universal Christ to diverse cultures. Either of these definitions must ultimately confront dogmatic Communist ideology at certain points of irreconcilable opposition. In the last analysis Marxism is a totalitarian philosophy as well as a political system; it leaves no room for divergent thought at any level of life. To take but one common example from China, belief in Divine creation is condemned not merely as superstition, but as reactionary, unpatriotic rejection of a basic Marxist tenet. In short, true Communism can tolerate no theology whatever, for the word "theology" itself implies a power beyond and above the State.

These paragraphs have said nothing directly about many weaknesses and failings of the Christian Church, both East and West. Among these are attitudes of racial superiority, denominational divisions, the "vicious circle" of a poor church unable to support adquately trained clergy yet unable to grow without that leadership, modern materialism and secularism, the threat to Christian fellowship inherent in a propaganda environment of hatred and deliberate recrimination. All of these are related to the foreign missionary enterprise as such, but not exclusively so. They are problems which must be wrestled with painfully and prayerfully in other parts of the world. Yet there is no evidence that eliminating any one or group of them would materially have altered the Communist impact on the Protestant Church in China.

What, then, does this mean? If developments in China, which brought the missionary era there to an end, are part and parcel of a universal movement; if Communist strategy creates its own points of attack, demanding from its victim fatal compromises; if Christianity at any point is fundamentally incompatible with Communist totalitarianism--then only one final pessmistic conclusion remains. The Christian missionary enterprise cannot exist for any length of time within a Communist state.

That does not mean the end of Christianity, the Gospel in thousands of individual lives. It may not mean the end of churches, services of worship and fellowship. Even here, the pastor and his congregation tread a narrow path, for "otherworldly" sermons may be as readily condemned for superstition as social viewpoints may be for subversion. Already, as indicated, a vast number of sermons have become mere political discourses, offering scriptural foundation for official policies--or official interpretation of scriptural passages. It does mean that the organized church must become subservient to the state if it is to survive. The Church will become "domesticated"--or underground. As Father Tennien put it: "The systematic suppression of religion in China, as in every Communist country, follows the same routine. Break the power of the Church, a Church submissive to the Government, and a dead Church are the steps."[1]

Matters of definition are clearly involved. As there are churches in Russia today, there may be churches in China thirty years hence, although the religious foundation is far less deeply rooted. But to Western minds the Church is more than a meeting for worship. Christianity has an explanation and an application for all of life which cannot conscientiously be suppressed. American Christians may be criticized for excessive activism, but they remain convinced that "faith without works is dead." More than that, faith which must remain silent in the presence of injustice, hatred, dishonesty, blasphemy, and atheism is worse than dead.

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[1] Tennien, No Secret is Safe, p. 226.

The incompatability of Christianity and Communism, therefore, goes beyond the mere presence of "subversive aliens" in the missionary movement. Despite its vagueness, its divisions, its democracy, Protestantism in the last analysis is, like Roman Catholicism, totalitarian. It clings with remarkable tenacity to certain dogmas of sacredness: love, truth, the individual, the supremacy of God. Each of these is diametrically and admittedly opposed, rejected, or distorted by Communism. To them should be added an insistence on social and international outreach, fields in which a Communist state can tolerate no rival.

At the Ecumenical Institute in December, 1950, Emil Brunner, perhaps the world's foremost authority on Christian social ethics, warned: "The Church must not be deceived by the clever tactics of the Communists, who start by reforming the land and tolerating the Church, and end by establishing a totalitarian state and eradicating Christianity altogether."[1] The experience of Protestant missions in Communist China was a unique experiment; it taught many lessons, confirmed many fears, shattered many illusions. What Mao Tse-tung said about imperialism and socialism his regime has now said in both theory and practice about Communism and foreign missions, or even about Communism and Christianity: "There can be no question of remaining between them; there is no third path. Not only in China, but also in the world, without exception, one either leans to one side or the other."[1]

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[1] Quoted by Whitener, "The Growth of Church Self-Government in North Hunan as Influenced by the Communist Movement," p. 33.

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[1] Mao, On People's Democratic Rule, pp. 5-6; cf. Bodde, Peking Diary, pp. 209-212.

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(The following bibliography is subdivided under five headings: *Communism*, *China*, *Communism in China*, *Communism and Christianity*, *Communism and Christianity in China*, with books, pamphlets, and articles separated under each. Despite overlapping, these materials are arranged not only by their principal content, but also by their most direct contribution to this study; e.g. only general books on Communism which shed some light on religious policy are included in the first category; only China books which touch at least briefly on Communism are included in the second group.

In general, the University of Chicago form has been used for footnotes. Author, title, publisher, and date are included in the first reference, only author and title for the first reference in subsequent chapters. *Op. cit.* has been used wherever the title has already appeared in that particular chapter, except where more than one work by the same author is mentioned. *Ibid.* has been used wherever any portion of the reference is identical to that immediately preceding. All published works cited in footnotes, except news items, are to be found in this bibliography.)

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